British and Allied Submarine
Operations in World War II
Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet KBE CB DSO* DSC

 

 

     
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1. Three L and nine H-class.
2. They had never achieved their designed diving depth of 500 feet and in spite of strengthening had had to have it reduced to 300 feet. Their engines had proved unreliable at high power and had had to be de-rated to 80% power reducing their surface speed from 18 to 16 knots. The design embodied oil fuel tanks external to the pressure
hull and these tended to leak. The tanks were originally riveted but were all replaced with welded joints which largely solved the problem. Nevertheless these submarines, although considered fully operational, were not popular and were thought to be too large and unhandy especially for home waters and the Mediterranean.
3. Their engines originally gave 22~ knots but these submarines too had to be de-rated and their speed fell to little more than 18 knots. Their designed diving depth was 300 feet but they failed to achieve this and it had to be reduced to 200 feet. They were therefore not fast enough to keep up with the fleet and could only be used as large and
unhandy patrol submarines.
4. The first of these, Porpoise, was similar to the P-class but the rest were a complete re-design of the same size but with internal oil fuel tanks.
5. See Appendix 1.
6. The O, P and R-classes also had two stern tubes and the new T-class had, in addition to the six internal tubes forward, another four external bow tubes making a salvo of ten torpedoes altogether.
7. H32 was the only one of the class to have an asdic set. This was the Type 113 that had the dome on top of the pressure hull and could only be used submerged. In the majority of new construction submarines, a type 118 was fitted. This had a retractable dome in the keel that allowed the set to be used both on the surface and submerged
but not with the submarine lying on the bottom. The latest T and U-class submarines had a new fixed set, the type 129, which was mounted at the forward end of the keel and this could also be used when bottomed.
8. There were two periscopes, one with a small diameter top for attacking and the other, rather larger in diameter, for lookout. The attack periscope was monocular and did not magnify. The lookout periscope was, in new construction submarines, binocular and also bifocal (that is it could be switched from no magnification to the magnification of a pair of binoculars). They also had a ‘sky search’ which allowed elevation and included a device to measure the angle sub-
tended by the masthead to the waterline of a target from which its range could be found. The length of the periscopes, which dictated the depth of the submarine at periscope depth varied from 40 feet in the large submarines to 25 feet in the H-class. Large submarines could therefore keep periscope watch in rougher weather than small submarines.
9. Using asdic actively by ‘pinging’ gave away the submarine’s position and this was why it was seldom used. If an enemy submarine was seen to submerge, ‘pinging’ could be resorted to so as to try to locate it but the chance of hitting it with torpedoes was remote because the bearing was not very accurate and there was no way to find the depth.
10. This was because of the ‘water noises’, which were particularly bad when on the surface and because of the noise of the submarine’s own diesel engines. Nevertheless submarines normally kept asdic watch on the surface at night.
11. The submarine had to be manoeuvred so that the enemy passed at a distance between 500 and 5000 yards. The torpedoes ran straight out of the tubes and so the submarine had to be pointed in the direction they were to go. The torpedoes had to be fired at the exact moment the sights came on and there was no chance of a second shot. With internal torpedo tubes of new construction submarines the torpedoes could also be set to turn ninety degrees left or right on firing, but this was a complicated and inaccurate method only used if a straight shot could not be made.
12. More for the larger faster submarines, less for the smaller slower ones.

13. Admiral Sir Martin E Dunbar-Nasmith VC KCB, Commander in Chief Plymouth.
Admiral Sir Charles JC Little KCB, Second Sea Lord.
Vice Admiral Sir Noel F Laurence KCB DSO, Admiral Commanding Reserves
Vice Admiral Sir Max K. Horton KCB DSO**, Admiral Commanding Reserve Fleet.
Vice Admiral G. Layton CB DSO, Vice Admiral Commanding First Battle Squadron and Second in Command of the Mediterranean Fleet.
Vice Admiral R.H.T. Raikes CB, Awaiting appointment.
There were also two submarine specialists on the retired list who had been re-employed:
Vice Admiral Sir Cecil P. Talbot KBE CB DSO, Director of Dockyards
Vice Admiral R. Ross-Turner CB DSO, Admiral Superintendent, Portsmouth Dockyard
14. This was nothing new. Flag Officers who had not served in submarines had often in the past commanded the submarines. During the twenties no officers who had actually served in submarines had yet reached flag rank and all holders of the post were from general service.
15. See Appendix II.
16. See Appendix III.
17. The Mark IV torpedo was common to both ships and submarines and although differing in details, could be modified for use in either type. The modern ship torpedo, the Mark IX, was too long for submarine torpedo tubes and could not be used in place of its submarine counterpart, the Mark VIII.
18. The Royal Navy’s torpedo factories at Greenock and Alexandria in Scotland and of Messrs Whitehead at Weymouth.
19. Roughly half of the stock of torpedoes was issued to submarines and depot ships in peacetime and the other half was kept in the torpedo depots in the home dockyards and in the depots at Msida in Malta and Kowloon in Hong Kong.
20. K5, H42 and L24 had all been lost by accident during exercises soon after World War II.
21. The training of submarines for war took on a more advanced form in two flotillas during 1938-1939. In the First Flotilla in the Mediterranean, night exercises without lights were carried out and Captain Ruck-Keene at last got this accepted for the 1939 combined fleet manoeuvres. Pack tactics were also tried out in the Mediterranean and also in the Far East. In the Fourth Flotilla, also, Regulus made a twentyeight day practice war patrol.
22. In 1919 the British Government ruled that all planning for the service should be on the basis that there would be no major war for ten years.
23. Second Submarine Flotilla (Aberdeen)
Lucia
Seahorse
Starfish
Swordfish
Seawolf
Sterlet
Sunfish
H33
H49

Third Submarine Flotilla (Blyth)
Titania
Porpoise
Narwhal
L23
H32
H34
H43
H44

24. See ‘Periscope View’ - Rear Admiral GWG Simpson CB CBE. Macmillan, London 1972.
25. At Corriemar House where he would be close to the Commander in Chief (C-in-C) Home Fleet then to be based in his flagship at Rosyth and also close to the Air Officer Commanding 18 Group, Coastal Command
RAF. Some of the administrative part of RA(S) staff would remain at Fort Blockhouse.



 

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