Home
Waters and the X-craft Attack on Tirpitz: July - December
1943
References
Patrolgram
20 War patrols in Home Waters July - December 1943
Map 45 X-craft attack on Tirpitz
- The Passage
Map 46 X-craft attack on Tirpitz
- Penetration of Fjords
Map 47 X-craft attack on Tirpitz
- The Attack 22 September 1943
Appendix
XIII Training submarines in September 1943
DURING THE
SUMMER OF 1943, with the end of the Tunisian campaign and with
the large number of new submarines being completed, it was found
possible to reinforce the Home flotillas substantially. By 1st
July, Truculent,
Tuna,
Seadog,
Stubborn,
Seanymph,
Satyr
and Syrtis
together with O15, Ula and Rubis composed
the operational strength available for patrols in Home waters
and they were shortly to be joined by Thrasher,
Sceptre
and Minerve. At this time the most important operation
for submarines in Home waters was the X-craft attack planned
to be made on Tirpitz in September. By July the six operational
X-craft (X5-10) had completed their trials and their
individual working up practices and, by 4th July, had arrived
at their operational training base at Eddrachillis Bay on the
west coast of Scotland. They were accompanied by their special
depot ship Bonaventure
(Captain PQ Roberts RN). Here they carried out intensive and
realistic training on battleship targets lent from the Home
Fleet. The battleship target was moored in a place similar to
the Norwegian Fjords and surrounded by nets provided by the
boom defence authorities. At the same time a force of two T-class
submarines and six S-class was allocated and fitted for towing
the X-craft to their destination. The towing system had by now
been perfected and consisted of a heavy nylon1
towrope with a telephone wire laid up in it. It was fitted
with a release mechanism at each end that could be worked from
inside the submarine or the X-craft. The towline had short chain
sections where it was subject to chaff.
Tirpitz,
Scharnhorst and Lutzow were still based in North
Norway at Alten Fjord but with the suspension of north Russian
convoys during the summer and with the constant daylight, submarine
operations were concentrated on anti U-boat measures in the
Bay of Biscay and to the north of the Shetlands. The U-boats
had suffered a heavy defeat in May 1943 and had been withdrawn
from the North Atlantic. Nevertheless they had 240 U-boats operational
and their numbers were still increasing. In addition, we knew
from cryptography that they planned to start operations again
in the autumn using new weapons and equipment. In any case operations
in distant areas using supply U-boats were still in progress,
so there was every reason for our submarines to continue their
anti U-boat patrols. The cryptographers also gave us information
that the Germans were planning to send seven surface blockade-runners
and five Italian transport submarines to Japan, although this
was not to be until the autumn. The Soviet submarines of the
Northern Fleet, however, continued operations to the north of
Norway. Twelve submarines made patrols during the summer and
they made eight unsuccessful attacks including one on Brummer.
The Russian submarine M106 was sunk by depth charges
and Shch422 was mined but S56 sank two small patrol
vessels.
The only British
submarine to be sent to the north was Seadog
(Lieutenant CR Pelly RN) who, as told in Chapter XVII, had gone
to the assistance of our meteorological station in Spitzbergen
and did not return until 11th July. On 1st July, Stubborn
(Lieutenant AA Duff RN) had been on patrol in the Bay for a
week and Rubis (Capitaine de Corvette H Rousselot) and
Seanymph
(Lieutenant JPH Oakley DSC RN) were on their way there to be
followed in a few days by Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston RN). North of the Shetlands, the new Free
French submarine Curie2
(Lieutenant de Vaisseau PM Sonneville) had just arrived
for her working up patrol and was joined a few days later by
Syrtis
(Lieutenant MH Jupp DSC RN). Stubborn
patrolled in the middle of the Bay about 100 miles west
of the Gironde. She was much hindered by fishing vessels and
was unable to complete an attack on two U-boats escorted by
minesweepers seen on 30th June. On 2nd July she sighted three
U-boats escorted by two destroyers and fired six torpedoes unsuccessfully
at a range of 1000 yards. The track was very broad and the torpedo
wakes were seen, but the destroyers did not counter attack.
Next day she sighted two more destroyers but they were out of
range. On 4th July, Seadog,
far to the north off Bear Island, fired a full salvo of six
torpedoes at a U-boat at a range of 3500 yards but one torpedo
broke surface and she missed. Seanymph
in a patrol position in the middle of the Bay sighted two inward
bound U-boats on 13th. They were in line abreast and she fired
a full salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards but from
nearly right astern and without result. One of the U-boats dived
on sighting the torpedo tracks. Rubis, also in the Bay,
closed the coast and laid two groups of mines in the swept channel
south of Cape Ferret. The German minesweeper M4451 struck
one of these a few days later and sank. Rubis was also
able to bring back intelligence of a radar station near Arcachon.
Satyr,
Syrtis
and Curie saw nothing.
For over two
years, a British force had been kept ready to occupy the Azores
should Portugal be invaded by Germany. By this time the danger
had receded but the Allies were very keen to secure air and
escort vessel bases in the islands to help them in the Battle
of the Atlantic. Negotiations were being conducted to try
and obtain permission from the Portuguese, who had been our
Allies since 1380, but they were not going very well. Early
in July the Admiralty required submarines to make a special
reconnaissance of the Azores and Tuna
(Lieutenant DSR Martin DSO RN) and Truculent
(Lieutenant RL Alexander RN) were detailed for this duty.
They sailed on 10th July but hardly had they arrived when
agreement was reached with the Portuguese Government to allow
us to use bases in the Islands and the submarines were recalled3.
Two more working
up patrols were made north of the Shetlands in July by Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN) and Minerve without
success, but Tally
Ho (Lieutenant LWA Bennington DSO DSC RN) on passage
through the Bay of Biscay sighted three U-boats but was not
able to make an attack on any of them.
In August
most of the patrols were again in the Bay of Biscay, Seadog,
Seanymph,
Satyr
and Syrtis
doing one each followed by patrols by Truculent
and Tuna.
Rubis also visited the area to lay more mines. Ula
(Loytnant RM Sars) made a patrol north of Lerwick and Thrasher
(Lieutenant AR Hezlet DSC RN), Upstart
(Lieutenant PC Chapman DSC* RN) and Untiring
(Lieutenant R Boyd DSC RN) carried out anti U-boat working
up patrols west of the Shetlands, northeast of Lerwick and
northeast of the Faeroes respectively. No success attended
any of these patrols and they saw very little. Seadog
and Satyr,
bored by lack of activity, both boarded fishing vessels but
found nothing but tunny fish, and such actions were not encouraged
as they gave away the submarine patrol positions and were
of little value. Truculent
too saw nothing but fishing vessels, but Tuna,
on 22nd August sighted five minesweepers outward bound ninety
miles west of St Nazaire. She waited for their return and
just before midday saw them again escorting two U-boats. The
U-boats were in line abreast and one of them passed too close,
so Tuna
fired eight torpedoes at the other at a range of 3000 yards.
The torpedoes missed but exploded at the end of their run.
Tuna's
presence was not suspected, however, and on surfacing that
night she found that she was towing a paravane which she had
fouled and which belonged to the German minesweepers. Untiring
closed a fishing vessel on 27th August believing it to be
a U-boat in a position about 130 miles north-east of the Shetlands.
The fishing vessel, the Danish Havbus I of Godoy, was
acting suspiciously so Untiring
took off her crew and sank her by gunfire.
DURING AUGUST
THE PLANS for the attack on Tirpitz by X-craft were
finalised and were named Operation 'Source'. The date for
the attack was chosen as 22nd September when the hours of
darkness, the moon, the tide and the weather were expected
to be favourable. As it was not known whether the German ships
would be in Trondheim, Narvik or Alten Fjord, three plans,
one for each place, were drawn up. The position of the ships
was thought to be in Alten Fjord, and some information of
their position and of the boom defences had been obtained
by signal intelligence, by agents and from Norwegian sources
through the British naval attaché at Stockholm. Nevertheless
it was of great importance that the X-craft should have really
up to date information on the exact position of the ships
and of the boom defences before they attacked. The co-operation
of the RAF was therefore enlisted to obtain this by photographic
air reconnaissance. During the latter part of August, Mosquito
aircraft flew shuttle reconnaissances between the United Kingdom
and North Russia but all their operations were frustrated
by the weather. Photo-reconnaissance Spitfires were therefore
flown to Vaenga in North Russia and a photographic interpretation
unit was sent there by destroyer. Catalina flying boats were
provided to fly the photographs back to the United Kingdom.
At the end of August, the six towing submarines, Thrasher,
Truculent,
Syrtis,
Seanymph,
Stubborn
and Sceptre
arrived at Eddrachillis Bay where the depot ship Titania
(Commander HR Conway RN) had been sent to look after them.
Final towing and crew changing exercises were carried out
and then the X-craft were hoisted on board Bonaventure
to have their explosive side charges fitted and for final
maintenance checks to be made. Two spare towing submarines,
Seadog
and Satyr
were kept ready at Scapa Flow in case they should be needed.
No Allied
submarines had closed the coast of Norway since April and
in September, Tantalus
(Lieutenant HS Mackenzie DSO* RN) was sent to patrol off Bear
Island where it was hoped she might catch a U-boat and would
also be at hand should assistance be required by the Allied
meteorological station at Barentzburg in Spitzbergen. The
Norwegian Ula (Loytnant RM Sars), after two days of
exercises in the Shetlands, sailed on 1st September to land
two agents and one and a half tons of stores in Me Fjord near
Tromso. This was done on the night of 5th/ 6th and she was
back in Lerwick by 11th September. Russian air reconnaissance
definitely located the enemy ships in Alten Fjord on 3rd September.
Spitfires flew the first British photographic reconnaissance
on 7th September and to the dismay of everyone involved in
Operation 'Source', they found the Tirpitz and Scharnhorst
berths empty and only Lutzow in harbour. The German
ships with ten destroyers had, in fact, sailed the day before
to destroy the Allied meteorological station in Spitzbergen,
which they did by bombardment and landing party on 8th September.
The Home Fleet
put to sea late on 8th September, but next day signal intelligence
indicated that the enemy was returning to base. The German
ships wasted no time and set course without delay for Alten
Fjord. Tantalus
off Bear Island, without waiting to be told, at once made
for Eis Fjord in Spitzbergen. She arrived early on 9th but
the enemy had already left. She then received a signal from
A(S) telling her not to close Eis Fjord in case a U-boat was
lying in wait there. Tantalus
then withdrew from the area and did sight a U-boat on 12th
but was unable to attack. She reconnoitred Barentzberg on
15th and found it destroyed. Seadog
(Lieutenant CR Pelly RN), one of the two spare towing submarines
at Scapa Flow, was then loaded with 12 tons of stores to re-establish
the base and left Lerwick on 16th September. She landed eight
men and the stores successfully on 25th September4.
Rear Admiral
Barry arrived at Loch Cairnbawn on 10th September and hoisted
his flag in Titania.
By this time the Spitfires had, to everyone's relief, reported
the German ships back in their berths in Alten Fjord. The six
submarines, each towing an X-craft, sailed from Loch Cairnbawn
at intervals on 11th/12th September5.
They were given parallel routes twenty miles apart up the coast
of Norway one to two hundred miles off shore. Most of the passage
was made with the towing submarine on the surface and the X-craft
submerged. In this way the T-class could make good 10 knots
and the S-class 8½ knots. When nearing the coast by day
or when aircraft were likely to be encountered, the submarine
could submerge too and continue to tow the X-craft, which also
would be submerged. To ventilate the X-craft periodically, it
could surface with the towing submarine on the surface or submerged,
but the towing submarine had to reduce speed when on the surface.
Telephone communication was maintained by 'ringing up' whenever
necessary. The passage was made with a passage crew in the X-craft,
the operational crew remaining in the large submarine until
the last moment.
The Spitfires
obtained good photographs of the enemy in Alten Fjord on 14th
September and these were flown to the United Kingdom and the
results signalled to the towing submarines on 15th and 17th.
The passage went without a hitch until the early morning of
15th September, when X8's tow parted from Seanymph.
X8 surfaced but had already lost sight of Seanymph,
so she set a course to follow her using her diesel engine at
three knots. Seanymph
did not realise that her tow had parted for two hours and she
then turned back to search. Stubborn
with X7 sighted a U-boat at midday and dived. She surfaced
soon after and at 1323 her tow parted too. While a new tow was
being passed between Stubborn
and X7, X8 sighted Stubborn.
Subsequently Stubborn
towing X7 with X8 in company, proceeded on her
way and she reported the situation to the A(S) by wireless.
X8, however, lost contact during the night and Seanymph
also reported the situation to A(S). At dawn, Stubborn
with X7 went on her way without X8, but before
dawn sighted Seanymph
and put her on to X8. Seanymph
sighted Sceptre
and X10 at midday on 16th, and then at 1700 she at last
found X8 and took her in tow again, having changed the
passage crew for the operational crew. If the tow parted again,
X8 was now in range of Alten Fjord and could proceed
to the attack independently. Meanwhile in the early hours of
16th, X9 also parted her tow from Syrtis.
She was never seen again and was lost with her passage captain
(Sub Lieutenant Kearon RNVR) and his crew6.
Syrtis
was now in the area where wireless silence was in force and
so could not report the loss of X9. During the 17th September,
X8 had further trouble when her side charges began to
flood. Both charges eventually had to be released and both exploded,
seriously damaging X8. Early next morning it was decided
to take off her crew and scuttle her. Both Syrtis
and Seanymph
then proceeded to the northwards out of the area of wireless
silence to report the situation. After dark on 18th, Stubborn
transferred the operational crew to X7 for the same reason
as Seanymph
had done for X8. On 20th September, Truculent,
Thrasher
and Sceptre
arrived in their release positions off Alten Fjord with X6,
X5 and X10 and Stubborn
with X7 was not far behind. X7 had trouble with
a mine which fouled the tow but it was kicked clear by the Commanding
Officer7.Syrtis
sighted a U-boat which passed within easy range but she had
to withhold her fire for fear of compromising the operation.
X5, X6, X7 and X10 were released as planned
after dark on 20th with their operational crews on board, and
set off across the minefield west of Soroy on the surface.
There is little
doubt that the X-craft Commanding Officers would have preferred
to attack singly and independently over a period and not all
together. The danger that the first attack could compromise
the whole operation and make subsequent attacks impossible was,
however, too great, and there is no question that A(S) was right
to plan for a single massed attack. So that the X-craft would
not blow each other up, the day of the assault was divided into
attacking periods of three hours and explosion periods of one
hour. With three enemy ships present a number of target plans
were included in the operation orders so that A(S) could control
which ships were to be attacked according to the results of
the air reconnaissance. In the event, Target Plan No.4 had been
ordered on 15th September after the results of the photographic
reconnaissance made on 14th September had been studied. This
was while the submarines were towing the X-craft up the Norwegian
coast. This plan ordered X5, X6 and X7 to attack
Tirpitz, X9 and X10 to attack Scharnhorst
and X8 to attack Lutzow. This plan was not altered
after X8 was scuttled, and the sinking of X9 was
not reported in time for it to be altered anyway. In consequence
X5, X6 and X7 were to attack Tirpitz and
X10 Scharnhorst with no X-craft left to attack Lutzow.
On the evening of 21st September, signal intelligence indicated
that a German main unit was about to leave for the south and
C-in-C Home Fleet was informed. C-in-C, fearing a break out
might be contemplated and believing that Tirpitz was
likely to sail before the X-craft could attack, requested the
Admiralty to cancel Operation 'Source'. A(S) pointed out that
Tirpitz was still in her berth at sunset and was unlikely
to leave before morning, and that if once postponed the operation
could never be laid on again. The Admiralty therefore refused
C-in-C's request and the submarines and X-craft remained unaware
of this incident8.
X5, X6,
X7 and X10, with their shallow draught, had already
crossed the Soroy minefield safely and entered Soroy Sound where
they had dived as soon as it was light9.
X10 then developed serious defects in her periscope and
compass and proceeded into Smalfjord on the north coast of Sternoy
to try to repair them. The other three proceeded submerged through
Sternsund into Alten Fjord arriving at the Brattholm Islands
by dark where they were to charge their batteries. X6
and X7 and probably X5, set course in the early
hours of the morning for Kaa Fjord to attack. X10, in
spite of strenuous efforts, was unable to remedy the defects
to her periscope and compasses without which she was blind and
Lieutenant Hudspeth reluctantly decided to withdraw. In any
case, his target, Scharnhorst, left her berth to do exercises
in Alten Fjord during the morning and could not have been attacked.
The other
three X-craft penetrated the anti-submarine nets at the entrance
to Kaa Fjord but by this time X6 had developed similar
defects to X10 having trouble with both periscope and
compass. X7 (Lieutenant BCG Place DSC RN) ran into
an empty torpedo net pen and took two hours to get clear.
X6 (Lieutenant D Cameron RNR) decided with great gallantry,
in spite of her defects to throw herself into the attack.
She was able to follow a tender through the gate in Tirpitz's
torpedo nets but without periscope or compass ran aground.
She was seen by the enemy but got off and then collided with
Tirpitz on her port side forward, releasing both her
charges. She then surfaced and abandoned ship, all four of
the crew being rescued and taken prisoner. Meanwhile X7
was trying to penetrate the torpedo nets on the other side
of Tirpitz. After several attempts to get through,
she wriggled her way under them and made a classic attack
dropping one side charge roughly under Tirpitz's B
turret and the other under the engine room. She had little
time to get away before the charges exploded but after a desperate
struggle had just got clear when the charges went off. Tirpitz,
forewarned by the sinking of X6 alongside that she
was under attack, also guessed that bottom charges were being
used. She was able by working her cables to haul her bow over
to starboard as far away as possible from the place where
X6 had sunk. She was thereby able to avoid the worst
effects of three of the four charges. X7's second charge
under the engine room, however, completely disabled the ship
causing many casualties and wrecking all three main turbines
as well as causing much other shock damage and flooding. X7,
some five hundred yards away, was also wrecked. She lay on
the bottom for an hour and then surfaced. She was at once
sunk by gunfire but two of her crew, including Lieutenant
Place, were rescued and taken prisoner. The Germans also claim
to have sunk an X-craft by gunfire after the attack about
a mile down the fjord and this was probably X5 (Lieutenant
H Henty Creer RNVR) from which there were no survivors10.
X10, the only survivor of the six X-craft, made her
way to seawards and was eventually picked up by Stubborn.
On 23rd September,
the day after the attack on Tirpitz, Lutzow
sailed from Alten Fjord and proceeded with a destroyer escort
south to Narvik. In fact she had not been 'flushed' by the
attack but was scheduled to sail on that day to return to
Germany to refit. She passed along the coast inside the Soroy
minefield while four of our submarines were waiting to recover
the X-craft just outside it. Seanymph
was on patrol to the west of Andoy and Sceptre
had been sent to patrol off Melangen Fjord. Lutzow
was not seen either by Seanymph
or Sceptre
as she took the inshore route through Tjelsundet. On 25th
September, Ula (Loytnant RM Sars) and Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston RN) left Lerwick to join Seanymph
off Andoy with the aim of intercepting U-boats, which were
believed to pass from their bases at Trondheim and Bergen
by that route to operate in the Arctic. Soon after midnight
on 25th/26th September, however, Lutzow sailed from
Narvik for the south, still keeping to the Indreled. She was
reported off Myken on the morning of 26th and Ula and
Satyr
were diverted to patrol off Stattlandet to intercept her.
Lutzow, however, got to Stattlandet first by a few
hours. An attack on her with both RAF Beaufighter and FAA
Tarpon
torpedo bombers was made, but these missed and she arrived
safely in the Baltic on 29th September.
Thrasher,
Truculent,
Syrtis
and Stubborn
waited, hoping to recover the X-craft and searched the north
coast of Soroy. By the end of the month, however, they were
withdrawn to base. Stubborn
towed X10 halfway back to the Shetlands but took off
the passage crew and sank her when a gale was forecast. All
six X-craft were therefore destroyed. The loss of personnel
was fortunately lighter. The operational crew of X5
and half that of X7 as well as the passage crew of
X9 were killed. The operational crew of X6 and
the other half of that of X7 were taken prisoner. Thus
there were nine officers and men killed, and six were made
prisoners of war. The damage done was enough to prevent Tirpitz
becoming operational again without a major refit in Germany.
This was a substantial victory with very important strategic
consequences. It was now considered safe to restart the North
Russian convoys, to attack enemy traffic along the coast of
Norway and to plan for capital ships to be transferred to
the Far East. Scharnhorst, however, was still in Alten
Fjord and had to be reckoned with.
The escape
of Lutzow from Alten Fjord was unfortunate and was
the subject of a searching enquiry. The official naval historian
is very critical of the air and surface performance. The operation
of the eight modern submarines on the Norwegian coast was
not one of which A(S) could be proud either. He did indeed
position Seanymph
and Sceptre
to catch any ships 'flushed' out of Alten Fjord to the south,
but they only blocked the open sea route. If less emphasis
had been put on recovering the X-craft and towing them back,
two submarines could have dived deep under the Soroy minefield
and patrolled in a position where the enemy would have had
to have passed. Two submarines would have been sufficient
to recover the X-craft crews before scuttling them12.Certainly
Syrtis,
and probably Varangian
too, was available for patrol in time to have reached Stattlandet
before Lutzow.
In addition
to Seadog,
Tantalus
and Ula, there were some other submarine patrols while
Operation 'Source' was in progress. O15 (Luitenant
ter zee 2e Kl AJ Schouwenaar) and Stonehenge
(Lieutenant DS McN Verschoyle Campbell DSC* RN) made uneventful
anti U-boat patrols in the Shetlands area and towards the
end of September, Varangian
(Lieutenant J Nash DSC RN) and Stoic
(Lieutenant PB Marriott DSO RN) left to patrol off the coast
of Norway, Varangian
going to a position off the Vesteralen Islands north of the
Lofotens. Both patrols were for working up and were blank.
No submarines operated in the Bay of Biscay13
but Upstart
and Untiring
passed through on their way to the Mediterranean and P614,
Unison,
United
and O23 passed through on their way home. In this same
period, the Soviet submarines continued their operations on
the north coast of Norway. In July S56 sank the German
minesweeper M346 escorting a minelaying force but in
five patrols in August they had no luck. In September M104
damaged a ship of 2036 tons, S51 sank UJ1202
and M107 sank UJ1217, but L20 failed
in an attack on a convoy and was damaged in a counter attack
by UJ1209. Shch404 also missed a convoy off
Vardo although she was working in co-operation with the Soviet
Air Force. In October, S55 sank the mine destructor
ship Ammerland in Porsanger Fjord but Shch403 and
M172 missed convoys off Vardo. Disaster then overtook
them and all three of these submarines struck mines and were
sunk. M174 also suffered the same fate and the large
submarine K1 failed to return from a trip to the Kara
Sea. These grievous losses were the result of extensive operations
by the German surface minelayers in the area during the late
summer and forced a more cautious policy on the Soviet submarines
of the Northern Fleet.
THERE HAD
BEEN NO SUBMARINE ATTACKS on the German traffic along the western
Norwegian coast for a year and C-in-C Home Fleet was keen to
resume them. The German forces in Norway depended a great deal
on this traffic and, of course, it still carried the important
iron ore from Narvik to Germany. The Ministry of Economic Warfare
believed that German shipping tonnage was already less than
they needed, but intelligence showed that more ships were being
built and that tonnage was being transferred from the Channel
and the Bay of Biscay to the Norwegian route. It was known that
the iron ore trade with Sweden had doubled during the last year.
The traffic was no easier to attack than in the past, but intelligence
had obtained the positions of the German minefields laid the
year before. Cryptography also gave much information including
their routes, ports of call, times of arrival and departure
and the composition of their escorts. The traffic, however,
could only be attacked where the route came out of the leads
into the open sea. One of these places was off Stattlandet and
another off Bredsund, and there were others off the Kya Light
in Fro Havet, north of Trondheim, and south of Skudenes, and
also in the Bodo area.
Ula
(Loytnant RM Sars) led the way and left Lerwick 20th November
to patrol off Stattlandet. She encountered a convoy of three
ships almost at once and fired two torpedoes at a range of 700
yards hitting and sinking the German Arcturus of 1682
tons. Two days later, Ula moved to a position off Bredsund
where she again met a convoy of three ships, firing another
two torpedoes at the long range of 8000 yards without result.
Shortly afterwards she made another long range attack (7000
yards) on two unescorted ships firing two torpedoes and sinking
Eisstrom of 887 tons loaded with ammunition and provisions.
Ula left patrol next day but her activities caused traffic
to be suspended for the time being. In October, more anti U-boat
patrols were carried out off Andoy. Sea Rover (Lieutenant
RD Cairns RN) leaving Lerwick on 9th and Seadog
(Lieutenant CR Pelly DSC RN) on the 13th, but they only sighted
small craft and fishing vessels. The German Arctic U-boat flotilla
was, with the longer nights, a threat to the North Russian convoys,
which were about to start again. Both Ula (Loytnant S
Valvatne) and Tantivy
(Commander MG Rimington DSO* RN) also made anti U-boat patrols
north west of Stattlandet. Ula's patrol spanned the period
between the end of September and the beginning of October, and
Tantivy's
was at the end of October. Both these patrols were blank except
that Ula intercepted and sent in the Swedish ship Nagana.
Rubis
(Capitaine de Corvette H Rousselot), operating from Fort Blockhouse,
laid another minefield in the Bay of Biscay at the beginning
of October. She was attacked when in a bombing restriction area
on her way home by an RAF Wellington aircraft firing rockets.
She was hit aft but managed to identify herself and got back
to Plymouth without any casualties. This time it was not the
RAF's fault. Rubis was in a 'Submerged Bombing Restriction'
area and should not have been on the surface. The German blockade-runners
to the Far East sailed as predicted during the autumn from Biscay
ports. All were intercepted in the Atlantic with the aid of
the cryptographers and of Allied air bases in the Azores. The
help of submarines in the Bay of Biscay was not required to
intercept them.
In November
the North Russian convoys were started again. The first of these
was RA54A of thirteen empty ships returning from Russia where
they had been since the spring, It was covered by Syrtis
(Lieutenant MH Jupp DSC RN), Stubborn
(Lieutenant AA Duff RN) and Varangian
(Lieutenant J Nash DSC RN), who patrolled off Alten Fjord
having left Lerwick on 25th October to cover the passage of
some minesweepers and the escort for RA54A, and these ships
were on their way to North Russia. They did not see anything
since Scharnhorst and her destroyers remained in harbour.
The submarines returned to Lerwick in mid November. They were
relieved off Alten Fjord by Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston RN), Storm
(Lieutenant EP Young DSC RNVR), Seanymph
(Lieutenant JPH Oakley DSC RN) and Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN), who left Lerwick in mid-November
to cover the passage of the convoy JW54A which left Loch Ewe
on 15th November, and convoy JW54B which followed a week later.
Storm
was relieved by Seadog
in the middle of this patrol and the others returned to Lerwick
by 7th December, all with blank patrol reports14.
The Russian submarines were able to cover the passage of this
convoy too. L15 and L20 laid minefields, L15
attacking some German minelayers unsuccessfully. M119
and M200 also patrolled off the Varanger Peninsula.
In December,
enough submarines were available to send three more of them
to attack the Norwegian coastal traffic. Stubborn
left Lerwick to patrol off Kya Light, Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston RN) for Stattlandet and O15 (Luitenant
ter zee 2e Kl AJ Schouwenaar) for Skudenes, all on 14th December.
All three closed the coast and found targets but no success
was secured. On 18th, Stubborn
sighted a convoy of a medium sized supply vessel and other smaller
ships escorted by two trawlers and fired four torpedoes at a
range of 3500 yards but failed to obtain a hit. Next day, Satyr
saw a ship of 7500 tons escorted by minesweepers and fired five
torpedoes at 2800 yards. One torpedo dived to the bottom and
exploded and the others missed. Satyr was counter attacked
but only suffered superficial damage. Bad drill, however, with
the stern tube caused her to lose trim and she bottomed heavily
in 54 fathoms with a bow up angle of twenty degrees. She had
to blow main ballast to try to regain control and broke surface
and was then attacked by aircraft and shore batteries. She dived
but did not at once regain control and hit the bottom again,
this time in 40 fathoms and parts of the submarine were flooded.
After a further hour and a half, however, full control was restored;
she struggled to the surface and left patrol to return to Lerwick.
On 26th, O15 also made an unsuccessful attack.
In December
too, another set of North Russian convoys were run. JW55A
and B outward and RA55A on its way back. Only one submarine
was sent north to cover these convoys and most of the submarines
that were available were kept for attack on the Norwegian
coastal traffic. This was given priority over the safety of
the convoys to Russia because the C-in-C Home Fleet had decided
to provide a battleship escort for JW55A all the way to Russia.
Sirdar
(Lieutenant JA Spender RN), however, left Lerwick on 13th
December for a position off the north coast of Norway during
the passage of JW55A and RA55A. The Soviet submarines L20,
K21 and S102 were also deployed to cover the convoy
on 26th December while L15, L22, S15, S103, M105 and
M201 patrolled off the North Norwegian coast. These
convoys do not seem to have been detected by the enemy. Sirdar
was to be relieved on 26th by Syrtis
(Lieutenant MH Jupp DSC RN), who had left Lerwick on 22nd
December. Conditions in the area were appalling. Night was
almost continuous and there were only a few hours of twilight,
which passed for day in those latitudes. The weather was extremely
cold and blowing a full gale. These conditions, however, also
applied to ships of the Home Fleet, the convoy and its escorts
and indeed the enemy ships as well. In any case the chance
of intercepting Scharnhorst was missed. She put to
sea with a destroyer escort on the evening of 25th December
to attack JW55B. Sirdar
was far to the east off the North Cape at the time and Syrtis
was equally far to the west on her way to relieve her. The
Home Fleet sank Scharnhorst and the only part taken
by submarines in this famous action was that Sirdar
was ordered by C-in-C Home Fleet to make a weather report
on 24th December in the hope that it would be picked up by
the enemy and deter Scharnhorst from putting to sea.
This was at a time when the C-in-C was not sure that he could
arrive in the Duke Of York in time to protect the convoy.
With no heavy
enemy ships left in North Norway, Sirdar
was withdrawn and Syrtis
was redirected to carry out an anti U-boat patrol north west
of Stattlandet, as it was known that the strength of the Arctic
U-boat flotilla had recently been increased. Ula (Loytnant
S Valvatne), Seadog
(Lieutenant CR Pelly RN) and Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN) formed another wave to attack
the traffic along the Norwegian coast. All three sailed on
24th December, Ula for Skudenes, Seadog
for Stattlandet and Sceptre
for the Kya Light. All saw action but only Seadog
achieved results. Nevertheless considerable disruption
of the traffic occurred. On 28th, Ula fired two torpedoes
at a merchant ship but missed at a range of three to four
thousand yards. A few hours later on the same day, Seadog
attacked a convoy of three ships escorted by minesweepers,
trawlers and an aircraft. She fired a full salvo of six torpedoes
at 2500 yards and, in spite of one of the torpedoes breaking
surface, she sank the 8537-ton Oldenberg with three
hits. Seadog
was counter attacked with 40 depth charges but without damage
and her quarry was carrying 9400 tons of coal bound for Tromso.
On 1st January, Ula missed again with three torpedoes
fired at a large ship at 1600 yards. Next day, however, Seadog
scored again firing three torpedoes at a convoy of three
ships with three escorts from 2900 yards, hitting and sinking
the German gunboat K2. On 3rd January, Seadog's
luck ran out when she missed a large tanker in convoy
with three torpedoes at 700 yards. The escorts dropped depth
charges both before and after firing. The tanker was in ballast
so the torpedoes may well have run under.
Three other
patrols began before the end of the year. Seanymph
(Lieutenant JPH Oakley DSC RN) left Lerwick on 28th September
to transfer stores and personnel to a Norwegian fishing vessel
in Lynvaer Fjord in the Bodo area. This was successfully accomplished
on 7th January after an abortive attempt on 2nd because of
a misunderstanding of the position. Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSC RN) and Spiteful
(Lieutenant Commander FH Sherwood RCNVR) also made anti U-boat
patrols north of the Shetlands but both were uneventful.
IN THE SIX
MONTHS COVERED by this chapter15
there were fifteen attacks firing 58 torpedoes which
sank the gunboat K2 and four ships of 13,106 tons.
This was only half the average score for a single month in
the Mediterranean at this time. There were, of course, fewer
submarines operational at Home but in fact, there were more
than in 1942 and the first half of 1943 and they were mostly
modern boats. Four of the attacks expending twenty-six torpedoes
were on U-boats and all missed. The eleven attacks on merchant
ships using 32 torpedoes achieving five successes showed a
reasonable standard of marksmanship. The great success of
this period was, however, by the X-craft against Tirpitz.
Although it was not known at the time, the damage was so severe
that she was never of any use again. The failure of our submarines
against Lutzow, although at the time unnoticed because
of the great success against Tirpitz, was nevertheless
very much a failure. It was through no fault of the submarines
themselves or their Commanding Officers. It was a failure
to position them in the right place at the right time. Fortunately
this failure was of no serious consequence as the Germans
never tried to use Lutzow again outside the Baltic.
A happy result of the operations in Home waters in the second
half of 1943 was that we suffered no losses at all.
Honours and
awards for the period of this chapter were almost entirely for
the X-craft attack on Tirpitz. Confirmation that Tirpitz
had been seriously damaged was soon obtained by signal intelligence
and also from an agent in Alten Fjord, in direct wireless communication,
who reported her down by the head and clearly in trouble. Exactly
what had happened, however, was not known until later when information
began to filter back from the prisoner of war camps. A(S) at
first recommended that the Commanding Officers of X5, X6
and X7 should receive the Victoria Cross but the Admiralty
preferred to wait for more information. In December 1943 and
January 1944, however, a number of decorations were awarded
for those parts of the operation that were clear. First of all,
Captain WE Banks RN, Captain(S) Twelfth Submarine Flotilla,
which included the X-craft organisation, was awarded the CBE
and Commander GPS Davies RN, the staff officer at Northways
who had planned Operation 'Source', received an OBE. Lieutenant
WG Meeke RN, the first officer to command an X-craft, although
he had not taken part in Operation 'Source', was responsible
for much of their earlier development, was given an MBE. Commander
DC Ingram DSC RN, who had been in charge of X-craft training
was also awarded the OBE but, for some reason, not until April
1944, when he had already left the organisation. Lieutenant
KR Hudspeth RANVR of X10, the only operational captain
to return from Operation 'Source' after penetrating into Alten
Fjord received a DSC and his crew were Mentioned in Despatches.
The main body of the awards of December-January, however, went
to those responsible for getting the X-craft to Alten Fjord.
All five surviving X- craft passage captains received the MBE16
and of the towing submarines, Lieutenant AA Duff RN of
Stubborn,
who had not only towed X7 north but had brought X10
half way back again, was given a Distinguished Service Cross.
Lieutenant AR Hezlet DSC RN of Thrasher,
Lieutenant RL Alexander DSO RN of Truculent
and Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSC RN of Sceptre
were Mentioned in Despatches.
By February,
enough information had been received to show that the damage
to Tirpitz had been done by X6 and X7 and
that X5 had almost certainly been sunk in Alten Fjord
before she was able to attack. Lieutenants Place and Cameron
were awarded the Victoria Cross, and three DSO's and a CGM and
two posthumous Mentions in Despatches were distributed among
the crews of X6 and X7. When by August 1944 no
further information had been received, Lieutenant H Henty Creer
and his crew were posthumously Mentioned in Despatches.17
Finally two
decorations were given in this period for submarine operations
that were not connected with Operation 'Source'. A Distinguished
Service Cross was awarded to Lieutenant Pelly of Seadog
for his successes on the coast of Norway and for his two operations
in support of the meteorological station in Spitzbergen and
also to Loytnant Valvatne of the Norwegian submarine Ula
for his attacks on shipping in November.
The demand
by our ever-expanding anti-submarine forces for training submarines
was insatiable. Some more of our older operational submarines
were retired to carry out such duties but with the ex-Vichy
submarines available after the invasion of North Africa and
with the surrender of the Italian Fleet, an almost inexhaustible
supply became available. The only problem was to refit and maintain
them.
In its other
important function of manning and training new submarines, the
Home submarine flotillas continued their good work. During the
period of this chapter, sixteen new submarines made their trials
and working up practices and became available for operations18.
Another twelve submarines were delivered and began the process.
In addition a number of older submarines were worked up after
refit. Most of the boats went to the Far East and it is to that
theatre that we must now return.
