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1.
Three L and nine H-class.
2. They had never achieved their designed diving depth of 500
feet and in spite of strengthening had had to have it reduced
to 300 feet. Their engines had proved unreliable at high power
and had had to be de-rated to 80% power reducing their surface
speed from 18 to 16 knots. The design embodied oil fuel tanks
external to the pressure
hull and these tended to leak. The tanks were originally riveted
but were all replaced with welded joints which largely solved
the problem. Nevertheless these submarines, although considered
fully operational, were not popular and were thought to be too
large and unhandy especially for home waters and the Mediterranean.
3. Their engines originally gave 22~ knots but these submarines
too had to be de-rated and their speed fell to little more than
18 knots. Their designed diving depth was 300 feet but they failed
to achieve this and it had to be reduced to 200 feet. They were
therefore not fast enough to keep up with the fleet and could
only be used as large and
unhandy patrol submarines.
4. The first of these, Porpoise,
was similar to the P-class but the rest were a complete re-design
of the same size but with internal oil fuel tanks.
5. See Appendix 1.
6. The O, P and R-classes also had two stern tubes and the new
T-class had, in addition to the six internal tubes forward, another
four external bow tubes making a salvo of ten torpedoes altogether.
7. H32
was the only one of the class to have an asdic set. This was
the Type 113 that had the dome on top of the pressure hull and
could only be used submerged. In the majority of new construction
submarines, a type 118 was fitted. This had a retractable dome
in the keel that allowed the set to be used both on the surface
and submerged
but not with the submarine lying on the bottom. The latest T and
U-class submarines had a new fixed set, the type 129, which was
mounted at the forward end of the keel and this could also be
used when bottomed.
8. There were two periscopes, one with a small diameter top for
attacking and the other, rather larger in diameter, for lookout.
The attack periscope was monocular and did not magnify. The lookout
periscope was, in new construction submarines, binocular and also
bifocal (that is it could be switched from no magnification to
the magnification of a pair of binoculars). They also had a sky
search which allowed elevation and included a device to
measure the angle sub-
tended by the masthead to the waterline of a target from which
its range could be found. The length of the periscopes, which
dictated the depth of the submarine at periscope depth varied
from 40 feet in the large submarines to 25 feet in the H-class.
Large submarines could therefore keep periscope watch in rougher
weather than small submarines.
9. Using asdic actively by pinging gave away the submarines
position and this was why it was seldom used. If an enemy submarine
was seen to submerge, pinging could be resorted to
so as to try to locate it but the chance of hitting it with torpedoes
was remote because the bearing was not very accurate and there
was no way to find the depth.
10. This was because of the water noises, which were
particularly bad when on the surface and because of the noise
of the submarines own diesel engines. Nevertheless submarines
normally kept asdic watch on the surface at night.
11.
The submarine had to be manoeuvred so that the enemy passed at
a distance between 500 and 5000 yards. The torpedoes ran straight
out of the tubes and so the submarine had to be pointed in the
direction they were to go. The torpedoes had to be fired at the
exact moment the sights came on and there was no chance of a second
shot. With internal torpedo tubes of new construction submarines
the torpedoes could also be set to turn ninety degrees left or
right on firing, but this was a complicated and inaccurate method
only used if a straight shot could not be made.
12. More for the larger faster submarines, less for the smaller
slower ones.
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13. Admiral
Sir Martin E Dunbar-Nasmith VC KCB, Commander in Chief Plymouth.
Admiral Sir Charles JC Little KCB, Second Sea Lord.
Vice Admiral Sir Noel F Laurence KCB DSO, Admiral Commanding Reserves
Vice Admiral Sir Max K. Horton KCB DSO**, Admiral Commanding Reserve
Fleet.
Vice Admiral G. Layton CB DSO, Vice Admiral Commanding First Battle
Squadron and Second in Command of the Mediterranean Fleet.
Vice Admiral R.H.T. Raikes CB, Awaiting appointment.
There were also two submarine specialists on the retired list
who had been re-employed:
Vice Admiral Sir Cecil P. Talbot KBE CB DSO, Director of Dockyards
Vice Admiral R. Ross-Turner CB DSO, Admiral Superintendent, Portsmouth
Dockyard
14. This was nothing new. Flag Officers who had not served in
submarines had often in the past commanded the submarines. During
the twenties no officers who had actually served in submarines
had yet reached flag rank and all holders of the post were from
general service.
15. See Appendix II.
16. See Appendix III.
17. The Mark IV torpedo was common to both ships and submarines
and although differing in details, could be modified for use in
either type. The modern ship torpedo, the Mark IX, was too long
for submarine torpedo tubes and could not be used in place of
its submarine counterpart, the Mark VIII.
18. The Royal Navys torpedo factories at Greenock and Alexandria
in Scotland and of Messrs Whitehead at Weymouth.
19. Roughly half of the stock of torpedoes was issued to submarines
and depot ships in peacetime and the other half was kept in the
torpedo depots in the home dockyards and in the depots at Msida
in Malta and Kowloon in Hong Kong.
20. K5, H42 and L24 had all been lost by accident during exercises
soon after World War II.
21. The training of submarines for war took on a more advanced
form in two flotillas during 1938-1939. In the First Flotilla
in the Mediterranean, night exercises without lights were carried
out and Captain Ruck-Keene at last got this accepted for the 1939
combined fleet manoeuvres. Pack tactics were also tried out in
the Mediterranean and also in the Far East. In the Fourth Flotilla,
also, Regulus
made a twentyeight day practice war patrol.
22. In 1919 the British Government ruled that all planning for
the service should be on the basis that there would be no major
war for ten years.
23. Second Submarine Flotilla (Aberdeen)
Lucia
Seahorse
Starfish
Swordfish
Seawolf
Sterlet
Sunfish
H33
H49
Third Submarine Flotilla (Blyth)
Titania
Porpoise
Narwhal
L23
H32
H34
H43
H44
24. See Periscope View - Rear Admiral GWG Simpson
CB CBE. Macmillan, London 1972.
25. At Corriemar House where he would be close to the Commander
in Chief (C-in-C) Home Fleet then to be based in his flagship
at Rosyth and also close to the Air Officer Commanding 18 Group,
Coastal Command
RAF. Some of the administrative part of RA(S) staff would remain
at Fort Blockhouse.
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