The
Build Up of British Submarines in the Far East: January - September
1944
References
Patrolgram 24
War patrols in Far East Jan - Sep 1944 (1)(2)
Map 51 Operations in Far East Jan
- Sep 1944
Appendix
XIV Submarines in the Royal Navy 1st Jan 1944
IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN AT THE BEGINNING OF 1944, there were still no signs
of an Allied offensive against the Japanese. Although a Supreme
Commander for the South East Asia Area had been appointed,
it needed more than planners to mount offensive operations.
Europe, with its invasion of Italy and the plans for landing
in Normandy, took most of the available resources, especially
of landing craft, and all that could be done was to build
up the infrastructure in Assam for an overland advance into
Burma. Although agreement had been reached at the Casablanca
Conference in January 1943 on the offensives to be taken against
Japan, the Prime Minister was not at all satisfied with them.
He favoured an amphibious advance to retake Malaya and Singapore
and to go on from there to recapture North Borneo and Hong
Kong before making an assault on Japan itself. The Americans,
however, wished to put all the available resources into the
two-pronged offensive in the Pacific, which had already begun.
In the southwest Pacific, hard fighting in the Solomons and
New Guinea throughout 1943 had thrown the enemy back and neutralised
Rabaul. In the Central Pacific, an island hopping amphibious
advance had retaken the Gilbert Islands and brought the Japanese
main fleet base at Truk within bombing range. So that not
only were the means for an amphibious advance lacking in the
Indian Ocean but also the high command of the Allies was at
loggerheads over what form it should take.
Nevertheless,
early in 1944, the Eastern Fleet was reconstituted. In January,
the battle cruiser Renown and the battleships Valiant
and Queen Elizabeth with the aircraft carriers Illustrious
and Unicorn accompanied by two more cruisers and twenty
destroyers arrived in Ceylon and were based at Trincomalee.
At last, after a year and a half, the Eastern Fleet was in
a position to defend the Indian Ocean rather than to hang
back at Kilindini in East Africa and let the Indian Ocean
defend the Eastern Fleet. They were, however, short of destroyers
and no offensive moves could be planned in the immediate future.
The Fourth Submarine Flotilla was an integral part of this
fleet but, although it had priority over all other submarine
areas since the Italian surrender, it still only consisted
of Adamant
and the five T-class Trespasser,
Taurus,
Tactician,
Tally
Ho and Templar.
Six other submarines were on the way out and were on passage
between the United Kingdom and Ceylon. These were Stonehenge,
Truculent,
Sea Rover, Surf,
Tantivy
and Storm.
The depot ship Maidstone
was also on her way and was having a short refit at Port Said.
Operations
in the Far East, however, were not confined to the Indian
Ocean. There was, in fact, a third American offensive in the
Pacific that we should consider and that was the American
submarine campaign against the Japanese sea communications.
The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, as the area of
the Japanese conquests was called, was entirely dependent
on the sea. The Japanese merchant marine of 6,052,000 tons
at the beginning of the war was scarcely large enough for
this purpose as it was. Up to the end of 1943, they had lost
from all causes 2,934,000 tons of shipping, two thirds of
which had been sunk by American submarines1.
In spite of a vigorous Japanese shipbuilding and repair organisation2,
the total tonnage available at the beginning of 1944 had been
reduced to 4,948,000 tons. The US submarine campaign had not
really got going until well into 1942 and initially suffered
a great deal from an unreliable torpedo. By the end of 1943,
however, it was going extremely well. Admittedly they had
lost twenty-five submarines in action. Nevertheless, one hundred
and twenty-three submarines based in Pearl Harbour in the
Hawaiian Islands and at Perth and Brisbane in Australia, were
waging unrestricted warfare and working in 'wolf packs' on
the surface at night. They were using their high speed with
radar and very high frequency voice radio, and these were
tactics with which the Japanese convoy escorts could not compete.
This was the campaign in which the British submarines wished
to take part, and was the main reason for the plan to transfer
their main operational strength to the Far East. The Fourth
Submarine Flotilla was, however, confined to operations in
the South East Asia Command, which meant the coast of Burma,
the Malacca Strait and the south west coast of Sumatra, but
not including the Sunda Strait. In this area there was little
except coastal traffic and no main shipping artery to be attacked.
The Japanese
Navy stationed at Singapore was the South West Area Fleet.
It consisted of the 16th Cruiser Squadron3,
the 1st Escort Flotilla4
and five naval air groups as well as the 3rd Submarine
Flotilla at Penang. The submarine base at Penang was also
used by the Germans for their U-boats in the Indian Ocean5.
These Japanese forces had responsibility for most of the Dutch
East Indies and Borneo as well and were not confined to the
Malacca Straits.
On 1st January
1944, three submarines of the Fourth Flotilla were on patrol.
Trespasser
(Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) was off the Burma coast
and the Andaman Islands, Templar
(Lieutenant DJ Beckley DSO RN) in the northern part of the Malacca
Strait and Tally
Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO DSC RN)
off the Sembilan Islands. Trespasser
tangled with the local antisubmarine forces off Port Blair and
was depth charged, and Templar,
after a special operation to recover agents had failed, had
to return early with defects to her high power periscope. Tally
Ho had ten agents with folbots and stores on board and
made periscope reconnaissances for them north of the Sembilan
Islands and off the Bernam River. After a rendezvous with a
junk, however, the situation was again judged too dangerous
and the agents were not landed. On 9th January, Tally
Ho sighted a Japanese light cruiser off Penang exercising
with destroyers but could not get within range. She was able,
however, to plot their route in and out of Penang and to take
up a suitable position to intercept in the future. Two days
later she sighted the same target and was able to close to within
1900 yards and fire seven torpedoes6,
two of which hit and sank Kuma of the 16th Cruiser Squadron.
The destroyer which was escorting her counter attacked with
18 depth charges but they were not very close. Then followed
a period of intense anti-submarine activity and Tally
Ho was bombed by an aircraft and slightly damaged. Kuma
was zigzagging at 20 knots and this attack was made in only
15 fathoms of water. It was the first substantial success by
the Royal Navy against the Japanese in the Second World War.
On 14th, Tally
Ho was submerged off Car Nicobar and sighted an escorted
merchant ship that passed out of range. At dusk, she surfaced
and pursued on the surface using radar and obtained a firing
position by midnight. She submerged in moonlight and attacked
firing six torpedoes at 5000 yards and scoring one hit which
sank Ryuko Maru of 2962 tons.
Tactician
(Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) put to sea on 5th January
and landed agents on the north coast of Sumatra but otherwise
had a blank patrol. Templar
was out again on 18th after changing her periscope and took
up her position in the northern part of the Malacca Straits.
On 24th January in the early morning, she sighted a Japanese
U-boat and fired six torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards but
it was flat calm and it seems likely that the enemy saw the
tracks and avoided them. On 26th, she sighted a second light
cruiser of the 16th Cruiser Squadron escorted by three destroyers.
She fired a full salvo of eight torpedoes at 6000 yards and
scored a hit on Kitagami. The cruiser, however, was only
damaged. She was able to get back to harbour and was later repaired.
On 31st, again early in the morning, she sighted another Japanese
U-boat. Templar
had expended all her bow torpedoes but got away three torpedoes
from her stern tubes. The range, however, was 7000 yards and
although she claimed a hit at the time, she missed. Templar
also had a special operation to pick up agents but it was unsuccessful.
Taurus
(Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO DSC RN) and Trespasser
(Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) both left Trincomalee for
patrol in January, Taurus
for the Andamans and Trespasser
for the Burma coast. Both had special operations to perform,
Taurus
landing 12 men and 9000 lbs of stores in the Andamans on 23rd,
and Trespasser
landing agents on Elphinstone Island on 5th February. Taurus
shifted to the south west coast of Sumatra and sank a tug and
a lighter by gunfire on 6th February. Trespasser
on 18th fired six torpedoes at a merchant ship with two escorts
at a range of 3600 yards, hitting with one of them and damaging
Ouri Maru of 3400 tons.
The first
of the six new submarines, on arrival from the United Kingdom,
was thrown into the fray just as soon as she could be prepared
for patrol. Stonehenge
(Lieutenant DSMcN Verschoyle Campbell DSC* RN) sailed on 1st
February for the Penang approaches, followed on 3rd by Tally
Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO DSC RN)
for a position south east of Penang. Truculent
(Lieutenant Commander RL Alexander DSO RN) and Tactician
(Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) put to sea on 8th and
10th for the north coast of Sumatra and to relieve Stonehenge
off Penang. On 5th, Stonehenge
sank an 889-ton ferry by gunfire. She had first fired two
torpedoes at a range of 800 yards but they ran under. Later
the same day she fired another four torpedoes at a small merchant
ship in ballast but the target sighted the tracks and avoided
them. Between the 6th and the 8th, she carried out a special
operation to land agents. On 12th, she attacked an escorted
seaplane carrier, firing four torpedoes followed by a fifth
in error. The range was 1200 yards and it was glassy calm and
the enemy probably avoided the torpedoes. Stonehenge
was counter attacked but got away her stern torpedo at the escort,
hitting but only damaging Choko Maru7,
a net tender of 890 tons. The hunt continued during Stonehenge's
withdrawal and she suffered minor damage. Nevertheless she got
away a single torpedo that completed the destruction of Choko
Maru.
Tally
Ho sailed with two agents and had a blank patrol, except
for being put down by a twin-engine aircraft, until 15th. On
that day she sighted a U-boat off the Dindings before it was
light. The U-boat was northbound for Penang from Singapore.
She fired three torpedoes from her stern tubes in a snap surface
attack at a range of 3500 yards and at once dived. She hit and
sank the German UIT23, an ex Italian submarine used for
cargo running between Japan and Europe. Between 17th and 19th,
Tally
Ho attempted to retrieve agents from the shore but was
unsuccessful. She was not able to find the junk in which she
was supposed to land two agents either. Altogether she spent
nine days on these special operations, during which targets
were not allowed to be attacked. She had to let a medium sized
escorted merchant ship go by, as well as the seaplane carrier
Kamikawa Maru, without attacking. On 21st February, she
fired five torpedoes at 1300 yards at the unescorted Daigen
Maru No 6 of 510 tons and hit and sank her in a position
50 miles west of the Bernam River. On 24th she had a night encounter
with the Japanese torpedo boat Keri. At first she thought
she was a U-boat and as both Truculent
and Tactician
were in the area, she made the challenge. By this time she was
too close to dive and tried to evade her on the surface but
ended by colliding heavily. The whole of her port external main
ballast tanks were seriously damaged but her pressure hull remained
intact and she was able to dive and get away. It is now known
that the enemy suffered considerable damage but got back to
harbour. Tally
Ho was able to get back to Trincomalee under her own
power although she had a heavy list when on the surface. Her
fore hydroplanes were also out of action and she was not easy
to control submerged. Halfway across the Bay of Bengal, heavy
weather was encountered but she was able to decrease the list
by shifting torpedoes and jettisoning fuel compensating water.
She proceeded to Colombo to dock and was repaired by Messrs
Walker and Sons, the local shipyard. On 14th, Truculent
fired four torpedoes on a rather late track at a small merchant
ship escorted by a torpedo boat but the range was 7500 yards
and she missed. Next day she fired four more torpedoes at 5500
yards at another ship escorted by a torpedo boat and with an
aircraft in attendance but it was calm and the torpedoes missed
or were avoided. However she sank a small coaster by gunfire
on the same day. Tactician
landed a beach reconnaissance party that had a measure of success,
and on 20th February she missed a Japanese U-boat at long range
firing five torpedoes at 5000 yards but under-estimating the
speed. On 28th she came upon a coaster lying stopped and fired
two torpedoes at 700 yards, one of which hit and sank her.
On 24th February,
the whole strategic situation was drastically changed by the
arrival of the Japanese Main Fleet in the Singapore area.
It consisted of five battleships including the two giants
Yamato and Musashi with their eighteen-inch
guns. Three aircraft carriers, and no less than nineteen cruisers
accompanied them with a large number of destroyers. This was
unquestionably a superior force to the British Eastern Fleet
and there were urgent consultations between the C-in-C and
the Admiralty, in which the Prime Minister intervened, as
to whether the Fleet would have to withdraw to Addu Atoll8.
At the time we had four submarines in the Malacca Strait.
Truculent
was on the north coast of Sumatra and Tactician
was off Penang, while Tally
Ho was limping away seriously damaged and Sea Rover
(Lieutenant JP Angell RN), who had sailed from Trincomalee
on 21st was just arriving. Surf
(Lieutenant D Lambert DSC RN) and Tantivy
(Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) had just left Trincomalee
and Tantivy,
after consultation with the Americans, was diverted to patrol
south of the Sunda Strait through which the enemy might well
emerge. Storm
(Lieutenant EP Young DSC RNVR), who had only arrived two days
earlier, was sailed on 24th February for patrol and Stonehenge
(Lieutenant DSMcN Verschoyle-Campbell DSC* RN) was got away
on 25th after only a week in harbour. Surf
was sent to patrol right into the Malacca Strait off the Aroa
Islands while Storm
went to the Penang side and Stonehenge
to the north coast of Sumatra. Nerves were, to a certain extent,
steadied by the offer of the US Navy to lend the aircraft
carrier Saratoga and three destroyers, and of the French
to send their new battleship Richelieu, recently completed
in the USA, to the Eastern Fleet. In fact, although it was
not known at the time, the Japanese had no offensive intention
for their main fleet in the Indian Ocean.
The US Pacific
Fleet had made devastating raids on the Japanese fleet base
at Truk in February and, although they had not caught the
fleet in harbour, they had done immense damage, sinking a
large number of auxiliary ships. The Japanese Fleet's appearance
at Singapore was therefore a retreat to keep out of range
of the American carrier borne aircraft. They set up their
new base in Lingga Roads, south of Singapore, where they were
close to the oil supplies at Palembang and the ex-British
dockyard at Singapore. They did, however, mount a raid by
three cruisers9
against shipping in the Indian Ocean early in March. They
only sank one ship south of the Cocos Islands. This raid from
Singapore was not seen by Tantivy
south of the Sunda Strait as it emerged, or by the American
submarine which relieved her in mid March as they returned.
Nor indeed was it seen by the Eastern Fleet on its way to
meet Saratoga coming up from Australia. The panic soon
died down and the Eastern Fleet submarines resumed their campaign
of attrition in the Malacca Strait.
Storm
sighted a westbound Japanese U-boat on 28th February in the
Nicobar Channel but was unable to get within effective range.
She pressed on into the Straits and on arrival ten miles north
of One Fathom Bank, encountered submarine chasers on patrol
and junks. On 7th March, she fired four torpedoes at an unidentified
vessel on a calm moonlight night but it turned out to be a
submarine chaser and the torpedoes probably ran under. She
was counter attacked with two depth charges and was hunted
for the rest of the night and again next day. Sea Rover
on 3rd March fired six torpedoes at 2500 yards at a Japanese
U-boat but the enemy turned away and she missed. Later, however,
she sank two coasters by gunfire and on 8th sank Shobo
Maru of 1950 tons with six torpedoes fired at 1200 yards
in an escorted convoy. Surf,
off the Aroa Islands, encountered heavy enemy patrol activity
but succeeded in destroying a tug and lighter by gunfire.
Stonehenge,
patrolling on the north coast of Sumatra, was lost with all
hands. This was the first British casualty in this area since
the outbreak of war and there is no indication whatever from
Allied or Japanese sources as to what happened to her. Her
captain was very young and, as shown by his activity in his
first patrol, full of offensive spirit. A submarine accident
cannot be ruled out9a.
She was lost with five officers and 44 men as well as Lieutenant
DSMcN Verschoyle Campbell whose Distinguished Service Order
was on its way to him when he was lost. Tantivy,
south of the Sunda Strait, saw nothing, as indicated earlier,
except patrol craft. Storm,
on her way back from patrol, sighted a coaster at dusk. She
engaged with her gun at 3000 yards firing in all 55 rounds
and closing to 900 yards when the enemy sank.
Six submarines
put to sea for patrol in March, one of which, Stoic
(Lieutenant PB Marriott DSO RN), was a new arrival and she was
sent first to Penang and then to Sabang. On 12th March she had
a night encounter with an escorted major unit and fired two
torpedoes by asdic at periscope depth from close range but she
missed. On 14th, she fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at
a large merchant ship escorted by a torpedo boat but the range
was 6500 yards and the track very broad and she failed to obtain
a hit. On 19th she sighted a U-boat and fired four torpedoes
at 3600 yards but the U-boat saw the torpedoes coming and avoided
them. Templar
(Lieutenant DJ Beckley DSO RN) on her fifth patrol, was unlucky,
and saw no targets but encountered considerable patrol activity.
Taurus
(Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO DSC* RN) and Trespasser
(Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) were armed with a new weapon,
the M Mark II mine. This was a 1000-lb ground magnetic mine
laid by firing it from the torpedo tubes. It had recently come
into service and it was hoped that it would be particularly
useful in the Malacca Straits against shipping coast crawling
in shallow water. Taurus
and Trespasser
each carried twelve mines in place of six torpedoes. Trespasser
laid her field on 14th March by the Outer Mati Bank off the
north coast of Sumatra and Taurus
laid her mines on 19th off the Aroa Islands. One of these fields
sank a small ship of 971 tons and on 27th April, the other damaged
the Japanese U-boat I37.
Truculent
(Lieutenant Commander RL Alexander DSO RN) attacked an escorted
convoy on 28th March firing four torpedoes at 1600 yards and
sank Yasushima Maru of 1911 tons and on 1st April, she
sank a coaster by gunfire. Taurus,
Trespasser
and Tactician
(Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN), who sailed on 31st
March, all carried out special operations, landing and recovering
agents in the Andaman Islands, on Langkawi and in North Sumatra.
Trespasser's
operation, however, was a failure. Tactician
was still on patrol on 19th April when the Eastern Fleet made
its first offensive move since the loss of Singapore. Aircraft
from Illustrious and Saratoga attacked the harbour
and storage tanks at Sabang. Tactician
was positioned off Sabang for air-sea-rescue duties during the
raid. She succeeded in rescuing an American pilot under fire
from shore batteries and in sight of an enemy torpedo boat10.
In March,
Maidstone
arrived in Trincomalee from the Mediterranean and the twelve
operational submarines in the Eastern Fleet were divided into
two flotillas. The T-class submarines remained in the Fourth
Flotilla based on Adamant
while the S-class transferred to the Eighth Flotilla and Maidstone.
Captain HMC Ionides RN, Captain(S) Four assumed the duties of
Senior Officer (Submarines) Eastern Fleet and was responsible
for the operation of the submarines of both flotillas. Captain
GBH Fawkes CBE RN had brought Maidstone
out but on arrival was relieved by Captain LM Shadwell RN as
Captain(S) Eighth Submarine Flotilla11.
Submarine
operations had, by now, settled down to a routine. T-class submarine
patrols normally were of 25 days at sea and S-class 20 days.
This depended upon the air conditioning system being in working
order. The few submarines without air conditioning, Surf,
and later Severn
and Clyde,
could not be expected to do more than 10-14 days at sea. Periods
in harbour between patrols varied according to the work to be
done but were seldom less than fourteen days and sometimes were
for three weeks. Half the crew were sent on leave for a week
each time and could elect to spend it in Colombo12
or at a rest camp in the hills at Diyatilawa. Tea planters
were generous in accommodating crews on their estates if this
was preferred.
Submarines
normally sailed from Trincomalee on patrol just before it got
dark. They were escorted to sea by one of the special escorts
attached to the submarine flotillas13.
About fifty miles from the coast of Ceylon, the escort would
turn back and the submarine would go on alone. At dawn, most
submarines would dive to ensure all was well and to adjust the
trim and would then surface and stay on the surface day and
night for the three or four days it took to cross the Bay of
Bengal. Radar would be used, backed up by lookouts to ensure
that the submarine would dive in time if ships or aircraft were
sighted. The submarine would also zigzag as a protection against
attack by enemy U-boats. On approaching the Andaman or Nicobar
Islands, which were enemy territory, it was usual to proceed
submerged by day at periscope depth and only to surface at night.
The batteries would then be charged and as much distance made
on the diesel engines as possible before it got light. On arrival
in the patrol area, the same routine would be followed except
that, after completing the charge, the submarine would remain
on surface patrol until it got light. Radar would be used or
not at the discretion of the Commanding Officer. There was a
general belief that the Japanese possessed search receivers
that could detect it. Asdic listening watch was always set when
submerged but was not of very much use on the surface, when
again watch would be set at the Commanding Officer's discretion.
Air conditioning made life tolerable submerged and ventilation
kept the submarine reasonably cool when on the surface at night.
The routine was arranged for all activity and cooking to take
place immediately after surfacing for the night. On diving in
the morning, an undisturbed period of sleep, the enemy permitting,
was indulged in. The rapid rising and setting of the sun in
the tropics meant that the period when nothing could be seen
through the periscope yet it was too light to surface was quite
short. In the tropics too, the nights were always long enough
to charge the batteries with plenty of time to spare. The return
passage was made on the surface as the outward passage had been
and the submarine escort was met fifty miles off Trincomalee
generally at night and so navigation had to be accurate if they
were not to miss each other. The submarine was normally alongside
its depot ship by breakfast time or soon after.
In March,
the Japanese Army in Burma attacked the British Fourth Corps
in Assam at Kohima and Imphal and fierce fighting continued
until July. It became important to prevent supplies arriving
at Rangoon by the sea route through the Malacca Strait and to
do this our submarines did their best. Fortunately the disposition
required for this was much the same as that needed to prevent
the Japanese main fleet making a sortie into the Indian Ocean
and to take a toll of the German and Japanese U-boats operating
from Penang.
EIGHT SUBMARINES
SAILED FOR PATROL during April, Tantalus,
Taurus,
Tantivy
and Templar
from the Fourth Flotilla, and Sea Rover, Surf,
Storm
and Stoic
from the Eighth. Tantalus
(Lieutenant Commander HS Mackenzie DSO* RN) was the only new
arrival on her first patrol. On 10th April, Sea Rover
(Lieutenant JP Angell RN), on the north coast of Sumatra,
missed a large merchant ship with an escort with six torpedoes
fired at 4200 yards. Ten days later, having seen nothing else,
she bombarded the railway that runs close to the coast in
north Sumatra. Storm
(Lieutenant EP Young DSC RNVR), on arrival off Port Blair
in the Andamans, had to let a convoy go as the ships comprising
it were too small to torpedo and the escort too strong for
her to use her gun. On 13th April, she missed a small tanker
escorted by a submarine chaser, with four torpedoes at 1200
yards in a night attack in moonlight, which started on the
surface and ended submerged. On 14th, this time in daylight,
Storm
fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a merchant ship with
three escorts and two aircraft overhead, but although she
claimed to have hit at the time, the range was 5000 yards
and in fact she missed again. On 15th, Storm
had yet another chance and fired her last two bow torpedoes
at a medium sized ship also with three escorts. The range
was again 5000 yards but this time she hit Special Minesweeper
No 7, one of the escorts, and sank her. On 16th, off the
Cinque Isles, Storm
engaged an anti-submarine vessel with her gun at a range of
5000 yards. The return fire, however, was accurate and she
had to break off the action and dive and was counter attacked
with six depth charges. In this patrol, Storm
had fired twelve torpedoes and suffered 44 depth charge explosions.
Tantalus
left Trincomalee on 12th April and as she approached her patrol
position off the Malayan coast a U-boat attacked her, but
the torpedoes fortunately missed. She went on and landed agents
near Dindings. On 1st May, she sighted an escorted merchant
ship of medium size and started an attack. The enemy, however,
altered course towards at a late stage and passed very close.
Tantalus
got away four torpedoes at 300 yards but they probably ran
under the target. She was able to surface as soon as it was
dark and set off in hot pursuit. Next day, after dark and
after a chase lasting over twenty-four hours, she got into
position to attack again and fired six torpedoes at a range
of 4000 yards, hitting and stopping the target. She then finished
off the enemy, which was Amagi Maru of 3165 tons, with
a single torpedo from one of her stern tubes. Before returning
to base, Tantalus
also sank a tug and a coaster by gunfire. Taurus
(Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO DSC RN) also sailed
on 12th April with twelve M Mark II mines embarked. She laid
them south of Penang on 18th April and then sighted a U-boat
approaching. She attempted an attack but 'missed the DA' and
failed to get her torpedoes away. On 22nd April, she surfaced
and engaged a tug towing a salvage vessel with her gun. During
the action she fired two torpedoes by eye but both missed.
Nevertheless she completed the destruction of the salvage
vessel Gio Hokuan of 560 tons and the tug with her
gun. Furthermore her mines sank Kasumi Maru of 1400
tons on the 12th May. Tantivy
(Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) was sent to patrol on the
west coast of Siam. On 29th April she found two damaged ships
in Phuket Harbour. One was partly submerged with a salvage
vessel alongside but she fired first one and then two more
torpedoes at a range of 4500 yards. The torpedoes either missed
or ran into mud and she had no success. On 4th May, she sighted
a Japanese U-boat and fired six torpedoes in a snap attack
on a late track at 3-4000 yards and missed. On 8th May, she
had another unsuccessful encounter with a U-boat but before
returning to base, sank a junk by gunfire. Stoic
(Lieutenant PB Marriott DSO RN) was sent to make a beach reconnaissance
on the north coast of Sumatra, where plans were being made
for a landing operation. On 6th May she looked into Sabang
and found a small merchant ship beached in the harbour14.
She fired three torpedoes at the long range of 6300 yards
but did not score a hit. Templar
(Lieutenant TG Ridgeway RN), also in early May, landed reconnaissance
parties in north Sumatra and recovered them successfully.
Surf
(Lieutenant D Lambert DSC RN), during April, visited the
Malacca Straits but had a blank patrol.
DURING MAY,
eleven submarines left Trincomalee for patrol in the Malacca
Strait. Truculent,
Tally
Ho, Tactician,
Templar
and Tantalus
were from the Fourth Flotilla, and Storm,
Surf,
Sea Rover, Spiteful,
Sirdar
and Stoic
from the Eighth. Spiteful
(Lieutenant Commander FH Sherwood DSC RCNVR) and Sirdar
(Lieutenant JA Spender RN) were newcomers on their first patrol
in the Far East. Three of these boats were entrusted with
special operations, Truculent
(Lieutenant RL Alexander DSO RN) landing and recovering a
reconnaissance party on the island of Simalur on the Indian
Ocean side of Sumatra, where a plan was being made to land
and establish an airfield. Storm
(Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR) landed an agent on
Pulau Weh to reconnoitre Sabang before the bombardment by
the fleet, but he was captured and she ran into an ambush
when trying to recover him fortunately without damage or casualties.
Tantalus
(Lieutenant Commander HS Mackenzie DSO* RN) also failed to
recover an agent from the coast of Malaya at Dindings. Seven
submarines laid mines. Surf
off the Butang Islands on 13th May, Tally
Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO DSC RN)
off Benja Shoal on 14th15.
Tactician
(Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) off Langkawi
on 16th, Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell RN) off the
Sembilan Islands on 18th, Templar
(Lieutenant TG Ridgeway RN) also off the Sembilans on 4th
June and Tantalus
off Dindings on 2nd June. The T-class laid fields of twelve
mines and the S-class of eight mines. As far as is known,
only one of these fields had any success, that laid by Tally
Ho damaging a ship of 1945 tons. Only four submarines
had the chance to fire torpedoes. On 17th, Tally
Ho sighted first an aircraft and then a German U-boat,
coming south between Kuala Selangor and Port Swettenham. She
fired five torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards but the U-boat,
later identified as U532, altered sharply away and
just succeeded in avoiding the torpedoes. Tally
Ho fired three more torpedoes on a late track but
they missed too. She now had only her stern torpedoes left
and she patrolled for another five days in the southern part
of the Malacca Strait. She was bombed by an aircraft that
caught her on the surface taking a sun sight, and was later
hunted by a minesweeper, two submarine chasers and a trawler
before returning to Trincomalee. On 22nd, Sea Rover encountered
a merchant ship escorted by two submarine chasers and two
aircraft and fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range
of 3900 yards. One torpedo hit and sank Kosho Maru of
1365 tons. On 28th, Templar
met two ships escorted by two trawlers and a submarine chaser
in the early morning. She fired her stern salvo of three torpedoes
and sank Tyokai Maru of 2658 tons with one of them.
She was counter attacked by the escort but was undamaged.
Subsequently there was considerable patrol activity. On 10th
June, Stoic
saw a small convoy and pursued it until it entered Phuket
Harbour. On 12th, she fired three torpedoes at a ship at anchor,
two of which hit and sank Kainan Maru of 1133 tons.
Finally five submarines used their guns. Tactician
destroyed two junks and took prisoners. Spiteful
bombarded Port Blair on 1st June and Tantalus
sank Hyoshi Maru of 535 tons on 10th. Sirdar
bombarded Sibolga and damaged a coaster and a junk also on
10th, and finally Stoic
destroyed three large junks and bombarded a bridge on the
coastal railway in north Sumatra.
Although the
number of ships sunk during the first five months of 1944 was
not large16, it represented
a substantial proportion of the local traffic and was making
it difficult and dangerous for the Japanese to use the Malacca
Strait. Most of the traffic was now in small ships, coasters
and local craft such as junks. In May the C-in-C obtained Admiralty
approval to sink junks. It was rapidly becoming apparent that
there were already more than enough submarines working in the
Malacca Strait and that with reinforcements arriving every month
that there was a need to expand their area of operations. Strategically
there was a need for our submarines to operate east of Singapore
and the Malay Peninsula to watch the Japanese Fleet based at
Lingga and to attack the main sea communications of their army
in Burma, which passed through the Gulf of Siam. This area was,
however, in the South West Pacific and was under American command
and would need their consent. The American submarine campaign
in the Pacific was going extremely well and in the first five
months of 1944 they had sunk 216 ships of 964,121 tons. This
was clearly where the targets were and our submarines were keen
to participate in this campaign too.
Although the
US fleet submarines with their long range, high speed and surface
search radar, were superior to the British submarines and would
remain so until the arrival of the new A-class in 1945, they
had one considerable disadvantage. This was their size and consequently
their inability to operate in shallow water. The area east of
Singapore and in the Dutch East Indies was shallow in many places
and the British submarines certainly felt that they had an important
role to play there. The employment of a British Fleet in the
Pacific had been under discussion since early in 1943. A submarine
element had always been included as a part of this fleet, but
current negotiations had led to an agreement that the British
Pacific Fleet was not required before 1945. Separate negotiations
for submarines to work earlier than this in the Pacific, however,
had now reached a conclusion. It was decided that when the third
depot ship, Wolfe,
arrived in August 1944 and British submarine strength reached
twenty-five boats, a flotilla would be sent to Australia to
operate from Fremantle in the South West Pacific Area. The US
Navy, however, imposed two conditions. The first was that the
logistic support should be provided entirely by the Royal Navy,
and the second was that the submarines would come under the
operational command of the Commander(Submarines), US Seventh
Fleet. There was no difficulty about the logistics, but the
change of command meant that the strategic purpose of the submarines
would no longer be the business of the British C-in-C, Eastern
Fleet but would be controlled by the Commander, US Seventh Fleet.
DURING JUNE,
twelve submarines left Trincomalee for patrol. No less than
five of these were newcomers on their first Far East patrol.
Some of the earlier arrivals in the Far East were, however,
due for refit and had begun to leave the station for home. Trespasser
(Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) had left at the end of March
and was followed by Tactician
(Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN). The new arrivals were
Tradewind,
Clyde,
Sturdy,
Spirit
and Stratagem.
Only three submarines were given special operations. Tradewind
(Lieutenant Commander SLC Maydon DSO* RN) and Truculent
(Lieutenant Commander RL Alexander DSO RN) had orders to capture
some Sumatrans to help with intelligence, which was successfully
accomplished. Tally
Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO* DSC* RN)
was ordered to bring off some agents landed previously but this
operation failed. Three submarines laid minefields, Tantivy
(Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) off the Sembilan Islands on
7th, Surf
(Lieutenant D Lambert DSC RN) off Langkawi on 9th and Truculent
off the Klang Strait on 14th. None of these minefields seemed
to have sunk anything. Six submarines in June made a total of
ten torpedo attacks altogether. On the 15th, Surf,
north of Penang, fired six torpedoes in three pairs at three
small ships escorted by four trawlers at a range of 800 yards
but they all missed or ran under. She was counter attacked with
depth charges but they were not close. On 18th, Storm
(Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR), also in the Penang
area, fired four torpedoes at an escorted ship at a range of
3000 yards and scored three hits sinking Eiko Maru of
3011 tons. The counter attack of seven depth charges was not
serious. Next day, on radio intelligence, Storm
was ordered to a position 80 miles north east of Sabang to intercept
a Japanese U-boat. She made a 125mile dash at full speed all
night and at 0905 sighted the enemy. She fired a full salvo
of six torpedoes at a range of 2500 yards but the U-boat saw
the tracks and altered course away and avoided it17.
On 20th June, Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell RN) sighted
a U-boat off Penang but was unable to attack. On 26th, she was
detected by anti-submarine patrols and depth charges were dropped
causing some damage. On 25th June, Sturdy
(Lieutenant WStG Anderson DSC RNR), on the west coast of Siam,
sighted a small merchant ship with one escort and fired four
torpedoes but they missed although the range was only 1200 yards.
On 26th, Truculent,
the first submarine to penetrate the waters above One Fathom
Bank in the Malacca Strait, made a difficult attack on a four
ship convoy escorted by two submarine-chasers, a motor launch
and an aircraft. She fired four torpedoes at the largest ship
at a range of 3500 yards and obtained two hits sinking Harukiki
Maru of 3040 tons17a. She was counter attacked
in shallow water and hit the bottom at 68 feet and although
some depth charges were close, she survived. On 28th, Spiteful
(Lieutenant Commander FH Sherwood DSC RCNVR), off the northwest
coast of Sumatra met a convoy of seven coasters and fired three
torpedoes at 1200 yards at the largest of them but they missed
or ran under. Stratagem
(Lieutenant CR Pelly DSC RN), in the Andamans area, expended
all her torpedoes for no hits in three attacks. At the time
she claimed hits in two of them but these have not been confirmed.
All were between the 1st and 4th of July and all were at long
range, the first, of four torpedoes at a small ship at 5000
yards, the second of six torpedoes at a larger ship at 7500
yards and the third with her last two torpedoes at a ship of
the same size at 7500 yards. On 4th July, Sturdy,
on the west coast of Siam, attacked a tug towing a large lighter,
firing three torpedoes at 500 yards but they ran under. She
then surfaced and sank both by gunfire. She also in the course
of this same patrol, sank another tug, four junks and four small
craft by gunfire and demolition charges.
Other submarines
did good work with their guns. Truculent
sank five junks, Sea Rover three and on 2nd July, Spiteful
sank a particularly large one of 70 tons. On 9th July, Spirit
(Lieutenant AW Langridge RN), on the north coast of Sumatra,
attacked a small tanker with her gun and set her on fire but
then had to dive for an aircraft before she could finish her
off. Tradewind
bombarded Sibolga on the west coast of Sumatra and Clyde
(Lieutenant Commander RS Brookes DSO DSC RN), the barracks
on Ross Island in the Andamans. Surprisingly Tally
Ho, the most successful submarine of the Fourth Flotilla,
had an almost blank patrol from 24th June to the 18th July.
However she was forced to dive by submarine chasers at night
off the Bernam River on 6th July and on 10th sighted a small
coaster close inshore that she engaged with her gun. She fired
40 rounds but the range was 4500-5000 yards and she only obtained
four hits and the enemy escaped into the Bernam River. The
operations of three submarines were connected with the movements
of the Eastern Fleet. Tradewind
was sent to patrol south of the Sunda Strait during the return
of the Fleet from its carrier air attack on Sourabaya18.
Tantivy
and Clyde
were stationed off Port Blair for air-sea-rescue duties during
an attack by aircraft from the Illustrious on 21st
June. Two of our aircraft were brought down but one was over
the land and the other crashed on its way back and the fleet
rescued its crew.
The carrier
air attack on Port Blair by Illustrious was synchronised
with the landings by the US Pacific Fleet in the Marianas.
These American amphibious operations led to the Battle of
the Philippine Sea and a resounding victory for the US Navy.
Three Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk and the air groups
of the remainder were cut to pieces. The American submarines
took a very important part in this famous naval battle, sinking
two of the aircraft carriers and giving first warning by their
reconnaissance of the approach of the Japanese Fleet. They
had also during June sunk forty-eight Japanese merchant ships
of 195,020 tons, which may be compared with the four ships
of 7719 tons, which was all the British submarines could scour
out of the Malacca Strait. After the battle, the Japanese
aircraft carriers retired north to Japan to reestablish their
air groups while the battlefleet returned south to Lingga.
At this time
our intelligence was greatly improved by cryptography and
other forms of signal intelligence. Information of the movements
of German and Japanese U-boats in the Indian Ocean became
available and also of movements of the Japanese Fleet. The
arrival of the Japanese Fleet in the Singapore area in February
was deduced from traffic analysis. Thirteen submarines left
Trincomalee for patrol in July, five of which were recent
additions to the Fourth and Eighth Flotillas. The first of
these was the elderly minelayer Porpoise
(Lieutenant Commander HAL Marsham OBE RN), who sailed on 1st
July and laid a total of 55 mines on 6th-8th July off the
Deli River in Sumatra. Forty-five of the mines were of the
moored contact Mark 16 type and ten were M Mark II ground
mines. These minefields scored three successes, Submarine
Chaser No 8, the tanker Takekun Maru of 3029 tons
and Special Minelayer No 119.
Porpoise
then sank a junk taking the crew prisoner and she returned
to Trincomalee on 13th. Telemachus
(Commander WDA King DSO DSC RN) and Tantalus
(Lieutenant Commander HS Mackenzie DSO* RN) sailed on 5th
and 6th for the inner reaches of the Malacca Strait. On 15th,
Tantalus
sighted an escorted convoy and closed, but before she could
attain a firing position, she was detected and counter attacked.
Sirdar
(Lieutenant JA Spender RN) and Templar
(Lieutenant TG Ridgeway RN) sailed from Trincomalee on 7th
and 9th for the Malacca Strait. In the middle of the month,
deciphered Japanese messages revealed the movement of two
U-boats and it was possible to position Sirdar
and Templar
to intercept one, and Tantalus
and Telemachus
the other. On 16th July, Sirdar
sighted a westbound U-boat on the surface and fired six
torpedoes on a fine track angle at a range of 500 yards. Unfortunately
she broke surface on firing and was seen. The U-boat opened
fire on her periscope and the torpedoes were avoided. Some
five hours later this U-boat was sighted, this time by Templar.
The weather was rough and she was only able to close to 3000
yards. She fired a full salvo of eight torpedoes but the U-boat,
now thoroughly on the alert, sighted the tracks and took avoiding
action. Tantalus
sighted the other U-boat on 17th July, which was the Japanese
I166, but before she could develop an attack, the U-boat
made a large alteration of course away. The same day, Telemachus,
off the One Fathom Bank, got into position to attack this
U-boat at a range of 2000 yards. She fired six torpedoes,
one of which hit and sank the large long range Japanese I166.
This success stirred up considerable anti-submarine activity
in the area and Telemachus
was hunted on 19th and 20th.
Stoic
(Lieutenant PB Marriott DSO RN), sailing from Trincomalee on
6th July, sank a landing barge and two junks off Penang by gunfire
and demolition charge. Intelligence indicated that supplies
for Burma, which arrived at Singapore by sea, were being sent
by rail to Mergui and thence by sea again to Rangoon in coasters
and other small vessels. Storm
(Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR) left Trincomalee on
15th for the area to investigate and had on board extra gun
ammunition and a boarding party. She arrived off Tavoy on 20th
and three days later decided to reconnoitre Port Owen. She met
the 554-ton coaster Kiso Maru northbound and engaged
with her gun at 800 yards, sinking her after firing 28 rounds
and then taking two prisoners. She later entered Port Owen in
heavy rain where it was too shallow to dive and engaged and
sank two small patrol vessels at a range of 1200 yards. She
had one member of her gun's crew wounded by the return fire.
She left by the southeast entrance and went on to investigate
Mergui. She engaged two landing craft but had to withdraw when
her gun jammed. She was later depth charged when at 60 feet
by the landing craft. In a night gun action on 1st August she
sank a 350-ton southbound coaster expending fifty rounds. She
then set the 100- ton schooner Kikaku Maru on fire and
she sank too. After sinking another 250-ton coaster, she set
a small vessel on fire and she blew up. Storm
now only had 12 rounds of 3" ammunition left. She was back
in Trincomalee on 7th August after this most successful patrol.
Tradewind
(Lieutenant Commander SLC Maydon DSO* RN) only encountered some
patrol activity inside the Malacca Strait; Tantivy
(Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) was sighted by an aircraft
when attacking an escorted merchant ship in a flat calm on 1st
August and had to abandon the attack; Thorough
(Lieutenant Commander JG Hopkins RN) had an encounter with an
antisubmarine trawler off Port Blair on 16th and was depth charged
while Stratagem
(Lieutenant CR Pelly DSC RN), on the west coast of Siam, had
a completely uneventful patrol.
Terrapin
(Lieutenant Commander DSR Martin DSO** RN) and Trenchant
(Lieutenant Commander AR Hezlet DSC RN) were sent to the south
coast of Sumatra off Benkulen for air-sea-rescue duties as part
of a raid by American B29 bombers from Ceylon, on the oil facilities
at Palembang in southern Sumatra. Before arrival in position,
Terrapin attacked a small
escorted merchant ship with four torpedoes at a range of 1000
yards but the target saw the torpedo tracks and took avoiding
action. On 5th August, she sank a coaster by gunfire and left
another on fire. On 5th August, Trenchant
fired three torpedoes from her stern tubes at what she thought
to be an escorted coaster but it was only a small fishing vessel
with a motor launch in company and the torpedoes missed or ran
under. On 9th, she sighted the same two ships and surfaced and
engaged with her gun sinking both of them and picking up fourteen
prisoners. The air-sea-rescue duties from 9th- 11th August were
uneventful. Templar
and Telemachus,
on their way home on 22nd-25th July had also carried out air-sea-rescue
duties for a carrier air attack and bombardment by the Eastern
Fleet on Sabang.
Templar,
who had suffered from a number of defects during her last patrol
in July, was sailed for home and refit in August. She was replaced
by no less than seven boats, which were Tudor,
Severn,
Statesman,
Strongbow,
Stygian,
and the Netherlands submarines Zvaardvisch (ex-British
Talent)
and O19. On 19th August, the depot ship Wolfe20
arrived in Trincomalee under the command of Captain JE Slaughter
DSO RN, Captain(S) Second Submarine Flotilla designate. Captain
Slaughter, as will be recalled, was an experienced Second World
War submarine captain who had distinguished himself in command
of Sunfish
during the Norwegian campaign. The Eastern Fleet submarines
by 1st September totalled twenty-seven boats and were re-organised
in three flotillas21.
It had already been arranged that the Eighth Flotilla should
be based at Fremantle in Western Australia and should work with
the US Navy in the South West Pacific Area under the Commander(Submarines)
Seventh Fleet. Maidstone,
escorted by the cruiser Nigeria, left Trincomalee for
Fremantle on 25th August and arrived on 4th September 1944.
Fourteen submarines
set out for patrol during August and they were divided into
two groups. The first group consisting of submarines from the
new Second Flotilla and the Fourth Flotilla, returned on completion
to Trincomalee, while the second group consisting of submarines
of the Eighth Flotilla, went on to Fremantle in Australia. Of
the first group, Tally
Ho (Commander LWA Bennington DSO* DSC* RN) sailed on
6th for the Malacca Strait and on 22nd August between Langkawi
and Penang engaged a 300-ton coaster with her gun. The range
was 2000 yards and it took 66 rounds to sink the wooden hulled
vessel. On 24th August, Tally
Ho sank three junks, of 50, 70 and 150 tons, all by
gunfire. Tudor
(Lieutenant SA Porter DSC RN), on her first patrol, went to
the north coast of Sumatra and undertook a special operation,
which was a beach reconnaissance, taking from 11th to the 24th.
She also sank a coaster by gunfire on 22nd. Severn
(Lieutenant RH Bull DSC RN) left on 7th to carry out two special
operations. These were to land men and stores in Siam and Malaya,
but both failed due to bad weather and serious engine defects.
Severn
had to abandon her patrol and limp back to base. She was found
to be unfit for any further operational employment. Statesman
(Lieutenant RGP Bulkeley RN), on her first patrol, was sent
to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. On 22nd August she fired
four torpedoes at a range of 3400 yards at a ship escorted by
two motor launches, two torpedo boats and an aircraft. She scored
a hit and sank Sugi Maru No 5 of 1983 tons. Two days
later, however, an attack on another convoy had to be broken
off when she was detected by the escort. Strongbow
(Lieutenant JAR Troup DSC RN), also on her first patrol, was
on the west coast of Siam and off Langkawi. On 2nd September,
she fired a single torpedo at a range of 500 yards and sank
Toso Maru No 1 of 800 tons. She also sank or drove ashore
a total of nine junks, a tug and two lighters with her gun,
assisted by demolition charges. Stygian
(Lieutenant GS Clarabut DSO RN) was also on her first patrol,
which was on the west coast of Burma and off Mergui. She sank
a schooner by gunfire and returned with some prisoners.
Of the second
group, on their way to Australia, Spiteful
(Lieutenant Commander FH Sherwood DSC RCNVR) patrolled on
the north coast of Sumatra where she saw nothing. She went
on her way to Fremantle on 16th and bombarded some oil tanks
at Christmas Island south of Java on 22nd as she passed. Zvaardvisch
(Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl HAW Goosens), on the east coast of
Sumatra sank four junks with her gun and continued her passage
to Fremantle on 22nd. She also reconnoitred Christmas Island
on 31st on her way. Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell
RN) had no contacts off the west coast of Burma between the
12th and the 18th and on her way to Fremantle carried out
air-sea-rescue duties off Padang on the west coast of Sumatra
for carrier borne air attacks. Sturdy
(Lieutenant WStG G Anderson DSC RNR), on the west coast of
Burma sank two coasters by gunfire and made a reconnaissance
of Hastings Harbour on 19th. She sank a 150-ton fishing vessel
on 27th when on her way to Fremantle. Sirdar
(Lieutenant JA Spender RN) patrolled on the north and west
coasts of Sumatra and on 1st September, in a gun action with
a coaster convoy, drove one of them ashore. She left on 5th
for Fremantle. O19 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl A van Karnebeek)
patrolled off Padang in west Sumatra and sank a coaster and
a junk, taking prisoners. She went on to Australia on 10th
sinking a coaster off Christmas Island on the way. Tantalus
(Lieutenant J Nash DSC RN) in the Malacca Strait, attacked
traffic inshore in face of anti-submarine patrols and sank
two coasters and a junk with her gun. She also damaged a tug
and drove another ashore before heading for Australia on 12th
September. Tantivy
(Lieutenant PH May RN), on passage direct to Fremantle,
was diverted to the Sunda Strait on 2nd September. She sighted
an escorted ship at night, estimated at 4000 tons, but her
attack was frustrated by a navigational alteration of course
and the three torpedoes she fired at a range of 4000 yards
missed. She took up the chase and in four hours had got into
position again and fired seven more torpedoes at 1500 yards.
This overwhelming attack scored two hits and sank Shiretoko
Maru of a modest 1800 tons. Tantivy
was counter attacked by the escort without damage and next
day left the area for Fremantle. Storm
(Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR) left Trincomalee
on 25th August to patrol off Mergui on her way to Australia.
She decided to patrol off Forest Passage and on 1st September,
after two days, sighted a northbound convoy of seven coasters
escorted by two small motor launches. Storm
fired five torpedoes, set to four feet, on the swing and spread
over several of the convoy but the torpedoes all either ran
under or missed. The convoy scattered but, passing behind
some islands, reformed and resumed its passage north. During
the night, Storm
headed north outside the islands and intercepted the convoy
again as it emerged into the open sea. She then surfaced and
engaged with her gun amongst the shallows. In a brilliant
action, lasting some 36 minutes, she fired 150 rounds and
sank both escorts and three coasters and damaged two others.
She left for Australia on 7th September reconnoitring Christmas
Island on the way and refuelling at Exmouth Gulf.
At the same
time, Porpoise
(Lieutenant Commander HAL Marsham OBE RN) was at sea preparing
for an operation that did not fit into either of the above
categories. This was Operation 'Rimau', which was to be an
attack on shipping in Singapore using a new type of submersible
canoe transported to the area by submarine. This was the brainchild
of Lieutenant Colonel Lyon of the Gordon Highlanders, who
had already carried out a successful attack of this nature
on Singapore during 1943 using local craft and limpet mines.
The operation involved the transport to the area of 25 men,
fifteen 'Sleeping Beauties', as the submersible canoes were
known, four folding assault boats and eight and a half tons
of stores. It could only be done by a large submarine, and
it had to be a minelayer using special containers in place
of her mines. The operation had to be completed before the
northeast monsoon broke in November. Porpoise
was detached from the Fourth Flotilla to Fremantle from where
the operation was to be mounted and she sailed from Trincomalee
early in August.
Wolfe
brought out a unit of seven chariots from the United Kingdom
under the command of Lieutenant Commander McCarter RNVR. Chariots
had not been used operationally since October 1943 when an
abortive attempt was made to attack shipping in Norway using
a Motor Torpedo Boat to transport them. Since then the new
Mark II Chariot had been developed, which was larger and the
divers sat back to back in cockpits inside it rather than
astride it with both facing forward. It carried twice the
weight of explosive head, was faster and had double the range.
It was designed to be carried on chocks on the external saddle
tanks of large submarines and did not need cumbersome containers23.
The obvious target for these chariots was the Japanese Battlefleet
based at Lingga south of Singapore. Plans were made for a
submarine to make a periscope reconnaissance of Lingga Roads
as soon as the Eighth Flotilla began operations from Fremantle.
With the departure
of the Eighth Flotilla for Australia, patrols in the Malacca
Strait were reduced somewhat. In all, nine boats sailed for
patrol during September. The pattern of patrols was the same.
Spirit
(Lieutenant AW Langridge RN) went to the west coast of Siam
where she sank four junks by gunfire. She then did air-sea-rescue
duties on the north coast of Sumatra while aircraft from Victorious
and Indomitable bombarded Sigli and made some photo-reconnaissance
flights. On 18th September she picked up the crew of a Barracuda
aircraft. Terrapin
(Lieutenant RHH Brunner RN) carried out a beach reconnaissance
on the north coast of Sumatra from 11th to 16th and also did
air-sea-rescue duty for the same air attacks as Spirit.
Trenchant
(Lieutenant Commander AR Hezlet DSC RN) sailed on 5th September
for the north and east coasts of Sumatra with a landing party
of Commandos to blow up a road and rail bridge over the Podada
River. The first landing attempt by eight men in four folbots
failed because the current coming out of the river mouth was
too strong. Next night, the 12th September, the landing was
made on the beach and the party struck inland until they met
the railway and the bridge was successfully demolished. On 16th,
Trenchant
laid twelve M Mark II mines in Aru Bay in shallow water and
this field sank Hozan Maru of 896 tons and Nikkaku
Maru of 1946 tons but not until 23rd January 1945. Two junks
were sunk by ramming on 19th after which information was obtained
by radio intelligence of the rendezvous of two German U-boats
with an escort off Penang. The Malacca Strait was crossed at
full speed on the nights of 21st/23rd September and position
taken up north west of Penang. There was a heavy swell and the
first U-boat was not sighted until she had closed to 2000 yards.
Three torpedoes of a stern salvo were fired at a range of 650
yards in a snap attack, one of them hitting and sinking U859.
Eleven of the crew were rescued and taken prisoner. The other
U-boat was not seen.
Tradewind
(Lieutenant Commander SLC Maydon DSO* RN) carried out two special
operations. The first was to land agents on the west coast of
Sumatra, which was successfully accomplished. The second, which
was to contact an agent near the Sunda Strait, however, failed.
On 18th September, she sank the escorted JunyoMaru of
5065 tons with two torpedo hits out of a salvo of four at a
range of 1500 yards.23a This was done in spite of
her lookout periscope being out of action. She also sank two
barges loaded with cement using demolition charges. Thorough
(Lieutenant Commander JG Hopkins RN) also carried out two
special operations involving beach reconnaissance and landing
agents on the west coasts of Burma and Siam and on the north
coast of Sumatra. On 23rd, she sighted a U-boat but was unable
to get into an attacking position. On 27th she sank a coaster
by gunfire. Stratagem
(Lieutenant AR Profit DSC RN) off the Andaman Islands during
the last part of September only saw anti-submarine patrols,
but on 30th she bombarded installations ashore at Ford Bay.
Tally
Ho (Commander LWA Bennington DSO* DSC* RN) after patrolling
for two days seventy miles north of Diamond Point, was sent
to the southern part of the Malacca Strait where it was restricted
and shallow. On 27th at dawn she sighted a sizeable coaster
coming north. She tried to head her off on the surface but was
forced to dive by aircraft. On 30th September, she intercepted
a convoy of three coasters escorted by three submarine chasers
close inshore, and fired one torpedo at a range of 1200 yards
at the leading coaster, but the torpedo was thought to have
hit fishing stakes short of the target. Tally
Ho then ran aground at periscope depth24.
On 4th October, she drove a coaster ashore by gunfire off the
Jumpal Bank firing 34 rounds at 4500 yards. A motor torpedo
boat then intervened and fired a torpedo but Tally
Ho was able to avoid it and to reach deeper water and
dive. On 6th, off Aru Bay, she surfaced and engaged Special
Subchaser No 2 in a gun action at 2500 yards. Tally
Ho sank her but not before her gunnery officer had been
mortally wounded by the return fire. Tally
Ho's bridge was holed in many places by 0.5" machine
gun fire and a member of the gun's crew was injured by a shell
case. A seaplane then appeared and was shot down by a Vickers
gun, but the Gunnery Officer died of his wounds that night and
was buried at sea. Tudor
(Lieutenant SA Porter DSC RN) laid ten mines off Langkawi on
24th September and on 8th-9th October, a special operation on
the west coast of Siam, to contact agents and land stores, was
carried out successfully. Statesman
(Lieutenant RGP Bulkeley RN) left to patrol off the Mergui Archipelago
on 27th and on 6th October she sank two coasters with her gun
and took prisoners.
The operations
of the submarines from Fremantle will be described in a later
chapter but the patrols of the first two fit more neatly into
this chapter. The first British submarine to leave Fremantle
for patrol was Porpoise
(Lieutenant Commander HAL Marsham OBE RN), and as we have seen,
she was not part of the Eighth Flotilla, but was lent from the
Fourth Flotilla at Trincomalee to carry out Operation 'Rimau'
which has already been outlined. After carrying out a number
of exercises after her arrival in Fremantle, she finally sailed
on 11th September with the twenty-four men of the attacking
force under Lieutenant Colonel Lyon and the fifteen 'Sleeping
Beauties' and other impediments. She transited the Lombok Strait
on 18th without difficulty and set course for the Karimata Strait.
Porpoise
was not allowed, by her orders, to attack or give away her position
except for an important target or reason and she had to let
a convoy go on 20th and a large unescorted tanker on 23rd. She
was, by now, having difficulty with a leak from an external
oil fuel tank. This was temporarily solved by transferring the
oil from this tank to one from which the fuel had been used
up. The plan was to land the stores on Merapas Island, south
east of Singapore, and set up a base. A junk was then to be
captured that would be used to transport the assault parties
with their 'Sleeping Beauties' to Singapore Roads where the
shipping was to be attacked with limpet mines. Porpoise
arrived in the eastern approaches to Singapore on 23rd September
and during the next week the stores were all landed at Merapas
and a junk was captured. Porpoise
left on 30th to return to Fremantle. She was to pick the
party up again between 7th November and 7th December. The return
trip through the Java Sea was made in heavy rainstorms and was
uneventful. The submerged passage south through the Lombok Strait
was difficult. Strong eddies and currents were experienced and
at times Porpoise
was scarcely controllable. She arrived safely in Fremantle on
11th October and went straight into dock to have her leaking
fuel tank repaired. The British and American commands, at this
time, did not realise that Operation 'Rimau' had met with disaster.
The junk with the assault force and the 'Sleeping Beauties'
was intercepted by a patrol vessel and fire had to be opened.
The men in several groups got back to Merapas Island but were
attacked there later and had to flee from island to island.
They were all eventually hunted down and killed or captured
and executed. Porpoise
was not repaired in time to pick up the Rimau party at Merapas
Island and Tantalus
undertook this duty instead. Tantalus,
of course, found nothing except signs that the party had left
in a hurry.
The second
operation was for Clyde
(Lieutenant RH Bull DSC RN) in which a large party from Force
136 and a considerable quantity of stores was to be landed
on the east coast of Malaya near Mersing. She sailed from
Trincomalee for Exmouth Gulf early in September where she
was to re-fuel. While there, she developed defects that made
it necessary for her to go to Fremantle to dock. Telemachus
(Commander WDA King DSO DSC RN) was at Fremantle and was ordered
to take her place and sailed on 14th September. The personnel
and stores were transferred to her at Exmouth Gulf and two
days were spent exercising. Telemachus
sailed on 21st and passed through the Lombok Strait on 26th
on the surface at night against a strong current. She reached
the coast of Johore on 1st October and landed most of the
party and stores about sixty miles north of Singapore on 5th.
She now also developed defects in one engine and a periscope
reconnaissance of Lingga had to be abandoned on 9th and she
returned to Fremantle. Her patrol lasted forty-four days and
the return passage of 2700 miles had to be made on one engine.
During the
period of nine months covered by this chapter, British and
Netherlands submarine strength in the Indian Ocean had risen
from one flotilla of five boats to three flotillas totalling
twenty-seven and furthermore all except three were modern
and up to date. This was as large a force of British submarines
as was employed in the Norwegian campaign or in the Mediterranean
except for a period during the Allied landings in North Africa,
when it was larger. It still needed thirteen more boats to
reach the planned total of forty for the beginning of 1945.
This figure had just been confirmed by the First Sea Lord.
The statistics
for the nine months show that eighty-nine patrols were carried
out and that a total of 63 torpedo attacks were made expending
268 torpedoes. In addition, 218 mines were laid in seventeen
fields, three quarters of which were magnetic ground mines
and the rest were of the moored contact type. All these led
to the sinking of the Japanese light cruiser Kuma and
serious damage to her sister ship Kitagami and to the
destruction of three U-boats, UIT23, I166 and
U859. Altogether thirteen attacks were made on U-boats
firing 67 torpedoes at these difficult targets and at least
four more were sighted which could not be attacked. The minor
war vessels Choko Maru (a netlayer) and Special
Minesweeper No 7 were also destroyed. In addition twenty
ships totalling 39,711 tons were sunk and another nine were
damaged. The use of submarine's guns backed up by demolition
charges and ramming destroyed another 98 coasters, junks and
small craft as well as the naval salvage vessel Hokuan
Maru, Special Subchaser No 2 and two of the ships
already listed totalling 1089 tons. Mines destroyed Special
Subchaser No 8 and Special Minelayer No 1 as well
as four of the ships already listed and totalling 7271 tons.
Also thirty-two special operations such as the landing and
recovery of agents and beach reconnaissances and, in one case,
the blowing up of a bridge, were carried out. Nine air-sea-rescue
missions saved two aircrew from falling into the enemy's hands.
Finally nine places were bombarded.
These results
when compared with the 408 ships of 1,798,669 tons sunk by
the American submarines in the Pacific over the same period
cannot but appear meagre. These were no more than our submarines
in the Mediterranean achieved in a couple of months during
1943. It must be pointed out, however, that the US Navy deployed
twenty times as many submarines at the beginning of the period
and still six times as many at the end. It must also be pointed
out that the marksmanship of our submarines in the Malacca
Strait was just as good as our submarines in the Mediterranean.
The reason for the low results was that the targets were simply
not available. Unfortunately the figures to show the number
of ships that got through have not come to light, but there
is little doubt that our submarines made the Malacca Strait
a very dangerous place for ships from light cruisers to junks.
Furthermore this result was achieved for the loss of only
one submarine while two more were damaged and another two
slightly damaged. By the 'exchange rate'25
sometimes used to judge the success of wars against
commerce, the campaign with a figure of twenty-six was doing
very well! The quantity of shipping sunk in a war against
commerce is, of course, important in assessing its success
when it is at its height. There comes a time, however, when
the enemy begins to run out of ships or refuses to risk them
at sea and then the number of ships sunk falls dramatically
even though the campaign is being won26.
It is arguable that this stage had already been reached in
the Malacca Strait in the autumn of 1944.
In the leading
place among the awards for the first nine months of 1944 in
the Far East must come the Bar to the DSO for Commander Bennington
of Tally
Ho for sinking Kuma. A Bar to the DSO also
went to Commander King of Telemachus
for his destruction of the Japanese I166 and a DSO
for Lieutenant Commander Hezlet of Trenchant
for sinking U859. Two other DSOs were awarded, one
to Lieutenant Commander Young of Storm
for four successful patrols and the other to Lieutenant
Verschoyle-Campbell of Stonehenge
who was thought to have sunk a seaplane tender on his first
patrol in which he also sank a coaster and the netlayer
Choho Maru. Commander Bennington of Tally
Ho also received a Bar to his DSC for destroying
UIT23 and a second Bar for his activities on patrol from
June to November. A Bar to the DSC also went to Lieutenant
Commander Collett of Tactician
and to Lieutenant Lambert of Surf.
DSCs were awarded to Lieutenant Beckley of Templar
for damaging Kitagami and to Lieutenant Commander Maydon
of Tradewind,
Lieutenant Commander Favell of Trespasser
and Lieutenant Commander Alexander of Truculent.