Home
Waters, The Normandy Landings to the Middle of 1944
References
Patrolgram
23 War patrols on Home Station Jan - Sep 1944 (1)(2)
Map 50 Anti-shipping campaign on
Norwegian Coast Nov 43 - Sep 44
Appendix
XIV Submarines in the Royal Navy 1 Jan 1944
DURING 1943,
THE UNITED KINGDOM arrived at the point where the end of her
available manpower came in sight. By late October, the Minister
of Labour was reporting that the mobilisation of the nation
was practically complete. Further expansion of the submarine
arm no longer depended on building capacity, on armaments
or facilities for training but on the supply of men. There
were already five million men in the services and another
million were needed to carry out all the strategic purposes
decided upon at the Casablanca Conference. There were formidable
rivals; the armies had to be built up to invade Europe; the
navy to oppose the U-boats and man the landing craft; and
the air force to build up Bomber Command, and many others.
In comparison the needs of the submarine branch were modest,
but nevertheless it filtered down from the Admiralty that
a standstill was likely to be imposed on the expansion in
manpower after the 1st April 1944, and that thereafter only
wastage would be made up. In order to decide upon submarine
building policy, therefore, the A(S) prepared a submission
to the Admiralty, prompted by the probability that the above
standstill would come into force. It also assumed that the
submarine campaigns at Home and in the Mediterranean would
be over by the end of 1944 but that the campaign in the Far
East would continue through 1945 and probably into 1946.
At the end
of 1943, the Royal Navy possessed 102 submarines, and another
nine British built boats had been manned by our Allies. Nineteen
more submarines belonging to the navies of our Allies and
built by them, were serving with the Royal Navy but not all
of them were operational. On top of these, the Italians had
surrendered 33 submarines and 27 ex-Vichy submarines had come
over to our side, but few of these were fit for operations.
The British had another hundred submarines building or projected.
Of these 17 were launched and fitting out; 32 hulls were building
on the slipways; 42 more were ordered and materials for their
construction were being procured and another nine were projected
but had not yet been started. Of these 26 were of the new
A-class, 20 of the T-class; 25 of the S-class and 29 of the
U and V-classes. The strength of the submarines in the Royal
Navy, in spite of the loss in action of 70 boats, had therefore
very nearly doubled since the outbreak of war. With a large
building programme equal to its numbers already afloat, it
was set for considerable further expansion. It was also backed
up by an almost inexhaustible supply of submarines for anti-submarine
training from the French and Italian Navies. This was the
material situation when the United Kingdom virtually ran out
of men.
In his submission
to the Admiralty, A(S) indicated that with the present building
programme, it should be possible to have a force of forty
operational in the Far East by the beginning of 1945. To keep
a force of this size on the station would need a total of
eighty operational submarines altogether to allow for refits
in the United Kingdom, for trials, working up and for passage
to and from the Far East. In addition to the eighty operational
submarines, it would be necessary to add 15% for losses and
wastage. This margin and the number needed for submarine and
anti-submarine training would require another fifty boats
or a grand total of one hundred and thirty submarines. A(S)
was therefore proposing a considerable increase in the submarine
fleet and without doubt was seeking for more men than he would
have on 1st April 1944. The operational force of submarines
in the Far East would consist of practically all the A, T
and S-class built and building, but the U and V-classes were
too small and so would provide the majority of the training
submarines. This would make some twenty-four elderly submarines
of pre-war construction redundant and A(S) proposed that they
should be scrapped or used as bottom targets for anti-submarine
training. There would still, however, be an imbalance in the
new construction programme and he proposed that some sixteen
submarines of the S, U and V-classes that had not yet been
ordered, should be cancelled and twenty more of the A-class
substituted as the 1946 War Programme. Operations in the Far
East would require four depot ships. Three of these, Adamant,
Maidstone
and Wolfe
were already available and a sister ship of Wolfe,
the liner Montclare, was already being converted.
The proposals
of A(S) were fully discussed in the Admiralty. Surprisingly
any suggestion that the expansion of the submarine fleet should
be restricted by manpower received little support and it was
considered that all the submarines we could build should be
manned. The proposal received the personal backing of the
First Sea Lord. Admiral Cunningham. With his experiences during
the British submarine campaign in the Mediterranean, he believed
that with their ability to operate unsupported in areas in
which command of the sea is in enemy hands, coupled with the
dependence of the Japanese on sea communications, meant that
submarines were a vital weapon for the Pacific war. No formal
approval of the policy submitted by A(S) was forthcoming,
however, although the 1946 war programme of twenty more A-class
in place of sixteen S and U-class was approved, as well as
the scrapping of the older submarines when they had been replaced
and were no longer required. It was not until August 1944
that the First Sea Lord, during discussions on manpower, ruled
that forty operational submarines should be provided for the
Far East. It is also surprising that the omission of A(S)
to include the submarines of our Allies in his calculations,
was not commented upon, especially the availability of a large
number of Italian and French submarines for anti-submarine
training, and that substantial savings in British manpower
might be obtained by using them instead of British submarines.
The design
of the new A-class had by now been finalised, but no submarines
of this type were expected to be completed before 1945. As the
only completely new type of British submarine designed during
the Second World War, its characteristics are of considerable
interest. Basically it was a submarine of the same size as the
T-class and designed for operations in the Far East. It had
two major improvements on the T-class embodied. The first was
a surface speed of 18 knots and the second was an operational
diving depth of 500 feet. The armament was sixteen instead of
seventeen torpedoes and these were disposed with six tubes forward
and four aft. A new anti-ship radar set was an integral part
of the design and it would be possible to use it submerged with
a periscopic aerial. It is of interest that, apart from the
radar, the staff requirements for the A-class were almost identical
to those of the O, P and R-classes of twenty years before. Whereas,
however, the O, P and R's had not met the requirements, modern
techniques used for the A-class were expected to enable them
not only to reach their designed characteristics on trials,
but to be able to repeat them in service without difficulty.
The diving depth of 500 feet was to be obtained by all welded
construction with better steel and with a circular cross section
throughout. The speed was to be reached by a streamlined double
hull design with engines of proven reliability of the same type
as in the T-class but of eight instead of six cylinders and
with supercharging to double the horsepower. There is no doubt
that the design was much influenced by the Fleet submarines
of the United States Navy. Their speed and anti-ship radar had
enabled them to be extremely effective in attacking Japanese
convoys on the surface at night. The A-class should be able
to do the same and have two added advantages. They were smaller
and handier and with their periscopic radar would be able to
complete their attacks submerged at night.
WE MUST NOW
TURN to the activities of submarines in Home waters during the
first half of 1944. Their main occupations continued to be training
and maintenance of the submarine branch, and only eight submarines
were employed on operations. Twelve boats were used for antisubmarine
training and five for submarine training. Fifteen submarines
were doing trials and working up, while eighteen were refitting
in the United Kingdom or in the USA. The number of patrols possible
in Home waters was increased substantially by the working up
patrol, which every new submarine or submarine emerging from
refit carried out before being sent to an operational flotilla.
The submarines in Home waters were now organised in six flotillas
and all of these had a duty to supervise submarine refits in
shipyards nearby. Operational submarines were attached to the
Third Flotilla in the Clyde or the Ninth Flotilla at Dundee.
The principal duty of the Third Flotilla, however, was the supervision
of trials and working up. The Sixth Flotilla at Blyth and the
Seventh Flotilla at Rothesay were concerned with submarine and
anti-submarine training, while the Fifth Flotilla at Fort Blockhouse
supervised shore training and refits in the south and sometimes
a visit by an operational submarine. The Twelfth Flotilla comprised
the X-craft and Chariot organisations.
In January,
no less than twelve submarines put to sea. Of these, Seanymph,
Satyr,
Stubborn,
Sceptre,
Seadog,
Venturer
and O15 were Home Station operational boats. Taku,
Telemachus,
Spirit,
Unswerving
and Stratagem
were new and making their first working up patrol. The working
up submarines made anti U-boat patrols mostly north of the Shetlands.
Of the operational boats, Satyr
patrolled off Statttlandet and was relieved by O15, Sceptre
followed by Stubborn
patrolled off Kya, Seadog
was off Skudenes, Seanymph
off Bodo and Venturer
off Sogne Fjord. The protection of the North Russian convoys
JW56 and RA56 by submarines was not considered to be important.
The main threat to them was now thought to be U-boats. After
Seadog's
success on 2nd, already described in Chapter XXI, these boats
had no further luck. On 25th, Seanymph
(Lieutenant JPH Oakley DSC RN) attacked a small merchant
ship escorted by a trawler in the Bodo area and fired four torpedoes
at 2750 yards but they missed. Next day, Stubborn
(Lieutenant AA Duff DSC RN) off Kya fired four torpedoes at
a slightly larger ship escorted by a whaler but the range was
4500 yards and she had no success either. RAF torpedo planes,
however, scored successes off Lister and Stattlandet. None of
the submarines on anti U-boat patrol saw anything at all and
this may have been because the U-boats, who had recently suffered
heavy casualties from aircraft, had orders to remain submerged
as much as possible when on passage and only to surface when
it was essential to re-charge their batteries. The weather during
January was, in any case, very bad and made lookout by submarines
either through the periscope or on the surface, very difficult.
The northern coast of Norway had, during this period, been left
entirely to the Soviet Northern Fleet. They attacked traffic
using aircraft and destroyers as well as submarines. Seven submarines
followed by three more, made patrols. Four attacks missed but
on 28th January, S56 sank a ship of 5056 tons from a
large convoy.
In February,
the weather was much improved. Six of the operational submarines
were out on patrol during the month. Taku
was off Skudenes, Sceptre
off Kya, Seanymph
off the Lofotens and Bodo, Stubborn
off Kya and Venturer
and Syrtis
off Stattlandet. Tradewind
was sent for her working up patrol to North Norway to intercept
U-boats operating against the North Russian convoys in the
Arctic. We knew from signal intelligence that the Arctic U-boat
Flotilla had recently been reinforced. Three other submarines,
Trusty,
Zeehond and Zwaardvisch, were sent on anti U-boat
working up patrols off the Shetlands but Vampire
and Unshaken
were despatched to the coast of Norway.
On 1st February,
Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN) off Kya, fired four torpedoes
at a small supply ship escorted by three trawlers. The range
was 1900 yards but she missed. On 3rd, she sighted a U-boat
and fired a full salvo of six torpedoes but the range was
4400 yards and although she thought she heard two torpedoes
hit, she in fact missed again. On 5th February, Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston RN) off Stattlandet, came upon a supply
ship at anchor and, after closing to 3200 yards, she fired
four torpedoes. One torpedo broke surface and ran crooked
but one of the others hit. The ship, Emsland of 5180
tons, was in fact aground after damage received from RAF Torpedo
planes. On 10th, Satyr
encountered a small ship escorted by two trawlers and fired
five torpedoes at a range of 5400 yards. Two hits were claimed
but in fact she did not score. Next day she sighted another
ship of about the same size escorted by a torpedo boat and
a trawler. She fired three torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards
but this time there was no doubt that she failed to secure
a hit. On 12th she returned to Stattlandet and the ship she
had hit on 5th was still aground. She closed to 2800 yards
and fired a single torpedo but it exploded short of the target
probably hitting the bottom. This was Satyr's
last torpedo and she could do no more.
Taku
(Lieutenant AJW Pitt RN), on patrol off Skudenes on 7th, fired
four torpedoes at a range of 3500 yards at a large ship in
a convoy escorted by four trawlers. She hit Rheinhausen
of 6298 tons, northbound with 9000 tons coal and sank her
in spite of one torpedo diving straight to the bottom and
exploding. On 12th Taku
fired four more torpedoes at an escorted ship at a range of
1200 yards, hitting Harm Fritzen of 4818 tons and she
had to beach herself to avoid sinking. In fact this did not
save her and she became a total loss. Next day Taku
fired a third salvo of four torpedoes at two ships in a convoy
of four with four escorts. The range was 1800 yards and she
hit and sank Bornhofen of 3000 tons with three out
of the four torpedoes.
On 11th February,
Stubborn
(Lieutenant AA Duff DSC RN), patrolling in Fro Havet, attacked
a convoy of seven ships with five escorts. She fired six torpedoes
at ranges of 2500 to 3000 yards at three of them and sank
both Makki Faulbaums of 1907 tons and Felix D of
2047 tons. On 13th, in Folden Fjord, she fired another salvo
of six torpedoes at two ships in a convoy of five with six
escorts at a range of 3000 yards. This time her luck ran out.
She missed and was heavily counter attacked, 36 depth charges
being dropped in a period of a quarter of an hour. Her after
hydroplanes jammed hard a dive, her Q tank flooded and the
starboard propeller was fouled. She dived out of control to
390 feet and had to be checked by blowing main ballast. This
caused her to break surface violently and when she vented
the main ballast tanks again she lost control and dived to
a depth of 500 feet with a pronounced bow down angle. An unexpected
shoal stopped her dive to destruction and she bottomed heavily.
Depth charging continued, putting her asdic and hydrophones
out of action and lasted for over four hours. After dark,
at 1930, she attempted to surface. It took three hours to
get her off the bottom and then it was found that her after
hydroplanes and starboard screw were free. Stubborn
then leapt to the surface with a seventy degree bow up angle
and found, to her intense relief, that the enemy had gone
home. We now know that they ran out of depth charges at 1830.
Stubborn's
port screw was badly damaged but she limped away from the
coast on one engine in a rising wind and sea. Next day at
1730, the steering gear failed when she was a hundred miles
out to sea. She then made distress messages by wireless but
did not get them through until the early hours of 15th February.
Fortunately the enemy did not sight her again and Tradewind,
returning prematurely from the north of Norway, was diverted
to her assistance and the destroyers Musketeer and
Scourge were despatched from Scapa. They found her
just before Tradewind
arrived on 16th and took her in tow. The tow parted after
eleven hours and progress was slow and difficult. By the 18th,
however, the destroyers Meteor and Swift and
the trawler Narvik made contact together with an escort
of Beaufighters, but she did not arrive at Lerwick until 0945
on 20th February. Stubborn's
Commanding Officer praised her construction and the steadiness
of her young and inexperienced ship's company, and gave thanks
for his astonishing luck.
The final
attacks on the enemy coastal traffic in this eventful month
were made by the Norwegian Ula (Loytnant RM Sars).
On 20th February she attacked a convoy of eight ships escorted
by six trawlers off Egersund and fired two torpedoes at a
medium sized merchant ship and two at a large tanker, but
the range was 6500 yards and they all missed. On 25th, she
fired three torpedoes at a range of 4800 yards at a small
merchant ship and although two hits were claimed at the time,
she missed again.
The submarine
campaign against the German traffic on the coast of Norway
continued into March but early in the month, intelligence
indicated that the repairs to Tirpitz were nearing
completion and that she would soon be ready for sea. It was
not expected that she would be ready for operations but would
probably be capable of making the passage to Germany to complete
her repairs in a dockyard there. On 1st March, there were
three submarines on the coast of Norway. Seanymph
was south of Bodo, Venturer
off Stattlandet and Sceptre
off the Kya Light.
Seanymph
(Lieutenant JPH Oakley DSC RN) ran aground in Lyngvaer Fjord
but fortunately suffered no damage. On 1st March, she fired
four torpedoes at a large transport escorted by a torpedo boat
and a whaler. The range was 1400 yards and a heavy explosion
was heard. This was Levante of 4869 tons carrying troops
but the torpedoes did not score a hit. The torpedoes had the
new CCR non-contact pistols but although they were set to go
off on contact, it seems that one of them fired prematurely.
On 3rd, Seanymph
fired five more torpedoes with CCR pistols at a range of 3800
yards at a large escorted merchant ship and, although explosions
were again heard, these torpedoes also failed to hit the target.
On 2nd, Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSC RN) made a night surface attack
on a merchant ship in a convoy firing four torpedoes at a range
of 1200 yards. These were also fitted with CCR pistols set deep
and to non-contact and explosions were heard. Thor of
2526 tons was sunk in this attack. On 6th, Venturer
fired her second salvo of four torpedoes at a range of 4300
yards at another large merchant vessel. They also had CCR pistols
and were set to non-contact and to run under. Explosions were
heard but no hits were obtained this time and prematures were
suspected.
On the 6th,
Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN), in Fro Havet, attacked a merchant
ship in convoy but she got too close. Nevertheless she got away
two torpedoes at 250 yards. These had CCR pistols and so should
have fired if they ran under but there was no result from this
attack. Next day, she attacked another convoy of three ships
with four escorts in Folden Fjord. She fired five torpedoes
aimed individually at the three ships and claimed to have hit
all of them. In fact she only hit one of them and Lippe
of 7849 tons was sunk. On 12th, Sceptre
made another attack firing three torpedoes with CCR pistols
at a range of 2600 yards at a small escorted merchant ship.
A hit was claimed and on 13th, she fired her last two torpedoes
in her bow tubes at a large ship with an escort of a trawler
and an aircraft. The range was 1200 yards and explosions were
heard but post war research does not confirm any hits in these
attacks. At the time this expenditure of twenty-nine torpedoes
with CCR pistols was thought to have been a great success and
to have hit at least six ships. In fact only two were sunk and
it is possible that CCR pistol failure or premature firing may
have been responsible for most of the misses.
Early in March,
photographic-reconnaissance Spitfires were sent to Vaenga in
North Russia to watch Tirpitz. By the middle of the month
there were definite signs that she was nearly ready for sea.
An escort was assembling and the repair ship, which had been
alongside for months, had shifted berth. The Home Fleet was
planning to attack Tirpitz with a carrier borne air strike
using the new Barracuda aircraft, which were capable of dive-bombing
as well as dropping torpedoes. The attack, however, was planned
to take place at the same time as convoy JW58 was on passage
to Russia in early April and there was now a danger that Tirpitz
might put to sea before this. It was important to intercept
her if she did and on 16th March, the Netherlands submarine
Zwaardvisch, Syrtis
and Taku
were sailed from Lerwick for the Norwegian coast. Zwaardvisch
(Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl HAW Goossens) was sent to Gimsos-trommen
outside the Lofotens, and Syrtis
(Lieutenant MH Jupp DSC RN) and Taku
(Lieutenant AJW Pitt RN) went to the Kya Light area. Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston RN) was moved from the Skagerrak approaches
to Stattlandet and was joined there by Vox
(Lieutenant JM Michell RN) who had been on her working up anti
U-boat patrol. At the same time, Ula (Loytnant S Valvatne)
was ordered to patrol off Bredsund and Trusty
(Lieutenant Commander JRG Harvey RN) and Vivid
(Lieutenant JC Varley RN) were sent to Skudenes. Of these eight
submarines, four were regular Home station operational boats
but the others were new vessels on trials and working up.
So important
was it considered that Tirpitz should not get back to
Germany that another eight submarines were mobilised and sent
to Lerwick. Two of these were working up and six were from anti-submarine
training duties. These were Truant,
Terrapin,
Sturdy,
Safari,
Una,
Unbending,
Unbroken
and the Netherlands Zeehond (ex-British Sturgeon).
All sailed from Lerwick for the Norwegian coast on 18th March
bringing the total number of submarines on patrol to sixteen.
After two days, however, intelligence indicated that Tirpitz
was not about to sail and that it was the repair ship Monterosa
that was about to return to Germany. On 20th, A(S) recalled
Unbroken,
Unbending,
Trusty,
Vivid,
Una,
Safari,
Zwaardvisch and Zeehond to continue trials and
training. Syrtis
was ordered to the Bodo area; Taku
to stay off Kya and Ula off Bredsund and Satyr
was to remain off Stattlandet. Terrapin,
however, was not recalled and was sent to Skudenes and Lister.
All these submarines were ordered to resume attacks on the Norwegian
coastal traffic.
On 21st, Ula
attacked a convoy of two ships escorted by two trawlers. She
fired three torpedoes at 2700 yards. She meant to fire a full
salvo of four but there was a drill failure and the three torpedoes
all missed. Next day Syrtis
off Bodo surfaced and sank the small Norwegian steamer Narvik
of 241 tons with her gun. Syrtis
was never seen again and failed to return to base on 1st April.
No enemy ship or aircraft claims to have attacked her and it
is almost certain that she struck a mine on 28th March. Mines
had been laid off Otvaer Fjord and in the entrance to Tennholm
Fjord and also in Fleinver Fjord and her patrol could have taken
her into these or a number of other small fields too1.
Syrtis
was lost with all hands including Lieutenant MH Jupp DSC RN,
her Commanding Officer, four other officers and 43 men.
On 24th March,
three of our submarines on the Norwegian coast attacked targets.
Taku
(Lieutenant AJW Pitt RN) approached a large and heavily escorted
tanker, firing a full salvo of six torpedoes with CCR pistols
at a range of 3500 yards. She had a drill failure with the second
torpedo but claimed one hit. Post war analysis shows she missed
or the CCR pistol prematured or failed. Terrapin
(Lieutenant DSR Martin DSO** RN), on her working up patrol
off Egersund, but with an experienced Commanding Officer, attacked
a large convoy of six ships escorted by two minesweepers, five
trawlers and two aircraft. She fired six torpedoes at 1500 yards,
four at a large tanker and two at a catapult ship2.
Two torpedoes hit the tanker Woerth of 6256 tons and
one the Schwabenland of 8631 tons, severely damaging
both ships. Both ships were towed in to Flekke Fjord where the
RAF later attacked them. The third attack on 24th was by Satyr
off Stattlandet. She fired four torpedoes with CCR pistols at
a range of 2000 yards, hitting and sinking Nord Norge of
340 tons. Next day, Satyr
ran aground and damaged her torpedo tubes, forcing her to abandon
patrol and return to base. On 24th, too, the 14,000-ton repair
ship Monterosa left Alten Fjord and sailed south. She
was past Syrtis'
patrol position off Bodo before air reconnaissance spotted that
she had sailed3.
Monterosa also evaded Taku
off the Kya Light and Ula off Stattlandet, leaving only
Terrapin
in ambush off Skudenes. On 30th, however, an RAF aircraft crashed
off Utsira and Terrapin
was sent to try to rescue the crew. While she was away, Monterosa
passed south and got to Germany safely. In this period, the
Soviet submarines were also active in North Norway. Some eight
or nine of them were deployed and made several attacks but without
success. L20, however, laid a minefield and landed a
raiding party.
On 3rd April,
the Home Fleet attacked Tirpitz in Alten Fjord with
a heavy carrier borne air strike. Tirpitz was about
to put to sea for trials and was hit by nine heavy bombs causing
over 400 casualties and putting her out of action for another
three months. The campaign against coastal shipping by our
submarines was therefore able to continue into April. On 4th,
Ula, off Stattlandet, sighted a large convoy of six ships
and eight escorts. She fired four torpedoes at 4100 yards
and hit the 6000-ton tanker Ill, damaging her so badly
that she had to be beached. Ula was subjected to a
counter attack of a hundred depth charges but none of them
was close. On 6th, she encountered a smaller convoy of two
ships with two escorts. She fired four more torpedoes at 2700
yards and hit Wesergau of 1900 tons and she had to
be beached too. Ula was again counter attacked, this
time by seventy depth charges but without damage. On 7th,
Unshaken
(Lieutenant J Whitton RN), on a short patrol off Lister, attacked
a convoy firing four torpedoes with CCR pistols and sank Asien
of 3894 tons. A second attack later in the day on a single
ship was unsuccessful, her four torpedoes, also fired at 2500
yards, missing. Unshaken
then, all her torpedoes having been expended in one day, had
to return to base after only three days on patrol.
Towards the
middle of April, a plan which had been under consideration
for some time, matured. It was to raid the inner Skagerrak,
which had not been visited by our submarines since 1940, and
was expected to provide easy targets in considerable numbers.
The Skagerrak had been protected by a mine barrage right across
its entrance since 1940 and it was known to have been reinforced
over the years4.
There was thought to be a gap at each end through which the
enemy traffic passed but it was considered safer for a submarine
to dive deep under the centre of the barrage in the same way
as submarines in the Mediterranean did when traversing the
Sicilian narrows. The plan was for three submarines to dive
under the minefield following each other in quick succession
by the same route. All three would stay in separate areas
inside until they had expended their torpedoes when they would
return by the same way as they had come. The original plan
to use three submarines had to be reduced to two after the
loss of Syrtis
and the damage to Stubborn
and on 10th April, Taku
(Lieutenant AJW Pitt RN) and Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSC RN) left Lerwick for the raid.
Taku
was to go in first and she dived deep early on 13th April
in a position just outside the minefield and roughly in its
centre. She set a course of 073 degrees along the 100 fathom
line where the current was expected to be favourable. She
hoped that in twenty hours at a speed of 2.7 knots she would
be clear of the far edge of the barrage. It would then be
dark and she would be able to surface to re-charge her batteries.
After five hours there was a heavy explosion overhead, putting
out all the lights, flooding the gun tower, causing many minor
leaks and injuring some of the crew by the concussion. Taku
wisely reversed course and withdrew the way she had come,
reporting by wireless what had happened as soon as she was
clear. We now know that the Germans, as an anti invasion measure,
had strongly reinforced the barrage very recently with deep
minefields right across. They had used a new type of mine
with an antenna down the mooring wire to fire if anything
touched it. Taku
was extremely lucky to survive and A(S) cancelled the raid.
She was ordered to return to base and Venturer
to patrol in the Egeroy area. A perusal of the German mine
charts recovered after the war shows that had the fields laid
in 1944 not been there, Taku
would have had an excellent chance to get through, most of
the older fields having been laid in 1942 and in 1940 and
no doubt many of these would have broken adrift or be defective
after so long a period.
After the
attack on Tirpitz in September 1943, the X-craft organisation
was left with the shore bases at Port Bannatyne and Loch Striven,
with the depot ship Bonaventure
and the prototypes X3 and X4. A new batch of
six operational X-craft was ordered numbered X20-X25,
but to allow Vickers to concentrate on building large submarines,
they were constructed by a consortium in the Midlands known
as the Rendel group5.
They were of the same general design as X5-X10, but
were made more robust to try and overcome the defects that
had plagued the operation when attacking the Tirpitz.
At the same time six more X-craft were ordered for training
purposes only, so as not to wear out the operational boats.
These were numbered XT1-6. All these X-craft were delivered
early in 1944 and progressed from trials and working up to
advanced operational training on the west coast of Scotland
based on the Bonaventure.
The Chariot
organisation was also flourishing but at this time it was
not very clear what they were to be used for. The Admiralty
suggested that they be used to attack European ports on the
coast from Calais to Bordeaux, and this was investigated thoroughly
by A(S). He concluded that there were no suitable targets
but the chariot organisation continued to be developed and
trained with its sights set on targets in the Far East.
By March the
new batch of X-craft had been delivered and some of them had
trained crews and were ready for action. During these exercises,
X22 was rammed and sunk by Syrtis
when engaged on towing practice and Lieutenant BM McFarlane
RAN and his crew were drowned. Clearly a repeat of the attack
on Tirpitz in Alten Fjord was completely compromised
and would be too hazardous, and there was a dearth of other
heavy German warship targets. There was, however, a floating
dock in Bergen that was much in use for the repair of U-boats,
and it was decided to make an attack on it during April. X24
was selected and she was to be towed to the scene of action
by Sceptre,
who had towed X10 to the attack on Tirpitz the
year before.
Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN) towing X24 (Lieutenant
MH Shean RANVR) left the Shetlands on 11th April and crossed
to Fedje in calm weather. X24 was slipped after dark
on 12th and entered Fejeosen. Sceptre
had total attack restrictions imposed on her and had to
watch a U-boat pass at a range of 500 yards on 13th. X24
entered the leads and proceeded for twenty miles on the surface,
diving for the last twelve miles. Early next morning she met
many merchant ships and had difficulty in avoiding being run
down. By 0800 the target was in sight but the dock was flooded
down. Lieutenant Shean made a dummy run and then attacked and
dropped both his charges. X24 made her way back to the
open sea, contacted Sceptre
that night and was taken in tow. She got back to Eddrachillis
Bay on 18th April with no defects at all. Unfortunately the
dock in Bergen was unscathed. X24, in this otherwise
model attack, had laid her charges under the 7800 ton Barenfels
lying nearby. Barenfels was sunk as well as another ship
of 1692 tons, blocking the coaling berth for the rest of the
war. The Germans did not realise what had sunk Barenfels
and thought it was sabotage.
In March as
well, X20 and X23 were sent south to Fort Blockhouse,
the submarine base at Gosport, to carry out operations in the
Channel. They were required to make reconnaissances for the
landing beaches in Normandy, an area too shallow for large submarines
to operate in at all. They were to work in the usual way with
Combined Operations Pilotage Parties personnel, but were to
use rubber dinghies instead of folbots for the actual reconnaissances.
After her
diversion from the Skagerrak raid to patrol off Egersund, Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSC RN) expended all her torpedoes.
On 14th April, she met a small merchant ship escorted by seven
fighter aircraft and fired three torpedoes with CCR pistols
at a range of 1200 yards which surprisingly missed or possibly
failed to explode. Next day she encountered a large ship escorted
by a trawler and fired three more torpedoes at 1500 yards and
these again missed. Later the same day she fired her last two
torpedoes with CCR pistols at a convoy of two ships escorted
by four trawlers at a range of 2200 yards. This time she hit
and sank Friedrichshaven of 1523 tons. Ula (Loytnant
S Valvatne) left Lerwick on 16th April to patrol off Skudenes.
On 19th she sighted a U-boat escorted by a minesweeper and achieved
a substantial success. She closed to 600 yards and fired a salvo
of four torpedoes hitting with one of them just abaft the conning
tower and sinking U974. This was not her only success
and on 23rd, she met a convoy early in the morning with several
escorts and while it was still dark. In a surface attack she
fired her second salvo of four torpedoes at 800 yards and hit
and sank Bahia of 4117 tons. Ula's highly successful
patrol was a fitting climax to the campaign against enemy coastal
shipping in the first few months of 1944. Anti-submarine activity
was now intense off the coast of Norway, and with the shortening
nights it was time for our submarines to abandon close patrols.
The Soviet submarines of the Russian Northern Fleet, however,
in spite of the constant daylight, continued operations against
coastal traffic along the north coast of Norway. They had recently
been reinforced by two more submarines, S16 and S19,
transferred by river and canal from the Caspian Sea. They persevered
in the difficult conditions and kept an average of half a dozen
boats on patrol. Results, however, were meagre and many attacks
missed. The only success in this period was the sinking of UJ1209
by S104 in June. L15 and L20 laid mines
and S104, M200 and M201 were heavily depth charged
after attacking convoys. The only loss, however, was S54,
probably by striking a mine.
May 1944 was
a month of inactivity for the Home station's operational submarines.
Final preparations for the landings in Normandy demanded intense
anti-submarine training for the many convoy escorts so operational
submarines had to be diverted to this task. With the withdrawal
from the coast in Norway by our submarines, however, and the
cessation of the RAF's 'Bay Offensive' to prepare for the invasion,
the opportunity to attack the enemy iron ore trade with Spain
seemed appropriate. This traffic, with the successful attacks
by our forces on the iron ore trade from Sweden, was now of
considerable importance. Nothing had been done about it since
the late summer of 1943 except that the French submarine minelayer
Rubis based on Portsmouth had laid two fields in the
Bordeaux area in late February and late March. The only result
of these lays was the sinking of the French Bernache
of 357 tons. Even now it was only found possible to send one
submarine to the Bay of Biscay and on 6th May, Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN) sailed from the Clyde to patrol
off Bilbao. Sceptre
arrived in her station on 15th and in the night of 20th/21st
sighted two darkened ships leaving harbour. It was impossible
to identify them and Sceptre
did not attack. The next night, when intelligence indicated
that two ore carriers were about to sail, she again sighted
two darkened ships leaving harbour. This time she fired a full
salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards and then dived.
An explosion was heard but it was soon realised that the two
ships were anti-submarine trawlers. Sceptre
was then depth charged and hunted for an hour and a half. In
fact the trawlers had been escorting the iron ore ship Hocheimer
of 1766 tons and two of Sceptre's
torpedoes had hit and sunk her. Sceptre
was informed of this next morning by A(S) who had been told
what had happened by intelligence. Sceptre
then shifted patrol to San Sebastian. On 22nd, she received
intelligence that the ore ship Baldur of 3594 tons, was
expected at Castro Urdiales and the submarine closed the place
to intercept. She found Baldur apparently at anchor,
and on 23rd May fired two torpedoes at a range of 2000 yards
both of which hit and sank her. It was then realised that her
quarry had been alongside a new jetty and had been sunk inside
Spanish territorial waters. Sceptre
was then ordered to Gibraltar and fortunately there were no
unfavourable diplomatic consequences. With the departure of
Sceptre
from the Bay of Biscay, our submarine operations in that area
finally came to an end and the landings in Normandy that took
place shortly afterwards made further patrols unnecessary.
There were
few other submarine operations during May. Virtue
(Lieutenant RD Cairns DSC RN) made her anti U-boat working
up patrol during the last week and X20 made a beach
reconnaissance near Arromanches in Normandy. The invasion
itself took place on 6th June without any other help from
the main submarine branch, which continued its business of
submarine and anti-submarine training with its sights set
on the Far East and a few anti U-boat patrols in the north
as if nothing had happened. X-craft, however, helped with
the invasion itself and on 2nd June, X20 (Lieutenant
KR Hudspeth DSC* RANVR) and X23 (Lieutenant GB Honour
RNVR) left Portsmouth and were towed halfway across the Channel
by trawlers. Here they were slipped and proceeded in to the
landing beaches under their own power. They approached submerged
and were able to fix their positions accurately by periscope,
X23 off the River Orne and X20 off Arromanches.
When the invasion was postponed for twenty-four hours, they
anchored and sat on the bottom. They then led in the leading
waves using a telescopic mast with a signal lamp. Subsequently
they were towed back across the Channel to Portsmouth.
The immediate
effect of the invasion on our submarine operations was that
U-boats ceased to use the Bay of Biscay, and all their transit
routes now passed north of the British Isles. Three anti U-boat
patrols to the east of the Orkneys and Shetlands were carried
out in June by the new submarines Visigoth,
and Subtle
on their working up patrols, but they saw nothing at all.
In mid June, Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston RN) was sent to patrol west of the Lofotens.
She sighted a U-boat on 13th but was unable to get into an
attacking position. On 15th she sighted another early in the
morning but was again unable to get close enough to fire torpedoes.
Two hours later, however, she sighted yet another and was
able to close to 3000 yards and fire a full salvo of six torpedoes.
The first two torpedoes either collided and exploded, or the
CCR pistol fired prematurely but in spite of this, two hits
were obtained and U987 was sunk with all hands. Another
U-boat was sighted shortly afterwards but Satyr
had not had time to reload her torpedo tubes. Patrol was then
shifted 120 miles to the northward on intelligence of U-boat
movements. Next day yet another U-boat was indeed sighted
but it was not possible to make an attack. At the end of June,
Viking
(Lieutenant R Bannar-Martin DSC RN) was sent up to the Arctic
to try and catch U-boats operating against the North Russian
convoys. She sighted U-boats on 3rd and 4th July but was unable
to get in an attack but on 5th, another U-boat appeared and
she was able to close to 600 yards and fire a salvo of four
torpedoes. However the first torpedo broke surface and the
U-boat, thus warned, was able to alter course and avoid the
others.
During July,
four more anti U-boat patrols were carried out. Those by Spark
(Lieutenant DG Kent RN), Shalimar
(Lieutenant WG Meeke DSC MBE RN) and Voracious
(Lieutenant FDG Challis DSC RN) in the Orkney and Shetland
area being completely blank. A patrol by Ula (Loytnant
S Valvatne) in the Arctic sighted a U-boat in very heavy weather
on 26th July but she was unable to attack. It is of interest
that all these sightings were made in the far north. This
is thought to be because Coastal Command was unable to make
many air patrols in that area and U-boats were able to spend
a considerable amount of their time on the surface. On passage,
north of the Shetlands, on the other hand, they proceeded
submerged by day and only surfaced at night. Another four
anti U-boat patrols in the Orkney and Shetland area during
August by Shakespeare
(Lieutenant D Swanston DSC* RN), Supreme
(Lieutenant TE Barlow RN), Upshot (Lieutenant MH Ferrar
RN) and Tudor
(Lieutenant SA Porter DSC RN) were also blank.
ON 20TH JUNE
1944, the A(S), Rear Admiral Barry, set off to tour the Mediterranean
and Far East Flotillas accompanied by some of his staff officers.
Admiral Barry, unfortunately, fell sick at Alexandria and
not only did his tour have to be cancelled but he was not
found to be fit enough to continue as A(S). Rear Admiral CB
Barry CB DSO had directed submarine affairs for twenty months
during which the submarine fleet had expanded to a total of
117 boats. The greatest operational success in Home waters
under his command had been the disabling of Tirpitz
in Alten Fjord in September 1943. On his return to active
duty in 1945, he was appointed Naval Secretary to the First
Lord of the Admiralty and later promoted to Vice Admiral and,
after his retirement became Director of Dockyards.
During 1944,
it became necessary to transfer a number of warships to the
Russians. The Russians had claimed a proportion of the Italian
Fleet after their surrender, and it was considered politic
to turn over a number of British and American vessels to them
instead. Four British submarines were included in the deal
and they were Sunfish,
Unbroken,
Unison
and Ursula,
which were numbered B1, B2, B3 and B4 respectively
in the Soviet Navy. They were taken over by Russian crews
during the summer and sailed from Lerwick for Murmansk at
the end of July. Sunfish
was unfortunately sunk in error by the RAF on her way
north. Four more elderly submarines, which would otherwise
have been scrapped, were retained in their place.
THE PRIMARY
FUNCTION OF OUR SUBMARINES in Home waters during the period
covered by this chapter, was the campaign against German coastal
shipping. The campaign had, in fact, begun in November 1943
and ended in May 1944. Its purpose can be summarised as a way
to take the offensive against the Germans and to deprive them
of the advantage of using the sea. They needed to use the sea
to import iron ore from Sweden and Spain and to supply their
armies in North Norway where land transport was weak and sometimes
non-existent. The submarine campaign was only part of a much
larger campaign by aircraft and surface forces as has already
been mentioned. The submarine campaign was really only possible
because the German heavy ships had been sunk or damaged and
were no longer a menace, because in winter the nights were long
enough for submarines to operate in northern latitudes, and
also because we now had good intelligence of where the German
minefields, specially laid to protect their coastal traffic,
were positioned. During the campaign 48 attacks were made firing
186 torpedoes. Altogether eighteen ships of 60,724 tons were
sunk and seven ships of 28,474 tons were damaged. One ship was
sunk by X-craft and another by gunfire. This total was achieved
by an average force of half a dozen submarines of which one
was lost. To put matters in perspective, it is of interest to
compare these results with those of other arms of the services.
Bomber Command6 laid
9,637 mines and sank 79 ships of 61,541 tons and damaged 15
of 28,134 tons for the loss of 48 aircraft. Coastal Command
anti-shipping strikes sank 36 ships of 48,007 tons and damaged
7 of 29,729 tons losing 55 aircraft.
Fleet Air Arm strikes from carriers sank 8 ships of 30,027 tons
and damaged 11 of 33,428 tons for the loss of six aircraft.
Finally the Dover coastal batteries sank two ships of 11,948
tons. These results added up to a very considerable success.
By May 1944, iron ore exports into Germany had fallen during
the year from 1,307,000 tons to 420,000 tons. Destroyers and
motor torpedo boats and occasionally cruisers, made many attacks
on coastal convoys in this period but their successes were almost
all against the escorts with which they tangled rather than
the merchant ships. Amongst their successes were the sinking
of the German torpedo boats T29, T27 and Greif and
the E-boats S147 and S141 for the loss of the
Canadian destroyer Athabaskan.
Against the
U-boats, our submarines carried out twenty-seven patrols, twenty-three
of these being by submarines working up. They made nine sightings
of U-boats, four of which developed into attacks, firing a total
of twenty torpedoes and two U-boats were sunk. Both of these
were sunk by operational rather than working up submarines and
one of them while the submarine was on an anti-shipping patrol.
Again, to put the matter into perspective, it must be pointed
out that, in the same period, Allied air and surface forces
sank no less than eighty-eight U-boats in the Atlantic but this,
of course, involved huge numbers of ships and aircraft. Sightings
of U-boats by our submarines was made difficult by the German
policy of remaining submerged as long as possible and only surfacing
to re-charge their batteries. The Schnorchel tube was just beginning
to be fitted in the U-boats and this would make matters worse
by enabling them to remain submerged all the time. The anti
U-boat patrols by our submarines were therefore no more than
a useful bonus in the Battle of the Atlantic at this time.
For operations
during the period of this chapter a number of awards were made.
Distinguished Service Orders were conferred for patrols off
the coast of Norway on Lieutenant Weston of Satyr,
who had also sunk U987, Lieutenant McIntosh of Sceptre,
Lieutenant Launders of Venturer
and Loytnant Valvatne of Ula who had also sunk U974.
Lieutenant Duff of Stubborn
was also awarded the DSO for bringing his ship back from its
ordeal off the Norwegian coast in February. Lieutenant Shean
of X24 also received the DSO for his attack on Bergen.
Lieutenant Launders was also awarded a Bar to his DSC and Lieutenant
Weston a DSC for their perseverance off the Norwegian coast,
and Lieutenant Pelly of Seadog
a DSC for his special operations off Spitzbergen. Finally the
X-craft operations connected with the Normandy landings were
recognised. Lieutenant Hudspeth of X20 received a Bar
to his DSC for his beach reconnaissance and a second Bar for
leading in the landing forces. Lieutenant Honour of X23
received a DSC for his part in beach marking.
