The arrival of these convoys was a serious setback for the British especially as the cryptographers had given warning that they were about to sail and had foretold their route. Furthermore there were five submarines at sea in the central Mediterranean. The reason for the failure was that the enemy covered the passage of the convoys by heavy air attacks on Malta¹. These not only prevented any attack by the air striking forces based in the island, but also prevented any effective air reconnaissance and the convoys were not located until they were nearing their destination. Signal intelligence continued to be received during the month, but it could not often be acted upon. It showed that the coastal route from Tripoli to El Agheila was being used to get supplies forward but no submarines were sent there after Force K ran into mines in the shallow water off the North African coast. As has been pointed out before, it was imprudent to use signal intelligence directly for fear of compromise. The difficulties with air reconnaissance from Malta due to air attacks on the island often meant that signal intelligence could not be used at all.

Some information was received from air reconnaissance, however, which was of value to try to intercept the Italian fleet on its way back to Taranto. Unique was already on patrol off Taranto, P34 was moved there on 4th from the coast of Sicily and Thrasher from patrol off Cephalonia. Sokol and Unbeaten were sent straight to the area from Malta. P34 and Unique were given the inshore positions in the Gulf of Taranto and Unbeaten, Sokol and Thrasher were positioned on a patrol line farther out. Thrasher was, however, delayed by heavy weather and did not arrive in time. Just after midday on 5th, Unique (Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) heard hydrophone effect and found herself right ahead of the battleship Duilio escorted by a cruiser, five destroyers and two flying boats. She went deep for one of the screen and by the time she was able to use her periscope again, she could only fire her four torpedoes at a range of 6000 yards from the quarter after the enemy had passed. Not surprisingly all the torpedoes missed. C-in-C was severely critical of this failure and pointed out that there was no need to go deep, as conditions were bad for air observation and such precautions against collision, necessary in peacetime exercises, were not warranted in wartime when risks must be run. The other submarines did not see the enemy force and the concentration were dispersed on 8th January.

Triumph, on patrol in the Aegean, had instructions to land a party near Piraeus to round up and rescue any army escapers they could find. While waiting to pick them up again she was given a patrol area south east of the Gulf of Athens and on 4th January she made an unsuccessful torpedo attack on the motor cutter Sofia south of Milo. She then moved to a position off Cape Sounion and on 9th January she attacked a large lighter under tow and missed again. She then almost certainly struck a mine in an antisubmarine field laid in this area by the Italian minelayer Barletta in December 1940. This time Triumph was sunk with all hands² including her new Commanding Officer, Lieutenant JS Huddart RN, five other officers and fifty five men. Four of her officers and twenty of the ship's company of this most successful submarine had been decorated or mentioned in dispatches, and she was a great loss.

Porpoise (Commander EF Pizey DSO RN), after being employed on a number of store trips to Malta, embarked mines at Haifa on 5th January and laid them off Suda Bay on 11th. The torpedo boat Cantore struck one of them on 15th and was damaged. On 18th January, Porpoise attacked a strongly escorted convoy of three ships, firing a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 6000 yards and sinking Citta di Livorno of 2471 tons even though one of the torpedoes had a gyro failure. Thrasher (Lieutenant HS Mackenzie RN) from Taranto was sent to the Straits of Otranto and at night in heavy weather fired four torpedoes at a range of 600 yards sinking Fedora of 5015 tons, which was southbound and fully laden. Unbeaten (Lieutenant Commander EA Woodward RN) when she left the Taranto patrol line was sent to Cape Spartivento to the south east of Messina and on the forenoon of 12th January she first heard, and then sighted and attacked a German U-boat. She fired four torpedoes at 1500 yards from periscope depth and obtained two hits and sank U374. Unbeaten picked up one survivor. After this success, on 19th, she attacked a convoy at long range on a broad track with four more torpedoes, but without result. On return to Malta, Unbeaten was attacked and machine gunned by enemy fighters as she entered harbour but dived and there were no casualties. After this attack, submarines approaching Valetta were ordered to remain submerged until one mile off St Elmo, and were only to surface after checking that the red air raid warning flag at the Castile was not flying. Sokol (Kapitan B Karnicki) the last of the Taranto line was sent to patrol off Crotone but saw nothing.

Urge on the east coast of Tunisia, south of Lampion, was joined early in the month by Upright, but they saw nothing and these two submarines were relieved by P35 and Una in the middle of January. On 17th, P35 (Lieutenant SLC Maydon RN), who had been sent to reconnoitre Sousse, sank the salvage vessel Rampino of 301 tons, hitting with one of three torpedoes at a range of 1500 yards. Three days later she sighted a lighted convoy off the Tunisian coast and outside territorial waters. It was in the 'Sink at Sight' zone so she fired four torpedoes at very long range, which was also probably underestimated and scored no hits.

On 16th January, opportunity was taken to send a four-ship convoy to Malta and take advantage of our possession of airfields in Cyrenaica to give it fighter protection. It was also escorted by light forces from the Mediterranean Fleet, and by Force K from Malta. A submarine patrol line was established south of Taranto by Upholder and Unique from Malta, and Torbay, who had been on patrol off Crete. The convoy arrived after heavy air attacks on 19th and was violently attacked in harbour too, but 21,000 tons of supplies were safely unloaded. The Italian surface forces did not leave harbour, and these submarines saw very little. Upholder sighted a hospital ship and an escorted supply ship too far off to attack, and on 20th the patrol line was dispersed. On her way back to Malta, Unique sighted a U-boat on 21st in the half-light before dawn. She fired four torpedoes at a range of 1500 yards on a late track and missed. The Italian Navy sent over another important convoy with a heavy surface ship covering force at this time. Torbay had been sent back to Taranto and was there when it left, and P36 and Urge had just arrived off Tripoli. Torbay (Lieutenant Commander ACC Miers DSO RN) sighted three cruisers with an escort of destroyers at midday on 22nd and fired six torpedoes at a range of 8000 yards on a track of 120 degrees. She was probably out of range and the torpedoes scored no hits. Early on 24th January Urge (Lieutenant Commander EP Tomkinson DSO* RN) saw aircraft flares as the RAF from Cyrenaica, and the Fleet Air Arm from Malta, heavily attacked the convoy, sinking the 13,000-ton liner Victoria with 1400 troops on board. Urge sighted the convoy and its cruiser escort but was unable to get within range. However she made an enemy report by asdic to P36. P36 (Lieutenant HN Edmonds RN) made contact and fired four torpedoes at a range of 4500 yards, claiming a hit and she was counter attacked with thirty depth charges. The remaining four ships of the convoy, however, reached Tripoli without further damage. Most of the troops were saved, and another 71 tanks were landed.

On 1st February, Urge (Lieutenant Commander EP Tomkinson DSO* RN) fired a long-range salvo of three torpedoes (at 7000 yards) at a convoy off the east coast of Sicily without result except that the destroyers of the escort counter attacked her with 29 depth charges. At almost exactly the same time, Thunderbolt (Lieutenant Commander CB Crouch DSO RN), on the other side of the Ionian Sea off Cephalonia, also attacked a convoy that was southbound. She fired three torpedoes at a range of 1000 yards and hit and sank Absirtea of 4170 tons. Two days later on 3rd February, P35 (Lieutenant SLC Maydon RN) in the Gulf of Hammamet, sighted Napoli of 6140 tons at anchor after the RAF had damaged her. She fired two torpedoes singly at 2500 yards obtaining one hit and sinking her but in shallow water. The RAF, trying to prevent her being salved, subsequently attacked this ship again. Meanwhile Upholder (now Lieutenant CP Norman RN) had left Malta under the command of the spare Commanding Officer, to patrol off Cape St Vito on the north coast of Sicily. On 4th February, six miles off Cape St Vito she took a shot in a rough sea at a Navigatori-class destroyer. She fired three torpedoes at 2000 yards but the tracks were seen, the torpedoes were avoided and she was counter attacked with ten depth charges, which fortunately did no damage. On 3rd too, Thunderbolt, now off Argostoli, damaged a trawler by gunfire and next day she sighted an Italian U-boat and fired a salvo of six torpedoes from 3000 yards. One of the torpedoes broke surface soon after being fired but does not seem to have been seen by the enemy, nevertheless all the torpedoes missed. Thunderbolt then surfaced and engaged with her gun and also fired her remaining two torpedoes from her amidships tubes but the enemy dived and escaped. Thorn in the Adriatic carried out a second landing operation near Mljet on 4th before returning to Alexandria. On 6th February, P31 (Lieutenant JBdeB Kershaw RN) in the approaches to Tripoli fired three torpedoes at a range of 5000 yards at a small merchant vessel escorted by an aircraft, but the aircraft saw the tracks and the torpedoes were avoided. On 12th, P31 suffered an accident with the operation of her main ballast tanks. She dived involuntarily and the Commanding Officer was knocked unconscious, an officer was drowned and there was serious flooding necessitating her immediate return to Malta. On 7th, Unbeaten (Lieutenant Commander EA Woodward RN), off Kerkenah fired four torpedoes at a range of 3500 yards at a convoy, but an aircraft of the escort probably saw the tracks and the torpedoes were avoided. She then suffered a counter attack of 29 depth charges by a destroyer of the escort. Between 5th and 7th, Upholder, still on the north west coast of Sicily, sighted traffic inshore off Cape Gallo and in Castellamare Bay. The weather was bad but she was hunted by air and surface patrols. On 8th at 1720 she attacked an eastbound convoy with three torpedoes at 1300 yards and hit and sank Salpi of 2710 tons and damaged Duino of 1334 tons. She was then counter attacked sharply by the escort over a period of fifteen minutes³. On 8th February, Proteus (Lieutenant Commander PS Francis RN), on the west coast of Greece, made a night attack on what she thought was a U-boat and fired two torpedoes at 700 yards from her stern tubes without result, probably because they ran under. Proteus turned to try again firing another torpedo at 1000 yards from the enemy's quarter. In a subsequent melee Proteus collided bow to bow with the enemy, which turned out to be the Italian torpedo boat Sagittario that had been escorting a convoy. Both ships were damaged, Proteus losing her port forward hydroplane as well as starting some rivets in her pressure hull. As a result she had to abandon her patrol and return to Alexandria.

On 6th February, it had been decided, in spite of the loss of western Cyrenaica, to attempt to send another convoy to Malta from the east. With no battleships left operational at Alexandria, the convoy had only light cruisers and destroyers as escort. Submarines therefore had an important role and were stationed south of Messina and across the Gulf of Taranto to report and attack any Italian heavy ships that left harbour. Convoy MF5 consisting of three large merchant ships, sailed on 12th February and the opportunity was taken to get four empty ships out of Malta. P36, Urge and Unique were stationed south of Messina and Una, Tempest and Upright formed the patrol line, ten miles apart, in the Gulf of Taranto. While approaching her patrol position, Una (Lieutenant DSR Martin RN) sighted and attacked a large tanker. She fired three torpedoes at a range of 2600 yards and hit and sank Lucania of 8106 tons. This was unfortunate as the ship had a safe conduct. Upright (Lieutenant JS Wraith RN) had, in accordance with her orders, already allowed her to pass unmolested. The mistake occurred as the markings agreed for the ship were difficult to see, and the Captain of Una had a high fever at the time. Nevertheless the British Government offered to replace the ship but this offer was not accepted⁴.The convoy to Malta failed to get through, all the ships being damaged by air attack, two having to be sunk by our own forces, and the third putting in to Tobruk. The empty ships from Malta reached Port Said safely. Four Italian cruisers and ten destroyers put to sea from Messina and Taranto to intercept the convoy. Warned of the presence of British submarines off Taranto by the attack on Lucania, the Italians sent out an anti-submarine hunting force. On 13th February the Italian torpedo boat Circe, recently fitted with German antisubmarine equipment⁵, after a six-hour hunt, located Tempest and, in an accurate depth charge attack, damaged her and forced her to the surface. Three officers and twenty men were rescued and taken prisoner of war and a party boarded the submarine. She sank, however, as soon as she was taken in tow. The casualties included her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander WAKN Cavanagh RN, one other officer and thirty-seven men. An hour after midnight on 15th P36 (Lieutenant HN Edmonds RN), south of Messina, sighted two cruisers southbound and escorted by destroyers. She fired a full salvo of four torpedoes in a surface attack. The range, however, was long (7000 yards) and the enemy speed was high and she failed to secure a hit. She made an enemy report and later air reconnaissance located the force, but a Fleet Air Arm attack from Malta failed to secure any hits either. Next day, P36 sighted the same force, which had been sent out from Messina to attack convoy MF5. She identified the main units as Gorizia and Trento. This time P36 got closer and fired another full salvo of four torpedoes. She again missed the large ships, which were steaming at 22 knots, but one torpedo hit and damaged the destroyer Carabinieri. Some of the seven other destroyers counter attacked for three and a half hours dropping 216 depth charges but without causing any significant damage. The others towed Carabinieri into harbour.

The failure of the February convoy to Malta increased the need for submarines to carry supplies there. The civilian rations had already been decreased below those in the United Kingdom and the expenditure of ammunition and aviation fuel in the many air raids was prodigious. During February, Porpoise (Lieutenant LWA Bennington DSC RN) ran a trip with petrol and personnel from Alexandria, and Olympus (Lieutenant Commander HG Dymott RN) and Pandora (Lieutenant RL Alexander RN) did the same from Gibraltar. During this month too there were countless raids dropping 1020 tons of bombs on the island. The destroyer Maori was sunk in the Grand Harbour but up to the middle of the month, most of the bombs were still aimed at the airfields and the dockyard. Force K and the air striking forces on the island were unable to achieve any results against the enemy convoys and nearly everything sunk during the month was by submarine. On 13th February, a very heavy raid, in which parachute mines were used, struck the submarine base on Manoel Island. It did a great deal of damage, demolishing a number of buildings including those of the mess decks and killing two men and wounding five others. There could have been heavy casualties but for the rock shelters under the base. The maintenance and repair of submarines was much hampered, not only by this attack but also by air raid alarms, and the crews could get little rest in harbour. Even the rest camp at Ghain Tuffieha was attacked. Nevertheless the base staffs persevered, and were just able to cope. The submarines now submerged by night and surfaced by day so that work could be done on them. At the end of February, the new arrival P39 was attacked by Me109 fighters as she entered harbour after her first patrol. In this same raid on 27th February, the submarine base, in spite of four Bofors guns that had been deployed on Manoel Island, was again heavily bombed and four officers were killed and the officer's quarters were destroyed. From now on all hands had to mess in the open and sleep in the over crowded shelters. During the month the Admiralty became alarmed at the scale of attack and suggested that the old submarine depot ship Lucia, now used in the Indian Ocean as depot ship for the Eastern Fleet submarines, should be sent to Alexandria to which place the Tenth Submarine Flotilla might have to withdraw. Captain Simpson, however, had no intention of being dislodged by the Luftwaffe and was determined to remain and continue to service and support his flotilla.

The results achieved by submarines during February were well up to previous performance. Twenty attacks were made firing 64 torpedoes and six ships of 30,825 tons were sunk as well as several small craft. Two destroyers were damaged as well as at least one ship of 1334 tons. Nevertheless Italian losses, as a percentage of the increased traffic in convoy now being sent, were small and the build up of their forces in Cyrenaica began. A sinister development was the loss of two submarines, Tempest and P38, by depth charge attack from asdic fitted escorts. Fortunately the German echo detection gear was greatly inferior to the British asdic, but the period in which the enemy ships had virtually no way to detect our submarines when they were submerged was over. Furthermore no new submarines arrived on the station during February to replace these losses.

IN MARCH, THE ARMIES IN THE DESERT remained in confrontation on the Gazala line, both building up their strength in the hope of taking the offensive. The main British strategic problem was to re-supply Malta. It was decided to run a convoy of four supply ships in from the east in the middle of March and also to fly in fighters from an aircraft carrier from the west. It was hoped that this would be sufficient to keep the island going until Cyrenaica could be retaken and convoys could be run in from the east more easily. Meanwhile the attack on the enemy supply lines to North Africa was as important as ever. However, submarine strength in the Mediterranean was falling and the total of twenty-five on paper was not available in practice. The Tenth Flotilla at Malta had the most boats, which was ten⁸ after the departure of Unique to refit in the United Kingdom. The First Flotilla, after the redeployment of Truant and Trusty to the Far East, the loss of Triumph and Tempest, the relegation of Otus and Osiris to non-operational duties and the use of Porpoise for store carrying, left only five operational boats⁹.Worst of all was the state of the Eighth Flotilla at Gibraltar which, with Clyde refitting, O23 on her way to the Far East and Olympus non operational, had no submarines fit for patrol at all. Maidstone at Gibraltar at this time was reduced to a staging post for new submarines joining the station and older ones passing to and from the United Kingdom to refit.

On 1st March there were nine submarines on patrol, four of which were from the First Flotilla and five from the Tenth. Thorn was off Taranto; Thrasher off Cephalonia and Torbay to the north of her off Corfu while Turbulent was in the Aegean. P31 was off Kerkenah and Unbeaten was about to return to Malta from the vicinity of Lampion. Upholder was north of Tripoli; P35 south of Messina and P36 was on her way back to Malta from Khoms. On 1st March, Unbeaten (Lieutenant JD Martin RN) attacked a convoy off Monastir in Tunisia firing four torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards and sinking the Vichy French tanker PLM2O of 3415 tons which was in German service. Unbeaten was counter attacked for an hour, and fifteen depth charges were dropped. Far away in the Aegean, Turbulent continued her roving commission. On 2nd March she sank three schooners by gunfire in the Gulf of Salonika and another one on 3rd. She let yet another one go, as it had many women passengers on board. Intelligence was then received that two enemy ships had left Istanbul for the south, and Turbulent moved across to Imbros. On 4th March, however, the ships passed out of range mainly because Turbulent was having navigational difficulties and was out of position. She pursued, however, and intercepted the two ships in the Doro Channel very early next morning. She made a night surface attack and fired four torpedoes at what she thought was a range of 4000 yards but they missed. The range was probably under estimated and was, in fact, much greater. After investigating the Gulf of Athens and Mykoni without seeing anything, Turbulent sank a 300-ton schooner by gunfire on 12th and yet another schooner also by gunfire on 13th March. She then headed for Alexandria with all her gun ammunition except one round expended. On 2nd March, Torbay (Lieutenant Commander ACC Miers DSO RN), off Corfu, approached a destroyer to attack with torpedoes. She was detected, however, before she could fire and was severely depth charged but was able to continue her patrol. On 4th March she sighted four troopships northbound but at too great a range to attack. They then entered the south channel between Corfu and the mainland. Lieutenant Commander Miers decided to follow them in and attack them in harbour. He was forced to dive by a patrol vessel shortly after midnight and met another when approaching for a dawn attack. It was glassy calm but it was soon apparent that the enemy had gone on and out through the northern entrance, but two supply ships were there at anchor. Torbay closed them and fired six torpedoes in pairs at a range of 3000 yards and sank Maddalena G of 5210 tons and probably damaged the other ship. Then after twenty hours in a defended enemy anchorage, Torbay made her way out to sea again. Lieutenant Commander Miers was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross for this and other outstanding patrols.

The Malta convoy, after a delay of some days, left Alexandria on 20th March. At this time there were seven submarines at sea on patrol. Unbeaten and P34 were south of Messina and P36, Proteus and Upholder were in the Gulf of Taranto¹¹.The Italians received reports of the sailing of the convoy on 21st from two of their submarines in the eastern Mediterranean. Littorio with four destroyers left Taranto after dark on 22nd to attack the convoy. It was a very dark night but P36 heard the enemy force on her asdic set. Except for a possible glimpse of a destroyer, she did not sight anything but at 0400 she sent an enemy report by wireless estimating that the enemy force as one battleship, six cruisers and a destroyer flotilla steering to the southwards. This was the only warning received by the convoy and its escorts that the Italian fleet was at sea before the enemy came in sight. A cruiser force consisting of Gorizia, Trento, Bande Nere and four destroyers also put to sea from Messina. They were not seen by or detected by P34 or Unbeaten south of Messina because they hugged the coast of Calabria and passed clear to the north of both submarines. These movements led to the 'Second Battle of Sirte' in which Admiral Vian brilliantly defended the convoy with his light cruisers and destroyers. The Italian Fleet, not wishing to risk a night action with the British radar fitted ships, broke off the battle before dark on 22nd and set course for home. At this point an exceptionally heavy southeast gale began to blow, the Italian destroyers Scirocco and Lanciere foundered and the cruiser Bande Nere was damaged. The cruiser force again evaded P34 and Unbeaten south of Messina, this time by hugging the Sicilian coast but Littorio, her escort now reduced to two destroyers, was heard in the evening of 23rd by Upholder as she approached Taranto. Upholder closed at full speed in very bad weather and at 1735 caught a brief glimpse of the battleship. Four torpedoes were fired at a range of 4000 yards but the enemy, who was zigzagging, altered away and they missed. It is in any case doubtful whether the torpedoes could run correctly in such weather

Although three out of the four merchant ships of the British convoy reached Malta, most of their cargo was lost by air attack before they could be unloaded. Malta had therefore to rely on another three storing trips run by submarines during the month by Porpoise from Alexandria with petrol and personnel, and Olympus and Pandora from Gibraltar with similar cargoes.

Earlier in the month, after completing a short refit, Urge (Lieutenant Commander EP Tomkinson DSO* RN) had sailed for patrol in the Tyrrhenian Sea but had had to return with engine trouble. She sailed again on 23rd March at the same time as P31 (Lieutenant JBdeB Kershaw RN) with a similar destination. Urge patrolled off Naples and P31 was sent to an area south of Elba to advertise her presence and try to draw anti-submarine vessels away from the route to North Africa, but she sighted nothing before the end of the month. Urge on the night of 29th/30th March, landed Captain Wilson with a demolition party who blew up a train near Policastro, the engine being derailed and rolling down the embankment. No sooner had the landing party returned than Urge sighted a ship approaching in the darkness. She fired three torpedoes at a range of 3500 yards but missed. She then engaged with her gun but after scoring three hits had to desist due to the enemy's return fire. Proteus (Lieutenant Commander PS Francis RN) who had been off Taranto during the Second Battle of Sirte was ordered to the Straits of Otranto. On 27th she sighted a small patrol vessel and fired three torpedoes at 1000 yards but they probably ran under. On 28th after dark, she sighted a convoy of seven ships and, in a surface attack, fired six torpedoes aimed at three of them at ranges between 1000 and 2000 yards sinking Galileo of 8040 tons. On 30th course was set to intercept another convoy reported by signal intelligence and the RAF. Contact was made just after dark and two torpedoes were fired at 450 yards from her stern tubes from periscope depth by moonlight sinking Bosforo of 3648 tons.

By the end of March the Luftwaffe had virtually neutralised the air and surface striking forces based on Malta. What was left of Force K put to sea for the Second Battle of Sirte but was reduced to Penelope and one destroyer. Aurora, under repair in the dockyard since she was mined the previous December, was got away to Gibraltar on 26th March but Penelope was damaged again and had to be docked shortly afterwards. The air striking forces had attacked a southbound convoy on 10th March but obtained no success. Signal intelligence was still available and although its value was decreased, as it could not be followed up by air reconnaissance, it still helped to place submarines in the right patrol positions. In fact our submarines did practically all the damage to the enemy convoys during March. In fourteen attacks firing 55 torpedoes, they had sunk three more Italian submarines, five ships of 25,393 tons and half a dozen caiques and schooners and had damaged another two ships of some 12,000 tons. Over half of their attacks were therefore successful and their sinkings were up to their usual average in spite of the decrease in their numbers. The report by P36 of the enemy fleet leaving Taranto was also of major importance in the Second Battle of Sirte at a time when air reconnaissance was extremely difficult. Nevertheless in February and March, 67,000 tons of supplies and 40,000 tons of fuel got across to Libya with a loss of only 9%.

Meanwhile submarine operations in the central Mediterranean, in spite of the difficulties, continued. One Commanding Officer actually remarked that he was glad when he was ordered to sea where it was much safer than to remain and face the danger of bombing in harbour. On 1st April, there were seven submarines at sea. Of the First Flotilla, Thrasher was in the Gulf of Sirte and Proteus was still in the Otranto area while Turbulent was in the Adriatic. Of the Tenth Flotilla, P35 was off Lampedusa while Urge and P31 were still in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The Dutch submarine O23 was also on passage through the Mediterranean bound for the Far East. P31 (Lieutenant JBdeB Kershaw RN), who was trying to advertise her presence off Elba, was not able to find an opportunity until 1st April when she met a small tanker escorted by four schooners off Civita Vecchia. She fired three torpedoes at 4000 yards but the first torpedo broke surface and the rest missed. The schooners then hunted her for nine hours. Next day she fired a single torpedo at a large three masted schooner, which was lying stopped, but the torpedo just missed ahead of her although the range was only 1400 yards. P31 was also able to plot the position of the swept channel in this area, which was of value. On 4th April, P35 (Lieutenant SLC Maydon RN), in a glassy calm off Lampedusa attacked a merchant vessel escorted by four E-boats and aircraft. She was put deep by the escorts but managed to come to periscope depth and fire a single torpedo from right astern, which, not surprisingly, missed. Una (Lieutenant CP Norman RN), south of Messina, sank Nineto G of 5335 tons in an escorted convoy with two hits out of a salvo of four fired at 3000 yards and the counter attack, although the enemy claimed to have sunk her, was negligible. P35 had another chance on 6th April but missed an escorted supply ship at 3200 yards with two torpedoes. She also sighted targets on 7th and 8th but was too far off to attack. Thrasher (Lieutenant HS Mackenzie RN), in the Gulf of Sirte, attacked a convoy of two ships on 9th April firing three torpedoes at each of them at a range of 2000 yards. She hit and sank the first ship, which was Gala of 1030 tons, but the second avoided the torpedoes. On 13th she was again successful in the Benghazi area and with three torpedoes fired at 1900 yards she sank Atlas of 2300 tons.

Meanwhile Turbulent (Commander JW Linton DSC RN) was busy in the Adriatic. She passed through the Straits of Otranto on 5th April and on 7th sank Rosa M of 271 tons by gunfire. Two days later off Sibenik, she attacked a supply ship, firing two torpedoes at 2500 yards but the target saw the tracks and altered course away. Next day off Ortona, she attacked another ship of about 3000 tons, firing three torpedoes at a range of 3000 yards and when these missed she fired another with no better luck. On 12th April she sighted a large Italian U-boat of the Ballila-class off Fiume but the target altered course at a critical moment and no attack was possible. Next day she inexplicably missed a merchant ship at 800 yards with her two external bow tubes. Returning to the Sibenik area on 14th she engaged two schooners with her gun, but had only succeeded in damaging one of them before she was forced to dive by shore batteries. On 15th, Dubrovnik was approached but the harbour was found to be empty. Next day off Monopoli she sank the unescorted Delia of 5404 tons, fully laden and southbound. Two torpedoes were used, both of which hit at 1000 yards. In spite of these successes early in April, the Italians got three convoys totalling six ships across to Tripoli without loss.

In Malta the bombing continued with increased fury and during April 6700 tons of bombs were dropped. The 7th and 8th April were two of the worst days, a great deal landing on the dockyard, which was put almost completely out of action. Raids were frequent and the average was nine alerts a day but the defences stoutly opposed them. Penelope escaped to Gibraltar on 8th but Havock was stranded and was lost off the Tunisian coast. The submarine base, with super human effort by the repair staff, continued to function and got five submarines to sea in this period; P34 to the heel of Italy, Urge to the Pantellaria area, P35 to Lampedusa, Una to Kuriat and Upholder to Tripoli. The policy was now to keep submarines at sea as much as possible and only to arrange for them to return to base for essential repairs and replenishment. These five submarines were to do short patrols. They were not in the best position but were close to Malta so that they could be recalled for the defence of the island if it should be invaded. Sokol, after fouling the boom, was also sailed for Gibraltar on 17th April with only one screw and one battery section in working order. Sokol's battery was giving off chlorine and she had difficulty in diving under the Sicilian barrage. She survived, however, and got to Gibraltar in this battered condition. On 12th April, Urge (Lieutenant Commander EP Tomkinson DSO* RN) attacked a convoy of two large ships escorted by destroyers and flying boats between Pantellaria and Lampedusa. She fired a full salvo of four torpedoes at a range of 5000 yards but an aircraft sighted the tracks, the convoy stopped engines and the torpedoes passed harmlessly ahead.

Upholder (Lieutenant Commander MD Wanklyn VC DSO* RN) who had sailed on 6th April for the Tripoli area on her twenty fifth patrol, carried out a special operation on the night of 9th/10th to land two Arab agents near Sousse. Captain Wilson landed them and was transferred next night to Unbeaten off Lampion Island for passage home to the United Kingdom. Signal intelligence was then received in Malta that a convoy was to leave Taranto for Tripoli in the near future. Upholder was given a position to patrol north east of Tripoli to intercept and Urge from the Lampedusa area with Thrasher from the Gulf of Sirte, were ordered to join her and form a patrol line. Only Upholder made contact with the enemy and she was sighted submerged by an Italian flying boat who summoned the torpedo boat Pegaso of the convoy's escort to the spot. Pegaso, using her German asdic set, made contact and attacked accurately with depth charges sinking her with all hands¹⁴ Urge and Thrasher heard the explosions of the depth charges but saw nothing. Upholder's outstanding Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander MD Wanklyn VC DSO* RN, was drowned together with three other officers and twenty seven men of her ship's company including the holders of two DSC's, six DSM's and three who had been mentioned in despatches. This was a major disaster not only for the Tenth Flotilla but for the Mediterranean Fleet and the submarine branch as a whole. Lieutenant Commander Wanklyn was, without question, the leading British submarine 'Ace' of the war and his indirect leadership of other submarine captains was of inestimable value. His loss was a serious blow to morale. Upholder, in her twenty-five patrols, had fired 98 torpedoes and 31 of these had hit sinking two J-boats, two destroyers and eleven transports and supply ships totalling 91,470 tons. She had also damaged the cruiser Garibaldi and carried out a number of special operations. The Admiralty kept her loss secret for a while but subsequently issued a statement saying, '..she was an inspiration, not only to her own flotilla but to the fleet...'

As soon as the submarines had gone, Captain Simpson and Commander MacGregor flew to Cairo in a Hudson aircraft of the RAF and went on to Medway in Alexandria. Captain Simpson's tenacity in holding on with the Tenth Flotilla in Malta was rightly viewed with admiration and his organisation in face of the vicious bombing was seen as exceptional. On 19th May he was gazetted a Commander of the Order of the British Empire for his services and at the end of June, Commander MacGregor and Lieutenant Commanders Marsham, Giddings and Tanner of the base and Tenth Flotilla staff were awarded the Order of the British Empire. With the value of hindsight, however, we may be permitted to wonder whether the Tenth Flotilla did not cling to its base at Malta for too long and whether this was not counter productive. Four submarines were lost as a result and three others so badly damaged that they had to return to the United Kingdom for repair.

The four that eventually retired to Alexandria were so in need of repair and maintenance that it was the best part of a month before they were operational again. There is little doubt that the Admiralty and A(S) were right in believing that the Tenth Flotilla should have left earlier. The fact that Lucia was not immediately available was not important. Medway had ample capacity to look after both the First and Tenth Flotilla submarines. The time to go was after the heavy air attack on the Lazaretto submarine base in mid February. The objection that this would bring all submarine operations to a halt in the central Mediterranean does not bear examination. Although the advantage of Malta's excellent geographical position would be lost, the U-class would still have been able to patrol from Alexandria in the southern Aegean, off the west coast of Greece and on the coast of Cyrenaica while the longer range boats of the First Flotilla could have taken over areas off Taranto, south of Messina and off the coasts of Sicily, Tunisia and Tripolitania. The Tyrrhenian Sea could have been left to any submarines available in the Eighth Flotilla at Gibraltar. In this way the submarine campaign against Rommel's supply routes across the Mediterranean could have been continuous and would not have suffered a complete break, as actually happened, during the summer. In war, however, matters are seldom as clear to the participants, who are denied the ability to see into the future, in the way that events are clear years later to historians.

Malta continued to receive stores by submarine while the operational boats were leaving. Clyde (Commander DC Ingram DSC RN) ran in stores to Malta in the middle of April from Gibraltar. She had had her foremost battery removed and by landing her reload torpedoes was able to carry 70 tons of ammunition as well as 88 tons of benzene and 30 tons of kerosene. With the lesson of Pandora recently learnt the hard way, Clyde and Porpoise (Commander EF Pizey DSO RN) too when she arrived on 26th, remained submerged on the bottom of the harbour all day and unloaded at night. When Clyde sailed next day she was loaded with copper ingots, no longer any use in Malta dockyard, and which came in handy as ballast. Before she got as far as Pantellaria, however, her after hydroplanes jammed and she had to return. They were lashed amidships and she set out to make the passage using her fore hydroplanes only. Her difficulties were still not at an end and she ran ashore when submerged off Sicily, but got off and reached Gibraltar after a very slow passage. Unbeaten at Gibraltar on her way home to refit was also sent back to Malta on a storing trip in the middle of April. Olympus (Lieutenant Commander HG Dymott RN) made another storing trip at the end of April arriving in Malta on 5th May. She sailed again on 8th with many passengers from the crews of P36 and P39 and had 11 officers and 87 men on board. She struck a mine six miles off St Elmo and sank. Twelve survivors swam ashore but her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Dymott and another nine officers amongst whom were Lieutenant N Marriott DSC RN, the captain of P39 and Lieutenant HN Edmonds DSC RN, captain of P36, and 75 men were drowned. The Greek Triton also arrived with 16 tons of stores and took the crew of Glaukos to Alexandria.

Una (Lieutenant CP Norman RN) was the last submarine to leave patrol when the Tenth Flotilla withdrew from Malta, but she saw no targets off Kuriat at all. At the end of the month there were only two submarines on patrol and these were from the First Flotilla. Proteus was off the west coast of Greece and Thorn in the Gulf of Sirte. There was also P42 from Gibraltar in the Gulf of Genoa. On 28th April, Proteus (Lieutenant Commander PS Francis RN) fired two torpedoes at a ship in ballast at 3-4000 yards but the submarine was swinging, lost trim and 'missed the DA' on a track of 135 degrees. She caught up the DA by 165 degrees but inevitably missed. On 2nd May, however, she attacked a convoy of two ships escorted by a destroyer and a trawler at a range of 2000 yards, firing five torpedoes and hitting Otto Leonhardt of 3682 tons with two of them. The ship, however, managed to beach herself and was subsequently salved. Thorn (Lieutenant Commander RG Norfolk RN) had a completely blank patrol and got back to Alexandria on 14th May. Torbay (Lieutenant Commander ACC Miers DSO* RN) sank an auxiliary minesweeper by gunfire on 9th April off Corfu and also a schooner, Gesu Crocifisso, of 137 tons. On 18th she fired two torpedoes at 5000 yards at Bellona of 1295 tons and hit with both of them, sinking her, which was remarkable shooting. She then left for Alexandria by Suda Bay. She pursued a convoy on 19th and on 21st sank a small tanker by gunfire firing two torpedoes at 800 yards during the battle and missing with both.

The dislodging of the Tenth Submarine Flotilla from Malta by the Luftwaffe's sustained bombing campaign and the minelaying by the E-boats and by aircraft, was a substantial victory for the Axis. With the surface and air striking forces already gone, the Italians were able to route their convoys evasively and to pass as close as fifty miles from the island. They seized the opportunity during April to run many more convoys and got across a record amount of supplies. These totalled 150,389 tons including 48,031 tons of fuel at a loss of less than one per cent. The result was that the Afrika Korps and the Italian Army on the Gazala line was well supplied and nearly ready to take the offensive while the Eighth Army saw no hope of being able to advance before June. Nevertheless the British submarines in April kept up their average rate of sinkings. During the month in 21 attacks firing 56 torpedoes they sank the cruiser Bande Nere and six ships of 19,585 tons although most of these were northbound and empty. Against this their losses were serious. Bombing in harbour had sunk four submarines, and two had struck mines off Valetta. Worst of all, however, was the loss of Upholder to a depth charge attack by the Italian torpedo boat Pegaso. Four of these losses were from the Tenth Flotilla, which was also reduced by the departure to refit of the damaged Sokol, Unique and Unbeaten. The Eighth Flotilla lost two boats and the Greeks one. The First Flotilla escaped casualties and was joined early in May by Taku from home waters. The new P42, as already mentioned, was intended for the Tenth Flotilla, but had been held at Gibraltar

The performance of the First Flotilla during May was, however, more than satisfactory. They succeeded in ten attacks in sinking the destroyer Pessagno and six ships of 18,700 tons as well as some schooners. They did this remarkably economically expending only thirty-three torpedoes. In the three attacks on convoys that missed, the reason in two and probably the third, was that the enemy sighted the torpedo tracks. This success by the First Flotilla during May occurred just after the departure of Captain SM Raw who was relieved in command of Medway and the First Flotilla after nearly two years during which time they had been based at Alexandria. Altogether forty-eight individual British and Allied submarines had come under his command and had operated in the Mediterranean^26a. They had sunk a cruiser, five enemy destroyers, five U-boats and some seventy supply ships and had damaged another cruiser. In achieving these results, sixteen submarines had been lost. Captain Raw was to take up the appointment of Chief Staff Officer (Operations) to A(S) and had been appointed a Commander of the Order of the British Empire in the New Year's Honours of 1942. He was relieved, as we have already noted, by Captain P Ruck Keene CBE RN, who had commanded the Third Submarine Flotilla in Home Waters in 1939-40 and had been Captain(S) First Submarine Flotilla when war broke out. He had come from the Western Approaches where he commanded the escorts based in Londonderry.

In spite of the efforts of the First Flotilla, however, the Italian Navy succeeded during May in landing a very large tonnage of supplies in North Africa totalling 86,439 tons including 18,581 tons of fuel with a loss of 7.2% on the way. On 26th May the Axis Army in Cyrenaica attacked with the object of capturing Tobruk and driving the British Eighth Army back to the Egyptian frontier. At first the attack was held and for nearly three weeks there was heavy fighting in the desert. At the time, the Royal Navy was busy with operations to relieve Malta. Convoys were to be run in from east and west simultaneously. More Spitfire fighters were to be flown in from the aircraft carrier Eagle and this was done on 3rd and again on 9th June. Practically all the British submarines in the Mediterranean were involved in these operations and attacks on traffic to Libya, although made whenever possible had become secondary.

The plan for the convoys to Malta from east and west during May was a major operation. The convoy from the west (code named 'Harpoon') consisting of six large merchant ships was to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar escorted by cruisers and destroyers, mostly from the Home Fleet. Its passage was to be covered by Force H, which consisted of the battleship Malaya, and the elderly aircraft carriers Eagle and Argus with 22 fighters and a striking force of 18 torpedo bombers. On arrival at the Sicilian narrows, the main units would turn back, and the convoy would be taken on by an anti-aircraft cruiser and destroyers that were under shore fighter protection from Malta. The convoy from the east (code named 'Vigorous') of eleven merchant ships would be escorted by destroyers and covered by Admiral Vian's light cruisers reinforced by two six inch gun cruisers from the Eastern Fleet. It would start with shore fighter protection from Egypt, and end with similar protection from Malta, but there would be a gap in the middle in which the ships would have to fend for themselves. Commandos were, however, landed to attack the airfield at Maleme by the Greek submarines Triton and Papanicolis. There was therefore only one capital ship on the British side whereas the Italians certainly had four and possibly five. This imbalance was to be redressed by the use of every available submarine to cover the two convoys and also by the use of air striking forces of shore based torpedo bombers in Malta and North Africa.The four submarines at Gibraltar were disposed in a line between Sardinia and Sicily to give warning of the approach of surface forces from Naples or which might come north through the Straits of Messina from Taranto or eastern Sicilian ports. These four boats, P211, P42, P43 and P44 were all brand new and three out of the four were on their first patrol. From Alexandria, nine submarines were available and they were to be used in a new way. Instead of being placed south of Messina and off Taranto as in former operations of this type, they were disposed in two patrol lines in the southern Ionian Sea just north of the convoy route. They would be moved as necessary to keep them in the best place to intercept the enemy. The reasons for this change seem to have been partly to avoid exposing submarines to the strong anti-submarine defences close to the enemy bases and partly because it was desired to use the submarines for attack rather than for reconnaissance. The enemy fleet generally left harbour after dark and the radar fitted reconnaissance aircraft now available were more likely to spot them than the submarines. The four boats of the Tenth Flotilla, Una, P31, P34 and P35, left Alexandria on 6th June to form the western patrol line and three submarines of the First Flotilla already on patrol, Proteus, Taku and Thorn, were joined by Porpoise and Thrasher to form the eastern patrol line²⁹. It is not intended to follow the fortunes of these two convoys in detail except to say that both were heavily attacked from the air.

The attempts by the Italian Fleet to intercept are relevant to our subject, however, and will be described in more detail. It was not realised at the time, that the Italians were desperately short of fuel and they had practically run out except for what was actually on board the ships. They were reluctant therefore to commit more forces than were absolutely necessary. They intended to use two groups.

While the 'Harpoon' and 'Vigorous' convoy operations were in progress, the Eighth Army in the desert suffered a severe reverse when making a counter attack and lost a large number of tanks. It was soon in full retreat towards the Egyptian frontier and on 21st June, Tobruk, which had been cut off behind the enemy lines, was attacked by Rommel and taken with the loss of a whole division of troops. The enemy wished to use Tobruk as a forward supply base as soon as possible and sent over 200 experts and technicians in the despatch vessel Diana of 1570 tons to open it up. The cryptographers revealed all to us, and Diana was intercepted by Thrasher, ordered to the spot from off Benghazi. She fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at her, hitting with four of them at a range of 700 yards, which sank her and drowned half of the experts. The British Army ashore, however, was forced back beyond the frontier and by the last days of June, the line was well to the east of Mersa Matruh. Plans had already been made to evacuate the fleet from Alexandria and on 29th Medway with the Greek depot ship Corinthia were sailed for Haifa. A strong escort of the light cruiser Dido and seven destroyers was provided but the asdic conditions were poor and early next day, U372 penetrated the screen and hit Medway with three torpedoes. All power was lost and she sank in seventeen minutes but fortunately only thirty out of a complement of 1135 officers and men were drowned. She took down with her a mass of submarine spare gear and stores and had 90 reserve torpedoes as deck cargo on board³¹.Forty-seven of these, however, floated clear and were picked up by the escort. The loss of Medway was a major disaster for our submarines in the Mediterranean. Captain Simpson witnessed her loss from the destroyer Sikh in which he was taking passage. Medway's ship's company lost no time in setting up a submarine base ashore at Haifa, which was at once named Medway II. The Tenth Flotilla submarines were sent to Port Said where a dock was available for their use.

As is clear from the events of June, the British submarines were mainly employed in operations designed to get supplies to Malta rather than to attack the enemy traffic to North Africa. Altogether they made eleven torpedo attacks over half of which were on enemy warships. Of the twenty-five torpedoes fired at these targets, ten were against large warships and fifteen against U-boats. The only success was the sinking of Trento by P35, a success that was shared with the RAF. Of the five attacks on supply ships firing fifteen torpedoes, three were successful sinking three ships of 4175 tons. The enemy, however, were not doing very well. The departure of Fliegerkorps II for Russia in May, meant that air attacks on their convoys increased and it is at this time that the Italian Official Naval Historian identifies the start of what he calls 'The Second battle of the Convoys'³². Although British aircraft during June only sank three ships of 16,701 tons, only 34,759 tons of supplies and 6760 tons of fuel left Italy and 23% and 17% respectively were lost on the way. The effect, however, was not immediate, as large stockpiles had been accumulated in North Africa in the preceding months.

THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS CHAPTER is an interesting one for maritime strategists. The sinking or disablement of the whole British Mediterranean battle squadron, and the decimation of Forces B and K, meant that the Italian surface fleet was now vastly superior in capital ships. The building up of an Eastern Fleet against the Japanese meant that no replacements could be provided. This indeed led to the loss of the command of the sea in the central Mediterranean and only two merchant ships got through to supply Malta. It also meant that surface operations against Rommel's supply line across the Mediterranean came to a standstill. The loss of Ark Royal and the needs of the Far East meant that the only aircraft carriers available had to be used for ferrying fighters to Malta, and aircraft of all types to Takoradi for onward transit to the Middle East. What was left of the Mediterranean Fleet was mainly occupied in supplying the garrison of Tobruk. The arrival of Fliegerkorps II in the Mediterranean drove the strike aircraft out of Malta and made any operations by Force K impossible. The only attack on the supply lines that continued throughout the period was by submarines. They exacted a steady toll month after month but it was not enough. The Axis were able steadily to build up supplies, which enabled them to take the offensive and recapture most of Cyrenaica. Submarine casualties were heavy, nine boats being lost. Six of these were sunk in Malta or its vicinity by bomb or mine, and the three lost on operations against the enemy supply routes were all sunk by escorts using the recently fitted German echo detection apparatus. In addition three submarines were so badly damaged that they had to be sent home to the United Kingdom for repair, and the four survivors of the Tenth Flotilla that got away to Alexandria were in a poor state and their crews were exhausted. The submarine base they left behind was in ruins. The submarines therefore in the end were also, by mine as well as by bombing, driven out of Malta. The submarines, however, although they lost the geographical advantage of Malta, were still able to operate and, as has been discussed earlier, could probably have done so more effectively with smaller losses, had they left earlier^32a.

In this period, submarines sank thirty-eight ships of 104,040 tons while aircraft disposed of six ships of 33,917 tons, some by bombing in harbour and surface ships only sank two small vessels of 810 tons³³.That greater disasters did not befall the British was mainly due to the severe fuel shortage that kept the Italian Fleet in harbour, but also because they declined to fight at night without radar. Their operations were also restricted by a decision to keep within fighter cover from the shore, which was seldom forthcoming. On the other side the coin was the priceless advantage that the British had with their cryptography, which gave them the Italian convoy movements in advance.