British and Allied Submarine
Operations in World War II
Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet KBE CB DSO* DSC

 

 

     
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CHAPTER XXV

The Build Up of British Submarines in the Far East: January - September 1944

References
Patrolgram 24 War patrols in Far East Jan - Sep 1944 (1)(2)
Map 51 Operations in Far East Jan - Sep 1944
Appendix XIV Submarines in the Royal Navy 1st Jan 1944

IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AT THE BEGINNING OF 1944, there were still no signs of an Allied offensive against the Japanese. Although a Supreme Commander for the South East Asia Area had been appointed, it needed more than planners to mount offensive operations. Europe, with its invasion of Italy and the plans for landing in Normandy, took most of the available resources, especially of landing craft, and all that could be done was to build up the infrastructure in Assam for an overland advance into Burma. Although agreement had been reached at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 on the offensives to be taken against Japan, the Prime Minister was not at all satisfied with them. He favoured an amphibious advance to retake Malaya and Singapore and to go on from there to recapture North Borneo and Hong Kong before making an assault on Japan itself. The Americans, however, wished to put all the available resources into the two-pronged offensive in the Pacific, which had already begun. In the southwest Pacific, hard fighting in the Solomons and New Guinea throughout 1943 had thrown the enemy back and neutralised Rabaul. In the Central Pacific, an island hopping amphibious advance had retaken the Gilbert Islands and brought the Japanese main fleet base at Truk within bombing range. So that not only were the means for an amphibious advance lacking in the Indian Ocean but also the high command of the Allies was at loggerheads over what form it should take.

Nevertheless, early in 1944, the Eastern Fleet was reconstituted. In January, the battle cruiser Renown and the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth with the aircraft carriers Illustrious and Unicorn accompanied by two more cruisers and twenty destroyers arrived in Ceylon and were based at Trincomalee. At last, after a year and a half, the Eastern Fleet was in a position to defend the Indian Ocean rather than to hang back at Kilindini in East Africa and let the Indian Ocean defend the Eastern Fleet. They were, however, short of destroyers and no offensive moves could be planned in the immediate future. The Fourth Submarine Flotilla was an integral part of this fleet but, although it had priority over all other submarine areas since the Italian surrender, it still only consisted of Adamant and the five T-class Trespasser, Taurus, Tactician, Tally Ho and Templar. Six other submarines were on the way out and were on passage between the United Kingdom and Ceylon. These were Stonehenge, Truculent, Sea Rover, Surf, Tantivy and Storm. The depot ship Maidstone was also on her way and was having a short refit at Port Said.

Operations in the Far East, however, were not confined to the Indian Ocean. There was, in fact, a third American offensive in the Pacific that we should consider and that was the American submarine campaign against the Japanese sea communications. The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, as the area of the Japanese conquests was called, was entirely dependent on the sea. The Japanese merchant marine of 6,052,000 tons at the beginning of the war was scarcely large enough for this purpose as it was. Up to the end of 1943, they had lost from all causes 2,934,000 tons of shipping, two thirds of which had been sunk by American submarines1. In spite of a vigorous Japanese shipbuilding and repair organisation2, the total tonnage available at the beginning of 1944 had been reduced to 4,948,000 tons. The US submarine campaign had not really got going until well into 1942 and initially suffered a great deal from an unreliable torpedo. By the end of 1943, however, it was going extremely well. Admittedly they had lost twenty-five submarines in action. Nevertheless, one hundred and twenty-three submarines based in Pearl Harbour in the Hawaiian Islands and at Perth and Brisbane in Australia, were waging unrestricted warfare and working in 'wolf packs' on the surface at night. They were using their high speed with radar and very high frequency voice radio, and these were tactics with which the Japanese convoy escorts could not compete. This was the campaign in which the British submarines wished to take part, and was the main reason for the plan to transfer their main operational strength to the Far East. The Fourth Submarine Flotilla was, however, confined to operations in the South East Asia Command, which meant the coast of Burma, the Malacca Strait and the south west coast of Sumatra, but not including the Sunda Strait. In this area there was little except coastal traffic and no main shipping artery to be attacked.

The Japanese Navy stationed at Singapore was the South West Area Fleet. It consisted of the 16th Cruiser Squadron3, the 1st Escort Flotilla4 and five naval air groups as well as the 3rd Submarine Flotilla at Penang. The submarine base at Penang was also used by the Germans for their U-boats in the Indian Ocean5. These Japanese forces had responsibility for most of the Dutch East Indies and Borneo as well and were not confined to the Malacca Straits.

On 1st January 1944, three submarines of the Fourth Flotilla were on patrol. Trespasser (Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) was off the Burma coast and the Andaman Islands, Templar (Lieutenant DJ Beckley DSO RN) in the northern part of the Malacca Strait and Tally Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO DSC RN) off the Sembilan Islands. Trespasser tangled with the local antisubmarine forces off Port Blair and was depth charged, and Templar, after a special operation to recover agents had failed, had to return early with defects to her high power periscope. Tally Ho had ten agents with folbots and stores on board and made periscope reconnaissances for them north of the Sembilan Islands and off the Bernam River. After a rendezvous with a junk, however, the situation was again judged too dangerous and the agents were not landed. On 9th January, Tally Ho sighted a Japanese light cruiser off Penang exercising with destroyers but could not get within range. She was able, however, to plot their route in and out of Penang and to take up a suitable position to intercept in the future. Two days later she sighted the same target and was able to close to within 1900 yards and fire seven torpedoes6, two of which hit and sank Kuma of the 16th Cruiser Squadron. The destroyer which was escorting her counter attacked with 18 depth charges but they were not very close. Then followed a period of intense anti-submarine activity and Tally Ho was bombed by an aircraft and slightly damaged. Kuma was zigzagging at 20 knots and this attack was made in only 15 fathoms of water. It was the first substantial success by the Royal Navy against the Japanese in the Second World War. On 14th, Tally Ho was submerged off Car Nicobar and sighted an escorted merchant ship that passed out of range. At dusk, she surfaced and pursued on the surface using radar and obtained a firing position by midnight. She submerged in moonlight and attacked firing six torpedoes at 5000 yards and scoring one hit which sank Ryuko Maru of 2962 tons.

Tactician (Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) put to sea on 5th January and landed agents on the north coast of Sumatra but otherwise had a blank patrol. Templar was out again on 18th after changing her periscope and took up her position in the northern part of the Malacca Straits. On 24th January in the early morning, she sighted a Japanese U-boat and fired six torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards but it was flat calm and it seems likely that the enemy saw the tracks and avoided them. On 26th, she sighted a second light cruiser of the 16th Cruiser Squadron escorted by three destroyers. She fired a full salvo of eight torpedoes at 6000 yards and scored a hit on Kitagami. The cruiser, however, was only damaged. She was able to get back to harbour and was later repaired. On 31st, again early in the morning, she sighted another Japanese U-boat. Templar had expended all her bow torpedoes but got away three torpedoes from her stern tubes. The range, however, was 7000 yards and although she claimed a hit at the time, she missed. Templar also had a special operation to pick up agents but it was unsuccessful. Taurus (Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO DSC RN) and Trespasser (Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) both left Trincomalee for patrol in January, Taurus for the Andamans and Trespasser for the Burma coast. Both had special operations to perform, Taurus landing 12 men and 9000 lbs of stores in the Andamans on 23rd, and Trespasser landing agents on Elphinstone Island on 5th February. Taurus shifted to the south west coast of Sumatra and sank a tug and a lighter by gunfire on 6th February. Trespasser on 18th fired six torpedoes at a merchant ship with two escorts at a range of 3600 yards, hitting with one of them and damaging Ouri Maru of 3400 tons.

The first of the six new submarines, on arrival from the United Kingdom, was thrown into the fray just as soon as she could be prepared for patrol. Stonehenge (Lieutenant DSMcN Verschoyle Campbell DSC* RN) sailed on 1st February for the Penang approaches, followed on 3rd by Tally Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO DSC RN) for a position south east of Penang. Truculent (Lieutenant Commander RL Alexander DSO RN) and Tactician (Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) put to sea on 8th and 10th for the north coast of Sumatra and to relieve Stonehenge off Penang. On 5th, Stonehenge sank an 889-ton ferry by gunfire. She had first fired two torpedoes at a range of 800 yards but they ran under. Later the same day she fired another four torpedoes at a small merchant ship in ballast but the target sighted the tracks and avoided them. Between the 6th and the 8th, she carried out a special operation to land agents. On 12th, she attacked an escorted seaplane carrier, firing four torpedoes followed by a fifth in error. The range was 1200 yards and it was glassy calm and the enemy probably avoided the torpedoes. Stonehenge was counter attacked but got away her stern torpedo at the escort, hitting but only damaging Choko Maru7, a net tender of 890 tons. The hunt continued during Stonehenge's withdrawal and she suffered minor damage. Nevertheless she got away a single torpedo that completed the destruction of Choko Maru.

Tally Ho sailed with two agents and had a blank patrol, except for being put down by a twin-engine aircraft, until 15th. On that day she sighted a U-boat off the Dindings before it was light. The U-boat was northbound for Penang from Singapore. She fired three torpedoes from her stern tubes in a snap surface attack at a range of 3500 yards and at once dived. She hit and sank the German UIT23, an ex Italian submarine used for cargo running between Japan and Europe. Between 17th and 19th, Tally Ho attempted to retrieve agents from the shore but was unsuccessful. She was not able to find the junk in which she was supposed to land two agents either. Altogether she spent nine days on these special operations, during which targets were not allowed to be attacked. She had to let a medium sized escorted merchant ship go by, as well as the seaplane carrier Kamikawa Maru, without attacking. On 21st February, she fired five torpedoes at 1300 yards at the unescorted Daigen Maru No 6 of 510 tons and hit and sank her in a position 50 miles west of the Bernam River. On 24th she had a night encounter with the Japanese torpedo boat Keri. At first she thought she was a U-boat and as both Truculent and Tactician were in the area, she made the challenge. By this time she was too close to dive and tried to evade her on the surface but ended by colliding heavily. The whole of her port external main ballast tanks were seriously damaged but her pressure hull remained intact and she was able to dive and get away. It is now known that the enemy suffered considerable damage but got back to harbour. Tally Ho was able to get back to Trincomalee under her own power although she had a heavy list when on the surface. Her fore hydroplanes were also out of action and she was not easy to control submerged. Halfway across the Bay of Bengal, heavy weather was encountered but she was able to decrease the list by shifting torpedoes and jettisoning fuel compensating water. She proceeded to Colombo to dock and was repaired by Messrs Walker and Sons, the local shipyard. On 14th, Truculent fired four torpedoes on a rather late track at a small merchant ship escorted by a torpedo boat but the range was 7500 yards and she missed. Next day she fired four more torpedoes at 5500 yards at another ship escorted by a torpedo boat and with an aircraft in attendance but it was calm and the torpedoes missed or were avoided. However she sank a small coaster by gunfire on the same day. Tactician landed a beach reconnaissance party that had a measure of success, and on 20th February she missed a Japanese U-boat at long range firing five torpedoes at 5000 yards but under-estimating the speed. On 28th she came upon a coaster lying stopped and fired two torpedoes at 700 yards, one of which hit and sank her.

On 24th February, the whole strategic situation was drastically changed by the arrival of the Japanese Main Fleet in the Singapore area. It consisted of five battleships including the two giants Yamato and Musashi with their eighteen-inch guns. Three aircraft carriers, and no less than nineteen cruisers accompanied them with a large number of destroyers. This was unquestionably a superior force to the British Eastern Fleet and there were urgent consultations between the C-in-C and the Admiralty, in which the Prime Minister intervened, as to whether the Fleet would have to withdraw to Addu Atoll8. At the time we had four submarines in the Malacca Strait. Truculent was on the north coast of Sumatra and Tactician was off Penang, while Tally Ho was limping away seriously damaged and Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell RN), who had sailed from Trincomalee on 21st was just arriving. Surf (Lieutenant D Lambert DSC RN) and Tantivy (Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) had just left Trincomalee and Tantivy, after consultation with the Americans, was diverted to patrol south of the Sunda Strait through which the enemy might well emerge. Storm (Lieutenant EP Young DSC RNVR), who had only arrived two days earlier, was sailed on 24th February for patrol and Stonehenge (Lieutenant DSMcN Verschoyle-Campbell DSC* RN) was got away on 25th after only a week in harbour. Surf was sent to patrol right into the Malacca Strait off the Aroa Islands while Storm went to the Penang side and Stonehenge to the north coast of Sumatra. Nerves were, to a certain extent, steadied by the offer of the US Navy to lend the aircraft carrier Saratoga and three destroyers, and of the French to send their new battleship Richelieu, recently completed in the USA, to the Eastern Fleet. In fact, although it was not known at the time, the Japanese had no offensive intention for their main fleet in the Indian Ocean.

The US Pacific Fleet had made devastating raids on the Japanese fleet base at Truk in February and, although they had not caught the fleet in harbour, they had done immense damage, sinking a large number of auxiliary ships. The Japanese Fleet's appearance at Singapore was therefore a retreat to keep out of range of the American carrier borne aircraft. They set up their new base in Lingga Roads, south of Singapore, where they were close to the oil supplies at Palembang and the ex-British dockyard at Singapore. They did, however, mount a raid by three cruisers9 against shipping in the Indian Ocean early in March. They only sank one ship south of the Cocos Islands. This raid from Singapore was not seen by Tantivy south of the Sunda Strait as it emerged, or by the American submarine which relieved her in mid March as they returned. Nor indeed was it seen by the Eastern Fleet on its way to meet Saratoga coming up from Australia. The panic soon died down and the Eastern Fleet submarines resumed their campaign of attrition in the Malacca Strait.

Storm sighted a westbound Japanese U-boat on 28th February in the Nicobar Channel but was unable to get within effective range. She pressed on into the Straits and on arrival ten miles north of One Fathom Bank, encountered submarine chasers on patrol and junks. On 7th March, she fired four torpedoes at an unidentified vessel on a calm moonlight night but it turned out to be a submarine chaser and the torpedoes probably ran under. She was counter attacked with two depth charges and was hunted for the rest of the night and again next day. Sea Rover on 3rd March fired six torpedoes at 2500 yards at a Japanese U-boat but the enemy turned away and she missed. Later, however, she sank two coasters by gunfire and on 8th sank Shobo Maru of 1950 tons with six torpedoes fired at 1200 yards in an escorted convoy. Surf, off the Aroa Islands, encountered heavy enemy patrol activity but succeeded in destroying a tug and lighter by gunfire. Stonehenge, patrolling on the north coast of Sumatra, was lost with all hands. This was the first British casualty in this area since the outbreak of war and there is no indication whatever from Allied or Japanese sources as to what happened to her. Her captain was very young and, as shown by his activity in his first patrol, full of offensive spirit. A submarine accident cannot be ruled out9a. She was lost with five officers and 44 men as well as Lieutenant DSMcN Verschoyle Campbell whose Distinguished Service Order was on its way to him when he was lost. Tantivy, south of the Sunda Strait, saw nothing, as indicated earlier, except patrol craft. Storm, on her way back from patrol, sighted a coaster at dusk. She engaged with her gun at 3000 yards firing in all 55 rounds and closing to 900 yards when the enemy sank.

Six submarines put to sea for patrol in March, one of which, Stoic (Lieutenant PB Marriott DSO RN), was a new arrival and she was sent first to Penang and then to Sabang. On 12th March she had a night encounter with an escorted major unit and fired two torpedoes by asdic at periscope depth from close range but she missed. On 14th, she fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a large merchant ship escorted by a torpedo boat but the range was 6500 yards and the track very broad and she failed to obtain a hit. On 19th she sighted a U-boat and fired four torpedoes at 3600 yards but the U-boat saw the torpedoes coming and avoided them. Templar (Lieutenant DJ Beckley DSO RN) on her fifth patrol, was unlucky, and saw no targets but encountered considerable patrol activity. Taurus (Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO DSC* RN) and Trespasser (Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) were armed with a new weapon, the M Mark II mine. This was a 1000-lb ground magnetic mine laid by firing it from the torpedo tubes. It had recently come into service and it was hoped that it would be particularly useful in the Malacca Straits against shipping coast crawling in shallow water. Taurus and Trespasser each carried twelve mines in place of six torpedoes. Trespasser laid her field on 14th March by the Outer Mati Bank off the north coast of Sumatra and Taurus laid her mines on 19th off the Aroa Islands. One of these fields sank a small ship of 971 tons and on 27th April, the other damaged the Japanese U-boat I37.

Truculent (Lieutenant Commander RL Alexander DSO RN) attacked an escorted convoy on 28th March firing four torpedoes at 1600 yards and sank Yasushima Maru of 1911 tons and on 1st April, she sank a coaster by gunfire. Taurus, Trespasser and Tactician (Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN), who sailed on 31st March, all carried out special operations, landing and recovering agents in the Andaman Islands, on Langkawi and in North Sumatra. Trespasser's operation, however, was a failure. Tactician was still on patrol on 19th April when the Eastern Fleet made its first offensive move since the loss of Singapore. Aircraft from Illustrious and Saratoga attacked the harbour and storage tanks at Sabang. Tactician was positioned off Sabang for air-sea-rescue duties during the raid. She succeeded in rescuing an American pilot under fire from shore batteries and in sight of an enemy torpedo boat10.

In March, Maidstone arrived in Trincomalee from the Mediterranean and the twelve operational submarines in the Eastern Fleet were divided into two flotillas. The T-class submarines remained in the Fourth Flotilla based on Adamant while the S-class transferred to the Eighth Flotilla and Maidstone. Captain HMC Ionides RN, Captain(S) Four assumed the duties of Senior Officer (Submarines) Eastern Fleet and was responsible for the operation of the submarines of both flotillas. Captain GBH Fawkes CBE RN had brought Maidstone out but on arrival was relieved by Captain LM Shadwell RN as Captain(S) Eighth Submarine Flotilla11.

Submarine operations had, by now, settled down to a routine. T-class submarine patrols normally were of 25 days at sea and S-class 20 days. This depended upon the air conditioning system being in working order. The few submarines without air conditioning, Surf, and later Severn and Clyde, could not be expected to do more than 10-14 days at sea. Periods in harbour between patrols varied according to the work to be done but were seldom less than fourteen days and sometimes were for three weeks. Half the crew were sent on leave for a week each time and could elect to spend it in Colombo12 or at a rest camp in the hills at Diyatilawa. Tea planters were generous in accommodating crews on their estates if this was preferred.

Submarines normally sailed from Trincomalee on patrol just before it got dark. They were escorted to sea by one of the special escorts attached to the submarine flotillas13. About fifty miles from the coast of Ceylon, the escort would turn back and the submarine would go on alone. At dawn, most submarines would dive to ensure all was well and to adjust the trim and would then surface and stay on the surface day and night for the three or four days it took to cross the Bay of Bengal. Radar would be used, backed up by lookouts to ensure that the submarine would dive in time if ships or aircraft were sighted. The submarine would also zigzag as a protection against attack by enemy U-boats. On approaching the Andaman or Nicobar Islands, which were enemy territory, it was usual to proceed submerged by day at periscope depth and only to surface at night. The batteries would then be charged and as much distance made on the diesel engines as possible before it got light. On arrival in the patrol area, the same routine would be followed except that, after completing the charge, the submarine would remain on surface patrol until it got light. Radar would be used or not at the discretion of the Commanding Officer. There was a general belief that the Japanese possessed search receivers that could detect it. Asdic listening watch was always set when submerged but was not of very much use on the surface, when again watch would be set at the Commanding Officer's discretion. Air conditioning made life tolerable submerged and ventilation kept the submarine reasonably cool when on the surface at night. The routine was arranged for all activity and cooking to take place immediately after surfacing for the night. On diving in the morning, an undisturbed period of sleep, the enemy permitting, was indulged in. The rapid rising and setting of the sun in the tropics meant that the period when nothing could be seen through the periscope yet it was too light to surface was quite short. In the tropics too, the nights were always long enough to charge the batteries with plenty of time to spare. The return passage was made on the surface as the outward passage had been and the submarine escort was met fifty miles off Trincomalee generally at night and so navigation had to be accurate if they were not to miss each other. The submarine was normally alongside its depot ship by breakfast time or soon after.

In March, the Japanese Army in Burma attacked the British Fourth Corps in Assam at Kohima and Imphal and fierce fighting continued until July. It became important to prevent supplies arriving at Rangoon by the sea route through the Malacca Strait and to do this our submarines did their best. Fortunately the disposition required for this was much the same as that needed to prevent the Japanese main fleet making a sortie into the Indian Ocean and to take a toll of the German and Japanese U-boats operating from Penang.

EIGHT SUBMARINES SAILED FOR PATROL during April, Tantalus, Taurus, Tantivy and Templar from the Fourth Flotilla, and Sea Rover, Surf, Storm and Stoic from the Eighth. Tantalus (Lieutenant Commander HS Mackenzie DSO* RN) was the only new arrival on her first patrol. On 10th April, Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell RN), on the north coast of Sumatra, missed a large merchant ship with an escort with six torpedoes fired at 4200 yards. Ten days later, having seen nothing else, she bombarded the railway that runs close to the coast in north Sumatra. Storm (Lieutenant EP Young DSC RNVR), on arrival off Port Blair in the Andamans, had to let a convoy go as the ships comprising it were too small to torpedo and the escort too strong for her to use her gun. On 13th April, she missed a small tanker escorted by a submarine chaser, with four torpedoes at 1200 yards in a night attack in moonlight, which started on the surface and ended submerged. On 14th, this time in daylight, Storm fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a merchant ship with three escorts and two aircraft overhead, but although she claimed to have hit at the time, the range was 5000 yards and in fact she missed again. On 15th, Storm had yet another chance and fired her last two bow torpedoes at a medium sized ship also with three escorts. The range was again 5000 yards but this time she hit Special Minesweeper No 7, one of the escorts, and sank her. On 16th, off the Cinque Isles, Storm engaged an anti-submarine vessel with her gun at a range of 5000 yards. The return fire, however, was accurate and she had to break off the action and dive and was counter attacked with six depth charges. In this patrol, Storm had fired twelve torpedoes and suffered 44 depth charge explosions. Tantalus left Trincomalee on 12th April and as she approached her patrol position off the Malayan coast a U-boat attacked her, but the torpedoes fortunately missed. She went on and landed agents near Dindings. On 1st May, she sighted an escorted merchant ship of medium size and started an attack. The enemy, however, altered course towards at a late stage and passed very close. Tantalus got away four torpedoes at 300 yards but they probably ran under the target. She was able to surface as soon as it was dark and set off in hot pursuit. Next day, after dark and after a chase lasting over twenty-four hours, she got into position to attack again and fired six torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards, hitting and stopping the target. She then finished off the enemy, which was Amagi Maru of 3165 tons, with a single torpedo from one of her stern tubes. Before returning to base, Tantalus also sank a tug and a coaster by gunfire. Taurus (Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO DSC RN) also sailed on 12th April with twelve M Mark II mines embarked. She laid them south of Penang on 18th April and then sighted a U-boat approaching. She attempted an attack but 'missed the DA' and failed to get her torpedoes away. On 22nd April, she surfaced and engaged a tug towing a salvage vessel with her gun. During the action she fired two torpedoes by eye but both missed. Nevertheless she completed the destruction of the salvage vessel Gio Hokuan of 560 tons and the tug with her gun. Furthermore her mines sank Kasumi Maru of 1400 tons on the 12th May. Tantivy (Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) was sent to patrol on the west coast of Siam. On 29th April she found two damaged ships in Phuket Harbour. One was partly submerged with a salvage vessel alongside but she fired first one and then two more torpedoes at a range of 4500 yards. The torpedoes either missed or ran into mud and she had no success. On 4th May, she sighted a Japanese U-boat and fired six torpedoes in a snap attack on a late track at 3-4000 yards and missed. On 8th May, she had another unsuccessful encounter with a U-boat but before returning to base, sank a junk by gunfire. Stoic (Lieutenant PB Marriott DSO RN) was sent to make a beach reconnaissance on the north coast of Sumatra, where plans were being made for a landing operation. On 6th May she looked into Sabang and found a small merchant ship beached in the harbour14. She fired three torpedoes at the long range of 6300 yards but did not score a hit. Templar (Lieutenant TG Ridgeway RN), also in early May, landed reconnaissance parties in north Sumatra and recovered them successfully. Surf (Lieutenant D Lambert DSC RN), during April, visited the Malacca Straits but had a blank patrol.

DURING MAY, eleven submarines left Trincomalee for patrol in the Malacca Strait. Truculent, Tally Ho, Tactician, Templar and Tantalus were from the Fourth Flotilla, and Storm, Surf, Sea Rover, Spiteful, Sirdar and Stoic from the Eighth. Spiteful (Lieutenant Commander FH Sherwood DSC RCNVR) and Sirdar (Lieutenant JA Spender RN) were newcomers on their first patrol in the Far East. Three of these boats were entrusted with special operations, Truculent (Lieutenant RL Alexander DSO RN) landing and recovering a reconnaissance party on the island of Simalur on the Indian Ocean side of Sumatra, where a plan was being made to land and establish an airfield. Storm (Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR) landed an agent on Pulau Weh to reconnoitre Sabang before the bombardment by the fleet, but he was captured and she ran into an ambush when trying to recover him fortunately without damage or casualties. Tantalus (Lieutenant Commander HS Mackenzie DSO* RN) also failed to recover an agent from the coast of Malaya at Dindings. Seven submarines laid mines. Surf off the Butang Islands on 13th May, Tally Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO DSC RN) off Benja Shoal on 14th15. Tactician (Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) off Langkawi on 16th, Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell RN) off the Sembilan Islands on 18th, Templar (Lieutenant TG Ridgeway RN) also off the Sembilans on 4th June and Tantalus off Dindings on 2nd June. The T-class laid fields of twelve mines and the S-class of eight mines. As far as is known, only one of these fields had any success, that laid by Tally Ho damaging a ship of 1945 tons. Only four submarines had the chance to fire torpedoes. On 17th, Tally Ho sighted first an aircraft and then a German U-boat, coming south between Kuala Selangor and Port Swettenham. She fired five torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards but the U-boat, later identified as U532, altered sharply away and just succeeded in avoiding the torpedoes. Tally Ho fired three more torpedoes on a late track but they missed too. She now had only her stern torpedoes left and she patrolled for another five days in the southern part of the Malacca Strait. She was bombed by an aircraft that caught her on the surface taking a sun sight, and was later hunted by a minesweeper, two submarine chasers and a trawler before returning to Trincomalee. On 22nd, Sea Rover encountered a merchant ship escorted by two submarine chasers and two aircraft and fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 3900 yards. One torpedo hit and sank Kosho Maru of 1365 tons. On 28th, Templar met two ships escorted by two trawlers and a submarine chaser in the early morning. She fired her stern salvo of three torpedoes and sank Tyokai Maru of 2658 tons with one of them. She was counter attacked by the escort but was undamaged. Subsequently there was considerable patrol activity. On 10th June, Stoic saw a small convoy and pursued it until it entered Phuket Harbour. On 12th, she fired three torpedoes at a ship at anchor, two of which hit and sank Kainan Maru of 1133 tons. Finally five submarines used their guns. Tactician destroyed two junks and took prisoners. Spiteful bombarded Port Blair on 1st June and Tantalus sank Hyoshi Maru of 535 tons on 10th. Sirdar bombarded Sibolga and damaged a coaster and a junk also on 10th, and finally Stoic destroyed three large junks and bombarded a bridge on the coastal railway in north Sumatra.

Although the number of ships sunk during the first five months of 1944 was not large16, it represented a substantial proportion of the local traffic and was making it difficult and dangerous for the Japanese to use the Malacca Strait. Most of the traffic was now in small ships, coasters and local craft such as junks. In May the C-in-C obtained Admiralty approval to sink junks. It was rapidly becoming apparent that there were already more than enough submarines working in the Malacca Strait and that with reinforcements arriving every month that there was a need to expand their area of operations. Strategically there was a need for our submarines to operate east of Singapore and the Malay Peninsula to watch the Japanese Fleet based at Lingga and to attack the main sea communications of their army in Burma, which passed through the Gulf of Siam. This area was, however, in the South West Pacific and was under American command and would need their consent. The American submarine campaign in the Pacific was going extremely well and in the first five months of 1944 they had sunk 216 ships of 964,121 tons. This was clearly where the targets were and our submarines were keen to participate in this campaign too.

Although the US fleet submarines with their long range, high speed and surface search radar, were superior to the British submarines and would remain so until the arrival of the new A-class in 1945, they had one considerable disadvantage. This was their size and consequently their inability to operate in shallow water. The area east of Singapore and in the Dutch East Indies was shallow in many places and the British submarines certainly felt that they had an important role to play there. The employment of a British Fleet in the Pacific had been under discussion since early in 1943. A submarine element had always been included as a part of this fleet, but current negotiations had led to an agreement that the British Pacific Fleet was not required before 1945. Separate negotiations for submarines to work earlier than this in the Pacific, however, had now reached a conclusion. It was decided that when the third depot ship, Wolfe, arrived in August 1944 and British submarine strength reached twenty-five boats, a flotilla would be sent to Australia to operate from Fremantle in the South West Pacific Area. The US Navy, however, imposed two conditions. The first was that the logistic support should be provided entirely by the Royal Navy, and the second was that the submarines would come under the operational command of the Commander(Submarines), US Seventh Fleet. There was no difficulty about the logistics, but the change of command meant that the strategic purpose of the submarines would no longer be the business of the British C-in-C, Eastern Fleet but would be controlled by the Commander, US Seventh Fleet.

DURING JUNE, twelve submarines left Trincomalee for patrol. No less than five of these were newcomers on their first Far East patrol. Some of the earlier arrivals in the Far East were, however, due for refit and had begun to leave the station for home. Trespasser (Lieutenant Commander RM Favell RN) had left at the end of March and was followed by Tactician (Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN). The new arrivals were Tradewind, Clyde, Sturdy, Spirit and Stratagem. Only three submarines were given special operations. Tradewind (Lieutenant Commander SLC Maydon DSO* RN) and Truculent (Lieutenant Commander RL Alexander DSO RN) had orders to capture some Sumatrans to help with intelligence, which was successfully accomplished. Tally Ho (Lieutenant Commander LWA Bennington DSO* DSC* RN) was ordered to bring off some agents landed previously but this operation failed. Three submarines laid minefields, Tantivy (Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) off the Sembilan Islands on 7th, Surf (Lieutenant D Lambert DSC RN) off Langkawi on 9th and Truculent off the Klang Strait on 14th. None of these minefields seemed to have sunk anything. Six submarines in June made a total of ten torpedo attacks altogether. On the 15th, Surf, north of Penang, fired six torpedoes in three pairs at three small ships escorted by four trawlers at a range of 800 yards but they all missed or ran under. She was counter attacked with depth charges but they were not close. On 18th, Storm (Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR), also in the Penang area, fired four torpedoes at an escorted ship at a range of 3000 yards and scored three hits sinking Eiko Maru of 3011 tons. The counter attack of seven depth charges was not serious. Next day, on radio intelligence, Storm was ordered to a position 80 miles north east of Sabang to intercept a Japanese U-boat. She made a 125mile dash at full speed all night and at 0905 sighted the enemy. She fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 2500 yards but the U-boat saw the tracks and altered course away and avoided it17. On 20th June, Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell RN) sighted a U-boat off Penang but was unable to attack. On 26th, she was detected by anti-submarine patrols and depth charges were dropped causing some damage. On 25th June, Sturdy (Lieutenant WStG Anderson DSC RNR), on the west coast of Siam, sighted a small merchant ship with one escort and fired four torpedoes but they missed although the range was only 1200 yards. On 26th, Truculent, the first submarine to penetrate the waters above One Fathom Bank in the Malacca Strait, made a difficult attack on a four ship convoy escorted by two submarine-chasers, a motor launch and an aircraft. She fired four torpedoes at the largest ship at a range of 3500 yards and obtained two hits sinking Harukiki Maru of 3040 tons17a. She was counter attacked in shallow water and hit the bottom at 68 feet and although some depth charges were close, she survived. On 28th, Spiteful (Lieutenant Commander FH Sherwood DSC RCNVR), off the northwest coast of Sumatra met a convoy of seven coasters and fired three torpedoes at 1200 yards at the largest of them but they missed or ran under. Stratagem (Lieutenant CR Pelly DSC RN), in the Andamans area, expended all her torpedoes for no hits in three attacks. At the time she claimed hits in two of them but these have not been confirmed. All were between the 1st and 4th of July and all were at long range, the first, of four torpedoes at a small ship at 5000 yards, the second of six torpedoes at a larger ship at 7500 yards and the third with her last two torpedoes at a ship of the same size at 7500 yards. On 4th July, Sturdy, on the west coast of Siam, attacked a tug towing a large lighter, firing three torpedoes at 500 yards but they ran under. She then surfaced and sank both by gunfire. She also in the course of this same patrol, sank another tug, four junks and four small craft by gunfire and demolition charges.

Other submarines did good work with their guns. Truculent sank five junks, Sea Rover three and on 2nd July, Spiteful sank a particularly large one of 70 tons. On 9th July, Spirit (Lieutenant AW Langridge RN), on the north coast of Sumatra, attacked a small tanker with her gun and set her on fire but then had to dive for an aircraft before she could finish her off. Tradewind bombarded Sibolga on the west coast of Sumatra and Clyde (Lieutenant Commander RS Brookes DSO DSC RN), the barracks on Ross Island in the Andamans. Surprisingly Tally Ho, the most successful submarine of the Fourth Flotilla, had an almost blank patrol from 24th June to the 18th July. However she was forced to dive by submarine chasers at night off the Bernam River on 6th July and on 10th sighted a small coaster close inshore that she engaged with her gun. She fired 40 rounds but the range was 4500-5000 yards and she only obtained four hits and the enemy escaped into the Bernam River. The operations of three submarines were connected with the movements of the Eastern Fleet. Tradewind was sent to patrol south of the Sunda Strait during the return of the Fleet from its carrier air attack on Sourabaya18. Tantivy and Clyde were stationed off Port Blair for air-sea-rescue duties during an attack by aircraft from the Illustrious on 21st June. Two of our aircraft were brought down but one was over the land and the other crashed on its way back and the fleet rescued its crew.

The carrier air attack on Port Blair by Illustrious was synchronised with the landings by the US Pacific Fleet in the Marianas. These American amphibious operations led to the Battle of the Philippine Sea and a resounding victory for the US Navy. Three Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk and the air groups of the remainder were cut to pieces. The American submarines took a very important part in this famous naval battle, sinking two of the aircraft carriers and giving first warning by their reconnaissance of the approach of the Japanese Fleet. They had also during June sunk forty-eight Japanese merchant ships of 195,020 tons, which may be compared with the four ships of 7719 tons, which was all the British submarines could scour out of the Malacca Strait. After the battle, the Japanese aircraft carriers retired north to Japan to reestablish their air groups while the battlefleet returned south to Lingga.

At this time our intelligence was greatly improved by cryptography and other forms of signal intelligence. Information of the movements of German and Japanese U-boats in the Indian Ocean became available and also of movements of the Japanese Fleet. The arrival of the Japanese Fleet in the Singapore area in February was deduced from traffic analysis. Thirteen submarines left Trincomalee for patrol in July, five of which were recent additions to the Fourth and Eighth Flotillas. The first of these was the elderly minelayer Porpoise (Lieutenant Commander HAL Marsham OBE RN), who sailed on 1st July and laid a total of 55 mines on 6th-8th July off the Deli River in Sumatra. Forty-five of the mines were of the moored contact Mark 16 type and ten were M Mark II ground mines. These minefields scored three successes, Submarine Chaser No 8, the tanker Takekun Maru of 3029 tons and Special Minelayer No 119. Porpoise then sank a junk taking the crew prisoner and she returned to Trincomalee on 13th. Telemachus (Commander WDA King DSO DSC RN) and Tantalus (Lieutenant Commander HS Mackenzie DSO* RN) sailed on 5th and 6th for the inner reaches of the Malacca Strait. On 15th, Tantalus sighted an escorted convoy and closed, but before she could attain a firing position, she was detected and counter attacked. Sirdar (Lieutenant JA Spender RN) and Templar (Lieutenant TG Ridgeway RN) sailed from Trincomalee on 7th and 9th for the Malacca Strait. In the middle of the month, deciphered Japanese messages revealed the movement of two U-boats and it was possible to position Sirdar and Templar to intercept one, and Tantalus and Telemachus the other. On 16th July, Sirdar sighted a westbound U-boat on the surface and fired six torpedoes on a fine track angle at a range of 500 yards. Unfortunately she broke surface on firing and was seen. The U-boat opened fire on her periscope and the torpedoes were avoided. Some five hours later this U-boat was sighted, this time by Templar. The weather was rough and she was only able to close to 3000 yards. She fired a full salvo of eight torpedoes but the U-boat, now thoroughly on the alert, sighted the tracks and took avoiding action. Tantalus sighted the other U-boat on 17th July, which was the Japanese I166, but before she could develop an attack, the U-boat made a large alteration of course away. The same day, Telemachus, off the One Fathom Bank, got into position to attack this U-boat at a range of 2000 yards. She fired six torpedoes, one of which hit and sank the large long range Japanese I166. This success stirred up considerable anti-submarine activity in the area and Telemachus was hunted on 19th and 20th.

Stoic (Lieutenant PB Marriott DSO RN), sailing from Trincomalee on 6th July, sank a landing barge and two junks off Penang by gunfire and demolition charge. Intelligence indicated that supplies for Burma, which arrived at Singapore by sea, were being sent by rail to Mergui and thence by sea again to Rangoon in coasters and other small vessels. Storm (Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR) left Trincomalee on 15th for the area to investigate and had on board extra gun ammunition and a boarding party. She arrived off Tavoy on 20th and three days later decided to reconnoitre Port Owen. She met the 554-ton coaster Kiso Maru northbound and engaged with her gun at 800 yards, sinking her after firing 28 rounds and then taking two prisoners. She later entered Port Owen in heavy rain where it was too shallow to dive and engaged and sank two small patrol vessels at a range of 1200 yards. She had one member of her gun's crew wounded by the return fire. She left by the southeast entrance and went on to investigate Mergui. She engaged two landing craft but had to withdraw when her gun jammed. She was later depth charged when at 60 feet by the landing craft. In a night gun action on 1st August she sank a 350-ton southbound coaster expending fifty rounds. She then set the 100- ton schooner Kikaku Maru on fire and she sank too. After sinking another 250-ton coaster, she set a small vessel on fire and she blew up. Storm now only had 12 rounds of 3" ammunition left. She was back in Trincomalee on 7th August after this most successful patrol.

Tradewind (Lieutenant Commander SLC Maydon DSO* RN) only encountered some patrol activity inside the Malacca Strait; Tantivy (Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) was sighted by an aircraft when attacking an escorted merchant ship in a flat calm on 1st August and had to abandon the attack; Thorough (Lieutenant Commander JG Hopkins RN) had an encounter with an antisubmarine trawler off Port Blair on 16th and was depth charged while Stratagem (Lieutenant CR Pelly DSC RN), on the west coast of Siam, had a completely uneventful patrol.

Terrapin (Lieutenant Commander DSR Martin DSO** RN) and Trenchant (Lieutenant Commander AR Hezlet DSC RN) were sent to the south coast of Sumatra off Benkulen for air-sea-rescue duties as part of a raid by American B29 bombers from Ceylon, on the oil facilities at Palembang in southern Sumatra. Before arrival in position, Terrapin attacked a small escorted merchant ship with four torpedoes at a range of 1000 yards but the target saw the torpedo tracks and took avoiding action. On 5th August, she sank a coaster by gunfire and left another on fire. On 5th August, Trenchant fired three torpedoes from her stern tubes at what she thought to be an escorted coaster but it was only a small fishing vessel with a motor launch in company and the torpedoes missed or ran under. On 9th, she sighted the same two ships and surfaced and engaged with her gun sinking both of them and picking up fourteen prisoners. The air-sea-rescue duties from 9th- 11th August were uneventful. Templar and Telemachus, on their way home on 22nd-25th July had also carried out air-sea-rescue duties for a carrier air attack and bombardment by the Eastern Fleet on Sabang.

Templar, who had suffered from a number of defects during her last patrol in July, was sailed for home and refit in August. She was replaced by no less than seven boats, which were Tudor, Severn, Statesman, Strongbow, Stygian, and the Netherlands submarines Zvaardvisch (ex-British Talent) and O19. On 19th August, the depot ship Wolfe20 arrived in Trincomalee under the command of Captain JE Slaughter DSO RN, Captain(S) Second Submarine Flotilla designate. Captain Slaughter, as will be recalled, was an experienced Second World War submarine captain who had distinguished himself in command of Sunfish during the Norwegian campaign. The Eastern Fleet submarines by 1st September totalled twenty-seven boats and were re-organised in three flotillas21. It had already been arranged that the Eighth Flotilla should be based at Fremantle in Western Australia and should work with the US Navy in the South West Pacific Area under the Commander(Submarines) Seventh Fleet. Maidstone, escorted by the cruiser Nigeria, left Trincomalee for Fremantle on 25th August and arrived on 4th September 1944.

Fourteen submarines set out for patrol during August and they were divided into two groups. The first group consisting of submarines from the new Second Flotilla and the Fourth Flotilla, returned on completion to Trincomalee, while the second group consisting of submarines of the Eighth Flotilla, went on to Fremantle in Australia. Of the first group, Tally Ho (Commander LWA Bennington DSO* DSC* RN) sailed on 6th for the Malacca Strait and on 22nd August between Langkawi and Penang engaged a 300-ton coaster with her gun. The range was 2000 yards and it took 66 rounds to sink the wooden hulled vessel. On 24th August, Tally Ho sank three junks, of 50, 70 and 150 tons, all by gunfire. Tudor (Lieutenant SA Porter DSC RN), on her first patrol, went to the north coast of Sumatra and undertook a special operation, which was a beach reconnaissance, taking from 11th to the 24th. She also sank a coaster by gunfire on 22nd. Severn (Lieutenant RH Bull DSC RN) left on 7th to carry out two special operations. These were to land men and stores in Siam and Malaya, but both failed due to bad weather and serious engine defects. Severn had to abandon her patrol and limp back to base. She was found to be unfit for any further operational employment. Statesman (Lieutenant RGP Bulkeley RN), on her first patrol, was sent to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. On 22nd August she fired four torpedoes at a range of 3400 yards at a ship escorted by two motor launches, two torpedo boats and an aircraft. She scored a hit and sank Sugi Maru No 5 of 1983 tons. Two days later, however, an attack on another convoy had to be broken off when she was detected by the escort. Strongbow (Lieutenant JAR Troup DSC RN), also on her first patrol, was on the west coast of Siam and off Langkawi. On 2nd September, she fired a single torpedo at a range of 500 yards and sank Toso Maru No 1 of 800 tons. She also sank or drove ashore a total of nine junks, a tug and two lighters with her gun, assisted by demolition charges. Stygian (Lieutenant GS Clarabut DSO RN) was also on her first patrol, which was on the west coast of Burma and off Mergui. She sank a schooner by gunfire and returned with some prisoners.

Of the second group, on their way to Australia, Spiteful (Lieutenant Commander FH Sherwood DSC RCNVR) patrolled on the north coast of Sumatra where she saw nothing. She went on her way to Fremantle on 16th and bombarded some oil tanks at Christmas Island south of Java on 22nd as she passed. Zvaardvisch (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl HAW Goosens), on the east coast of Sumatra sank four junks with her gun and continued her passage to Fremantle on 22nd. She also reconnoitred Christmas Island on 31st on her way. Sea Rover (Lieutenant JP Angell RN) had no contacts off the west coast of Burma between the 12th and the 18th and on her way to Fremantle carried out air-sea-rescue duties off Padang on the west coast of Sumatra for carrier borne air attacks. Sturdy (Lieutenant WStG G Anderson DSC RNR), on the west coast of Burma sank two coasters by gunfire and made a reconnaissance of Hastings Harbour on 19th. She sank a 150-ton fishing vessel on 27th when on her way to Fremantle. Sirdar (Lieutenant JA Spender RN) patrolled on the north and west coasts of Sumatra and on 1st September, in a gun action with a coaster convoy, drove one of them ashore. She left on 5th for Fremantle. O19 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl A van Karnebeek) patrolled off Padang in west Sumatra and sank a coaster and a junk, taking prisoners. She went on to Australia on 10th sinking a coaster off Christmas Island on the way. Tantalus (Lieutenant J Nash DSC RN) in the Malacca Strait, attacked traffic inshore in face of anti-submarine patrols and sank two coasters and a junk with her gun. She also damaged a tug and drove another ashore before heading for Australia on 12th September. Tantivy (Lieutenant PH May RN), on passage direct to Fremantle, was diverted to the Sunda Strait on 2nd September. She sighted an escorted ship at night, estimated at 4000 tons, but her attack was frustrated by a navigational alteration of course and the three torpedoes she fired at a range of 4000 yards missed. She took up the chase and in four hours had got into position again and fired seven more torpedoes at 1500 yards. This overwhelming attack scored two hits and sank Shiretoko Maru of a modest 1800 tons. Tantivy was counter attacked by the escort without damage and next day left the area for Fremantle. Storm (Lieutenant Commander EP Young DSC RNVR) left Trincomalee on 25th August to patrol off Mergui on her way to Australia. She decided to patrol off Forest Passage and on 1st September, after two days, sighted a northbound convoy of seven coasters escorted by two small motor launches. Storm fired five torpedoes, set to four feet, on the swing and spread over several of the convoy but the torpedoes all either ran under or missed. The convoy scattered but, passing behind some islands, reformed and resumed its passage north. During the night, Storm headed north outside the islands and intercepted the convoy again as it emerged into the open sea. She then surfaced and engaged with her gun amongst the shallows. In a brilliant action, lasting some 36 minutes, she fired 150 rounds and sank both escorts and three coasters and damaged two others. She left for Australia on 7th September reconnoitring Christmas Island on the way and refuelling at Exmouth Gulf.

At the same time, Porpoise (Lieutenant Commander HAL Marsham OBE RN) was at sea preparing for an operation that did not fit into either of the above categories. This was Operation 'Rimau', which was to be an attack on shipping in Singapore using a new type of submersible canoe transported to the area by submarine. This was the brainchild of Lieutenant Colonel Lyon of the Gordon Highlanders, who had already carried out a successful attack of this nature on Singapore during 1943 using local craft and limpet mines. The operation involved the transport to the area of 25 men, fifteen 'Sleeping Beauties', as the submersible canoes were known, four folding assault boats and eight and a half tons of stores. It could only be done by a large submarine, and it had to be a minelayer using special containers in place of her mines. The operation had to be completed before the northeast monsoon broke in November. Porpoise was detached from the Fourth Flotilla to Fremantle from where the operation was to be mounted and she sailed from Trincomalee early in August.

Wolfe brought out a unit of seven chariots from the United Kingdom under the command of Lieutenant Commander McCarter RNVR. Chariots had not been used operationally since October 1943 when an abortive attempt was made to attack shipping in Norway using a Motor Torpedo Boat to transport them. Since then the new Mark II Chariot had been developed, which was larger and the divers sat back to back in cockpits inside it rather than astride it with both facing forward. It carried twice the weight of explosive head, was faster and had double the range. It was designed to be carried on chocks on the external saddle tanks of large submarines and did not need cumbersome containers23. The obvious target for these chariots was the Japanese Battlefleet based at Lingga south of Singapore. Plans were made for a submarine to make a periscope reconnaissance of Lingga Roads as soon as the Eighth Flotilla began operations from Fremantle.

With the departure of the Eighth Flotilla for Australia, patrols in the Malacca Strait were reduced somewhat. In all, nine boats sailed for patrol during September. The pattern of patrols was the same. Spirit (Lieutenant AW Langridge RN) went to the west coast of Siam where she sank four junks by gunfire. She then did air-sea-rescue duties on the north coast of Sumatra while aircraft from Victorious and Indomitable bombarded Sigli and made some photo-reconnaissance flights. On 18th September she picked up the crew of a Barracuda aircraft. Terrapin (Lieutenant RHH Brunner RN) carried out a beach reconnaissance on the north coast of Sumatra from 11th to 16th and also did air-sea-rescue duty for the same air attacks as Spirit. Trenchant (Lieutenant Commander AR Hezlet DSC RN) sailed on 5th September for the north and east coasts of Sumatra with a landing party of Commandos to blow up a road and rail bridge over the Podada River. The first landing attempt by eight men in four folbots failed because the current coming out of the river mouth was too strong. Next night, the 12th September, the landing was made on the beach and the party struck inland until they met the railway and the bridge was successfully demolished. On 16th, Trenchant laid twelve M Mark II mines in Aru Bay in shallow water and this field sank Hozan Maru of 896 tons and Nikkaku Maru of 1946 tons but not until 23rd January 1945. Two junks were sunk by ramming on 19th after which information was obtained by radio intelligence of the rendezvous of two German U-boats with an escort off Penang. The Malacca Strait was crossed at full speed on the nights of 21st/23rd September and position taken up north west of Penang. There was a heavy swell and the first U-boat was not sighted until she had closed to 2000 yards. Three torpedoes of a stern salvo were fired at a range of 650 yards in a snap attack, one of them hitting and sinking U859. Eleven of the crew were rescued and taken prisoner. The other U-boat was not seen.

Tradewind (Lieutenant Commander SLC Maydon DSO* RN) carried out two special operations. The first was to land agents on the west coast of Sumatra, which was successfully accomplished. The second, which was to contact an agent near the Sunda Strait, however, failed. On 18th September, she sank the escorted JunyoMaru of 5065 tons with two torpedo hits out of a salvo of four at a range of 1500 yards.23a This was done in spite of her lookout periscope being out of action. She also sank two barges loaded with cement using demolition charges. Thorough (Lieutenant Commander JG Hopkins RN) also carried out two special operations involving beach reconnaissance and landing agents on the west coasts of Burma and Siam and on the north coast of Sumatra. On 23rd, she sighted a U-boat but was unable to get into an attacking position. On 27th she sank a coaster by gunfire. Stratagem (Lieutenant AR Profit DSC RN) off the Andaman Islands during the last part of September only saw anti-submarine patrols, but on 30th she bombarded installations ashore at Ford Bay. Tally Ho (Commander LWA Bennington DSO* DSC* RN) after patrolling for two days seventy miles north of Diamond Point, was sent to the southern part of the Malacca Strait where it was restricted and shallow. On 27th at dawn she sighted a sizeable coaster coming north. She tried to head her off on the surface but was forced to dive by aircraft. On 30th September, she intercepted a convoy of three coasters escorted by three submarine chasers close inshore, and fired one torpedo at a range of 1200 yards at the leading coaster, but the torpedo was thought to have hit fishing stakes short of the target. Tally Ho then ran aground at periscope depth24. On 4th October, she drove a coaster ashore by gunfire off the Jumpal Bank firing 34 rounds at 4500 yards. A motor torpedo boat then intervened and fired a torpedo but Tally Ho was able to avoid it and to reach deeper water and dive. On 6th, off Aru Bay, she surfaced and engaged Special Subchaser No 2 in a gun action at 2500 yards. Tally Ho sank her but not before her gunnery officer had been mortally wounded by the return fire. Tally Ho's bridge was holed in many places by 0.5" machine gun fire and a member of the gun's crew was injured by a shell case. A seaplane then appeared and was shot down by a Vickers gun, but the Gunnery Officer died of his wounds that night and was buried at sea. Tudor (Lieutenant SA Porter DSC RN) laid ten mines off Langkawi on 24th September and on 8th-9th October, a special operation on the west coast of Siam, to contact agents and land stores, was carried out successfully. Statesman (Lieutenant RGP Bulkeley RN) left to patrol off the Mergui Archipelago on 27th and on 6th October she sank two coasters with her gun and took prisoners.

The operations of the submarines from Fremantle will be described in a later chapter but the patrols of the first two fit more neatly into this chapter. The first British submarine to leave Fremantle for patrol was Porpoise (Lieutenant Commander HAL Marsham OBE RN), and as we have seen, she was not part of the Eighth Flotilla, but was lent from the Fourth Flotilla at Trincomalee to carry out Operation 'Rimau' which has already been outlined. After carrying out a number of exercises after her arrival in Fremantle, she finally sailed on 11th September with the twenty-four men of the attacking force under Lieutenant Colonel Lyon and the fifteen 'Sleeping Beauties' and other impediments. She transited the Lombok Strait on 18th without difficulty and set course for the Karimata Strait. Porpoise was not allowed, by her orders, to attack or give away her position except for an important target or reason and she had to let a convoy go on 20th and a large unescorted tanker on 23rd. She was, by now, having difficulty with a leak from an external oil fuel tank. This was temporarily solved by transferring the oil from this tank to one from which the fuel had been used up. The plan was to land the stores on Merapas Island, south east of Singapore, and set up a base. A junk was then to be captured that would be used to transport the assault parties with their 'Sleeping Beauties' to Singapore Roads where the shipping was to be attacked with limpet mines. Porpoise arrived in the eastern approaches to Singapore on 23rd September and during the next week the stores were all landed at Merapas and a junk was captured. Porpoise left on 30th to return to Fremantle. She was to pick the party up again between 7th November and 7th December. The return trip through the Java Sea was made in heavy rainstorms and was uneventful. The submerged passage south through the Lombok Strait was difficult. Strong eddies and currents were experienced and at times Porpoise was scarcely controllable. She arrived safely in Fremantle on 11th October and went straight into dock to have her leaking fuel tank repaired. The British and American commands, at this time, did not realise that Operation 'Rimau' had met with disaster. The junk with the assault force and the 'Sleeping Beauties' was intercepted by a patrol vessel and fire had to be opened. The men in several groups got back to Merapas Island but were attacked there later and had to flee from island to island. They were all eventually hunted down and killed or captured and executed. Porpoise was not repaired in time to pick up the Rimau party at Merapas Island and Tantalus undertook this duty instead. Tantalus, of course, found nothing except signs that the party had left in a hurry.

The second operation was for Clyde (Lieutenant RH Bull DSC RN) in which a large party from Force 136 and a considerable quantity of stores was to be landed on the east coast of Malaya near Mersing. She sailed from Trincomalee for Exmouth Gulf early in September where she was to re-fuel. While there, she developed defects that made it necessary for her to go to Fremantle to dock. Telemachus (Commander WDA King DSO DSC RN) was at Fremantle and was ordered to take her place and sailed on 14th September. The personnel and stores were transferred to her at Exmouth Gulf and two days were spent exercising. Telemachus sailed on 21st and passed through the Lombok Strait on 26th on the surface at night against a strong current. She reached the coast of Johore on 1st October and landed most of the party and stores about sixty miles north of Singapore on 5th. She now also developed defects in one engine and a periscope reconnaissance of Lingga had to be abandoned on 9th and she returned to Fremantle. Her patrol lasted forty-four days and the return passage of 2700 miles had to be made on one engine.

During the period of nine months covered by this chapter, British and Netherlands submarine strength in the Indian Ocean had risen from one flotilla of five boats to three flotillas totalling twenty-seven and furthermore all except three were modern and up to date. This was as large a force of British submarines as was employed in the Norwegian campaign or in the Mediterranean except for a period during the Allied landings in North Africa, when it was larger. It still needed thirteen more boats to reach the planned total of forty for the beginning of 1945. This figure had just been confirmed by the First Sea Lord.

The statistics for the nine months show that eighty-nine patrols were carried out and that a total of 63 torpedo attacks were made expending 268 torpedoes. In addition, 218 mines were laid in seventeen fields, three quarters of which were magnetic ground mines and the rest were of the moored contact type. All these led to the sinking of the Japanese light cruiser Kuma and serious damage to her sister ship Kitagami and to the destruction of three U-boats, UIT23, I166 and U859. Altogether thirteen attacks were made on U-boats firing 67 torpedoes at these difficult targets and at least four more were sighted which could not be attacked. The minor war vessels Choko Maru (a netlayer) and Special Minesweeper No 7 were also destroyed. In addition twenty ships totalling 39,711 tons were sunk and another nine were damaged. The use of submarine's guns backed up by demolition charges and ramming destroyed another 98 coasters, junks and small craft as well as the naval salvage vessel Hokuan Maru, Special Subchaser No 2 and two of the ships already listed totalling 1089 tons. Mines destroyed Special Subchaser No 8 and Special Minelayer No 1 as well as four of the ships already listed and totalling 7271 tons. Also thirty-two special operations such as the landing and recovery of agents and beach reconnaissances and, in one case, the blowing up of a bridge, were carried out. Nine air-sea-rescue missions saved two aircrew from falling into the enemy's hands. Finally nine places were bombarded.

These results when compared with the 408 ships of 1,798,669 tons sunk by the American submarines in the Pacific over the same period cannot but appear meagre. These were no more than our submarines in the Mediterranean achieved in a couple of months during 1943. It must be pointed out, however, that the US Navy deployed twenty times as many submarines at the beginning of the period and still six times as many at the end. It must also be pointed out that the marksmanship of our submarines in the Malacca Strait was just as good as our submarines in the Mediterranean. The reason for the low results was that the targets were simply not available. Unfortunately the figures to show the number of ships that got through have not come to light, but there is little doubt that our submarines made the Malacca Strait a very dangerous place for ships from light cruisers to junks. Furthermore this result was achieved for the loss of only one submarine while two more were damaged and another two slightly damaged. By the 'exchange rate'25 sometimes used to judge the success of wars against commerce, the campaign with a figure of twenty-six was doing very well! The quantity of shipping sunk in a war against commerce is, of course, important in assessing its success when it is at its height. There comes a time, however, when the enemy begins to run out of ships or refuses to risk them at sea and then the number of ships sunk falls dramatically even though the campaign is being won26. It is arguable that this stage had already been reached in the Malacca Strait in the autumn of 1944.

In the leading place among the awards for the first nine months of 1944 in the Far East must come the Bar to the DSO for Commander Bennington of Tally Ho for sinking Kuma. A Bar to the DSO also went to Commander King of Telemachus for his destruction of the Japanese I166 and a DSO for Lieutenant Commander Hezlet of Trenchant for sinking U859. Two other DSOs were awarded, one to Lieutenant Commander Young of Storm for four successful patrols and the other to Lieutenant Verschoyle-Campbell of Stonehenge who was thought to have sunk a seaplane tender on his first patrol in which he also sank a coaster and the netlayer Choho Maru. Commander Bennington of Tally Ho also received a Bar to his DSC for destroying UIT23 and a second Bar for his activities on patrol from June to November. A Bar to the DSC also went to Lieutenant Commander Collett of Tactician and to Lieutenant Lambert of Surf. DSCs were awarded to Lieutenant Beckley of Templar for damaging Kitagami and to Lieutenant Commander Maydon of Tradewind, Lieutenant Commander Favell of Trespasser and Lieutenant Commander Alexander of Truculent.

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