BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1943, after the Italian surrender, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean had changed yet again. As before the Allies now held the whole coast of North Africa, except for that of Spanish Morocco opposite Gibraltar, right round to the Turkish frontier near Aleppo. They controlled both exits to the Mediterranean: the Straits of Gibraltar in the west and the Suez Canal in the east. The Italian front had stabilised across the peninsula from just north of Naples on the Tyrrhenian Sea to Termoli on the Adriatic. The Allies also held Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily but the Germans still held Crete. Enemy waters were now divided into three areas. The first was the sea off the south coast of France and the northwest coast of Italy to the north of Corsica and Elba. The second was the northern Adriatic extending down the Dalmatian coast and the third was the Aegean. The first two were completely cut off from each other and the second two, although connected by the Corinth Canal and the passage south of Greece, were, with the Allies holding the heel of Italy, practically cut off from each other except for occasional sorties. The result was that the Allies had complete command of the sea for the main passage through the Mediterranean, and convoys were already running along the coast of North Africa. In the three enemy areas, with the surrender of the Italian Fleet and the scuttling of the French Fleet, only light and weak Axis naval forces remained but they were dominated by strong shore based air forces and only submarines could operate in them effectively without fighter protection.

At the end of September, there were twenty-eight Allied operational submarines in the Mediterranean. In addition there were seven ex-Vichy French submarines fit only for limited operations and based at Algiers and Oran. There were also the four Greek submarines in the eastern basin. Of the twenty-eight, all were British built although two were manned by the Polish Navy, one by the Netherlands and one by the Free French. Only two of the British submarines were built pre-war, Severn and Rorqual, all the others were new. Two were T-class; seven were S-class and the rest U-class. The disposition of these submarines was somewhat uneven amongst the three flotillas. At Algiers were the seven S-class, at Malta the seventeen U-class while the First Flotilla at Beirut was reduced to Trooper and Torbay, as its remaining T-class had just left for the Far East. Three other submarines were under orders for the Far East, Severn, Surf and Simoom, and Surf had already started on her way. Rorqual was still in the Mediterranean but was also on her way back to the United Kingdom to refit.

After the Italian Armistice, it was decided to send four U-class submarines to the First Flotilla to replace the five T-class that had been ordered to the Far East. Unsparing, Unrivalled and Unruly were sent east and were ordered to patrol in the Aegean on the way. Sokol was also sent and she was ordered to patrol in the Adriatic. Sokol (Kapitan GC Koziolkowski) sailed from Malta on 26th September and proceeded direct to the northern Adriatic. She was off Pola on 4th October and fired two torpedoes at 700 yards at a southbound ship scoring a hit. The target blew up and sank and was the ex-Italian Dea Mazzella of 3082 tons in German service. A second southbound ship was attacked later in the day with another two torpedoes but one of them circled and the other missed at a range of 2000 yards. On 7th October she fired three torpedoes at a German steamer at a range of 600 yards and hit with one of them, sinking Eridania of 7094 tons. Finally, the same afternoon, she fired her last torpedo at a small passenger ship carrying troops but the range was 2000 yards and she missed. Sokol then surfaced and opened fire with her gun but was forced to dive by shore batteries after securing several hits. She then returned to Malta for fuel and went on to Beirut at the end of October. In spite of this successful patrol, it proved to be the last by an Allied submarine in the Adriatic. The area was taken over by destroyers and motor torpedo boats, as our shore based aircraft, working from Italy, were strong enough to cover their operations.

Decisions now had to be made on how to employ submarines in the Mediterranean after the Italian surrender. On 18th September, Captain(S) Ten (Captain GC Phillips DSO GM RN) was summoned from Malta to Algiers to discuss the problem with Captain(S) Eight (Captain GBH Fawkes CBE RN) and the C-in-C's staff. Almost at once the need to prevent the evacuation of Corsica arose and this occupied the majority of the submarines of the Eighth and Tenth Flotillas for the rest of September as already related in Chapter X. For the future it was clear that the German armies in Italy would need coastal traffic on both sides of the peninsula to supplement their road and rail communications. We now know that, in fact, they had a requirement for 30,000 tons a month along the Italian Adriatic coast as well as 100,000 tons a month along the Dalmatian coast to the southwards¹. What was already apparent was that Malta was a considerable way away from the patrol areas off the south of France and in the Gulf of Genoa, and this involved a long escorted passage through our own waters with its problems of mutual interference. Officers were therefore despatched to Maddalena in north Sardinia to investigate whether it would be possible to move the Tenth Flotilla to the Italian shore submarine base there. At the end of September the Admiralty, as has already been told, announced that all new S and T-class submarines would henceforth be sent to the Far East. It was obvious that Maidstone would follow them there before long and that the Eighth Flotilla would go too. At the end of September, however, a crisis developed in the Aegean and it became necessary to send substantial reinforcements there. First, the Polish Dzik from Malta was sailed after the four U-class already sent to replace the T-class that had gone to the Far East. Then Seraph, Shakespeare, Sickle, Sibyl and Sportsman were despatched from Algiers to join the First Flotilla too. At the same time, Rorqual's voyage home to refit was delayed, as was the deployment of Severn, Simoom and Surf to the Far East. Finally the Italian submarines Menotti, Atropo, Corridoni and Zoea, which had surrendered at Malta, were despatched to Haifa to carry stores to the Aegean.

Torbay (Lieutenant RJ Clutterbuck RN) left Beirut on 10th October to relieve Trooper off Leros. The island was suffering frequent and heavy air attacks by the time she arrived. On 15th Torbay sank a 50-ton German caique by gunfire off Calino, and later that day she attacked some landing craft with her gun but accurate return fire from the anti-submarine caique G445, which had been escorting the convoy, forced her to dive and she was depth charged. On 16th October, Torbay, acting on information provided by cryptography, sighted an escorted convoy of two merchant ships in line abreast. She fired four torpedoes at 1400 yards from close ahead of the port escort and had to dive deep at once. She was then bombed by an aircraft and counter attacked with seventeen depth charges, but she had hit her target with two torpedoes and had sunk the 1925-ton Kari. The rest of this convoy was later intercepted and sunk by Allied destroyers.

Surf (Lieutenant D Lambert DSC RN) had already passed through the Suez Canal on her way to the Far East but was recalled to Beirut and left for patrol on 12th October. She took up a position south west of Leros. On 16th she sighted an escorted merchant ship and approached to attack. The escort, however, gained contact with her before she was able to fire torpedoes and forced her to break off the attack and go deep. An accurate counter attack put one of her main motors out of action and before she could regain control she dived involuntarily to 445 feet. Fortunately she was not damaged further but the target got away. On 25th, off Amorgos, she engaged a ship by gunfire at long range, but it was armed and its accurate return fire forced her to dive and she had to let her go too. On 29th she began another attack on a ship with an escort and also two seaplanes overhead. This was when she was north of Mykoni and the ship escaped into Port Panormos in the island. Soon after midday, Surf fired two torpedoes into the harbour at her from 4500 yards but without success. Just before dark she tried again and fired another two torpedoes, this time from 3400 yards, but missed again.

The supply of the garrison of Leros, which was a brigade strong, was proving very difficult. The only fighters available for its defence were long range Beaufighters working from North Africa. With the strong air opposition it could only be supplied at night and there was no question of using merchant ships. Everything had to be run in by destroyers, caiques and small craft and these had to be out of the area or lying up in Turkish waters by dawn. Several destroyers had been lost and it was decided to use the submarines that were now available to run in supplies. Severn (Lieutenant Commander ANG Campbell RN), already on her way to the Far East, was diverted to Beirut for this purpose. She sailed from Beirut on 18th October with six Bofors guns secured on her casing and carrying 15 tons of ammunition, three tons of petrol and stores and eight soldiers. She arrived off Leros on the 21st and unloaded that night being away by dawn. Even so she was bombed as she left, but fortunately without suffering any damage. Rorqual (Lieutenant Commander LW Napier DSO RN), on her way home to refit, had reached Malta but was recalled to Beirut and sailed on 20th October with six more Bofors guns and a jeep, as well as 15 tons of ammunition and petrol and ten tons of food. She was bombed as she approached Leros on 21st October but suffered no serious damage and unloaded that night. She ran aground in the harbour but got off helped by a tug and got back to Beirut safely. Starting on 26th October, the Italian submarines Zoea, Menotti, Atropo and Corridoni left Haifa at intervals carrying 45 tons of stores each and delivered them to Leros successfully.

The First Submarine Flotilla continued to take energetic measures to try to prevent the Germans recapturing Leros. Seraph (Lieutenant NLA Jewell MBE RN) left Beirut on 20th October, Shakespeare (Lieutenant MFR Ainslie DSC RN) on 21st, Unruly (Lieutenant JP Fyfe RN) and Unsparing (Lieutenant AD Piper DSC** RNR) on 24th. Seraph passed through the Kaso Strait and arrived south of Amorgos on 23rd. Two days later she was moved to a new position between Naxos and Mykoni. On 27th she sank a caique by gunfire but then encountered two anti-submarine vessels and fired two torpedoes at one of them at a range of 2000 yards. The target sighted the tracks and took avoiding action and counter attacked with 58 depth charges. The counter attack was not close and Seraph watched from periscope depth throughout. On 30th, Seraph was moved north of Samos, also still in our hands, but saw nothing. On her way home on 5th November, Seraph intercepted a caique in the Kaso Strait and found a German Officer and thirteen soldiers on board and took them prisoner. The caique, Miltiades of 150 tons was sunk. Next day she reconnoitred Pegadia Bay in Scarpanto and fired a torpedo at a large caique at a range of 1600 yards, hitting and sinking Narkyssos, which was flying German colours. Seraph also bombarded the shore hitting a seaplane and some warehouses. Shakespeare also entered by the Kaso Strait and, passing west of Stampalia, patrolled between Mykoni and Nikaria. On 25th October she was moved to the approaches to the Doro Channel, and the following day she sank a large two masted caique by gunfire. On 28th October, Shakespeare was ordered to the northern Aegean to create a diversion. In deteriorating weather, she patrolled between the Skyros and Skopalos groups of islands, taking such shelter as she could. She then moved to Lemnos and on 2nd November returned to Mykoni. She encountered considerable air activity, and she attacked a trawler with her gun on 8th but had to desist due to the appearance of an aircraft. Unruly arrived in an area north of Amorgos on 27th and sighted many aircraft. She also attacked a schooner with her gun but it jammed and the enemy fired back and she had to dive. The schooner then dropped eight depth charges. Unsparing's area was south of Amorgos to prevent reinforcement of German forces in Kos and Kalymnos. On 29th at night, using information supplied by the cryptographers, she sighted a medium sized ship escorted by two R-boats steering east. She got into position and fired four torpedoes at a range of 3000 yards but on a rather late track. Unsparing dived after firing and heard two explosions. After daylight she saw many liferafts, some with German soldiers, and an R-boat picking up survivors. She fired a single torpedo, which hit and sank the R-boat. A second R-boat dropped depth charges fairly close but no doubt killed or injured the survivors in the water. The ship sunk was the German Ingeborg of 1160 tons carrying troops. On 31st Unsparing surfaced to attack a caique at a range of 3000 yards but was forced to dive after accurate return fire killed one of her gun's crew and wounded three others. She had to leave patrol early to land her injured men. It was clear that some caiques were equipped as Q-ships⁴.

Dzik, who had been on patrol off the coast of Morea, returned along the north coast of Crete. She had sunk a caique by gunfire on 17th off Monemvasia but that was all and she arrived at Beirut on 24th November. Sickle, who had been between Amorgos and Nio during the fighting on Leros, sank a caique by gunfire on 18th taking a German naval rating prisoner. She then moved to Cape Malea and worked northwards along the coast of Morea. On 19th, north of Cape Monemvasia, she found a merchant ship and two anti-submarine craft at anchor. As she closed to attack, in a flat calm, her periscope was seen and fired upon. She fired three torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards and hit with two of them. The two anti-submarine vessels then weighed and hunted ineffectively for an hour. The German Bocaccio of 3141 tons was sunk. Bocaccio was one of nine ships that the Germans wished to transfer from the Adriatic to the Aegean. Aircraft and surface forces in the Otranto area sank six of them, and only two reached Piraeus. Sickle then moved north and sank two caiques by gunfire in the Therma Channel, and then passed through the Kaso Strait back to Beirut⁷.

THE CRISIS IN THE AEGEAN now having been followed to its conclusion, we must return to study events in the western Mediterranean, which occurred at the same time. During October and November after the evacuation of Corsica, patrols were continued off the south coast of France and in the Gulf of Genoa with three objects in mind.

The first was to interdict such supplies for the German forces in Italy as were transported by sea. The second was to try and sink German U-boats, which were operating in the Mediterranean and were based at La Spezia and Toulon, and the third was to try to prevent any German trade with Spain. Most of the submarines involved in these patrols belonged to the Tenth Flotilla at Malta but this proved an uneasy arrangement. Not only was Malta a long way away but also it proved difficult to send the boats on patrol through the Sicilian narrows and other 'friendly' sea areas where the Allies wished to conduct intense anti-submarine measures. It had already been decided that the solution to this problem was to move the base of the Tenth Flotilla from Malta to Maddalena in Sardinia, but the US Air Force had heavily bombed Maddalena and much work had to be done before it could be ready. The majority of the submarine patrols in October were therefore made from Maidstone at Algiers, and were controlled by the Captain(S) Eighth Submarine Flotilla.

Dolfijn, Ultor and Unseen left Algiers on 7th, 11th and 12th October to patrol off Toulon and the French Riviera and for the Gulf of Genoa. Untiring, who had just arrived on the station from the United Kingdom, left Gibraltar for the Gulf of Lions on 11th. Dolfijn (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl HMLFE van Oostrom Soede) had an uneventful patrol but made a gun attack on barges off Frejus on 14th but was driven off by shore batteries. Untiring (Lieutenant R Boyd DSC RN), on 15th sighted a German U-boat bound for Toulon and fired four torpedoes at a range of 6000 yards. Her quarry, U616, however, sighted the tracks and avoided the torpedoes. On 19th, Untiring fired two more torpedoes at two large landing barges at a range of 800 yards in the Gulf of Frejus but they ran under. On 21st off Cape Sicie near Toulon, she fired her last two torpedoes at a merchant ship in ballast at a range of 400 yards but these missed probably also running under. Untiring, having expended all her torpedoes for no hits, then set course for Algiers. Ultor (Lieutenant GE Hunt DSC RN), on 19th when north west of Spezia, fired four torpedoes at a range of 2200 yards at a northbound passenger ship escorted by a corvette and E-boats. Two torpedoes hit and sank the German Aversa of 3723 tons. Moving to Genoa, on 24th, Ultor fired four torpedoes at a range of 2800 yards at an escorted merchant ship but she avoided them. Ultor suffered a counter attack but was undamaged although some depth charges were close. Unseen (Lieutenant MLC Crawford DSC* RN) on 14th, also sighted U616 homeward bound but could not get close enough to attack. On 22nd, she fired three torpedoes at a pair of F-lighters at a range of 500 yards and hit one of them with two torpedoes sinking her. The other lighter escaped inshore and Unseen fired a fourth torpedo, which damaged her and also a nearby railway bridge. Unseen, Dolfijn and Ultor returned to Malta from Algiers after these patrols.

A second batch of submarines left Algiers for patrol later in October. Ultimatum for the south of France on 19th, Curie for the Gulf of Genoa on 23rd, Unshaken also for the south of France on 25th and Upstart, recently arrived from the United Kingdom, for the south of France on 28th. The ex-Vichy La Perle also made a special operation during October in the south of France. On 26th, Ultimatum (Lieutenant WH Kett DSC RNR) sighted an outward-bound U-boat but because of poor light and long range, no attack was possible. Next day a convoy of two ships was seen off Cape Sicie and four torpedoes were fired at a range of 7000 yards. Although she heard an explosion at the right range and later only one ship was in sight, German post war records do not confirm a sinking. Next day Ultimatum was told that an inward bound U-boat might be expected. She sighted the enemy soon after daylight and fired three torpedoes at the long range of 6500 yards. One torpedo hit and sank U431, which was a remarkable shot⁸.

Unseen (Lieutenant MLC Crawford DSC RN) patrolled for four days and saw nothing but on 21st she inadvertently broke surface in rough weather. After submerging again, propeller noises were heard overhead and an accurate pattern of five depth charges was dropped causing minor damage. Unseen dived to 280 feet before regaining control. The visibility was poor and she never saw her tormentor. The only other incident in this patrol was the sighting of a small convoy that passed her out of range on 22nd December. Universal (Lieutenant C Gordon RN) on 18th December encountered a convoy of two merchant ships escorted by three anti-submarine trawlers, a UJ-boat and three flak lighters. She fired four torpedoes at a range of 2700 yards hitting the steamer La Foce of 2497 tons with two of them and sinking her. She was counter attacked for two and a half hours, 45 depth charges being dropped without causing damage. Curie (Lieutenant de Vaisseau PM Sonneville) sailed from Algiers on 14th December to patrol off the south coast of France. On 23rd she fired two torpedoes at a tank landing craft at a range of 4200 yards but did not score a hit. Next day another tank landing craft appeared and Curie got in to 2400 yards but this time she only fired one torpedo and missed again. On 29th December, the French submarine Protee, on patrol off Toulon, was sunk by the German UJ2208. Uproar (Lieutenant LE Herrick DSC RN) also left for patrol in December in the Gulf of Genoa. She sailed on 24th and on 27th having moved to the French Riviera, sighted a merchant vessel in ballast escorted by a destroyer and a UJ-boat. She fired four torpedoes at between 3000 and 4000 yards but all missed or ran under. The French Casabianca (Capitaine de Fregate L'Herminier), however, was on patrol off Toulon, having left Algiers on 20th and she attacked and hit the same ship shortly afterwards⁹.

Captain(S) Ten (Captain GC Phillips DSO GM RN) arrived at Maddalena from Malta in the Italian corvette Chimera early in December. The new base, bringing the name Talbot from Malta, consisted of shore accommodation, which had been damaged by Allied bombing; of submarine pens which had not been damaged, and the Italian repair ship Paccinotte with a mixed team of Italian naval artificers and civilians supervised by the British base staff. Bombing had seriously damaged the adjoining dockyard and little had been done to repair it. Everybody soon settled in and by the end of the year, Uproar, Untiring, Ultor, Unseen and Universal had arrived and were being looked after. It had been decided to maintain the strength of the Tenth Flotilla at three to five boats. Three was the minimum to keep one on patrol on the south coast of France and five was the maximum considered to be justified by the task to be done.

WE MUST NOW RETURN TO THE AEGEAN and the activities of the First Submarine Flotilla to the end of 1943. On 5th November, Commander DC Ingram DSC RN took over the command of the flotilla with the acting rank of Captain, from Captain HMC Ionides who had been appointed to command Adamant and the Fourth Submarine Flotilla in the Far East. Captain Ingram had commanded Clyde early in the war, and in 1940 had torpedoed and damaged the German battle cruiser Gneisenau. He had come immediately from the X-craft organisation in Scotland and he had been mainly responsible for the trials and training of the X-craft that had attacked Tirpitz in September.

In November 1943 at the Teheran Conference, the Prime Minister, in conversation with Stalin, became aware of the difficulties of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in stopping the German evacuation of the Crimea. Remembering the success of the British submarines in North Russia, but without any naval advice, he offered the Russian dictator the use of some of our submarines. On his return, the Prime Minister directed the Admiralty to go ahead with this project and the Admiralty, in their turn, wanted the A(S) to send six of the S-class from Beirut into the Black Sea. There were, however, two serious difficulties; firstly the area in which the submarines were to operate was shallow, badly charted and of very low salinity, and secondly the transit of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus was subject to the Montreux Convention of 1936 which was still in force. A secret entry into the Black Sea submerged without Turkish permission was scarcely practicable, and although the Foreign Office were prepared to try and get the Turks to turn a blind eye to a surface passage at night, they were not thought likely to agree. Re-ballasting the submarines could solve the salinity problem but the difficulty of operating in shallow, badly charted areas remained. The plan continued to the point of instructing Captain(S) One to make preparations, and he replied that docking the submarines for re-ballasting would take six weeks. In the end, to everyone's relief, Stalin refused this assistance and the project died a natural death¹⁰.

Patrols continued in the Aegean after the loss of Leros, with the general aim of interfering with the enemy's sea communications, and three submarines sailed for patrol during November. Torbay (Lieutenant RJ Clutterbuck RN) left Beirut on 15th, Unsparing (Lieutenant AD Piper DSC** RNR) on 16th and Unruly (Lieutenant JP Fyfe RN) on 28th November. Torbay had an eventful patrol and on 18th she was off Amorgos after she had had to change a piston in the port engine at sea. After dark she was sighted by two anti-submarine vessels, which opened fire on her. Torbay dived and shook them off, heading afterwards for the northwest Aegean by the Mykoni Channel. On 21st she sank a 50-ton caique by gunfire off Psathura and left a second caique to pick up the survivors. At midday next day she sighted smoke in the Skiathos Channel and turned to investigate. A floating dock in tow of three tugs and escorted by six anti-submarine vessels then came in sight heading north towards Salonika at 4-5 knots. Torbay made a long submerged approach and fired five torpedoes, three at the dock and two at the tugs that were overlapping. The range was 1500 yards and the torpedoes were set to a depth of 8 feet, but all ran under and it seems that the attack was unobserved. Torbay, still submerged, then set course to keep contact and reloaded. Three quarters of an hour later, she regained a firing position and launched two more torpedoes at a range of 1000 yards and set to run on the surface. Both of the torpedoes hit and the dock sank. This second attack also seems to have been unobserved and was probably attributed by the enemy to a mine, the tugs and escorts making off towards Skiathos. On 26th, Torbay was between Lemnos and Tenedos where she sighted a small merchant ship. It was very rough and she fired three torpedoes at a range of 800 yards but they ran under. Next day in the early morning when she was off Samos, she sighted a merchant ship with two escorts leaving harbour. Torbay fired her two remaining internal torpedoes set to run at a depth of two feet. Both hit and sank the German Palma of 2610 tons. An accurate counter attack followed and lasted forty minutes putting the after periscope out of action and cracking the barrel of the underwater signal gun which began to leak badly. Torbay dived deep and touched bottom at 240 feet but was able to shake the enemy off by a drastic alteration of course. The underwater gun was first plugged and then blanked, and she was able to patrol for another two days off Mykoni before returning to Beirut by the Scarpanto Strait. Unsparing, on the other hand, had an uneventful patrol in the southwest Aegean, her only contact being when she sighted a caique unloading in Malea Bay in Morea on 1st December. She fired two torpedoes at a range of 700 yards, which missed, probably because of the tide.

On 21st, too, Sportsman, who had sunk a caique by demolition charge on 19th, engaged another caique with her gun south of Lemnos. Shore batteries intervened, however, and she was forced to dive. The caique, Spiridon Sy283, was towed into Mudros Bay in a sinking condition and beached. Also on 21st, when Sokol and Surf were on their way back to Beirut, they met in the Kaso Strait. Surf had been delayed intentionally to avoid meeting Torbay, who was entering the Aegean. Sokol was ahead of time hurrying back to Beirut for Christmas! On 22nd, Torbay, north of Candia, was hunted unsuccessfully by a UJ-boat. On 23rd, Sportsman sighted the elusive 3840-ton Balkan outside Mudros Bay escorted by an aircraft and the destroyer TA15 and the R211 and the E-boat S54. Sportsman got away three torpedoes from very fine on the quarter at a range of 1650 yards. All three torpedoes, which had CCR pistols, exploded, one ahead, one astern and one right under the target, sinking her with her cargo of coal. This time both sides realised what had happened, the Captain of S54 reporting that acoustic or magnetic pistols must be in use. The escort counter attacked but lost contact and Sportsman was able to withdraw.

On 23rd, before returning to base, Sickle successfully landed a Greek officer in Kalama Bay in Euboea. Torbay, on Christmas Day, engaged an 80-ton caique off Cape Stavros. She had only scored four hits when the shore battery on the Cape forced her to dive and the caique was rescued and towed in. Torbay then shifted patrol to the Turkish coast south of Kos, but she only glimpsed one small ship in heavy rain before she returned to Beirut.

DURING THE THREE MONTHS covered by this chapter, Allied submarine activity in the Mediterranean declined. There were thirty-two torpedo attacks made in October, only fifteen in November and twenty-one in December. This was not only because the German use of the sea in the Mediterranean decreased substantially both in volume and importance, but also because the number of Allied operational submarines decreased as well. Only one patrol was made in the Adriatic but the submarine sent there expended all her eight torpedoes and sank two ships of 10,175 tons. Thereafter this area was left to air and surface forces. Off the south coast of France and in the Gulf of Genoa, there were thirty-five attacks during the three months, expending 94 torpedoes and sinking the German U431, an auxiliary minelayer and three ships of 17,940 tons. These were small results but were achieved by only a few small submarines and helped our campaign in Italy and forced the enemy to maintain anti-submarine measures including coast defences, in the area. By far the greatest results were obtained in the Aegean. Here in twenty-nine attacks expending 84 torpedoes they sank an auxiliary minelayer, an R-boat and an E-boat, a 15,000 ton floating dock, seven ships of 19,595 tons and some thirty caiques and schooners, most of the last type being destroyed by the use of the gun. The enemy needed to use the sea in the Aegean to support the garrisons in Crete and the Greek islands and the Dodecanese. It is probably in this area that the enemy most felt the effect of our submarine operations at this time. The price of these operations was the loss of two British submarines, Trooper and Simoom. The fate of these two boats is not certain but most probably both were mined. The French Protee was also lost, falling to a German anti-submarine vessel.

Decorations awarded for this period in the Mediterranean all included recognition for earlier exploits during 1943. Lieutenant Clutterbuck of Torbay received a Distinguished Service Order, Lieutenant Hunt of Ultor, a bar to his Distinguished Service Cross, Lieutenant Commander Napier of Rorqual a Distinguished Service Cross for laying 300 mines and sinking two supply ships and finally Kapitan Romanowski of Dzik the same for five successful patrols.

During this period, too, air and surface forces continued to attack enemy shipping. The total sunk by all arms from October to December inclusive was thirty-one ships of 119,663 tons, over half of which were sunk by submarines and most of the rest by aircraft and a few by ships¹³. It will be recalled from Chapter XX, that at the Italian surrender, 1,158,817 tons of shipping remained and that 410,234 tons of this were damaged leaving 748,578 tons available¹⁴. Of this total 183,591 tons were surrendered to the Allies and 76,298 tons were scuttled to prevent them falling into the hands of the Germans¹⁵. This leaves 564,987 tons¹⁶ and the sinking of 119,663 tons represents slightly less than a quarter of this total, which is not insubstantial.

AT THE END OF 1943, there were nine submarines in the First Flotilla at Beirut. These were Torbay, Sibyl, Sportsman, Sickle, Unruly, Unsparing, the Polish Sokol and Dzik and the Netherlands Dolfijn. Surf had gone on to the Far East and Severn was under orders to do the same as soon as her serious engine defects had been made good. Rorqual had gone home to the United Kingdom to refit. These nine submarines of the First Flotilla and the five in the Tenth, and also the Free French Curie which had been grouped uneasily with the ex-Vichy French submarines at Algiers, made a total of fifteen fully operational submarines in the Mediterranean. In addition, available for limited operations and also for anti-submarine training were the Greek Flotilla with their depot ship Carinthia at Beirut, the ex-Vichy flotilla, already mentioned, at Algiers and an Italian Flotilla at Haifa which had been used to run stores to Leros in October and November. The total number of boats in this category was another fifteen. Most of them, however, were in poor mechanical condition and in need of refit and were short of spare gear and torpedoes. The future of the Italian boats was expected to be, at most, for anti-submarine training but the French submarines still had important work to do landing agents in the south of France. The crews of the ex-Vichy, perhaps better called Giraudist, submarines at Algiers and the Greeks were clamouring to man British new construction submarines, but the Admiralty were still able to man most new boats with British or with Polish, Norwegian, Netherlands or Free French crews. The new V-class submarine Veldt (ex-P71), however, was to be manned by the Royal Hellenic Navy. The total number of fully operational boats in the Mediterranean, as we have seen, had been reduced from twenty-seven to fifteen during the three months of this chapter. Nevertheless, in spite of the decline in importance of submarine operations in the Mediterranean and the priority now given to the Far East, there were still over twice as many submarines operating in the Mediterranean as in the Indian Ocean. This was partly because some of the submarines were unsuitable for the Far East. Torbay, for instance, was a short range T-boat and the three S-class were nearing their time to refit in the United Kingdom and it was not worth sending any of them east. All the other operational submarines in the Mediterranean were of the U-class, which had not sufficient endurance for the Indian Ocean. Although, therefore, the Mediterranean had ceased to be the most important station for submarines, they were still present in some strength and were performing a useful function in that sea.