IN THE LAST CHAPTER, EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST were taken to the end of 1942 and we must now return to the beginning of the year to follow the submarine campaign in Home Waters over the first ten months of the same period. On 1st January 1942, there were ten operational submarines in Home Waters. Trident, Tigris, Tuna, Sealion, Seawolf and Sturgeon of the Third Submarine Flotilla (Captain HMC Ionides RN) were based in the Holy Loch, and P37, Minerve, Rubis and O14 of the Ninth Submarine Flotilla (Captain HV King OBE RN)¹ were based at Dundee. Minerve was in dockyard hands after breaking down in November and Sturgeon was in North Russia, reducing the strength available to eight. In emergency, however, the ten elderly training submarines could be called upon, and Severn and Clyde of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla (Captain GAW Voelcker RN) at Gibraltar were also available for use in the Atlantic. Submarines working up for the Mediterranean and others returning to refit or on their way out, could also be used if the situation demanded it. There was plenty of work to be done on the Home Station. A watch had to be kept on the German heavy units, there were U-boats to be intercepted on their way to and from the Atlantic, as well as blockade-runners and armed merchant raiders. The enemy coastal trade with its valuable cargoes of iron ore from Norway and Spain had also to be interfered with as opportunity offered.

Submarine operations in Home waters early in 1942 were, however, to become almost entirely concerned with the German main units. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were still in Brest and had been further damaged by Bomber Command, two of the three being in dock. Intelligence of the state of the ships in Brest was good. Although there was not much signal intelligence because of the use of landlines, photo-reconnaissance flights were made whenever the weather permitted and Ml6 had agents in the port. Nevertheless intelligence gave no indication of the enemy's intentions. Tirpitz, the brand new sister of Bismarck, was working up in the Baltic. Scheer and Hipper were also in the Baltic and ready for sea but Lutzow was still under repair. Two of our submarines operated in the Bay of Biscay in January, but as some of the enemy units in Brest were known to be in dock, they were temporarily employed on other business. Rubis (Lieutenant de Vaisseau H Rousselot DSC*) had been sent from Dundee on 3rd January north about to lay 32 mines off St Jean de Luz to interfere with the German iron ore traffic from Spain, which, due to shallow water, had been found difficult to attack with torpedoes. She sighted a U-boat in the middle of the day on 15th but was unable to get into an attacking position. Nevertheless she successfully laid her mines next day. Tuna (Lieutenant MBSt John RN) in the middle of the month was busy trying to transfer petrol and stores to a French fishing vessel off Penmarch for the resistance before patrolling for a few days off Belleisle. Clyde (Commander DC Ingram DSC RN) from Gibraltar was sent to the Azores on an anti U-boat patrol for a month in January and February but without result.

On the coast of Norway, Tigris, Tuna and O14 were acting or had been acting as navigational beacons in Commando and Destroyer raids. Tuna had taken part in the Vaagso raid at the end of December, and was now back in harbour. Tigris (Commander HF Bone DSO* DSC RN) took part in the Vestfjord raid, and was still on patrol off Utvaer and O14 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl G Quint) took part in the destroyer raid on Floro on 3rd/4th January. Seawolf (Lieutenant RP Raikes RN) was returning from North Russia and Sturgeon (Lieutenant MRG Wingfield RN) was on her way there as her relief. Between 7th and 19th January, however, all these boats were back in harbour or had arrived at their destinations except Seawolf who was far to the north. There were then no submarines on patrol on the Norwegian coast at all. In this interval Tirpitz moved from the Baltic to Trondheim. There is no indication that the Germans knew about our submarine dispositions, but the operation was planned taking great care to use weather, which was bad for air reconnaissance. Tirpitz came through the Kiel Canal to the Elbe before sailing northwards to avoid being seen passing through the Baltic passages. She made the passage at high speed escorted by four destroyers, leaving Danzig on 11th and arriving at Trondheim on 16th. Next day British intelligence got its first indication of the move and O14 was sailed from Scapa to patrol in Fro Havet: Trident had her orders to sail to North Russia cancelled and Seawolf in the Vestfjord area was ordered to join O14 north of Trondheim. On 20th January intelligence reported Tirpitz in Trondheim, and on 23rd air reconnaissance definitely located her there. It was not known at the time what the intentions of Tirpitz were, but she clearly posed a threat to our convoys to North Russia and, of course, might break out into the Atlantic to raid shipping. Steps were therefore taken to keep the two patrol positions in Fro Havet north of Trondheim filled, and Trident (Commander GM Sladen DSC RN) to relieve Seawolf and Tigris (now Lieutenant LW Napier RN) to relieve O14. At the same time, to provide enough boats for this duty, A(S) asked to be relieved of the responsibility of providing submarines for North Russia altogether. Although attack on the German Army's communications to North Norway was still important in order to prevent an advance on Murmansk, it was now considered that the Russian submarines were capable of carrying out this duty by themselves. A(S)'s request was therefore approved, and Sturgeon was sailed south again towards the end of the month.

P37 (Lieutenant H Winter RN) left Lerwick on 10th February to meet C-in-C's wishes, and she and Tuna (Lieutenant MB St John RN) were ordered to patrol eighteen miles off the coast between Stattlandet and Gripholen. On 10th February, Minerve (Lieutenant de Vaisseau P Sonneville) and Trident (Commander GM Sladen DSC RN) left Lerwick to patrol to the southward of P37 and Tuna. Submarines on the Norwegian coast at this time of year had some difficulty in maintaining their positions in the bad weather prevailing. On 13th February, Tuna when submerged grounded in Fro Havet and had to surface when she found herself almost surrounded by rocks. On 16th, P37 hit the bottom at 60 feet off Grip and on 18th, Tuna and P37 met at night when they should have been many miles apart. A(S) had informed the submarines on patrol that enemy aircraft had increased their vigilance and warned against surfacing to take astronomical fixes in daylight. Fog, snow squalls and gales, which were frequently met, did not make matters easy.

On 12th February, signal intelligence indicated that Scheer and Prinz Eugen were about to move to Norway. On 17th, other intelligence stated that Tirpitz was ready for sea. On 19th the Admiralty told Coastal Command that fleet reconnaissance in the North Sea must take precedence over trade protection, and that they expected enemy units to attack the North Russian convoys before long. P37, who was due to leave patrol on 19th was told to remain in position in Fro Havet, off the northern entrance to Trondheim, Tuna was off Grip Helen at the southern entrance, and Minerve was sixteen miles off the coast at Stattlandet and Trident fifteen miles north east of the same headland. A(S), after further thought, believed that the available intelligence showed that a movement from Germany was more likely than a breakout from Trondheim. He therefore moved P37 to patrol between Griptarene and Smolen and Tuna to a position five miles south of the Griptarene buoy. He was right and at 1115 on 21st February the RAF sighted an enemy force consisting of a pocket battleship, a cruiser and three destroyers west of Jutland and steaming north at 25 knots. It was calculated that they would reach a position between Stattlandet and Gripholen at dawn, and would pass Trident and Minerve in the dark. These two submarines were therefore moved north, Minerve to the north of P37 and Trident to the west of Tuna. The German squadron realised from wireless intercepts that they had been sighted and turned south again returning to their northerly course after dark. At daylight they were off Skudenes and entered the leads at Haugesund. They arrived at Bergen at midday and here the RAF again spotted them. The German Admiral in Prinz Eugen then decided to press on and the ships left the leads again at 2200. They passed through Minerve's original position and set course for Gripholen at 24 knots. Here an ambush of four submarines, which had been told on no account to compromise their positions, awaited them. At 0551 while it was still dark, the enemy ships were sighted by Trident, who made a surface attack intending to fire seven torpedoes. She allowed for a speed of 15 knots whereas the enemy were steaming at 20 knots. Trident was forced to dive by the escort while firing her salvo and due to a drill failure only three torpedoes were got away at a range of 1500 yards. The first torpedo hit Prinz Eugen aft putting her steering gear out of action and virtually blowing off her stern. Nine men were killed and twenty-five wounded. The ship stopped but was later got under way at three knots steering on her main engines. She was sighted by Tuna after daylight but was out of range. Scheer pressed on at high speed and was soon safe in the leads but Prinz Eugen did not get in until nightfall. The Germans thought that Prinz Eugen had struck a mine and so Trident was not counter attacked by the escort. She was able to surface and make an enemy report less than an hour after the attack. The other two submarines in the area, P37 and Minerve, saw nothing.

After the departure of the British submarines from North Russia, the submarines of the Russian Northern Fleet continued their operations against the communications of the German Army in North Norway. They patrolled from the Varanger Fjord to Soroy Sound, and there were generally five or six of them at sea at a time. In January and February they made fifteen torpedo attacks and sank three ships totalling 6026 tons as well as a fishing boat and a small patrol vessel. They laid two mine-fields sinking one small vessel of 327 tons and K22 and K23 attacked the ports of Svaerholhavet and Berlevang sinking another two small vessels totalling 612 tons. One boat, the small M175 was sunk by U584 and three boats had narrow escapes. Shch402 was counter attacked with 190 depth charges, Shch403 was rammed and her Captain was taken prisoner of war, but she dived and escaped. Shch402 was badly damaged by depth charges and was escorted in by K21.

The convoys to North Russia with important war materials had begun in the autumn of 1941. In the early stages they were small. They had few casualties during 1941 but early in 1942 began to suffer losses at the Russian end of the route. In March the twelfth convoy sailed from Iceland and was synchronised with a return convoy, which left the Kola Inlet at the same time. These convoys were now in peril from the German heavy ships recently moved up to Trondheim, and practically all British submarine patrols in Home waters were placed so as to protect them while on passage during the Spring and Summer of 1942. The Home Fleet itself also put to sea in support of them.

The new strategic situation caused by the arrival of Tirpitz and the other heavy units in Norway coupled with the withdrawal of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from Brest, was seen somewhat differently by the British and German high commands. The change was on German initiative and the main purpose of the redisposition was to defend Norway. Hitler believed that the Russians were likely to launch an offensive overland against North Norway and at the same time, British Commando raids on the coast led him to fear landings and an invasion of Norway from the sea. The German naval staff was keen to renew the attack on shipping in the Atlantic with heavy units, but Hitler was so demoralised by the sinking of Bismarck and the consequent loss of prestige, that he did not favour such a move. All the naval staff could get Hitler to accept was that the fleet could be used, under favourable circumstances, to attack the North Russian convoys. The British had seen the flight of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau up Channel almost as a strategic victory, although they were annoyed with themselves that they had not destroyed them on the way. The British saw the move of Tirpitz and other heavy ships to Norway as a threat to Atlantic shipping and a serious threat to the convoys to North Russia. The building up of the German squadron, especially if Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were repaired and came north, was also a threat to our overall command of the sea that could only be countered by a strong Home Fleet. The ships that had had to be retained in the Home Fleet were badly needed in the Far East to restore the situation in the Indian Ocean where we had virtually lost command of the sea. If Tirpitz could be destroyed, not only would the dangers of a breakout into the Atlantic and to our North Russian convoys be removed, but also the situation could be restored in the Far East.

Attention was therefore directed towards two special weapons which came under the A(S) which were under development and which could be used against the Tirpitz and the other heavy German ships. The first of these was a British designed copy of the Italian human torpedo, which had been used with such effect in Alexandria the previous December. Already in January 1942, the Prime Minister was asking what we were doing about the development of a similar weapon. We had, in fact, already salved one of the Italian machines after an attack on Gibraltar and it proved comparatively simple to design and produce a British copy. The second weapon was a midget submarine known for security reasons as an X-craft. The Japanese had used midget submarines at Pearl Harbour and something on the lines of the X-craft had been in the minds of various submarine officers, including Admiral Horton himself, for many years. But the type now under development was the brainchild of a retired First World War submarine officer, Lieutenant Commander CH Varley DSC RN who owned a yacht-building yard on the Hamble. It was essentially a three man midget submarine of some thirty tons, from which a diver could emerge and attach explosive charges to the bottom of a ship in harbour. One X-craft, X3, had in fact, with mild Admiralty encouragement, been under construction at Hamble for some time. A(S) visited Hamble in February, and on 15th March X3 was launched and a naval crew appointed. A second slightly larger and improved X-craft, X4, was at once laid down. The human torpedoes or 'Chariots' as they were code named, were simply electric torpedoes driven by two operators sitting astride of them and using diving apparatus similar to the Davis Escape gear. They too would attach the chariot's warhead to the bottom of a ship, and would then escape on the chariot itself. They were not suicide weapons and the crews had a reasonable chance of escaping capture. Both devices now, with the need to get rid of Tirpitz, were given a high priority and active submarine officers and men were appointed to help develop them and to devise methods of using them.

WE MUST NOW RETURN to the coast of Norway when convoys PQ13 and QP9 left Iceland and Murmansk on 20th March. The Russians sent out K21, K22, Shch404 and Shch421 to cover the convoys' southern flank. The convoys were also covered by the Fro Havet patrol of Tuna (Lieutenant MB St John RN) and O14 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl O Quint). The new submarine P43 (Lieutenant AC Halliday RN) was also at sea carrying out a working up and anti U-boat patrol 130 miles north east of the Shetlands. All these patrols were hampered by heavy weather and were uneventful. After the convoys had passed, the Russian submarines closed the coast and Shch404 sank a ship of 2310 tons off Tanafjord. Five other torpedo attacks were made but all missed. Shch421 hit a mine and was disabled. Her crew were rescued by K22 who completed her destruction. K1 laid a minefield and two German minesweepers struck mines off Petsamo. On 30th March, P37 (Lieutenant H Winter RN) relieved Tuna in Fro Havet but, although the convoys had arrived safely, she was restricted for the whole of her patrol by orders only to attack enemy cruisers and above. Thirty-one merchant ships, including two tankers, totalling some 80,000 tons passed her and she was not allowed to fire at them. A(S) justified this policy because an attack on a merchant vessel could well mean that the submarine would be counter-attacked and driven from the coast, and an enemy main unit could then pass unseen and unmolested. In any case the position of the submarine would be compromised, or she might expend her torpedoes on a merchant ship then meet a large warship before her torpedo tubes could be reloaded.

The German heavy ships were, however, short of fuel and unwilling to face the aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm at sea, and Hitler wanted them to be kept for the defence of Norway. They in fact made no sorties until PQ17 sailed in July. Nevertheless Trident (now Lieutenant AR Hezlet DSC RN) and Seawolf (Lieutenant RP Raikes RN) took over the Fro Havet patrol for the passage of PQ14 and QP10 in April. The Russians also sent out their usual flank guard, which included K2, K21, S101 and Shch401. The British patrols were uneventful except that Seawolf sighted a large U-boat making a rendezvous with its escort but too far off to attack, and Trident saw 100,000 tons of unescorted shipping pass without being allowed to attack it. However A(S) did not intend to occupy the Fro Havet positions again during the summer due to the shortening of the nights and so on 17th April raised the ban on attacking merchant ships. Next day Trident fired two torpedoes at a range of 1000 yards at a southbound ship off Villa but without success. The torpedoes exploded on the shore warning an approaching northbound convoy, which turned back into the leads⁶. Next day another northbound convoy turned into Folden Fjord and could not be attacked. Trident was then ordered to return to base but decided to stay in the area an extra day and was rewarded by sinking Hoedur of 5368 tons firing three torpedoes⁷ at a range of 1700 yards and hitting with one of them. She then left patrol at full speed to try and catch up her bombing restriction area, which was by now half way across the North Sea⁸. After the passage of the convoy the Russian submarines closed the coast as usual. Shch401 attacked a convoy off Tanafjord but missed and K2 laid a minefield. Shch401 then sank a ship of 1359 tons but was destroyed in a counter attack by UJ1101 and UJ1110. Between 12th April and 28th May, the Third Russian Submarine Division consisting of the small M-class, attacked shipping on either side of the Varanger Peninsula. They made seventeen attacks altogether and sank two ships of 8232 tons and M172 was heavily counter attacked but survived.

PQ16 was the largest and most important convoy yet to sail for North Russia and consisted of thirty-five ships. It was to be given a strong close escort including a cruiser squadron. The Home Fleet was to give distant cover. In addition two submarines, Trident (Lieutenant AR Hezlet DSC RN) and Seawolf (Lieutenant RP Raikes RN), were to escort it and stay with it all the way to Russia. Distant cover was to be given by five submarines, P614, O14, P46, P37 and Minerve¹¹, which were to occupy some of the new areas and move to keep between the convoy and the enemy naval bases. The cruisers and the Home Fleet were to break off before the convoy passed north of Norway, and it was in this area that it was in greatest danger from surface as well as air and U-boat attack. Three Soviet submarines were also on patrol in this area and extended the flank guard to the eastwards. Aircraft from Bardufoss and Banak in North Norway heavily attacked the convoy. It was attacked by U-boats too, losing seven ships altogether but the enemy surface ships in Narvik and Trondheim remained in harbour. There was considerable debate about the position to be taken up by the escorting submarines. In the end they were stationed astern of the convoy with a corvette as escort. At first they dived during air attacks, but it took so long to catch up afterwards that Trident decided to remain on the surface with the convoy and she used her machine guns and also her four-inch gun to engage enemy aircraft. Trident also had to torpedo the damaged Alamar on 27th May after taking off some of her crew. She also tried unsuccessfully to fight a fire in EmpirePorcel. In general the position astern of the convoy proved satisfactory, keeping the submarines clear of the anti-submarine activities of the escort, but being screened by them from U-boat attack. The submarines in the covering positions saw nothing except a few reconnaissance aircraft. They had difficulty with navigation and P46 (Lieutenant JS Stevens RN) and Uredd (Loytnant RQ Roren) met each other when they should have been ninety miles apart. There was some debate on whether the submarines should patrol on the surface or submerged. Opinion differed and P614 (Lieutenant DJ Beckley RN), O14 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl G Quint) and P37 (Lieutenant H Winter RN) favoured a surface patrol, while P46 kept a diving patrol for most of the time. Uredd kept a diving patrol too, but surfaced frequently to take sunsights. A(S) decided that the decision on whether to patrol on the surface or submerged must be made by individual Commanding Officers according to the conditions at the time. In general, however, he favoured a submerged patrol with frequent astronomical observations, and felt that the advantage of the extra visibility, which would be obtained on the surface, was outweighed by the increased risk of air and U-boat attack. The constant daylight inhibited coastal operations by the Soviet submarines during this period. Only two successful attacks were made and S101 was lucky to escape after a counterattack. Both Shch403 and Shch404 were damaged by air attack in harbour, but a reinforcement of M121 arrived from the Caspian using the inland waterways was outweighed by the increased risk of air and U-boat attack.

On 27th May Rubis�(Lieutenant de Vaisseau H Rousselot DSC) was transferred from Dundee to Fort Blockhouse in Gosport, to operate in the Bay of Biscay during the summer months against the iron ore traffic from Spain. She laid three minefields of 32 mines each, the first off Cape Breton on 5th June and the other two near Arcachon on 7th July and 14th August. She broke down on the third trip but her mines sank the patrol boat VP406 and damaged U600. She then returned north to Dundee.

The next North Russian convoy had to be postponed until the end of June as many ships of the Home Fleet, required as escorts or for covering forces, had to take part in a convoy to Malta. PQ17 was another large convoy of thirty-six ships and was to be synchronised with QP13 returning with thirty-five ships. The arrangements for the protection of these convoys by surface ships were roughly the same as for its predecessor PQ16. That is: a strong close escort of destroyers and corvettes would be provided with a cruiser squadron in support and with the Home Fleet giving distant cover. It was realised, however, that the German main units were most likely to attack in the Barents Sea north of Norway, where they had the support of the Luftwaffe, rather than in the Norwegian Sea, north west of Norway, where they would be liable to attack by British carrier borne aircraft. Nevertheless it was considered foolhardy for the Home Fleet itself or even the supporting cruisers to venture into the Barents Sea close to the Luftwaffe's air bases at Banak, Bardufoss and Kirkesnes. Cover for the convoy against surface ship attack in the Barents Sea would therefore have to be left to the submarines. To meet this important task, A(S) scraped together a force of eleven boats. This was possible, partly by a slight increase in strength of the Home Flotillas and partly by reorganising patrols so that the maximum number of submarines were available during the passage of the convoys. Periods of replenishment, repairs and rest in harbour were to be between convoys. It was also done by taking submarines that had just been completed, or had just finished refits before sailing for the Mediterranean. PQ17 was to be escorted all the way from Iceland to Russia by the submarines P614 and P615. QP13 was to be escorted by Trident, who had been in North Russia since the arrival of PQ16, but only as far as Bear Island when she would break off and join the covering force. Fears that surface ships would attack the convoy were increased when signal intelligence revealed that Admiral Raeder had visited Norway. New areas were drawn north of Norway between the convoy's route and the northern exits from the leads by which the enemy was expected to sortie. There were two sets of areas; in the southern, P212, Sturgeon, Minerve, P45 and P54 were to patrol, and in the northern Ursula, Tribune, Seawolf and Trident would be stationed. There were also four Russian submarines out, and the areas they occupied can be seen on the map. Restrictions were imposed on attacks on U-boats in the area. A(S) issued instructions that it was important for submarines to keep their positions accurately, and that enemy reports were of the greatest importance and should be passed by asdic to adjacent submarines as well as to the shore by wireless. The covering force submarines, except Trident and Seawolf who were in Polyarnoe, left their bases in the United Kingdom on 24th and 25th June to be in position by 30th. The convoys with their submarine escorts left Iceland and North Russia on 27th June. On her way to take up her position on 26th June, P45 (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) made contact with a submerged U-boat in a latitude just north of Trondheim, and fired a single torpedo by asdic but without result. The Russians also sent out D3, K2, K21, K22, Shch402, Shch403 and M176 to take up positions between the Norwegian coast and the convoys.

In his remarks on the operation, A(S) drew attention to the low mobility of submarines on patrol if they were to remain unseen, and stated that in conditions of constant daylight with strong air opposition, they were seldom able to average more than five knots. Much has been written on the Admiralty's order to scatter the convoy. It is only necessary to comment here that their order not only led to the destruction of the convoy, but also removed any chance our submarines had of destroying Tirpitz. If the convoy had not been ordered to scatter, Tirpitz would have had to risk passing twice through the second patrol line of submarines as well as face the danger from the two submarine escorts. Any idea of running another convoy to Russia during July was abandoned and P614 and P615, which had gone on to Polyarnoe to escort the next QP convoy home, were withdrawn to the United Kingdom.

PROGRESS ON HUMAN TORPEDOES and X-craft continued during the summer. The chariots were developing well ahead of the X-craft and selection of personnel and training had begun under the command of Commander GM Sladen DSO DSC RN. Early training of the volunteers was carried out at Fort Blockhouse in the Davis Escape training tank, and subsequently in the lake at Horsea Island using at first a towed wooden dummy chariot. Twenty production chariots were ordered from Messrs Stothert and Pitt of Bath. A plan began to evolve with the Special Operations executive to take two chariots to Norway in a fishing boat to attack Tirpitz during the autumn. Progress with X-craft was slower. X3, the first one, was nearly completed and the second one, X4, was under construction at Hamble. Admiral Horton decided that matters must be speeded up to try to mount an operation in the spring of 1943. The first two craft were to be used for training, and six new craft for operations were to be built at Barrow to the designs of Vickers Armstrong, and were to have a new armament. Instead of warheads of torpedo size being fixed to the bottom of an enemy ship by divers, massive side charges, two to each craft, with 4000 lbs of high explosive each, were to be dropped on the bottom underneath Tirpitz and were to be detonated by time fuse. The diving lock and divers were to be retained for net cutting. It was intended to set up a training organisation in the autumn under the command of Commander ACC Miers VC DSO RN. To oversee all these matters at the headquarters of A(S), Captain The Lord Ashbourne was appointed as an additional Chief Staff Officer.

ON 1ST AUGUST, two important pieces of signal intelligence were received. The first was of two outward-bound U-boats that were expected to pass through an area fifty to a hundred miles north northwest of the Shetlands. P247 (Lieutenant MGR Lumby RN) had left Lerwick on 29th July for her working up patrol in a position just to the westwards, and on being informed, was able to take up an intercepting position. On the evening of 3rd August she sighted a U-boat surfacing and three minutes later fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 2500 yards. She hit with one of them and sank U335, who was on her way to operate in the Atlantic and the Germans never knew what had happened to her. The other piece of signal intelligence was that one of the large German ships now at Trondheim would shortly leave to return to Germany. The nights were now just long enough for submarines to operate off the south-western coast of Norway, and Sturgeon (Lieutenant MRG Wingfield RN) and P54 (Lieutenant CE Oxborrow RN) were at once sailed for intercepting positions between Skudenes and Lindesnes, where the enemy would have to come out into the open sea. The two submarines left Lerwick on 4th with permission to attack shipping when north of Utsire provided they kept a full salvo for the heavy ship. South of Utsire, which they passed on 7th, they were only allowed to attack cruisers and above. Lutzow was sighted by the RAF in Trondheim on 9th and A(S) informed the two submarines that she was likely to pass through their area on the night of 10th/ 11th, and that he expected her to be routed between four and eight miles off shore between Feisten and Lister. P54 therefore took up a position eight miles west of Egeroy, and Sturgeon between Egeroy and Lister five miles off shore. Lutzow did exactly what was expected of her and sailed from Trondheim with a destroyer escort after dark on 9th August. She kept to the leads as far as possible and at 2200 10th August came out into the open sea at Skudenes and increased speed to 24 knots. It was a very dark night with poor or at best moderate visibility, and Lutzow had to use her radar for navigation. She slipped by both submarines probably inshore of them and all they saw was Egeroy Light which had been put on to help Lutzow. She passed the Skaw next morning, and by 12th A(S) realised that she must have passed. He therefore released both submarines to attack merchant shipping before returning to base. They had to leave patrol on 13th to prepare for operations in support of the next Russian convoy. Both submarines at once seized their opportunity. P54 let a 1200-ton ship go by hoping for something bigger, and later was rewarded by sighting a three-ship convoy escorted by a trawler off Obrestadt. She fired four torpedoes at a range of 2500 yards hitting and sinking George Lm Russ of 2080 tons. The trawler escort then hunted P54 for two hours, but only four depth charges were dropped. Thirty miles to the south, Sturgeon had already sunk Bolten Hagen of 3335 tons with three torpedoes fired at 1600 yards. She was also counter attacked by the trawler escort, but the five charges dropped did no damage.

Minerve (Lieutenant de Vaisseau P Sonneville) left Lerwick on 16th August to land two Norwegian naval officers with stores for the resistance on the island of Televig. This was done, but Minerve was damaged when bottoming to wait for darkness, causing an oil leak. After embarking the two Norwegians again, she was released to attack shipping off Egeroy but before she could do so, her position was revealed to the anti-submarine patrols by the oil leak, and she was hunted all the afternoon, twenty-three depth charges being dropped. Minerve then withdrew and returned to base. The only other patrol during August was by the new P221 (Lieutenant MFR Ainslie DSC RN) who made a working up patrol during the second half of the month between the Faeroes and the Norwegian coast, but without result. The other submarines remained in harbour preparing for convoy PQ18 to Russia. During this time, the enemy fleet units in Narvik made several sorties while we had no submarines on patrol to watch their bases. We knew all these sorties by signal intelligence. In the second half of August, Scheer, with U601 and U251 visited the Arctic to try to intercept Russian shipping using the route north of Siberia, and sank an icebreaker. Hipper, some destroyers and the minelayer Ulm laid mines between Svalbard and Novaya Zemlya to catch our convoys hugging the ice edge. The Ulm was caught and sunk by some of our destroyers or their way back from Russia, and the German mines sank a Russian tanker. During August the Soviet submarines in the Arctic were active. Shch403 and Shch422 attacked four convoys, and both submarines were heavily counter attacked. Mines were laid by K1 and K21, and K1 herself struck a mine and was damaged but survived. M173, however, was lost.

Meanwhile PQ18 was fighting its way eastwards against stiff opposition from U-boats and the Luftwaffe, and had already lost eight ships. The situation was not at all clear to A(S) as the submarine reports all mentioned Tirpitz as part of the German squadron. He considered that the present positions of the inshore submarines were now compromised and that, if Tirpitz was still in Narvik, she would probably sortie by a different route. He did not think he would be able to block all the exits from Alten Fjord and so he decided to order all the submarines that were close in to the coast to join and extend the moving patrol line. On receipt of this redisposition, P54 decided to make a wireless report saying that she thought that the enemy squadron had retired up And Fjord and this was not questioned by Uredd, who knew that they had not, because she had received P54's signal corruptly. A(S) then ordered Tigris. P54 and Uredd to patrol off And Fjord. By 11th September, however, signal intelligence revealed the true situation and these boats were again ordered to join the moving patrol line. On 13th September the headquarters of the German Group North wished to send the Alten Fjord force to attack QP14 but Herr Hitler was not in favour and they remained in harbour. The submarine patrol line was moved east to cover PQ18 and then west again to cover QP14. On 20th, when there was no longer any fear of surface attack, P614 and P615 were ordered to leave the convoy and patrol north of the other submarines in the hope of intercepting any U-boats in the area. P614 sighted a U-boat almost as soon as she arrived in position. She fired four torpedoes at 500 yards in a snowstorm. Two explosions were heard, the U-boat disappeared and its hydrophone effect ceased and success was assumed. Post war research, however, does not confirm the sinking. Rubis left Lerwick on 12th September and headed north to the Lofotens and on 16th was ordered to lay her mines in Malangen Fjord, which she did on 19th. This was, of course, too late to catch the German squadron. This minelay did, however, sink the small Norwegian steamer Nordland of 785 tons. During the passage of PQ18 Russian submarines saw nothing. On closing the coast after the convoys had passed, K2 struck a mine and was lost.

There were two other submarine operations off the Norwegian coast during September. The first was by the new P217 (Lieutenant EJD Turner DSC RN) who made a blank patrol from 16th-23rd off Feje in the hope of intercepting U-boats and shipping. The second was a special operation by the French submarine Junon (Capitaine de Fregate J Querville). The plan was to land a party of twelve men from Combined Operations command, to blow up the power station at the head of Glen Fjord about thirty miles south of Bodo. This power station was important as it supplied a local aluminium plant. Just before sailing on 11th September, the two Norwegians of the party wished to change the planned landing place, and this was arranged between the officer-in-charge and the Captain of Junon without reference to higher authority. Junon's voyage to Norway was uneventful except that she was forced to dive several times by enemy aircraft. On 14th September, after making a coastal reconnaissance and charging her batteries fully, she dived up Lyngvaer Fjord, Ottvaer Fjord and Skers Fjord to Bjaerangs Fjord, where, now some forty miles inland, she landed the party after lying all the afternoon on the bottom to await darkness. She then made her way back to the open sea, mostly on the surface using her diesel engines. The landing force, after an approach over mountainous country, successfully blew up the power station. They were then intercepted by German troops, one man was killed, seven taken prisoner but four escaped across the Swedish frontier.

During October, preparations for the Allied landings in North Africa held the stage. A(S) was anxious to keep up the strength of the Mediterranean submarines and was also prepared to lend up to eight submarines from Home waters for the operation. The eleven submarines used to support PQ18 were resting and carrying out maintenance and repairs. Operations in Home waters during the month were therefore on a small scale. On 1st and 2nd of October, while no submarines were on patrol in North Norway, Hipper and Koln moved south to Narvik through the leads, and we knew this by signal Intelligence. On 12th October Uredd (Loytnant RQ Roren) and Junon (Capitaine de Fregate J Querville) left Lerwick to attack shipping on the Norwegian coast. Uredd proceeded to an area between Stattlandet and Utvaer, while Junon was sent to the coast south of Bodo where she had carried out the special operation in September. Uredd penetrated the leads at Bue Fjord on 14th and 15th without seeing anything, but on 18th she fired two torpedoes at Libau of 3700 tons at a range of 1000 yards, and hit her in the engine room. She beached herself on rocks at Aradelflu and Uredd fired another torpedo at long range at her but missed. Nevertheless she became a total loss. Uredd also encountered a number of small Norwegian ships but understandably did not molest them. Junon visited Tennholm Fjord on 14th and Salt Fjord on 16th, where she missed a 4000-ton Norwegian ship with torpedoes. On 17th she returned to Tennholm Fjord and torpedoed a 2000-ton German supply ship, which beached herself on Grasvaer Island. Next day at Salt Fjord she torpedoed a fully laden southbound steamer of 5000 tons and claimed to have sunk her¹⁴.

On 20th October, Scheer moved south from Alten Fjord to Narvik through the leads. Some signal intelligence was received of this movement, and also some warning that other moves were contemplated. Junon, who had only three torpedoes left, was ordered to patrol to the north of Uredd, but being short of lubricating oil too, was recalled to base on 23rd. On this day, Tirpitz and Scheer with some destroyers, left Narvik for the south. Although signal intelligence was obtained, they could not be intercepted as they kept within the leads and anchored for the night before going on to Trondheim, where they arrived on 24th. Uredd was kept on patrol until 27th in case they should continue their voyage to Germany. Russian wireless Intelligence then also predicted a movement of heavy units, and Tuna (Lieutenant RP Raikes DSC RN) and O15 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl O Quint), who were at Lerwick, were also ordered to the Norwegian coast. Tuna was sent to patrol off Utvaer and O15 off Stattlandet. Hipper, however, with a destroyer escort left Narvik for Alten Fjord on 28th proceeding through the Lofotens and Gavl Fjord and our submarine dispositions were in no position to intercept her.

In operations against the German heavy units, signal intelligence during the period of this chapter, was of very great assistance. Although it did not often give the full picture and seldom gave away the enemy's intentions, it was possible, when it was combined with traffic analysis, photo-reconnaissance and with agents and coast watchers, to keep track of the positions of the German heavy ships. So much so that the purpose of submarine patrols became more one of attack than reconnaissance. Sometimes it gave sufficient warning for submarines to be deployed on the Norwegian coast from their bases. It gradually built up intelligence of their routes so that, in any case, submarines could be placed in the right patrol positions.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL SUBMARINES in Home waters against the German main units was clearly of considerable importance, and the best role in which they could be used. It led, however, between January and October, to only two real successes. These were the damaging of Prinz Eugen by Trident in February, and the sighting by Seawolf of Tirpitz putting to sea from Trondheim to attack PQ12 in March. If this seems a somewhat meagre return for so much effort, it can be pointed out that the Home Fleet, except for its carrier borne air attack on Tirpitz in March, did not achieve anything either. The entrusting of the cover for PQ17 to submarines in the Barents Sea was probably the most important operation for them in this period. A(S) positioned them in the right place at the right time and the losses in the convoy were entirely due to the extraordinary blunder of the Admiralty in scattering it. There is, however, a point that needs to be made. Submarines seem all to have been treated as equals, whereas the offensive power of the different types varied substantially. The U-class, the French submarines and the Dutch O15 only had salvoes of four torpedoes, which at best could only damage Tirpitz. The S-class could do better with six torpedoes, but only the T-class with their powerful ten torpedo salvoes were really capable of sinking her. Whether more thought should have been given to the concentration of the T-class where they would be most likely to meet enemy heavy ships, and the U-class for commerce destruction or hunting U-boats, although no doubt far easier to suggest than to carry out, is a point of interest.

It was, of course, often possible to deploy the maximum number of submarines at the critical time because we had the initiative. It was the British who decided when the North Russian convoys would sail and so submarines could be concentrated accordingly¹⁶. Although it did not lead to a positive success, the strategic positioning of submarines to protect PQ18, aided by signal intelligence, was extremely good. All five submarines, deployed close to the coast, sighted the enemy force that put to sea, and its movements were well reported. On the other hand, the submarine that got into an attacking position failed to secure a torpedo hit. Admittedly the conditions were unfavourable and the high-speed screened targets were very difficult ones, nevertheless it was a severe disappointment when one of our most powerful submarines was brushed aside in this way. It drew attention to the inadequacy of submarine training, not only of submarine commanding officers and of new submarines working up, but of continuation training for operational submarines themselves.

There were other uses to which submarines were put in this period which have also been noticed. While deployed almost entirely against the German Fleet, no opportunity of attacking a U-boat was ever missed. Nine attacks were made firing 36 torpedoes but these difficult targets generally managed to avoid being hit. Success was finally achieved when U336 was sunk. Attacks on coastal traffic were normally prohibited because it would interfere with action against the German Fleet. Only five ships of 17,383 tons were sunk in six attacks expending 27 torpedoes, and this was no more than a minor irritant to the enemy. Another sideline in which submarines were found useful was in acting as navigational beacons for Commando or destroyer raids. The submarine was able to reconnoitre the area, fix her position accurately while submerged in daylight, and subsequently surface and guide the raiding forces to the objective. Finally the faithful Rubis, our only minelayer in Home waters, continued to lay mines in enemy waters. Altogether she laid 128 mines and sank a coaster, a minesweeper and two fishing vessels and damaged a U-boat.

In spite of the small number of sinkings of enemy ships in Home waters during the period of this chapter, a number of awards for gallantry were made. Commander Sladen of Trident received a bar to the Distinguished Service Order for torpedoing the Prinz Eugen, and Lieutenant Commander Wingfield of Sturgeon a Distinguished Service Order for patrols between November 1941 and September 1942, including the sinking of a supply ship in August. Lieutenant Commander Colvin received a somewhat belated recognition of his attempt to enter the Brest exercise areas in Sealion in search of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in January 1942 by the award of the Distinguished Service Cross. Capitaine de Fregate Jean de Querville of Junon also received a Distinguished Service Cross for three special operations in Norway, and Capitaine de Corvette H Rousselot of Rubis received the Distinguished Service Order for his minelaying in the Bay and off Norway. Finally Lieutenant Hezlet of Trident was Mentioned in Despatches for his part in the escort of convoy PQ16 to Russia. The unsuccessful attack on Tirpitz was recognised by the award of a Distinguished Service Cross to Sub Lieutenant WR Brewster RNVR, and of the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal to Quartermaster Leif Larsen of the Royal Norwegian Naval Reserve. Four submarine captains were decorated for attacks on U-boats, which at the time were thought to have been successful. Distinguished Service Orders were awarded to Lieutenant Marriott of Graph, Lieutenant Beckley of P614 and Lieutenant Raikes of Seawolf, but alas none of these sinkings could be confirmed after the war. The only successful attack was by Lieutenant Lumby of P247 who definitely sank U335 and he, for some reason, only received a Distinguished Service Cross.