The
Final Phase in the Far East: 1945
References
Patrolgram
30 War patrols in the Far East during final phase 1945
Map 57 Final phase in the war with
Japan April - Aug 45
IN APRIL 1945,
AS THE FINAL PHASE of the submarine campaign in the Far East
began, the war in Europe was nearing its conclusion. The Allied
armies were overrunning Germany and on 30th April Hitler committed
suicide. Finally on 7th May the Germans capitulated unconditionally.
In the Pacific, the US forces, supported by the British Pacific
Fleet, landed in Okinawa as a preliminary to the assault on
Japan itself. In Burma, the Fourteenth Army was driving down
the Irrawaddy towards Rangoon, and in the South West Pacific,
preparations were being made for the Australians to land in
Borneo. The American submarines in the Pacific had practically
run out of targets. The Japanese merchant marine had fallen
to 2,465,000 tons from the 6,052,000 tons it had been in 1941
and such traffic as put to sea was in the inner zone around
Japan. The US still found plenty to do protecting amphibious
operations from attack by the remnants of the Japanese Navy,
sweeping ahead of carrier forces to sink the enemy reconnaissance
picket boats and, above all, doing 'lifeguard' duty, as the
Americans called air-searescue. Nevertheless they still sank
sixty ships of 220,269 tons in these three months for the
loss of four submarines.
The Japanese
had now practically lost command of the sea and could only
run convoys at great peril. They were desperately short of
oil in Japan and, indeed, of everything necessary for their
war industries. They were even short of food for the civilian
population. The five remaining battleships were lying camouflaged
and hidden in creeks and inlets in the Inland Sea with no
fuel: a few aircraft carriers were in the same state and without
any aircraft. In the southern zone, based on Singapore, Field
Marshal Count Terauchi, the Supreme Commander, had already
decided to withdraw all his outlying garrisons to Malaya so
that he could conduct a fighting withdrawal up the Kra Isthmus
into Siam and Indo China. Such Japanese aircraft as were available
were to be used as Kamikaze suicide planes but to all except
a few fanatics, the end was in sight. Nevertheless the Japanese
were expected to make a desperate fight for their homeland.
The invasion of Japan was clearly going to be accompanied
by very heavy Allied casualties.
This then
was the strategic setting into which the considerable force
of British submarines in the Far East had now to be fitted.
Already decisions had been made for a redistribution of the
flotillas and for changes in their composition. These had
been fully discussed between the US Commander, Submarines
Seventh Fleet, the Cs-in-C of the British Pacific Fleet and
of the East Indies, as well as A(S) during his visit in February
and March. The first move was of the Fourth Flotilla from
Trincomalee to Fremantle. Adamant
(Captain HMC Ionides RN) sailed on 1st April and arrived
on 11th. Four of her submarines had already left for patrol
in the Malacca Strait and were afterwards to follow her to
Western Australia1.
Four more submarines sailed later2,
and three of them made the passage to Fremantle direct and
three others, already in the South West Pacific, transferred
to the Fourth Flotilla from the Eighth3.The
Second Flotilla remained at Trincomalee with the depot ship
Wolfe
(Captain JE Slaughter DSO RN) with the three short range T-class4
and six of the S-class5.
Maidstone
(Captain LM Shadwell RN) left Fremantle on 19th April and
proceeded by Sydney, Manus and Leyte to Subic Bay in the Philippines,
where, on arrival on 20th May, she found two US tenders with
their squadrons and Admiral Fife already operating from a
headquarters ashore. The Eighth Flotilla submarines underwent
considerable change at this time. Storm
had already left for the United Kingdom to refit and was followed
by Sirdar
and Spirit.
They were replaced by Stygian,
Supreme
and Selene
from the Second Flotilla, and Solent
and Sleuth
direct from the United Kingdom. With Seascout
and Spark,
these boats now formed the Eighth Flotilla and all proceeded
to Subic from Fremantle at various dates, patrolling on the
way. There were another nine British submarines in the Far
East at this time but none of them was operational6.The
grand total of British submarines in the Far East at this
time was therefore thirty-five, and there were five others
on passage and three under repair as well as three Netherlands
boats.
Bonaventure
(Captain WR Fell OBE RN) and the Fourteenth Submarine Flotilla
consisting of XE1-6 had now also arrived in the Pacific.
She had left the United Kingdom at the end of February and
passed through the Panama Canal to San Diego in California
and then to Pearl Harbour. While Bonaventure
was crossing the Pacific, the C-in-C of the US Pacific Fleet
decided that there was no use for X-craft in the area and
the C-in-C British Pacific Fleet reluctantly concurred. She
was therefore ordered to proceed to Brisbane to await orders.
The obvious targets for the XE-craft were the surviving battleships
and aircraft carriers of the Japanese Navy now in the Inland
Sea. These ships could, without doubt, have been destroyed
by this means using the T-class submarines of the Fourth Flotilla
to tow them from the Philippines to Japan. Although in the
more recent X-craft attacks on Bergen they had attacked successfully
and the crews had been recovered with their craft, in the
earlier Tirpitz operation, all the crews who had attacked
had been killed or taken prisoner. There is little doubt that
the American high command regarded them almost as suicide
machines and felt that there was no need at this stage of
the war for such sacrifices. It must also be said that the
US Navy felt that they should have the honour of finishing
off what remained of the Imperial Japanese Navy. They believed
that this was due to them as restitution for Pearl Harbour
and they were reluctant to allow the Royal Navy to do this
for them after the American Navy's long and hard fought campaigns
in the Pacific7.
It is also probable that the US Navy's carrier forces reckoned
that the remains of the Japanese battlefleet were 'their bird'.
Although many years later such notions may seem to us almost
puerile, they were at the time very understandable. To the
X-craft crews of the Fourteenth Flotilla, however, the decision
was devastating. Not to put their years of X-craft training
and development to the test was a terrible blow to the morale
of these brave and skilled officers and men. The real trouble,
of course, was that they had arrived too late. If they had
been a year earlier an attack on the Japanese Fleet at Lingga
would have been quite possible and might have been sanctioned
by the American authorities. On 7th April, however, the whole
question was rendered somewhat academic by the sinking of
the Japanese super battleship Yamato by the US Third
Fleet, for she was the prime target for the XE-craft. Plans
were therefore made to scrap the six XE-craft in Australia
and to use Bonaventure
in the Fleet Train of the British Pacific Fleet.
Both the Fourth
and Eighth Submarine Flotillas now came under the operational
command of the American Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet,
who, as we have seen, had moved his headquarters to Subic Bay.
Administratively they were part of the British Pacific Fleet
and came under its C-in-C. The Fourteenth Flotilla was also
under the direct command of C-in-C, British Pacific Fleet, and
he was trying hard to find something for it to do. The Second
Submarine Flotilla remained under C-in-C, East Indies. It is
perhaps surprising that, with this considerable force of submarines
east of Suez, no overall British submarine commander, a Commodore
(Submarines) perhaps, was appointed for the area and that all
worked smoothly without one. At about this time a change was
made in the American submarine command. The Commander, Submarines
Seventh Fleet was placed directly under the Commander Submarines
Pacific, who thereby commanded all submarines in the Pacific.
In April,
the submarines continued to try to prevent any Japanese movement
by sea whatever. They also carried out special operations and
air-sea-rescue duties as before and two new functions were required
of them. The first was to patrol in distant support of amphibious
operations such as the invasion of North Borneo and the landings
at Rangoon and the second was to intercept the Japanese cruisers
being used to transport troops from the outlying islands to
Singapore. The first success against these cruisers had already
been attained by the sinking of Isuzu by the American
submarine Charr on 7th April north of Sumbawa. There
were four eight-inch gun cruisers at Singapore; Ashigara
and Haguro were known to be operational but the state
of the Takao and Myoko, damaged at Leyte Gulf,
was in doubt. Takao had not moved for six months or so
but the dockyard at Singapore might well have repaired her sufficiently
to put to sea. Myoko made an attempt to get back to Japan
before Christmas 1944, but was torpedoed by the US submarine
Bergall and had to return to Singapore. Submarine patrols
in April were often distorted by the need to redistribute boats
amongst the three flotillas.
On 31st March.
Seascout
(Lieutenant JW Kelly RN) had left Colombo, where she had been
in dock, for patrol in the South West Pacific Area. She fuelled
in Exmouth Gulf and was sent to the north coast of Sumbawa by
the Lombok Strait. She sank a petrol-laden coaster by gunfire
on 25th and then, as Maidstone
was still on passage to Subic Bay, went back to Fremantle. On
1st April, O19 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl JF Drijfhout
van Hooff) left Fremantle with a full load of forty mines on
board and passed through the Sunda Strait at night on the surface.
She first patrolled north of Batavia and on 10th, sank the tanker
Hosei Maru of 896 tons by gunfire after missing her with
two torpedoes at 400 yards, the torpedoes probably running under.
She then passed northwards through the Karimata Strait and on
13th laid her mines in the northern entrance to the Bangka Strait,
which was on the inshore route from Batavia to Singapore. Unfortunately
one of the mines was a surface failure and almost compromised
this field, which consequently did not cause any casualties.
O19 then returned to her patrol position north of Batavia
where she carried out air-sea-rescue duties on 16th. Next day
she sighted Ashigara approaching from the north escorted
by a destroyer. Her attack, however, was frustrated by a large
alteration of course, which left her out of range. On 18th,
she saw the cruiser returning having embarked troops at Batavia.
It was a difficult attack with the enemy up sun, but she got
away a full salvo of four torpedoes at a range of 6000 yards.
They missed however, and fortunately the destroyer for some
reason did not counter attack. O19 was now left with
only two spare torpedoes to load in her forward tubes and, with
such targets about, she needed to have a full salvo ready. That
night she transferred the two torpedoes from her rotating deck
tubes to her bow tubes, an operation of some danger as it involved
opening her fore hatch and rigging torpedo rails through it,
which meant that she was unable to dive for some three quarters
of an hour. However the night was dark and the transfer was
successfully achieved. It was just as well as on 22nd the cruiser
was sighted again coming south on another trooping trip. A full
salvo of four torpedoes was fired, this time at 5200 yards,
and at the time, O19 believed that she had scored a hit.
This was not so, however, and although distant depth charges
were dropped, she was not subjected to a proper counter attack
this time either. O19, however, developed a defect in
one of her bow caps and had to bottom in 160 feet for an hour.
That night a man was lowered over the side and found a bow shutter
broken and, with some skill, cleared away the remains of it
in spite of an uncomfortable swell. O19 then left the
Java Sea by the Lombok Strait and, on arrival at Fremantle,
joined the Fourth Flotilla. O19, however, had many defects
and, after strenuous efforts to remedy them, had to be declared
unfit for further operations. Her colleague, Zvaardvisch,
left Fremantle on 9th April to patrol in the west Java Sea.
She fuelled at Exmouth Gulf and entered by the Lombok Strait,
doing air-sea-rescue duty on 21st. On 25th, she sank two large
hulks, which were carrying coal to Surubaya, by demolition charge
and ramming. She had more air-sea-rescue off Surubaya and on
28th, fired six torpedoes in two salvoes of three, at a convoy
of small ships but missed at a range of 2000 yards. An escort
prevented surfacing for gun action. She then accumulated a number
of defects in both main engines and torpedoes and was recalled
to Fremantle from where, after a short period in the Fourth
Flotilla, she returned to the United Kingdom for refit.
At the same
time as O19 and Zvaardvisch were working in
the Java Sea, Scythian
(Lieutenant CP Thode RNZNVR), Torbay
(Lieutenant Commander CP Norman DSO RN) and O24 (Luitenant
ter zee 1e Kl PJS de Jong) were operating in the Malacca Strait
and off the west coast of Sumatra. Scythian
left Trincomalee on 6th April for the northern part of the
Strait but was recalled after three days for another operation.
Torbay
sailed on 7th for special operations landing and recovering
beach reconnaissance parties on the west coast of Siam and
the north coast of Sumatra. O24 also sailed on 7th
to patrol on the west coast of Sumatra on her way to Fremantle.
She sank a large junk on 14th and joined the Fourth Flotilla
on 28th.
The two new
S-class submarines Solent
(Lieutenant Commander JD Martin DSC RN) and Sleuth
(Lieutenant KH Martin RN) left Fremantle on 14th April, five
days before Maidstone,
and their patrols were timed to join her on her arrival at
Subic Bay. Although both were on their first patrol in the
Far East, they were ordered to work together as a 'wolf-pack'
in the east Java Sea8.
The two submarines fuelled at Exmouth Gulf but met a strong
southerly set in the Lombok Strait. Both were also forced
to dive by a patrol and only Sleuth
was able to get through. Solent
had to turn back and wait for another opportunity. While still
south of the Strait on 23rd April, Solent
sighted a small merchant ship approaching from the eastwards.
She was escorted by a whaler and three aircraft. Solent
made a submerged attack and fired five torpedoes at a
range of 2000 yards, but one of them had a gyro failure and
circled overhead and the other four missed, the tracks probably
being seen by the air escort. The whaler counter attacked
and hunted for an hour dropping twenty-four depth charges
but none close enough to cause any damage. Solent
successfully transitted the Strait that night and met
Sleuth
again on 25th April. That evening a landing barge escorted
by a trawler was encountered. The trawler, however, detected
Solent
and counter attacked her. After dark, both submarines manoeuvred
to obtain the advantage of the moon and then opened fire with
their guns on the escort, destroying Special Minesweeper
No3, which blew up and sank. The landing barge was found
ashore next day and was also destroyed. Two days later, a
coaster was sunk by the guns of both submarines and no less
than 90 survivors were picked up before both submarines were
forced to dive by aircraft. All except five were subsequently
put ashore on the Laurent Islands next night. On 2nd May,
a coaster full of oil barrels was sunk by concentrated gunfire
and on 8th both submarines were ordered to shift patrol area.
They were, however, already short of fuel and had to return
to Exmouth Gulf to fill up. Here the Captain of Solent
went sick and was relieved by the spare Commanding Officer
from Adamant,
who was flown up on 11th (Lieutenant JC Ogle DSC RN). Both
submarines sailed again on 13th May and were ordered to proceed
direct to Subic Bay where they arrived on 26th. These patrols
lasted forty-two days, steaming a total of 7180 miles.
On 14th, Thrasher
(Lieutenant Commander MFR Ainslie DSO DSC RN) left Trincomalee
to land stores and a party in the Nicobar Islands on the night
of 18th/19th, returning direct to base. Sturdy
(Lieutenant FA Wicker RNVR) left Fremantle on 19th for the
United Kingdom to refit. She was to patrol along the north
coast of Java on the way, fuelling at Exmouth Gulf. She was
to enter by the Lombok Strait and leave by the Sunda Strait
for Trincomalee. She too met an adverse current in the Lombok
Strait and failed to get through at the first attempt. She
got through the next night but otherwise her patrol was uneventful.
On 21st April, Supreme
(Lieutenant Commander TE Barlow RN) left Fremantle for Subic
Bay. She fuelled at Exmouth Gulf and passed northward through
the Lombok Strait without trouble. While on passage through
the Java Sea, she sighted a convoy consisting of a small passenger
vessel and a merchant ship escorted by a torpedo boat, a trawler
and two aircraft. It was flat calm but she managed to fire
five torpedoes at 4400 yards, but the tracks were seen and
the torpedoes were avoided. The counter attack was feeble
and only one depth charge was dropped. The convoy then sought
safety by anchoring among the Kangean Islands. Attempts that
night by Supreme
to renew the attack were prevented by the torpedo boat, which
forced her to dive. The depth charges dropped, however, did
no damage. She then went on her way to the Gulf of Siam, where
she had been ordered to patrol, being bombed ineffectively
by an aircraft as she passed through the Karimata Strait.
After reaching the Gulf on 7th May, she destroyed two coasters
and a motor junk by gunfire. Next day she began an attack
on a coaster with three escorts in very shallow water. Supreme
was, however, detected by a large submarine chaser and she
hit the bottom at 55 feet while trying to evade the counter
attack. The Subchaser dropped two close patterns causing leaks
in the high-pressure air system, putting the asdic out of
action and damaging the port propeller and both periscopes.
The hunt continued for two hours and then Supreme
successfully wriggled into deeper water and got away. The
rest of the patrol was spent making a reconnaissance of the
area in co-operation with American submarines. She arrived
at Subic on 27th May having expended nearly all her fuel and
having run 6567 miles. She was docked for repairs that were
within the capacity of Maidstone
to remedy. During this same period, Stygian,
Spark,
Selene
and Seascout
proceeded direct from Fremantle to Subic Bay through the East
Indies without any incidents of consequence.
In the Malacca
Strait, Thrasher
(Lieutenant Commander MFR Ainslie DSO DSC RN) made another short
trip to carry out a special operation. This was to land stores
and agents on the west coast of Burma from 25th April to 5th
May. The main operation at the end of April was, however, to
cover the amphibious operation against Rangoon that it had been
decided to mount. Subtle
(Lieutenant BJB Andrew DSC RN), Statesman
(Lieutenant RGP Bulkeley RN) and Scythian
(Lieutenant CP Thode RNZNVR) left Trincomalee on 24th and 25th
to patrol in the Malacca Strait off the One Fathom Bank and
the Aroa Islands to prevent attack by the heavy Japanese cruisers
Ashigara and Haguro based at Singapore, and possibly
by the Takao and Myoko too if they had been repaired.
Their orders were to report first and then attack these ships
if they were sighted and so were there principally for reconnaissance.
The protection of the Rangoon landing force was to be the responsibility
of a covering force of the battleship Queen Elizabeth
and aircraft from escort carriers in the Bay of Bengal. Nothing
was, however, seen before 9th May, when the object of the patrol
was altered. It was now to be to attack the enemy first and
then report. This was after Rangoon had been occupied on 3rd
May. Nevertheless both Statesman
and Scythian
had found it necessary, on 1st and 5th May, to sink small craft
that had seen them so as to prevent the compromising of their
patrol positions. On the afternoon of 12th May, Subtle
sighted the cruiser Haguro escorted by a destroyer
and two submarine chasers northbound at eighteen knots. She
started to attack but just as the sights were coming on, the
enemy turned sharply away. Subtle
therefore withheld her fire and in trying to remain undetected,
hit the bottom with 35 feet on the gauge. Statesman
also sighted the upperworks of Haguro but far outside
torpedo range. Both submarines were able to surface and make
enemy reports by wireless. The covering force for the landings
at Rangoon had just returned to Trincomalee and, on receipt
of the enemy reports, at once put to sea again in the hope of
intercepting Haguro as she returned to Singapore. Queen
Elizabeth and her accompanying cruisers, escort carriers
and destroyers were, however, sighted by a Japanese reconnaissance
plane and Haguro at once reversed course. Early on 12th
May she was sighted returning by both Subtle
and Statesman.
As before, Statesman
was out of range but Subtle
fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 2000 yards
but the enemy was steaming at 25 knots, the track was late and
the sea was calm. The torpedo tracks were seen and the enemy
avoided them. The destroyer of the escort made an accurate counter
attack and caused widespread minor damage and put Subtle's
wireless out of action. Statesman
then closed and tried to attack the destroyer but could not
get in a shot. Subsequently she was able to make an enemy report.
Admiral Walker, commanding the surface covering force, rightly
appreciated that Haguro was engaged in evacuating troops
from the Andaman Islands and that she was likely to try again.
He therefore retired to the southwards where he hoped to avoid
detection by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately
Statesman
was sent to pick up agents on 13th May near the Dindings in
place of Torbay,
who had broken down. Subtle
contacted Scythian
and informed her that her wireless was out of action and these
two submarines remained in their patrol positions near the Aroa
Islands. Admiral Walker was right; the enemy made a second attempt
and passed the submarines northbound on the night of 14th/15th
without being seen. At the same time, Admiral Walker made an
air reconnaissance from his escort carriers, which sighted Haguro,
and he sent the 26th Destroyer Flotilla into the Malacca Strait.
On the night of 16th, the destroyers intercepted Haguro and
sank her with torpedoes. The submarine patrols were then withdrawn,
Scythian
sinking a junk as she did so on 19th.
Two more submarines
left to patrol during April and both sailed on 30th. Seadog
(Lieutenant EA Hobson DSC RN) from Trincomalee, visited the
west coast of Burma and the Andaman Islands, but saw nothing.
On the north coast of Sumatra on 18th May, however, she fired
three torpedoes at a range of 3000 yards at a coaster at anchor
and hit and sank her. Rorqual
(Lieutenant JPH Oakley DSC RN) left Fremantle with a full load
of mines and proceeded direct to the Sunda Strait. She laid
twelve magnetic ground mines in the Sumatra Channel and then
went on and laid forty-four moored contact mines in the Batavia
approaches. The original intention of these fields was to catch
the German U-boats based at Batavia on their way to and from
the Indian Ocean. All the German U-boats had, however, already
been recalled to Germany to be fitted with 'schnorchel' and
had left the area. These fields failed to trap any other vessels.
On 11th May, however, Rorqual
sank a coaster by gunfire when returning through the Sunda Strait.
She obtained 15 hits out of 21 rounds fired and was only on
the surface for five minutes.
EARLY IN MAY
C-in-C, British Pacific Fleet discussed the employment of submarines
with the Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet and on 2nd, he reported
the results to the Admiralty. Maidstone
and the Eighth Flotilla of up to ten of the S-class would operate
in the South China Sea from Subic Bay, but he warned that already
the American submarines in this area were almost exclusively
used for air-sea-rescue duties and that such targets as there
were would diminish still further. Adamant
and the Fourth Flotilla of nine T-class and Rorqual
now operating in the Java Sea area where there were still adequate
small targets for gun action, should continue to operate from
Fremantle and should not, as at present planned, move up to
a base in the Philippines. He could see no further case to lay
mines from submarines in this area. This situation would probably
continue until about September 1945, but would be reviewed at
two monthly intervals. In general he could not employ more than
the twenty British submarines now under his command in the Pacific.
The C-in-C ended his report by saying that he was endeavouring
to find a use for Bonaventure
and her XE-craft. No formal review of the part of submarines
in the East Indies was made at this time but here Wolfe
and the Second Flotilla, consisting of the three short range
T-class and six S-class were also running short of targets but,
with the planned amphibious operations in Malaya, there was
a requirement for a number of special operations. As a result
of this review, the minelayer Rorqual
was sent home9.
In the first
few days of May, a group of four T-class submarines left Fremantle
independently for the Java Sea. Terrapin
(Lieutenant RHH Brunner RN), Trump
(Lieutenant AA Catlow RN), Tiptoe
(Acting Lieutenant Commander RL Jay) RN) and Tudor
(Lieutenant SA Porter DSC RN) all sailed between 3rd and 7th
and all fuelled at Exmouth Gulf, passing through the Lombok
Strait successfully. Terrapin
was sent west to Batavia and the Thousand Islands. Trump
was sent to investigate the Sapudi Strait, Tiptoe
to the north coast of Sumbawa and the Postillon and Kangean
Islands, and Tudor
to the Makassar Strait. On arrival in her area, Terrapin
had the misfortune to run hard aground on the Arnemuiden Bank
in the early morning of 16th. She got off after one and a
half hours and jettisoning over 70 tons of oil fuel and two
torpedoes. Two days later she sank a motor lugger carrying
forty Japanese soldiers, and also a schooner with a cargo
of coal, both by gunfire. On 19th, she fired a stern salvo
of three torpedoes at 2500 yards at a tanker escorted by a
frigate and another small warship and missed. In taking evasive
action, Terrapin
struck the bottom with 57 feet on the gauge. She was shortly
afterwards heavily and accurately counter attacked with two
patterns of depth charges as she lay on the bottom causing
serious structural damage to the pressure hull forward and
a number of leaks. Attacks continued intermittently for five
hours and Terrapin
stayed where she was without further damage until nightfall.
After dark she surfaced and evaded the frigate, which was
still in the vicinity, and withdrew at full speed on the surface.
When clear, she made a trial dive but there were many leaks.
Most of these were repaired by dawn and a second dive was
found to be satisfactory. She decided to return to base but
her wireless was out of action. Fortunately on 21st she fell
in with the US Submarine Cavalla, who reported her
plight and escorted her through the Lombok Strait back to
Fremantle. Terrapin's
damage was so severe that she was, in fact, out of the war.
Trump,
in the Sapudi Strait, also had an exciting time. On 13th,
she damaged and set on fire an armed trawler with her gun
but was forced to dive and was counter attacked by another
escort vessel. She was stuck in mud on the bottom in 150 feet
of water but was undamaged. Later the same day she fired three
torpedoes at 800 yards at a submarine chaser and missed because
the tracks were sighted. The counter attack was fortunately
not serious and she escaped damage. She saw nothing more until
25th, when she sank a junk and, three days later, found a
camouflaged coaster inshore and sank her by gunfire. On 31st,
she fired two torpedoes at two anchored coasters close inshore
at a range of 2000 yards but the torpedoes ran into soft mud
before reaching the target. Next day, in Bewleleng Roads,
she sank a wooden coaster by gunfire and damaged some sheds
and a bridge ashore. On 8th June, she drove a small tanker
ashore on the north coast of Bali with her gun but then she
ran out of ammunition. She subsequently expended no less than
six torpedoes at this same target. The first three torpedoes
missed at 3500 yards but the second salvo of three, fired
at 2000 yards, secured a hit and blew her stern off. Tiptoe
also saw action and, after looking in to a number of anchorages
in her area, she sank two coasters by gunfire on 15th and
17th May. On 1st June, after a fortnight's inactivity, she
fired three torpedoes from her stern tubes at a range of 800
yards at the escorted 982-ton Tobi Maru near the Laurot
Islands and hit and sank her. She was only in 140 feet of
water and was heavily counter attacked with thirteen depth
charges, which exploded very close. The torpedo tubes were
put temporarily out of action as well as her asdic and there
was other minor damage. Tiptoe
was, in any case, near the end of her patrol and decided
to return to base. She dived out through the Sape Strait and
arrived at Fremantle on 17th June. Tudor,
in the Macassar Strait, had a blank patrol and only sighted
some anti-submarine craft in the distance.
During the
early part of May, four submarines put to sea from Trincomalee
and three of these were for special operations only. Torbay
(Lieutenant Commander CP Norman DSO RN) sailed on 8th but
broke down and had to return and, as related earlier, Statesman
carried out her retrieval of agents near the Dindings in her
place. Sibyl
(Lieutenant HR Murray RN) also left on 8th and sank five
junks by gunfire and demolition charge in the Malacca Strait.
She also searched for a suspected minefield with her mine
detecting unit. Clyde
(Lieutenant RH Bull DSC RN) left on 9th for her last patrol
and carried out a special operation on the west coast of Siam
but a second special operation had to be abandoned because
of defects to her hydroplanes. Thule
(Lieutenant Commander ACG Mars DSO DSC RN), on her way to
join the Fourth Flotilla at Fremantle, was ordered to carry
out one more of her special operations on the east coast of
Malaya. She left Trincomalee on 15th without reload torpedoes,
but carrying nineteen Royal Marines, four tons of stores and
fourteen raiding craft. She passed through the Sunda Strait
and landed her party on 30th/31st May on the east coast of
Johore, picking up thirty men from an earlier landing party
and some US airmen who had been shot down, in exchange. The
landing place was five miles from water deep enough for Thule
to dive. With ninety-four men on board, she then went on to
Fremantle by the Sunda Strait.
One more submarine
left Trincomalee right at the end of May and this was Trident
(Lieutenant AR Profit DSC RN) with orders to carry out two special
operations in the Malacca Strait and on the west coast of Sumatra.
Both of these were to contact agents and both failed. Trident,
however, sank a junk and two landing craft and also bombarded
an aircraft control tower. She then returned but her age was
beginning to tell and she had many defects.
The next group
of three T-boats from Fremantle sailed together on 13th May
and proceeded north in company as a 'wolf-pack'. These were
Trenchant
(Commander AR Hezlet DSO DSC RN), Thorough
(Lieutenant AG Chandler RNR) and Taciturn
(Lieutenant Commander ET Stanley DSO DSC RN) and they carried
out exercises on passage. They were not, however, to stay together
for long and on 19th, Thorough
was detached to reconnoitre Sape Strait, which she later passed
through independently, and was ordered to operate in the Surubaya
area. Trenchant
and Taciturn
made separate reconnaissances along the south coast of Sumbawa
and then passed north through the Lombok Strait in company on
the night of 23rd. They then went to the north Java coast west
of Surubaya. On 25th, Trenchant,
in company with Taciturn,
sighted a coaster escorted by a minesweeper. Combined gun action
was ordered but Taciturn
was too far away to intervene. Trenchant
engaged the minesweeper and began to hit but then her gun jammed.
She fired a single torpedo at 400 yards, which ran under and
then, having cleared her gun sank SpecialMinesweeperNo105.
The coaster had beached herself but before she could be destroyed,
an aircraft appeared and both submarines had to dive. Trenchant
was then ordered to patrol north of the Sunda Strait and Taciturn
to join Thorough,
who, also on 25th off Surabaya, fired five torpedoes at an escorted
southbound ship at a range of 1700 yards. She obtained one hit
sinking the 1000-ton Nittei Maru. The escort, a frigate,
surprisingly made no counter attack. On 29th, Trenchant,
north of Batavia, witnessed an attack by the US Submarine Boarfish
on a convoy and the subsequent counter attack but was too far
away to intervene. Taciturn,
west of Surabaya, had been harassed by anti-submarine patrols
since 25th and on 28th fired her three stern torpedoes at a
subchaser at a range of 700 yards. The torpedoes either missed
or ran under, and a sharp counter attack followed in which Taciturn
suffered damage to one of her main motors. Taciturn
met Thorough
on 30th, but only in time to proceed in company by the Karimata
Strait to a patrol line north of Singapore to cover the landings
in North Borneo scheduled for 10th June. On 31st, Trenchant
was also ordered to join the patrol line off Pulau Tengol and
while transiting the Karimata Strait was sighted by Thule
returning from her special operation on the east coast of Johore.
Stygian
(Lieutenant GS Clarabut DSO RN) and Spark
(Lieutenant DG Kent RN) sailed from Subic Bay on 29th May
in company to take up positions east of Singapore as additional
cover for the North Borneo landings. Operations in the area
took on a new importance at this time when the US Submarines
Blueback and Chubb sighted Ashigara and
a destroyer entering Batavia. Ashigara was now the main
threat to the North Borneo expedition as the seaworthiness of
Takao and Myoko in Singapore was doubtful. Trenchant,
who, in any case, was behind schedule and could not reach the
Pulau Tengol patrol line by the 3rd June as ordered, now asked
permission to patrol at the northern entrance to the Bangka
Strait to intercept Ashigara on her way back to Singapore.
This was approved by the Commander, Submarines, Seventh Fleet
and she altered course accordingly.
Trenchant
rounded Bangka Island and closed the north end of the straits
on the night of 6th-7th June. Here she encountered Stygian,
who had moved down from her patrol position off Lingga with
the same objective in mind. After consultation alongside each
other, it was decided that Trenchant
should patrol in the Bangka Strait inside O19's minefield,
and that Stygian
should patrol just outside. As soon as it was light, Trenchant
dived in between Bangka Island and O19's minefield into
a position in the middle of the straits, in about 20 fathoms,
where she was within torpedo range of the land on both sides.
Stygian
took up a position in about 17 fathoms, five miles north
of the Frederik Hendrik Klippen shoal. After dark both submarines
had plenty of time to re-charge their batteries fully and at
0400 received Blueback's report that the two enemy ships
had left Batavia and were heading north. Shortly afterwards,
Trenchant
sighted a darkened ship approaching from the south and kept
bows on. It was soon recognised as a destroyer and she stayed
on the surface looking for the cruiser expected to be following.
The destroyer passed close ahead, Trenchant
keeping bows on and then turning away sharply. At this point
she was seen by the destroyer who opened fire with starshell
and antiaircraft guns. Trenchant
fired a stern torpedo at her and she turned away and contact
was soon broken. Trenchant
then made a sweep up the straits searching for Ashigara
but nothing was seen. Stygian
saw the starshell and then received a message from Trenchant
reporting the destroyer and that Trenchant
had been seen. Eventually the destroyer retired up the straits
and the two submarines resumed patrol, waiting for daylight.
Both submarines
dived at dawn and at 0955, Trenchant
sighted the destroyer coming down the straits operating
her asdic. She kept end on and carefully plotted the destroyer's
track as it was expected that the cruiser would follow in her
wake. The destroyer went on to seawards and was sighted by Stygian
who also remained undetected. Seeing no cruiser, she then decided
to attack the destroyer when she turned south towards the straits
again. She fired two torpedoes at a range of 800 yards but the
splash of discharge was seen and they were avoided. The counter
attack of 27 depth charges fortunately only caused minor damage,
but the destroyer stayed in the area searching for her while
Stygian
crept towards the straits to keep between her and the cruiser.
At 1148, Trenchant
sighted Ashigara coming down the straits following the
same track as the destroyer on the Sumatra side. She fired a
full salvo of eight torpedoes at a range of 4800 yards on a
track of 120 degrees. Five of the torpedoes hit, stopping the
enemy with a heavy fire forward and a rapidly increasing list.
Control after
firing the salvo was regained within three minutes and, as
the enemy was still afloat, a turn was begun to bring the
stern tubes to bear. The two remaining stern tubes were then
fired but the enemy still had way on and they missed. The
destroyer then appeared to the northwards and, as she arrived,
Ashigara capsized to starboard and sank. She was carrying
some 2000 troops and 800 men were drowned.
Trenchant
withdrew without delay in order to pass between O19's
minefield and Bangka Island in daylight while accurate navigation
was possible. Stygian
withdrew to the northwards to her patrol position off Lingga
where she hoped she might get another shot at the destroyer.
Trenchant
was clear by dark and after surfacing, reported her success
and set course for the Karimata Strait in anticipation of
orders to return to Fremantle. She was, however, ordered to
the patrol line off Pulau Tengol. Thorough
and Taciturn
had been on the patrol line since 3rd June. Thorough
sank two coasters by gunfire off Pulau Tengol in 5 fathoms
of water on 3rd and 5th and on 6th, Taciturn
was attacked but missed by torpedo from a Japanese U-boat.
Thorough
was recalled to Fremantle on 11th and Taciturn
on 13th, but after passing through the Karimata Strait, both
boats, having plenty of fuel and torpedoes, asked for a week's
extension. Extensions were approved and the two boats met
off Surubaya on 16th. Next day, Taciturn
met a curious convoy consisting of an armed trawler, an old
and very rusty ex-Dutch submarine and a large hulk with promenade
decks and a roof and towed by Special Submarine Chaser
No105. Taciturn
closed in water too shallow to dive and engaged with her
gun. Most of this strange collection of ships were armed and
returned the fire. The rusty submarine was sunk by gunfire,
and then three torpedoes were fired at 2000 yards at the hulk,
hitting with two of them and sinking her. The submarine chaser
was also sunk by gunfire but the armed trawler made off. Taciturn
expended 205 rounds of ammunition. Next day the armed trawler
was sighted and pursued by Taciturn,
but the enemy ran straight into the arms of Thorough
who sank her with 17 hits out of 18 rounds fired. Taciturn
was now short of ammunition and a rendezvous was arranged
to obtain some from Thorough.
During the transfer, two schooners carrying coal to Surubaya
were sighted and one of them was boarded by Taciturn
and sunk by demolition charge. On 13th, Trenchant,
who had previously met the US Submarine Puffer off
Pulau Tengol, encountered a large tanker in ballast escorted
by a destroyer and a minesweeper. They were inside the ten-fathom
line and the water was very clear. When attacking, Trenchant
began to run into shallower water and, considering it to be
suicidal to continue, broke off the attack. On 15th, she was
ordered to Subic Bay where she received a great welcome from
Admiral Fife and the Maidstone
and the Eighth Flotilla. The sinking of Ashigara removed
the only remaining heavy Japanese warship from the southern
area. All three cruisers used for Field Marshal Terauchi's
evacuation policy for a concentration at Singapore had now
been destroyed.
Stygian
and Spark
remained on patrol east of Singapore until nearly the end
of June. On 14th, Stygian
had returned to the entrance to the Bangka Strait and she
engaged a coaster at long range but had to break off the action
because of fire from shore batteries. Both submarines were
used for air-sea-rescue but Spark's
patrol was otherwise uneventful. On her way back to Subic,
Stygian
investigated anchorages and local craft off the coast
of Borneo. There was one other submarine which sailed for
patrol at the end of May and that was the newly arrived O24
(Luitenant ter zee 2e Kl PJS de Jong) after refit in the United
Kingdom. She sailed from Fremantle on 29th May and carried
out a fifty-two day patrol in the Flores Sea with a short
break in the middle at Darwin from 18th- 21st June to fuel.
She only had one excitement and that was an attack on a Japanese
torpedo boat on 12th June. She fired four torpedoes at a range
of 3000 yards and missed. She was then subjected to a long
but fortunately ineffective counter attack.
CAPTAIN(S/m)
FOURTEEN in Bonaventure,
under orders to turn over his XE-craft for scrap in Australia
and for Bonaventure
to join the Pacific Fleet train, had never ceased to look
for an operational role for his flotilla. At a staff meeting
in June, he heard of a requirement to cut the telegraph cables
between Singapore, Saigon and Hong Kong. At this time the
Allies were able to decrypt practically every message sent
by radio by the Japanese. Messages sent by cable, however,
could not be intercepted and so could not be decrypted. If
the cables could be cut, then all traffic would have to be
sent by radio and it would be possible to read it. Captain
Fell was confident that XE-craft would be able to cut the
cables and was given permission by the C-in-C, British Pacific
Fleet to fly to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
the Commander of the Seventh Fleet and Admiral Fife. After
trials off Brisbane in the Great Barrier Reef, it was shown
that XE-craft could locate and cut cables, the proposal was
accepted by the US Navy and plans were made to mount the operation
towards the end of July. The Fourteenth Flotilla was therefore
reprieved from an ignominious end and given a chance to show
what it could do operationally.
During June,
the Eighth Flotilla at Subic got away five submarines on patrol.
Selene
(Lieutenant Commander HRB Newton DSC RN) on 7th, Seascout
(Lieutenant JW Kelly RN) on 16th and Supreme
(Lieutenant TE Barlow RN) on 22nd, sailed for the Gulf of
Siam. Solent
(Lieutenant Commander JD Martin DSC RN) and Sleuth
(Lieutenant KH Martin RN), acting as a 'wolf-pack', left for
the Bangka Strait and Singapore approaches on 17th. Patrols
in the Gulf of Siam were co-ordinated by the senior of two
US submarines in the area. Most of the targets were attacked
by gunfire and only two torpedo attacks were made. On 24th,
Selene
fired two torpedoes at one of two coasters at anchor at a
range of 3000 yards but one torpedo probably hit the bottom
before it reached the target, and the other stuck in the mud
just clear of the submarine's bow and then circled. On 30th,
Supreme,
having been put on to a convoy by the US Submarine Charr,
fired six torpedoes at two small tankers escorted by two subchasers
at 800 yards but they missed or ran under. This convoy turned
back to seek shelter and although Supreme
tried hard to get at them with her gun, she was unsuccessful.
Selene
sank a total of three coasters, a junk and a schooner by gunfire
and damaged another coaster. Seascout
sank a tug, two schooners, a coaster, five barges and two
junks and Supreme
a lugger, a tug towing a lighter and three coasters, all by
gunfire. Both Selene
and Supreme
were short of fuel by the end of heir patrols, Selene
having run 5138 miles. Solent
and Sleuth
found two landing craft on the north coast of Bangka. Solent
sank one and badly damaged the other, while Sleuth
kept guard to seawards. Sleuth
boarded a junk on 2nd July but let it go as it was not
in the service of the Japanese. On 5th, both submarines joined
the US Submarine Blower for a sweep thirty miles east
of Singapore, and next morning Sleuth
sighted a Japanese U-boat. She fired six torpedoes in a night
attack at 4000 yards from the quarter. The U-boat, however,
saw the tracks and avoided them. The next night, two patrol
vessels were detected by radar. Sleuth
was forced to dive, but Solent
fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards
but they probably ran under in the swell.
No submarines
left Fremantle to patrol during the month of June but Trenchant
of the Fourth Flotilla, after six days in harbour at Subic Bay,
set off back to Fremantle on 26th with orders to patrol on the
way. She was first to go to the Salayer Strait and then to make
a reconnaissance of the Gulf of Boni in Celebes. From 7th-9th
July, she waited in the Salayer Strait for a Japanese torpedo
boat, which was expected to pass that way. Nothing was seen
and she went on to the Gulf of Boni. This was more of a navigational
problem than anything else, the area being poorly charted with
many reefs. On 13th, she boarded a schooner, which was found
to be carrying kapok but also had three Japanese soldiers on
board, who fired at the boarding party through the hatches.
She was therefore sunk with gunfire as she was technically a
troopship. The Gulf of Boni was found to have little traffic
and the navigation was not as difficult as had been feared,
as the reefs could be seen under water. On her return voyage
to Fremantle, Trenchant
sank a small motor launch by gunfire in Kombal Bay in the Lombok
Strait, and also destroyed a tug and a landing barge, which
had beached themselves during the action. She arrived at Fremantle
on 24th July with no defects after being at sea for 82 out of
the last 95 days and having run over 15,000 miles. She found
that, since her departure from Fremantle on 13th May, Captain
HMC Ionides had been relieved in command of Adamant
and the Fourth Submarine Flotilla by Captain B Bryant DSO**
DSC RN.
During June
in the East Indies, five submarines left Trincomalee for operations.
Seadog
(Lieutenant EA Hobson DSC RN) sailed on 2nd for the southern
end of the Malacca Strait to land a party for a beach reconnaissance.
Two canoes were lost but what happened to them is not known.
Vivid
(Lieutenant JC Varley DSC RN) left on 11th June to carry out
air-sea-rescue duties in the Malacca Strait. She had to leave
patrol early because of a generator defect. Vivid
was a veteran of the Aegean campaign, but had been sent to the
Far East for anti-submarine training duties. She showed in this
patrol of just over three weeks, that the V-class had sufficient
endurance to work in the Malacca Strait. Thrasher
(Lieutenant Commander MFR Ainslie DSO DSC RN) went to the west
coast of Siam for a special operation on 14th, and had time
to sink three junks by gunfire and was attacked by an aircraft
for her pains but fortunately suffered no damage. Statesman
(Lieutenant RM Seaburne May DSC RN) sailed on 17th for the north
coast of Sumatra. She sank two junks and fired one torpedo at
a beached coaster at a range of 3800 yards and missed. She was
then hunted by anti-submarine craft when reconnoitring Sabang.
Finally Torbay
(Lieutenant Commander CP Norman DSO RN) went to the Malacca
Strait where she sank a coaster and two junks by gunfire and
demolition charge. She landed a party and stores in Sumatra
between 2nd and 6th July.
By early July,
the Fourteenth Submarine Flotilla had worked up its X-craft
on an old disused cable in the Brisbane area and they were ready
for action. Bonaventure
then sailed with her XE-craft on board and arrived at Subic
Bay on 20th July. Here the operations to cut the cables between
Hong Kong and Saigon to the south were planned in detail with
the enthusiastic support of Admiral Fife and his staff. It will
be recalled that T-class submarines of the Fourth Flotilla were
equipped to tow the XE-craft but they were far away at Fremantle.
The auxiliary towing arrangements were therefore adapted for
use by S-class submarines of the Eighth Flotilla at Subic. By
this time it had been decided to add two additional targets
to the operation. These were the Japanese cruisers Takao
and Myoko lying in the Johore Strait at Singapore. These
ships had not moved for some months. It was not known whether
they were operational or whether any progress had been made
with repairs. Nevertheless they remained a threat, especially
to the British landings in Malaya planned for September, and
it would be prudent to put them out of action for good.
Meanwhile
ordinary submarine patrols were continued by all three flotillas.
Five submarines left Trincomalee for patrol during the month.
Sibyl
(Lieutenant HR Murray RN) sailed on 2nd for the southern part
of the Malacca Strait and sank a coaster and eight junks and
damaged a tug and a schooner, all by gunfire. She left patrol
early because of a sick officer. Vigorous
(Lieutenant NR Wood DSC RN), the second V- class to do so, made
a three-week patrol on the north coast of Sumatra sailing also
on 2nd. She destroyed a beached coaster but did not see any
other targets. Thrasher
(Lieutenant Commander MFR Ainslie DSO DSC RN) left on 15th July
to patrol the northern part of the Malacca Strait and sank four
small coasters and two junks with her gun. A new 'wolf-pack'
consisting of Shalimar
(Lieutenant Commander WG Meeke MBE DSC RN) and Seadog
(Lieutenant EA Hobson DSC RN), both on their fourth patrol,
then put to sea on 18th to take Sibyl's
place in the southern part of the Malacca Strait. They caused
havoc among the small craft in this area, sinking, in spite
of considerable air activity, jointly a tank landing craft,
a coaster, a tug, a junk and a lighter. In addition, Shalimar
by herself sank another coaster, a tug, a lighter and four junks
and Seadog
another five junks. Finally Subtle
(Lieutenant BJB Andrew DSC RN) sailed from Trincomalee for the
Andaman Sea to report the weather for the widespread air operations
in the area.
The Fourth
Flotilla in Fremantle, which had practically had a sabbatical
in sailings for patrol in June, got nine boats to sea during
July, but one of these was a relief for the Eighth Flotilla
and went on to Subic. Thule
(Lieutenant Commander ACG Mars DSO DSC RN), who had been employed
a great deal for special operations, sailed on 5th July for
a normal patrol on the north coast of Java. She fuelled at
Onslow and passed northward through the Lombok Strait submerged,
which was unusual. On 14th, she drove an armed coaster ashore
and she was bombed, the missile fortunately missing 50 feet
astern, as she dived into a mud bottom. She destroyed three
coasters and bombarded a slipway on the north coast of Java
but was then, on 20th, recalled, as C-in-C East Indies had
asked for her back to carry out another special operation
in Johore in which she had become the undoubted expert. She
therefore left patrol by the Sunda Strait and returned to
Fremantle. The special operation was, however, later cancelled.
O21 (Luitenant ter zee 2e Kl FJ Kroesen), on her first
patrol since refit in the United Kingdom, sailed on 7th July
for the south coast of Java, which she searched, and then
passed through the Sunda Strait. On 29th she unsuccessfully
attacked two coasters with her gun but it jammed and they
got away. O21 was recalled through the Sunda Strait
at the end of July and sank a Japanese fishing boat off southwest
Java on her way back to Fremantle. It had been intended to
send Sidon
(Lieutenant HC Gowan RN) direct from Trincomalee to Subic
to join the Eighth Flotilla, but battery trouble necessitated
a visit to Fremantle. She subsequently left for Subic on 7th
July and to patrol east of Singapore Strait on the way. She
fuelled at Onslow and passed through the Lombok and Karimata
Strait and was then ordered to proceed direct to Subic. Later
she was diverted to search for the crew of an American Liberator,
which had come down off Saigon. She rescued a Second Lieutenant
of the US Air Force after five days some 287 miles from the
position in which his aircraft had crashed. Three more days
were spent searching for other members of the crew without
success, before going on to Subic Bay.
Tudor
(Lieutenant Commander SA Porter DSC RN) sailed on 9th July
to patrol in the west Java Sea and, after passing through
the Lombok Strait, took up a position west of Surubaya. On
27th, she attacked a convoy but was driven off by the escort.
She later sank four small coasters with her gun. She carried
out air-sea-rescue duties south of Lombok on her way back
to Fremantle. Stubborn
(Lieutenant Commander AG Davies RN) arrived in Fremantle
after service in Home waters and a refit. She was originally
intended for the Eighth Flotilla but it was decided to keep
her in the Fourth Flotilla as the Eighth, in early July, was
already up to full strength. She was sent on her first patrol
to the east Java Sea and, after fuelling at Onslow, passed
through the Lombok Strait. On 25th she sighted an eastbound
destroyer north of Bali and was able to fire four torpedoes
at a range of 3000 yards at this difficult zigzagging target.
She hit with two of them and sank Japanese Patrol Boat
No2, which was the elderly ex destroyer Nadakaze
of 750 tons. This was the last Japanese warship to be sunk
by torpedo by a British submarine during the Second World
War. Two days later, Stubborn
met the US Submarine Cabrilla and together they
reconnoitred Suleh Bay in Sumbawa forcing a small vessel to
jettison its cargo and sinking another. Sadly an officer was
lost boarding a junk. On 30th, Stubborn
bombarded Bewlelang Roads in northern Bali damaging slipways
and landing craft. She was forced to break off this action
by shore batteries and an aircraft. On her way back to Fremantle,
she contacted Taciturn
to take off an injured man and also carried out air-sea-rescue
duties.
Finally in
July, two T-boat 'wolf-packs' left Fremantle for the west
Java Sea. The first of these consisted of Trump
(Lieutenant Commander AA Catlow RN) and Tiptoe
(Lieutenant Commander RL Jay RN) who sailed on the 16th of
the month. They first made a thorough investigation of the
south coast of Java from the Lombok Strait to the Sunda Strait,
which they passed through in company. Tiptoe
damaged a coaster on the last day of the month, being forced
to let her go on the arrival of a subchaser with an aircraft.
On 2nd August, they sank two coasters with combined gunfire
and next day, Trump
off Batavia, sighted a substantial convoy consisting of four
large ships, one of which was a tanker, escorted by a destroyer,
two smaller escorts and aircraft. She fired five torpedoes
at the tanker, which was of 6000 tons, at a range of 6500
yards and hit with two of them. The target was seen to catch
fire and sink. Tiptoe,
four miles away, received an enemy report from Trump
and intercepted the convoy in very shallow water and a calm
sea. She fired four torpedoes at a range of 3500 yards and
one hit was obtained, sinking a merchant ship of 4000 tons.
Tiptoe
was practically aground at periscope depth on firing, but
extricated herself before a counter attack developed which
was, in any case, ineffective.
On 9th the
combined gunfire of both submarines sank a coastal tanker
north of the Sunda Strait. Both submarines returned to Fremantle
by the Lombok Strait. The second 'wolf-pack' consisted of
Taciturn
(Lieutenant Commander ET Stanley DSO DSC RN) and Thorough
(Lieutenant Commander AG Chandler RNR) who left Fremantle
on 25th July. They entered the Java Sea by the Lombok Strait
in company at the end of the month and sank two schooners
by demolition charge north of Bali on 1st August. They then
surfaced in Bewlelang Roads and while Thorough
sank a coaster and a landing craft, and damaged the waterfront,
Taciturn
kept the shore battery busy. Thorough
sank a schooner that night and another on the next day, but
she was slightly damaged by a bomb from an aircraft as she
dived. On 5th, the 'wolf-pack' closed the Kangean Islands
near where a coaster had been reported by an American submarine.
The coaster had an air escort and Taciturn
surfaced to attract its attention and then dived. This ruse
had to be repeated before the aircraft expended its bombs,
but when Taciturn
surfaced to engage the coaster, she was forced to dive by
another aircraft. Thorough
sank two coasters on 4th and 12th by gunfire and on 14th sighted
two large coasters with five anti-submarine vessels and three
aircraft escorting them. Shallow water prevented a submerged
attack. Thorough
was missed by bombs from two aircraft when withdrawing
through the Lombok Strait.
ADMIRAL FIFE,
having planned the attacks to be made by the X-craft of the
Fourteenth Flotilla, embarked in Bonaventure
where he hoisted his flag and sailed from Subic Bay to Brunei
Bay in North Borneo, which was now in Allied hands. There he
met Spark,
Stygian,
Spearhead
and Selene
of the Eighth Flotilla, which were to be the towing submarines
for the operation. Preliminary exercises and towing trials had
been carried out before leaving Subic Bay. On 26th July, Spark
(Lieutenant DG Kent RN) towing XE1 (Lieutenant JE Smart
MBE RNVR) and Stygian
(Lieutenant GS Clarabut DSO RN) towing XE3 (Lieutenant
IE Fraser DSC RNR), sailed for Singapore to attack Takao
and Myoko. Spearhead
(Lieutenant Commander RE Youngman DSC RNR) towing XE4
(Lieutenant MH Shean DSO RANVR) sailed the same day to cut the
Saigon cables while Selene
(Lieutenant Commander HRB Newton DSC RN) with XE5 (Lieutenant
HP Westmacott DSO DSC RN) left on 27th to cut the Hong Kong
cables. All four submarines slipped their X-craft on the night
of 30th/31st July, on time and in the right places. XE3
penetrated the Johore Strait and found Takao without
difficulty. She laid a side charge underneath her and placed
limpets as well, some difficulty being experienced as there
was little room between the cruiser's hull and the bottom. The
second side charge failed to release and had to be cut, or rather
bludgeoned free by a diver. XE3, her mission accomplished,
then withdrew. XE1, after being slipped, was delayed
by adverse tides and by patrol craft and instead of preceding
XE3 up the Johore Straits, was astern of her. Her target
was Myoko, lying higher up the Straits than Takao,
and calculations showed that XE3's charges under Takao
would explode before she could get out past her again. Lieutenant
Smart decided that it would be better to ensure Takao's
destruction rather than take the risk of passing her after attacking
Myoko at a time when XE3's charges were likely
to explode. If he waited above her, not only would he be too
close to his own charges under Myoko but he would almost
certainly be trapped by the consequent counter measures including
the closing of the boom across the Straits, which, it seems,
was normally left open. XE1 therefore attacked Takao
too but the shallow water prevented her charges being placed
underneath her and so had to be laid close alongside. Both XE1
and XE3 withdrew successfully and were picked up by Spark
and Stygian
and towed back to Brunei Bay. The explosions caused Takao
to subside onto the bottom but it was too shallow for her to
sink altogether.
Spearhead
towed XE4 to a position 14 miles from Cape St Jacques
off Saigon where she was slipped. XE4 successfully grappled
both the cables to Hong Kong and Singapore and cut them, bringing
back a one-foot length of each. XE4 made a rendezvous
with and was also towed back to Brunei Bay. Selene
with XE5, slipped her off Hong Kong to cut the Hong Kong-Singapore
cable west of Lamma Island. It was, however, laid in deep mud
and she had the greatest difficulty in locating and cutting
it, spending three and a half days in the attempt. On 3rd August,
further attempts were abandoned and XE5 was towed back
to Brunei Bay. In fact her efforts were later found to have
so damaged the cable that it was put out of action. These operations,
although confirming that X-craft were a very useful weapon in
war, cannot be claimed to have hastened the defeat of Japan.
Takao was out of action anyway and the Allies captured
the cables and could have put them to good use within weeks.
Nevertheless the operations were carried out with great skill
and bravery, and without casualties either of personnel or material.
The sinking of Takao was perhaps some slight compensation
to the British, whose carrier fleet at this time had not been
allowed by Admiral Halsey any share in destroying the remnants
of the Japanese battle fleet. which were sunk by the US Third
Fleet. No targets were, however, found for XE2 and XE6,
whose crews had to be satisfied with their being available to
take the place of the others had it been necessary.
In July, there
were two serious accidents in which one submarine was lost and
another put out of action for the rest of the war. O19 (Luitenant
ter zee 1e Kl JF Drijfhout van Hooff) had had her defects remedied
at Fremantle during June but, being a minelayer, was not required
operationally any longer15.
At the time, however, Maidstone
was seriously short of certain spares and stores for her
submarines and a requirement arose for some purpose or other
for dummy mines. O19 was therefore despatched from Fremantle
with a load of dummy mines and stores, to Subic Bay. She transitted
the Lombok and Karimata Straits but in the South China Sea,
due to a navigational error, ran ashore on the edge of the Ladd
Reef. The US Submarine Cod was sent to her assistance
but, after two days hard work, it was found to be impossible
to refloat her. She had, therefore, to be blown up and her ship's
company were taken to Subic Bay. After a stay in Maidstone,
they were sent south to Fremantle. The other accident was to
the newly arrived Seanymph
alongside Maidstone.
On 13th July she caught fire due to a mistake in disconnecting
charging leads from the depot ship. She had to be abandoned
and shut down, but with the assistance of an American salvage
vessel the fire was eventually extinguished. The damage done
was so extensive that a dockyard refit would be necessary to
put it right. Even repairs to make it possible for her to return
to the United Kingdom were beyond Maidstone's
capacity. The work, however, was undertaken by the American
repair ship Anthedon. With a hundred men working twenty-four
hours a day the work was done within a week. On 31st July, Seanymph
sailed for home calling at Manus and Darwin.
ON THE 1ST
AUGUST 1945, few members of the Allied forces fighting the
Japanese in the Pacific had the remotest knowledge of the
existence of the Atom Bomb, or that its use was a matter of
weeks away. Nearly all believed that total victory would not
come until Japan had been invaded and that this would take
a considerable time and much hard fighting. In South East
Asia the plan was still to land in Malaya between Port Swettenham
and Port Dickson and preparations were at an advanced stage.
British submarine operations therefore continued much as before.
The 'wolf-pack' consisting of Solent
(Lieutenant Commander JD Martin DSC RN) and Sleuth
(Lieutenant Commander KH Martin RN) had left Subic to operate
in the Gulf of Siam on 31st July. There was little left in
this area except junks and the two submarines sank fifteen
of them as well as a small Japanese patrol vessel. The crews
of the junks were all saved. Seascout
(Lieutenant Commander JW Kelly RN) left Subic on 8th August
to join Solent
and Sleuth
in the Gulf of Siam. From Trincomalee the newly arrived Spur
(Lieutenant PS Beale RN) left for her first patrol at the
southern end of the Malacca Strait. She sank eleven junks
by gunfire and demolition charges. Torbay
(Lieutenant Commander CP Norman DSO RN) set off on 7th
to land Dutch military personnel and stores in Sumatra and
Trident
(Lieutenant AR Profit DSC RN) sailed next day to relieve Subtle
in weather reporting duty in the Andaman Sea. Finally Statesman
(Lieutenant Commander RGP Bulkeley RN) left Trincomalee on
9th August for the Malacca Strait and sank five junks by gunfire
and finished off a derelict coaster with a torpedo, the last
to be fired by a British submarine during the Second World
War.
On 6th August,
the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and on 9th,
the second was exploded over Nagasaki and it was obvious that
the whole war situation had completely changed. On 15th August
the Japanese government surrendered and that day all British
submarines in the Pacific were recalled from Patrol: those
in the East Indies were recalled on 18th except for Trident
on weather reporting duty in the Andaman Sea. She remained
there until 31st August. On 15th, there were eight British
submarines at sea in the Pacific and five in the East Indies.
In the Pacific, there were three 'wolf-packs' operating: Solent
and Sleuth
were in the Gulf of Siam; Tiptoe
and Trump
were on their way back to Fremantle by the Lombok Strait and
Taciturn
and Thorough
were actually pursuing a convoy in the west Java Sea. Seascout
was by herself, also in the Gulf of Siam and Spearhead
was on air-sea-rescue duty east of Singapore. In the East
Indies, Spur
and Statesman
were on patrol in the Malacca Strait. Trident
had just relieved Subtle
on weather reporting duties and Torbay
was landing Dutch military personnel in Sumatra. There were
five S-class submarines in harbour at Subic Bay16.
was on her way back to the United Kingdom in a damaged state;
six T, S and Netherlands submarines were at Fremantle17,
and seven assorted boats were at Trincomalee18.
Scorcher
was sent out on weather reporting duties on 23rd August
to relieve Trident
and remained in position until 13th September. The Eighth
Flotilla at Subic Bay reverted to national operational control
before the end of August and was ordered to join Rear Admiral
Harcourt's force for the re-occupation of Hong Kong. Maidstone
arrived there with eight S-class submarines on 29th August.
On 30th, Maidstone
berthed at the dockyard and the submarines entered the
basin and at once began to supply electricity to the city,
whose power stations had no fuel. Apart from this, the requirement
for submarines in the Far East had ceased. The available naval
and military forces were used to re-occupy territory and take
the surrender of the Japanese garrisons; submarines could
not help much with these tasks. Maidstone
was in need of refit and in poor shape. On 17th September,
she was sailed for Fremantle to adjust complement with Adamant
and then left for the United Kingdom round the Cape, reaching
Portsmouth in December. By October, the Admiralty had issued
orders for the submarines of the Eighth Flotilla and also
Wolfe
and the Second Flotilla, to return to the United Kingdom too,
which they did via the Mediterranean. Adamant
and the Fourth Flotilla received orders to remain in the Far
East as part of the post war fleet. Adamant
and three T-and one S-class20
sailed for Hong Kong accordingly. Trenchant,
Thorough,
Tudor
and Thule
returned to the United Kingdom and O21 and O24
returned to national control.
SO ENDED THE
BRITISH SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN in the Far East, the third major
campaign which they had fought during the Second World War.
In its last year, it had a greater number of submarines operating
than in the Mediterranean campaign of 1940-43 or the
Norwegian campaign of 1940. It is, however, doubtful if they
exerted as great a strategic effect as in the other two campaigns.
As discussed in Chapter XII, the original purpose of sending
British submarines to the Far East after the First World War,
was to 'hold the fort' against the Japanese until a battle
fleet could arrive from Europe. Not only, when the time came,
were no submarines available for this task but no battle fleet
was to hand either. In the next phase in 1942, after Admiral
Nagumo's raid into the Indian Ocean and the retreat of the
Eastern Fleet to Kilindini, there was a pressing need for
submarines in the Far East. They were needed not only to give
warning of Japanese raids but also because they were the only
naval force capable of operating at all in an area in which
we had lost command of the sea. The question was considered
by the Admiralty after calls for submarines from C-in-C Ceylon
and C-in-C, Eastern Fleet. In the end it was decided to keep
the submarines in the Mediterranean, which was the only place
from which they could be sent. A small force of Netherlands
submarines with British support was all that was allocated.
That we survived without further disasters was due entirely
to the victory of the US Navy at Midway and the Coral Sea
and their campaign in the Solomons, which kept the Japanese
too busy to spare any forces for the Indian Ocean. When, after
the Italian surrender, submarines did become available for
the Far East, surface ships also became available to build
up an Eastern Fleet and the strategic purpose of submarines
changed again. It was now not only to satisfy the local needs
in the Indian Ocean such as reconnaissance for the Eastern
Fleet, attrition of the German and Japanese U-boats operating
in the area and attack on the sea communications of the Japanese
army in Burma, but also to join the American submarines in
the Pacific in their general campaign against Japanese shipping
wherever it could be found.
The American
submarine campaign in the Pacific, after a slow start during
its withdrawal from the Philippines to Australia and, with trouble
with their torpedoes, was a major plank in their strategy. It
proved equal in importance to the operation of their aircraft
carriers and to those of the amphibious forces. The main campaign
was their direct attack on Japanese shipping and, in the three
and a half years that it lasted, they made 4112 attacks firing
14,748 torpedoes sinking 1152 ships totalling 4,861,317 tons.
This not only cut the communications of the Japanese forces
occupying the territories they had invaded, but deprived their
industry of most of the raw materials required for war production.
Fuel was desperately short and the population was even deprived
of food. Although this success did not, by itself, bring about
a capitulation, it so weakened the Japanese war effort, that
it made the invasion of Japan a possibility. The American submarines
also had great success against the Imperial Japanese Navy. They
sank the battleship Kongo, the aircraft carriers Taiho,
Shokaku, Shinano and Unryu and four smaller escort
carriers, fourteen cruisers, forty-five destroyers, twenty-five
submarines, sixty-two frigates and small minelayers and thirty-four
submarine chasers and minesweepers21.
Against these figures, the performance of the British and Netherlands
submarines over the same period, seems very small. British submarines
made 191 attacks firing a total of 718 torpedoes sinking thirty-five
ships of 85,379 tons. They also sank the cruisers Ashigara
and Kuma and four German and Japanese U-boats, an old
destroyer and ten minecraft and subchasers. British submarines
also laid a total of 558 mines. The Netherlands submarines sank
eleven ships of 44,700 tons, the minelayer Itsukushima,
the destroyer Sagiri, the German U168 and also
laid eighty mines. The mining campaign by British and Netherlands
submarines in the Malacca Strait and East Indies did not prove
very successful. A total of thirty-two fields were laid but
only sank two small warships and five ships totalling 7864 tons.
Although every effort was made to lay the mines close inshore,
they had to be in very shallow water to be effective and this
meant laying them on the surface at night in water in which
the submarines could not dive. Many of the small vessels were
built of wood and the magnetic pistols of the ground mines would
not be actuated by them in any case.
The very great
success of the American submarine campaign in the Pacific was
due to a number of factors. Not least was the order, issued
soon after Pearl Harbour, to wage unrestricted submarine warfare
against Japan and there were no restrictions or sink at sight
zones. The long endurance of the US fleet type submarine which
enabled them to operate deep into Japanese waters from bases
as far away as Pearl Harbour and Australia was also important.
The directive to use pack tactics at night proved of even greater
value to them than to the German U-boats because the submarines
had a higher speed and, above all, ten centimetric radar and
VHF voice radio. This meant that they won the battles round
the convoys. This does not mean that the opposition was weak
or ineffective. The US Navy lost fifty submarines in the Pacific22.
Of these, nine were nothing to do with the Japanese, two being
by accident and four wrecked by running ashore while on patrol,
two more were sunk by their own circling torpedoes and one in
error by US forces. By far the greatest number sunk by the enemy
was by surface anti-submarine vessels of some type, which disposed
of twenty boats by depth charge and sometimes by gunfire. In
six of these sinkings, aircraft had a part and seven of them
occurred when attacking convoys. One submarine was sunk in harbour
by bombing and four were destroyed by aircraft at sea. Five
almost certainly struck mines and one was sunk by a Japanese
submarine and another by the fire from a shore battery. The
fate of the remaining nine is unknown even with the assistance
of Japanese records. An interesting fact is that, although twenty
American submarines were sunk by Japanese anti-submarine vessels
of some kind, the US submarines sank a total of 141 destroyers,
frigates, subchasers and similar small warships, an exchange
rate of seven to one.
It would,
however, be wrong to assume that the apparent poor showing of
the British and Netherlands submarines, compared with the Americans,
was because of technical inferiority. It is true that after
the loss of Singapore and Surabaya, they had not got the endurance
to reach Japanese waters from Australia or Ceylon and so could
never have achieved as much as their American colleagues. Nevertheless
it would be truer to describe their characteristics as 'different'
rather than as 'inferior'. There is little doubt that for European
waters off Norway, in the Bay of Biscay and in the Mediterranean,
they were better than the American type, which were too big
and unhandy. The performance of Subron in European waters in
1942-3, far from showing them to be superior to British types,
indicated that, in confined waters, they were not so effective.
The speed of the American submarines was only a few knots faster
than the British, but it made all the difference in being able
to overhaul convoys on the surface at night. The British A-class
were designed to overcome the deficiences in speed and endurance
of the T and S-classes but Amphion,
the first of the class, was only just doing her trials and they
were too late for the war. The British and Netherlands submarines
all had radar as well as the Americans. The British radar, the
type 291, however, was a general purpose set designed to detect
both ships and aircraft and worked on a frequency in the metre
band. The American radar, the type SJ in the centimetric band,
was designed to detect ships and could do so at far greater
distances than the type 291. It was also fitted with a planned
position indicator rather than an A-scope, and was greatly superior
tactically for attacking convoys at night. The type 291 was,
however, far better for detecting aircraft. The Americans had
a separate set, Type SD, for this purpose, which was omnidirectional
and greatly inferior. The Royal Navy had always been behind
the US Navy in the development of voice radio and had no suitable
set for submarines or for that matter, for ships either. By
the end of the Pacific war, however, sets were being fitted
in submarines to facilitate wolf-pack tactics. The American
submarines also had a sophisticated torpedo control system with
all round angling of torpedoes, which made it impossible to
'miss the DA' and the submarine did not have to be pointed in
the direction in which torpedoes had to be fired. Surprisingly
this did not achieve any better hitting rate than the British
with their primitive system but made up for the comparative
unmanoeuvrability of the large US submarines23.The
British submarines, nevertheless, had two substantial advantages
over the Americans. The first was that they were smaller and
more manoeuvrable and could operate in shallower water24.
The main difference was, however, one of tactics. While British
submarines were prepared to operate to their limits in shallow
water, the Americans were uneasy in depths of less than 100
fathoms and felt vulnerable in under 30 fathoms. In a number
of cases British submarines ran aground at periscope depth when
attacking and many attacks, such as that on Ashigara were
in under 20 fathoms. When Japanese large merchant ships became
scarce, they resorted to mass-produced coasters and the use
of local craft, operating in shallow water where it was difficult
for the large American submarines to get at them. The mounting
of guns in British submarines, with their quick manning hatches
and, in the larger classes, rotating breastworks, was undoubtedly
superior to the Americans. For operations in shallow water and
with the gun, they were actually superior to the US Fleet type
and were of the greatest value working with them and complementing
their operations. While it is incontestable that the Americans
could not have secured the results they did in the Pacific if
they had had British type submarines, it is certain too that
the British would not have done so well in Norway and in the
Mediterranean as they did if they had had American Fleet type
submarines.
The above
comments, except to point out that British submarines unlike
those of the US Navy, could not reach Japanese waters after
the fall of Singapore, do not explain the huge difference
in the sinkings. There were two other reasons for this. The
first was the number of British compared with American submarines
operating in the Pacific and the second was that until 1944,
the British were restricted to the Malacca Strait. At the
outbreak of war with Japan, the British had no operational
submarines in the Far East at all. The two that were then
sent from the Mediterranean only arrived as Singapore fell.
The Dutch had at first eleven and the Americans sixty-seven
in the Pacific. Soon after the end of 1942, the two British
submarines departed for refit, leaving three Netherlands boats
on the station. American strength by the end of 1942 rose
to eighty and a year later it was one hundred and twenty-three.
British submarines did not return to the Pacific until the
Italian collapse in the late summer of 1943 and their strength
was at first slow to increase. By the end of 1943, there were
still only seven boats on the station. Thereafter reinforcement
was fairly rapid and by the end of March 1944, they reached
a total of nearly thirty and this strength was maintained
until the end of the war. By the end of 1944 the Americans
had one hundred and fifty-six submarines in the Pacific and
their strength was kept at this level until hostilities ceased.
After 1943, the Dutch had about three submarines in the Far
East. Roughly, therefore, the British only deployed just over
ten per cent of Allied submarine strength in the Far East
over the whole period and the Netherlands about 2.5%. With
the restrictions on the area of operations, partly brought
about by lack of endurance and partly by the division of responsibilities
between the Allies, it is not altogether surprising that the
sinkings by British and Dutch submarines only amounted to
some two per cent of the total. In general the British submarines
were not available for the Far East when they were really
required in the early stages, and when the Eastern Fleet had
retired to Kilindini; and were in abundance after the
US Submarines had virtually destroyed the Japanese merchant
fleet.
Much greater
results were expected when the British submarines moved from
the East Indies to the Pacific. However hopes were not realised
as, by the time they got there, targets were as short as in
the Malacca Strait. As has already been pointed out, the distance
to most of the important patrol areas was no shorter by sending
British submarines to Fremantle and the same areas could have
been reached as easily from Trincomalee especially if an advanced
fuelling base had been organised in the Cocos Islands. Better
results could probably have been obtained if the Gulf of Siam,
the waters east of Singapore and the Sunda Strait area had
been included in the South East Asia Area from its inception
and the whole British submarine force operated from Trincomalee
throughout without sending any boats to Australia. Strategically
the blockade of Burma, in which the South East Asia Command
was mainly concerned, as well as the isolation by sea of Singapore
could have been better co-ordinated in this way.
The British
submarines in the Pacific, although operating in the shadow
of the victorious American Submarine Force of the Pacific
Fleet, had done well. They had arrived too late to partake
in the destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet but had
helped substantially in the final stages. Not only had they
prevented the Japanese Army in Burma using the sea in the
Malacca Strait and the port of Rangoon for their supplies
but after joining the American submarines in Fremantle were
able to assist them with attacks in shallow water and on small
craft with their guns which kept up the pressure of the blockade.
It was British forces which were mainly responsible for frustrating
Count Terauchi's strategy of concentrating his armies in Malaya
by sinking Haguro and Ashigara which would have
been of increased importance had the Japanese surrender not
come early as a result of the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.
The low tonnage
sunk by the British submarines in the Far East was balanced
by extraordinarily low casualties. Whereas we had lost forty-five
submarines in the Mediterranean and fifteen in Norway, during
the whole period of the war against the Japanese, we only lost
three boats. Furthermore, of these, only one was definitely
attributable to the Japanese Navy and the fate of the other
two is unknown. It is, however, true that another six submarines
were seriously damaged and were lucky to survive. The low casualties
were certainly not because risks were not taken. The British
submarines operated in very shallow waters and there were a
number of attacks in which submarines ran aground just before
or after firing, which illustrates this point. Credit must go
to the toughness of the submarines themselves and to the excellent
training and battle worthiness of their crews, hardened in the
Mediterranean and Norway. The Netherlands submarines, although
every bit as good as the British, were not so lucky. They lost
a total of nine boats but most of these were sunk in the early
stages of the conflict in attempting to stop the first Japanese
onrush. Four of the submarines were lost in Surabaya. In fact
only one Netherlands submarine was lost during the last three
years of the war and that was nothing to do with the Japanese25.
The highest
decorations for this final period of the war went to the X-craft
personnel for the sinking of Takao and the cutting of
the telephone cables. For the sinking of Takao, Lieutenant
Fraser of XE3 and his diver, Leading Seaman Magennis,
received the Victoria Cross and the other two members of his
crew the DSO and CGM. Lieutenant Smart of XE1 received
the DSO with suitable awards for his crew. Lieutenant Shean
of XE4 received a bar to his DSO for cutting the Saigon
cables and Lieutenant Westmacott of XE5 a bar to his
DSC for his three-day attempt to cut the Hong Kong cable. Later
Captain Fell commanding the Fourteenth Flotilla received the
CBE.
Awards to
the large submarine Commanding Officers reflected the paucity
of targets in the area at this time. A bar to his DSO went to
Commander Hezlet of Trenchant
for sinking Ashigara and a DSO to Luitenant ter zee
Drijfhout van Hooff of O19 for his gallant attempts to
achieve the same goal earlier in the year. Ten other Commanding
Officers received bars to their DSCs26
and another eleven the Distinguished Service Cross27.
Seven other Commanding Officers were Mentioned in Despatches28.
The chariot attack on Phuket was recognised by the award of
the DSC to Sub Lieutenant Eldridge RNVR and a DSM to Petty Officer
Smith and the two crew members. Finally in the New Year's Honours
of 1945, Captain Ionides, commanding the Fourth Submarine Flotilla,
was awarded the CBE.