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1.
The nylon rope was not used by all submarines because of a shortage
of nylon and some boats used Siesel rope.
2. British built U-class P67.
3. There seems little doubt that in these operations coercion
was contemplated although this is nowhere specifically admitted.
4. Signal intelligence gave no warning of the German sortie but
yielded some information during the operation. The results, however,
were not very clear and it was thought that Lutzow was about to
make a sortie into the Kara Sea.
5. Submarine X-craft Sailed Truculent
X6 1600/11th (Lieutenant RL Alexander DSO RN) (Lieutenant D Cameron
RNR) Syrtis
X9 1600/11th (Lieutenant MH Jupp DSC RN) (Lieutenant Thomas L
Martin RN) Thrasher
X5 1800/11th (Lieutenant AR Hezlet DSC RN) (Lieutenant H Henty
Creer RNVR) Seanymph
X8 2000/11th (Lieutenant JPH Oakley DSC RN) (Lieutenant BM McFarlane
RAN)
Stubborn
X7 2130/11th (Lieutenant AA Duff RN) (Lieutenant BCG Place DSC
RN) Sceptre
X10 1300/12th
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh MBE DSC RN) (Lieutenant KR Hudspeth RANVR)
6. From what subsequently happened in X8, it seems likely that
her side charges flooded and that when the tow parted she dived
straight to the bottom.
7. This somewhat unconventional mine countermeasure was achieved
by deft footwork by which the mine was kicked on its shell and
not on its horns.
8. The signal intelligence in fact referred to Lutzow and not
Tirpitz. The incident is not related in any of the official histories
but is taken from Alastair Mars’ ‘Submarines at War
1939–45’ Alastair Mars was the staff officer at Northways
at the time who handled the matter,
Information about signal intelligence in Hinsley fits the story
and there is no doubt that it is true.
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9. There were
no survivors from X5 and her movements are not
known for certain so are based on surmise and one German report.
10. Divers after the war were unable to find any trace of X5 in
this position.
11. Roskill’s ‘War at Sea’.
12. The value of towing any X-craft back was purely one of emotion.
Their state after the operation was such that they could never
have been used again for war purposes. A plan simply to recover
the crews and scuttle them would only have needed two submarines.
13. This may seem surprising as we had definite information that
seven blockade-runners were now ready to sail for the Far East.
But see later for the reason given in the text.
14. There is an excellent description of Storm’s
patrol in Edward
Young’s ‘One of Our Submarines’.
15. From 1st July 1943 to 3rd January 1944.
16. Passage Captains who received the MBE were: X5 Lieutenant
J. V. Terry-Lloyd SANF, X6 Lieutenant A Wilson RNVR, X7 Lieutenant
P Philip SANF, X8 Lieutenant JE Smart RNVR, X10 Sub Lieutenant
EV Page RNVR. The passage Captain of X9 was Lieutenant Kearon
RNVR who was lost with his X-craft.
17. Lieutenant Henty Creer’s family were very upset by this
apparent lack of recognition and engaged in a long campaign after
the war to have it changed. The problem was that the only awards
that can be given posthumously are the Victoria Cross or a Mention
in Despatches.
The authorities presumably decided that as there was no evidence
that X5 contributed to the damage to Tirpitz, a Victoria Cross
was not justified, which left only a posthumous Mention in Despatches.
Lieutenant Henty-Creer, who penetrated the defences of Alten Fjord
and was almost certainly killed in action attacking the enemy
who had by this time been alerted, deserved more than this but
the rules in force at the time did not permit it.
18. Tantalus,
Tantivy,
Sceptre,
Sea Rover, Sirdar,
Spiteful,
Syrtis,
Stoic,
Stonehenge,
Storm,
Untiring,
Varangian,
Upstart,
Ula (Norwegian), Venturer
and Viking.
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