THE SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER, which covers the first four and a half months of 1943 in the Mediterranean, deals mainly with the Allied attempt to cut the sea communications of the Axis forces in Tunisia. This intense struggle is identified by the official Italian naval historian as the 'Third Battle of the Convoys', but before we turn to it we must first describe Operation 'Principal', which took place in the first few days of January and which was the first large scale attack on the enemy by our human torpedoes or chariots.

It will be recalled that the chariot force of a dozen machines or so with their crews, accompanied by the three T-class submarines, P311, Trooper and Thunderbolt, with containers on deck to carry them, arrived in the Mediterranean during November and was based at Malta. It will also be recalled that their original targets were to be the three modern Italian battleships of the Littorio-class then based at Taranto. The first move was to send Traveller to Taranto to see whether it would be possible to lie on the surface close enough and for long enough, with hatches and containers open to launch the chariots. She had not returned from this reconnaissance and, in any case, the Italian battleships had moved to Naples in early December. Before another operation could be planned, a heavy air raid, by American Liberator bombers on Naples from Egypt, sank the Italian cruiser Attendolo and damaged two others. The Italian battleships at once retired north to La Spezia and the eight-inch gun cruisers Trieste and Gorizia to Maddalena in Sardinia. In making a new plan a number of factors had to be taken into consideration. At the time the cause of the loss of Traveller was not known but there were serious misgivings as to whether it was practicable for the launching submarines to lie stopped with hatches open within eight miles of a heavily defended naval base. The attack depended on the phase of the moon for its success. The chariots needed moonlight to be able to see to attack but no moon was desirable when launching them from the parent submarines. The modern Italian battleships were formidable warships and the Allies were short of capital ships to oppose them. Nevertheless their performance at sea in recent years had been far from impressive and they had achieved little. Captain(S) Ten certainly felt that there were better alternative targets for the chariots. He was also keen to use the chariots as soon as possible so as to release the parent submarines, after their containers had been removed, for operations. In the end, a plan was evolved, not to attack the Italian battle fleet in its heavily defended base at La Spezia, but to attack the cruisers at Maddalena and also merchant ships engaged in supplying Tunisia and now lying in Palermo and Cagliari. It would be possible to mount this attack during the next favourable period of the moon in January.

On 29th December, Turbulent (Commander JW Linton DSO DSC RN) already on patrol off Cavoli Island was ordered to reconnoitre Maddalena and P37 (Lieutenant ET Stanley DSC RN), after landing agents in Tunisia on 28th was ordered to do the same at Cagliari. P46 (Lieutenant JS Stevens DSC RN) sailed from Malta on 28th for Palermo, followed by P311 (Commander RD Cayley DSO** RN) with chariots X and XVIII embarked, bound for Maddalena. The purpose of the reconnoitring submarines was to check that patrol activity off the enemy ports to be attacked was light enough for the transporting submarines to launch their chariots. The next evening, Trooper (Lieutenant JS Wraith DSO DSC RN) sailed with chariots XVI, XIX and XXIII for Palermo and Thunderbolt (Lieutenant Commander CB Crouch DSO* RN) with chariots XV and XXII for Cagliari. Finally P43 (Lieutenant AR Daniell DSC RN) sailed from Malta on 30th to act as recovery vessel off Maddalena¹. It had been decided that the transporting submarines were too vulnerable to wait around for the chariots to return and that a U-class submarine would be available at each place for this duty. It was accepted therefore that the chariots themselves would not be recovered. P37 and P46 would be available at Cagliari and Palermo after making their reconnaissances, to recover the chariot crews there.

All these submarines had to pass through the Sicilian narrows where now, in addition to the extensive mine-fields, there were the dangers of crossing the heavily patrolled Italian convoy route to Tunisia. Although operational submarines could cope with these problems, it was a different matter for the chariot transporting boats with their ungainly containers on deck². In the morning of 30th December, air reconnaissance reported Italian torpedo boats operating between Marittimo and the Skerki Bank: P311 was already diving deep under the minefields but Trooper and Thunderbolt were ordered to remain south of Pantellaria for the present. P311 was ordered to report when safely through and this she did at 0130 on 31st December. Trooper and Thunderbolt were then allowed to proceed as air reconnaissance reported that there was now less patrol activity.

Of the Axis supplies, only 12,981 tons had reached Tripoli during December and now practically all the supplies were being sent to Tunisia, mostly to Tunis itself and Bizerta but some to Sousse and Sfax on the east coast. Every effort was being made to get empty ships away from Tripoli but six were kept there to be used as blockships, as we have already seen, to deny the port to the Allies. The Axis ships were being loaded mainly at Naples and Palermo while ferries and smaller ships were loaded at Trapani. Other ships were using Leghorn and ports to the north. All this supply shipping was in convoy and crossed to Africa in a corridor on each side of which mine-fields had been built up to protect them. As far as possible, convoys crossed at night but by day were given fighter escort from the nearby airfields in Sicily. There was already a shortage of supply ships and also of escorts. The French ships that had been commandeered were mostly in need of repair and were not yet available. Troops were mostly transported at night in destroyers at high speed while air transport was used as much as possible across the narrows.

Allied air and naval forces were doing their best to disrupt the Axis traffic to Tunisia. Bombing aircraft from Algeria, Cyrenaica and Malta were mounting heavy raids on the ports of arrival and departure. Air reconnaissance of the ports was being made by photographic Spitfires and of the sea routes by radar fitted Wellingtons. The convoys at sea were being attacked by low flying bombers by day and torpedo bombers at night. In January torpedo bombers sank three ships of 11,929 tons and low-level bombers two of 9016 tons. Surface striking forces of cruisers and destroyers as well as motor torpedo boats were stationed at Bone and Malta and minelayers of all types were mining the enemy corridor. Allied submarines, of which there were now twenty seven operational⁵ continued their campaign but had ceased to work among the minefields between Sicily and Tunisia, leaving this area to other forces. They now patrolled in the Tyrrhenian Sea, along the north coast of Sicily and off the east coast of Tunisia.

ON 1ST JANUARY 1943, in addition to the seven submarines involved in Operation 'Principal', there were six others on patrol. P42 (Lieutenant ACG Mars DSO RN) and P217 (Lieutenant EJD Turner DSC RN) were off Naples where they were soon joined by Turbulent after her release from Operation 'Principal', while Tribune (Lieutenant SA Porter RN) was on her way to Corsica. Ursula (Lieutenant RB Lakin DSC RN) was off Marittimo and P45 (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) off Kerkenah. Tribune landed agents in Cupabia Bay in Corsica on the night of 6th/7th January and then went on to Toulon and on 10th off San Remo she met Dalny of 6672 tons and fired four torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards and hit with one of them. The target beached herself and Tribune was able to hit her again with a single torpedo fired at 2200 yards completing her destruction. On the night of 6th/7th January, P44 (Lieutenant JCY Roxburgh DSC RN) was on her way from Malta to patrol and was missed west of Sicily by two torpedoes from an E-boat. She had to spend most of the rest of the night submerged. On 10th January she was caught in the beam of a searchlight ashore near Cape St Vito and was again hunted by E-boats. On 8th January, Turbulent south of Capri was sent south to join Una (Lieutenant JD Martin RN) and P44 to form a patrol line to try to intercept a convoy reported by signal intelligence and air reconnaissance. The weather was very bad and the convoy was not seen so the two U-class submarines returned to their areas further south. Turbulent then closed the coast off Paola and on 11th she fired two torpedoes at a range of 3000 yards at Vittorio Beraldo of 545 tons, which she hit and stopped. Another torpedo was fired at 2500 yards, which missed, and the enemy beached herself. Here a final torpedo fired at 3900 yards hit her and broke her in two. P217 in this area sighted a destroyer off Naples on 8th but that was all. P35 (Lieutenant SLC Maydon DSO RN) arrived in the Kerkenah-Hammamet area from Malta having sailed on 6th. On 9th she sighted a small northbound ship escorted by four F-boats⁶. She fired a single torpedo at 1200 yards and missed due to a drill failure. A few minutes later a second torpedo was fired at a range of 2000 yards from nearly right astern and also missed. The target was a slow one and P35 was able to pursue submerged until it was dark when she surfaced and overtook the enemy reaching a surface firing position. Another single torpedo was fired at 600 yards, which hit and sank Emilio Morandi of 1525 tons. On 10th, P35 fired another single torpedo at a small tanker and missed. She then surfaced and engaged with her gun but before she could obtain a hit the enemy escaped into Monastir. This action on the surface continued for over half an hour close to the enemy coast and in spite of the target being escorted by two auxiliary vessels. Next day yet another single torpedo was fired at a small escorted northbound merchant ship at a range of 3500 yards and again missed, the track probably being seen. On this same day two caiques from Hammamet were engaged with the gun and set on fire and driven ashore. Then on 12th, P35 fired a single torpedo at a Siebel ferry at a range of 500 yards. Although the torpedo was only set to four feet this torpedo ran under. On 14th, she had a night encounter with enemy patrols and later next day, met an unescorted ship in the north of Hamlet Gulf. P35 opened fire with her gun at 3000 yards but the enemy replied with accurate fire and she had to break off the action and dive. This eventful patrol was her fourteenth and last before returning to the United Kingdom for refit. It was remarkable for its six attacks, all firing only one torpedo. This was contrary to submarine practice at the time and was criticised by Captain(S) Ten. Had she used the standard two or three torpedo salvoes, she would have run out of torpedoes after three attacks or so.

Further to the south, P51 (Lieutenant MLC Crawford DSC RN) arrived off the western approaches to Tripoli on 9th January. For a week she only sighted small craft but then the evacuation of Tripoli began as the Eighth Army took up its advance again. On 17th, P51 sighted a merchant ship escorted by a destroyer off Djerba Island.

During the last ten days of January, submarine operations continued in the Gulf of Genoa and Tyrrhenian Sea and also off the north coast of Sicily. It was through this area that most of the traffic to Tunisia passed. The majority of the submarines were based at Algiers. The Malta submarines no longer had to patrol off Tripolitania, which, with the advance of the Eighth Army, was rapidly falling in to our hands. The submarines were, however, busy off the east coast of Tunisia preventing supplies arriving from the north to Sousse and Sfax and other minor ports. The Malta submarines also watched the southern approaches to the Straits of Messina where, even if the traffic was not bound for Tunisia, a toll on the Axis shipping pool could be exacted. Some patrols were made in the Aegean and Adriatic by the First Flotilla at Beirut, where at least the enemy anti-submarine effort could be dissipated and kept away from the important areas. The Aegean patrols were the only ones based at Beirut, most of whose submarines were still lent to the Tenth Flotilla and worked from Malta.

On 17th January, P45 (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) in the Gulf of Hammamet engaged a tug off Sousse with her gun and drove her ashore, but she was then forced to dive by fire from shore batteries. On 19th she engaged a small vessel with gunfire but had to break off the action as her gun jammed. Next day off Mehedia she encountered two auxiliary minesweepers, one in tow of the other, and escorted by a torpedo boat. She fired two torpedoes at a range of 1350 yards hitting and sinking the towing vessel after which the towed vessel beached herself. Both these ships, which were the Auxiliary Minesweepers 31 and 36 were lost and the escorting torpedo boat, which was Lince, made no counter attack⁷. Next day two schooners were engaged with her gun and one was sunk and the other left on fire and holed by demolition charge. On 23rd, P45 was again forced to desist by shore batteries after engaging a small ship and after sunset in moonlight she fired two torpedoes at a range of 800 yards at a small naval auxiliary but did not succeed in hitting. Next day she sank a small ketch by demolition charge, which had been damaged by the RAF. On 21st January, far to the north, in the Gulf of Genoa, P212 (Lieutenant JH Bromage DSC RN), on being recalled to Algiers, bombarded a seaplane hangar near Cape Noli. Next day she sighted the German U301 on the surface taking a sunsight and ventilating. P212 fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at 4800 yards securing one hit and sinking her and picking up one survivor. On 22nd January off Naples, P247 (Lieutenant MGR Lumby DSC RN) sank the anti-submarine schooner Maria Angeletta of 214 tons by gunfire and demolition charge. On the same date in moonlight and a glassy calm she attacked a convoy of three small ships firing four torpedoes at 1500 yards but without result. Early next morning in the same conditions she missed a U-boat at 1000 yards with five torpedoes. On the same day, P37 (Lieutenant ET Stanley DSC RN), on patrol south of Messina sighted a large ship towed by two tugs and escorted by a torpedo boat, an auxiliary and an aircraft. She fired three torpedoes at 2000 yards hitting with two of them. This was Viminale, damaged in Palermo by the chariot attack, and on her way to be repaired. In spite of further damage, however, the tugs got her back into Messina. Furthermore an immediate and accurate counter attack damaged P37's battery and she had to abandon her patrol and return to Malta. Meanwhile P211 (Commander B Bryant DSC RN) had arrived off Naples having been depth charged off Algiers by an over enthusiastic Wellington aircraft, fortunately without being damaged. On 24th she was attempting an attack on what she took to be a large fleet destroyer, but it was a torpedo boat and her periscope was sighted and she was attacked with depth charges before she could fire torpedoes. P211 went full ahead to avoid the pattern but one of her screws and her stern glands were damaged. On 26th she fired four torpedoes at two large escorted steamers off the Bocca Piccolo at a range of 3000 yards and missed. On 30th, she sank two schooners by gunfire.

Off the east coast of Tunisia, P46 (Lieutenant JS Stevens DSC RN) was busy. On 23rd she surfaced and attacked a large schooner at anchor off Hammamet with her gun and scored ten hits before being forced to dive by shore batteries. She was able, however, to approach submerged and despatch her victim with a single torpedo fired from 1000 yards. On 25th, also off Hammamet, she found a small tanker, Teodolinda of 350 tons at anchor and fired a single torpedo at 1500 yards, which ran under. A second torpedo fired at 1850 yards, however, hit and left her a total wreck. Next day she engaged a motor schooner by gunfire early in the morning and left her in a waterlogged condition. Finally on 31st, P46 received reports of a southbound merchant vessel off Cape Bon. Guessing correctly that she was bound for Sousse, she was able to head her off on the surface in daylight. She dived and after a long chase sighted the enemy three hours later. She fired four torpedoes at a range of 6000 yards and secured a hit, which was a remarkable shot. The ship was the German Lisbon of 1800 tons, which sank after exploding and catching fire. P42 (Lieutenant ACG Mars DSO RN) also arrived in this area to land agents near Kelibia, which she did on the night of 28th/29th. She was not able to recover them as the alarm was raised.

By the beginning of February, the Italian Navy's ability to defend the supply line to Tunisia was seriously impaired. There were only nine torpedo boats and one destroyer in service as escorts while eight destroyers were used to ferry personnel. These destroyers worked from Pozzuoli near Naples and made the passages at high speed as far as possible at night. Fuel was now desperately short. The battleships had had to be emptied to supply the escort vessels and at times, Palermo and other ports in Sicily ran out completely and the sailing of convoys had to be delayed. In general, ships sailing to the east Tunisian ports were small. The Allies kept up their attacks on these convoys in the same way as in January and had received reinforcements for the air forces. The submarines continued to operate as before and in much the same way. On 1st February, there were eight submarines on patrol. Safari/P211 (Commander B Bryant DSC RN) was off Naples and Turbulent (Commander JW Linton DSO DSC RN) was on the north coast of Sicily. Una (Lieutenant JD Martin RN) and Unison/P43 (Lieutenant AR Daniell DSC RN) were in the Gulf of Hammamet while Unruffled/P46 (Lieutenant JS Stevens DSC RN) was returning to Malta from the same area. Unseen/P51 (Lieutenant MLC Crawford DSC RN) was on the Calabrian coast and Rorqual (Lieutenant Commander LW Napier DSO RN) had just left an adjacent position for Malta. Tigris (Lieutenant Commander GR Colvin DSC RN) was in the Zante area returning from the Adriatic bound for Malta. Finally Umbra / P35 (Lieutenant SLC Maydon DSO RN) was on passage from Malta on her way to the United Kingdom to refit.

Successes came to our submarines straight away in February. On 1st, Turbulent, on patrol off the north west coast of Sicily encountered the unescorted Pozzuoli of 5350 tons. She closed to 950 yards and hit and sank her with two torpedoes. An hour later a Ramb-class naval auxiliary stopped in the vicinity presumably to rescue survivors. Turbulent got away a stern torpedo at her at 3200 yards but she went ahead in the nick of time and the torpedo missed astern. Next day, Safari/P211 off Naples fired three torpedoes at 1150 yards at an unescorted convoy and hit and sank Valsavoia of 5735 tons with two of them. She then surfaced and sank the other ship, Salemi of 1176 tons by gunfire expending 26 rounds. Una in the northern part of the Gulf of Hammamet had surfaced on 1st February to engage two large schooners. She damaged them both but was forced to break off the action by shore batteries, which wounded one of her gun's crew, and she had to return to Malta to land him. On 4th, Unseen/P51 in the Crotone area near Taranto failed to find a ship aground reported by the RAF. However a small steamer towed by a tug appeared and she fired two torpedoes at 1500 yards, one of which hit and sank Le Tre Marie of 1085 tons. On 7th Unison/P43 in the northern part of Hammamet Gulf fired a single torpedo at some dumb barges at anchor but it only ran a short distance, probably hitting the bottom. Next day she surfaced and engaged three southbound motor barges with her gun, destroying the two largest and leaving the third in a sinking condition. On 11th, Unison/P43 and United/P44 were ordered to intercept a southbound convoy heading for Sousse. They failed to intercept it but Unison encountered a straggler of 350 tons and, after ten rounds had set her on fire; she blew up and sank. United had no luck and when off Sousse on 8th, her periscope was sighted from the land and fired at by the shore batteries. Unbroken/P42 (Lieutenant ACG Mars DSO RN) also had a blank patrol off Sousse at this time. Meanwhile Turbulent at dawn on 5th scored a substantial success north of Sicily when she fired four torpedoes at a range of 4800 yards and scored two hits, which sank the laden 5640-ton tanker Utilitas. On 7th she engaged and hit a train in St Ambroglio station near Cephalu, but next day underestimated the speed of a small merchant vessel and missed her with two torpedoes at 1200 yards. Sibyl/P217 (Lieutenant EJD Turner DSC RN) had a blank patrol off Naples in the middle of February and Tribune (Lieutenant SA Porter RN) nearly so. She sighted a small merchant ship on 10th and fired three torpedoes at a range of 2300 yards but without result.

Submarines joining the station from the United Kingdom continued to do a working up patrol in the western Mediterranean before being sent into the areas where greater opposition was to be expected. On 8th February, the new Netherlands submarine Dolfijn (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl HMLFE van Oostrom Soede) a British built U-class (ex-P47), carrying out her working up patrol off Sardinia, scored another substantial success when she met the Italian submarine Malachite and fired four torpedoes at 2200 yards, hitting and sinking her. Taurus (Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO RN) had an uneventful working up patrol off Alicante on her way from Gibraltar to Algiers but Torbay (Lieutenant RJ Clutterbuck RN) had rather more excitement. Her working up patrol was off Valencia. On 7th she sighted an unescorted submarine and gave chase and opened fire, hitting with the first round but then her gun jammed. This was providential as the target turned out to be the Spanish San Jurgo. She was exercising but was out of position and had no escort as she was supposed to have. On 11th, Torbay met the German controlled Danish Grete of 1565 tons outside territorial waters and sank her with one torpedo out of a salvo of two at a range of 2800 yards.

From 1st-10th February, the French submarine Casabianca (Capitaine de Corvette de L'Herminier), who had escaped from Toulon and joined the Allies after the Germans had invaded Unoccupied France, made a special operation from Algiers to land agents in the south of France. For some time it had been possible for the Special Operations Executive to land and retrieve agents from Vichy France using local craft such as feluccas. With the seizure of Unoccupied France by the Germans in November 1942 this became hazardous and there were demands for submarines for this purpose. The French Giraudist submarines in North Africa, with their local knowledge, seemed well suited for such operations. As they were short of torpedoes, which handicapped any offensive patrols, it was decided to use them almost exclusively for this purpose and they began a regular monthly service to and from the south coast of France. They carried French intelligence agents and security personnel as well as the Special Operations Executive agents and provided a route to France controlled by the French themselves except that their movements across the Mediterranean were ordered by the British Captain(S), Eighth Submarine Flotilla at Algiers.

At the end of February, Admiral Cunningham, who had again been appointed as C-in-C Mediterranean at Algiers, visited Malta and the Tenth Flotilla at their base in the Lazaretto. He was, of course, already well known to the personnel of the Eighth Flotilla at Algiers.

The successes of our submarines during February were substantial and were achieved without loss to themselves. In thirty-five attacks firing 102 torpedoes, they sank an Italian U-boat and fifteen ships of 51,305 tons and damaged another of 12,300 tons and possibly two others. They also sank a minesweeper by gunfire as well as seven small vessels and damaged a corvette and three schooners. They also damaged a train and a schooner-building yard and on two occasions landed agents. Of the large ships sunk by submarines, however, only four of 17,976 tons were actually on their way to Tunisia and it was aircraft that caused most of the damage to this traffic. They sank ten ships of 43,357 tons but the surface forces did not succeed in sinking anything at all. By the middle of the month, the Italian Navy's escort force for the Tunisian route had been reduced to four torpedo boats, two corvettes and one destroyer. As a result and also because of a desperate shortage of fuel, they only succeeded in sailing thirty four ships for Tunisia during February and of these thirteen were sunk and another seriously damaged which represented a casualty rate of 47%. In spite of this, the Axis managed to get across 8,900 tons of fuel, 134 guns and 50 tanks with 8130 men while 12,800 men were flown in. However the Allies were building up their forces very much more quickly; four large convoys, each carrying more than the total transported to Tunisia by the Axis during the month, arrived at Algiers in February. The Allied army was now considerably larger than that of the Axis, whose units were under strength and had only the fuel and ammunition they could carry with virtually no reserves at all.

The Allied submarine campaign, as we have seen, was directed more at Axis shipping in the whole Mediterranean than against the traffic to Tunisia. This was not the result of a conscious strategic decision but because they found it difficult to operate amongst the minefields north west of the Sicilian narrows, and it seemed sense to leave this area to unrestricted attacks by the air forces. Nevertheless this policy proved effective and by the end of February there were only fifty-one Axis ships left for the route to North Africa and, if losses continued at the present rate, it was expected that the Axis shipping resources would be entirely exhausted by midsummer 1943. This was in spite of fourteen new ships building in Italy and the ships requisitioned from France and chartered from neutrals.

AT THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE IN JANUARY, it was planned to throw the enemy out of North Africa altogether by the end of April and to invade Sicily in July or August. The fighting on land continued throughout March, the Axis forces counter attacking at Medinine and in north Tunisia. They were repulsed in both places during the first few weeks of the month although fighting continued in the north. In mid March the Eighth Army attacked at Mareth and drove the enemy back to the Wadi Akarit north of Gabes but still south of the east Tunisian ports that remained in the enemy's hands. The struggle on both sides to bring in reinforcements and supplies continued unabated and this was the key to the whole strategic situation.

For the landings in Sicily, it was essential to have accurate information about beach gradients and the sandbars believed to exist off shore. Some of this information could be obtained by photographic reconnaissance from the air, but the positive surveys by Combined Operations Pilotage Parties (COPPs) landed by submarine were considered essential. Unlike the landings in North Africa there was time to obtain this information during the planning stages for the operation. At the end of February and beginning of March, therefore, four submarines left to make these reconnaissances and, if bad conditions were found, then the plans could be altered to allow for them. The submarines involved were not permitted to attack shipping in case they compromised the landing places. Each carried one or two COPPs, who were specially trained to survey the beaches and their gradients and firmness and record all other necessary navigational information. They worked inshore in shallow water in diving suits from folbots carried by the submarines. The periscopes of the submarines were also, of course, important and of value for these surveys. Safari (Commander B Bryant DSC RN) from Algiers made a beach reconnaissance of Castelamare Bay in northwest Sicily with COPP4, losing one of its folbots with its crew. The crew, however, had a good cover story but in fact it would not have mattered much if this landing place had been compromised, as it was not used. Safari, on her way home, encountered a 150-ton schooner and sank her by gunfire. At the same time, Unbending (Lieutenant ET Stanley DSC RN) and United (Lieutenant JCY Roxburgh DSC RN) from Malta were surveying beaches on the southeast coasts of Sicily. United with COPP1 off Gela also lost a folbot and its crew, but, determined not to risk compromise, this folbot paddled 75 miles all the way back to Malta in a voyage lasting 37 hours. United had, of course, the same attack restrictions on this operation and had to watch a U-boat cross her bows at 500 yards without being allowed to fire. She had to dive and in consequence failed to recover another folbot for which she was searching at the time. Unrivalled (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) also surveyed beaches in this same area early in March. Later in the month Unruffled (Lieutenant JS Stevens DSC RN) made a beach reconnaissance north of Cape Passaro and she lost two folbots probably in the heavy swell. Nevertheless all the surveys were successfully completed without compromise. The loss of so many folbots was, however, worrying especially as they had infra-red torches to help make contact with the submarines. It was decided to investigate the use of chariots, a few of which were at Malta, for future beach reconnaissances.

There then followed in a period of a few days, a series of disasters to the submarines lent to the Eighth Flotilla from the First Flotilla. Tigris, who had been on patrol in the Naples area since February, was ordered to return to Algiers on 6th March. She never arrived and for many years it was thought that she struck a mine twenty miles north of Zembra Island on 10th March. Later research into enemy records now indicates that she was sunk on 27th February by UJ2210 of the German 22nd Anti-Submarine Flotilla south of Capri. The 22nd Flotilla, consisting of UJ2201, UJ2209 and UJ2210, was returning to Naples from patrol. UJ2209 had broken down and was in tow of UJ2201 who obtained a firm sound contact of a submarine. UJ2210 was ordered to take the contact over which she did, delivering four fifteen charge patterns set to various depths. There was an upheaval of water and air followed by oil and wreckage after the third attack. After the fourth attack contact was lost. The depth was some 500 fathoms and there is little doubt that this contact was Tigris. She went down with all hands including her experienced Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander GR Colvin DSO DSC RN, five other officers and 57 men. Turbulent, after crossing to the coasts of Corsica and Sardinia, was not heard of again and was probably sunk on one of a number of Italian anti-submarine mine-fields off the north east coast of Sardinia^11a. The loss of this submarine was a major disaster. She too was sunk with all hands including her outstanding Commanding Officer, unquestionably at the time of his loss the leading British submarine 'Ace'. Commander JW Linton DSO DSC RN had formerly commanded Pandora in the Mediterranean with conspicuous success and was on his second 'tour' in Turbulent. Five other officers were lost with her including two who had been decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Sixty-one men were lost too and amongst these were eight holders of the Distinguished Service Medal and fourteen who had been Mentioned in Despatches. Commander Linton, who had accounted for a destroyer and over 90,000 tons of shipping, was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. Thunderbolt had left Malta on 9th March to patrol north of Sicily on her way to Algiers. She worked to the east along the coast from Marittimo to Cape St Vito and on the 12th sank Esterel of 3100 tons. The corvette Cicogna of the escort counter attacked and maintained contact all night running out of depth charges. After replenishing, she located Thunderbolt again on 14th March in much the same position. Her periscope was sighted and she was counter attacked with 24 more depth charges and was seen to break surface at a large angle and sink again. Thunderbolt was thus lost finally having earlier been sunk as Thetis on trials in 1939. She went down with her experienced Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander CB Crouch DSO* RN, five other officers and fifty six men including six holders of the Distinguished Service Medal and seven who had been Mentioned in Despatches. Anti-submarine vessels were therefore responsible for all of these grievous losses.

During the previous month a new device had been fitted in the submarines Unbending, United and Unruffled. It was called QV4 or 'The Rooster' and was a primitive form of search receiver for picking up enemy radar transmissions. It could only be used on the surface and it was only directional by swinging the submarine either side to get a bearing and even then there was no way to tell whether it was ahead or astern. It was hoped that QV4 would be developed so that submarines could dive on detecting a radar fitted ship and was also, of course, of value for plotting the positions of radar stations on shore. This was particularly important for the invasion of Sicily. The device, although it was able to detect enemy transmissions, did not prove very valuable. It tended to hear radar approaching most of the time, but the cumbersome way to obtain a bearing meant that submarine captains switched it off unless pinpointing a shore station. United, off Cape Spartivento, certainly detected a radar station there, but its position was already known as its large rotating aerial had been seen by submarines using their periscopes. Four more of the U- class were fitted in the Mediterranean but QV4 was not developed further.

At the end of February and beginning of March, two other submarines on beach reconnaissance lost folbots. Unbending (Lieutenant ET Stanley DSC RN) with COPP3 lost all four of her folbots and returned to Malta on 6th March. Unrivalled (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) with COPP ME2 lost all of them on 4th and 6th March. Miraculously the landing places did not seem to be compromised and in spite of these difficulties the surviving COPPs brought back enough information.

On 13th, Unbending, after her Sicilian beach reconnaissance, was off the east Calabrian coast and landed a party of Commandos to blow up the coastal railway. The aim was to blow up a train in a tunnel but the Commandos got involved in a fire fight with railway guards and to make matters worse one of their folbots was damaged when landing. Unbending was unable to recover them and next day she met a convoy of three medium sized ships escorted by E-boats and aircraft. She fired four torpedoes at 1600 yards from the nearer column and 2700 yards from the more distant one. Two hit Citta di Bergamo of 2163 tons and another Cosenza of 1471 tons, both sank and there was no counter attack. The Commandos, who were still at large, watched this attack and then crossed to Sicily in a requisitioned boat. They were later captured and made prisoners of war. On her way back to Malta, Unbending picked up a survivor of an American Baltimore aircraft that had been shot down.

The day after Unbending's brilliant attack, Sibyl (Lieutenant EJD Turner DSC RN) on patrol off northwest Sicily, fired four torpedoes at Pegli of 1595 tons carrying cased petrol and scored two hits at a range of 1800 yards and sank her. She was accurately counter attacked but survived as she did another hunt by destroyers on 16th March. On this same day, Trooper (Lieutenant JS Wraith DSO DSC RN) off Naples attacked a convoy at night at very long range firing four torpedoes at 10,000 yards not surprisingly without result. On 17th in a day attack from submerged, she fired six torpedoes in two groups of three at two ships in a northbound convoy at a range of 4500 yards. She secured a hit on Forli of 1525 tons and sank her. On 17th too, Unshaken (Lieutenant J Whitton RN) returning from Algiers to Malta¹² met a U-boat in the middle of the night. She fired four torpedoes but the range was 8000 yards and she missed. On this same day, Splendid (Lieutenant ILM McGeoch RN) patrolling close in off Cape St Vito, with radio intelligence, intercepted the 3177 ton tanker Devoli, laden and in convoy and fired four torpedoes at 600 yards hitting with three of them and sinking her. She suffered a heavy but fortunately inaccurate counter attack. Finally on 17th, Unbroken (Lieutenant ACG Mars DSO RN) fired a single elderly Mark II torpedo at shipping in the harbour at Sousse at a range of 5200 yards. The torpedo ran correctly but exploded short either against the breakwater or the boom defences.

March was another very successful month for our submarines. They made thirty-one attacks firing one hundred torpedoes sinking eighteen ships of 42,439 tons and a patrol vessel and damaging several others. In addition nearly thirty small craft were sunk by gunfire and ramming and some oil tanks and a factory were bombarded. This was in addition to landing agents, rescuing a member of an aircrew and blowing up a coastal railway. As before, only a small proportion of these sinkings were actually carrying reinforcements and supplies to Tunisia but the air forces made up for this sinking eighteen ships of 62,453 tons. This total was equally divided between casualties sunk at sea and in harbour. In all forty-four Axis ships, that is more than in February, put to sea to carry supplies to Tunisia. Seventeen of them were sunk and six damaged so that 57% failed to get through. A total of 43,125 tons were landed including 7000 tons of fuel, 8400 troops and twenty tanks and another 11,800 troops were flown across. Altogether in the Mediterranean, thirty-six ships of nearly a hundred thousand tons were sunk and sixteen damaged. The 'Third Battle of the Convoys' was being steadily lost by the Axis. The armies, which confronted each other in North Africa, show how the Allies were winning. The Allied army consisted of a dozen up to strength divisions with ample supplies while the Axis had eight under-strength divisions with only the ammunition and food they could carry and the fuel in their tanks. At this time Hitler decreed that the supplies to Tunisia must be doubled if not trebled, but he did not say how this was to be done.

The success of our submarines in March 1943 was marred by the loss of three T-class submarines within a few days. The sinking of Turbulent, Thunderbolt and Tigris were, however, quite unconnected and it seems that it was by chance that they were so soon one after the other. Following on the loss of Traveller, however, it gave rise to a feeling that the T-class was unsuitable and too large for the Mediterranean. All three submarines were modern boats with experienced and, in one case, an outstanding Commanding Officer. It is true that twelve of the class had, by now, been lost in the Mediterranean, but so had twelve of the small U-class. It is true that the T-class were larger than necessary for the distances in the Mediterranean, but with their seventeen torpedoes and a four inch gun they were much more powerful than the U-class with only eight torpedoes and a three inch gun. They were also faster by four knots or so. Probably the S-class were the best size for the Mediterranean, but there was no reason to believe that the T-class were unacceptably large. The loss, however, of the three experienced submarine captains was a great blow, especially of Commander Linton. His demise damaged morale not only in the Mediterranean but also throughout the submarine branch.

IN THE FIRST WEEKS OF APRIL the Eighth Army attacked the enemy holding the Wadi Akarit and drove them out of it. The Axis forces had just enough fuel to retire into northern Tunisia, abandoning the east Tunisian ports, notably Sfax and Sousse. The Dictators decided, however, that northern Tunisia should be held; indeed they had really no alternative¹³. The enemy were desperately short of supplies of all kinds and were practically out of fuel and ammunition. The battle for supplies therefore remained the key to the situation and the Axis position was worsened because the Allies had captured airfields closer to the Sicilian narrows and were rapidly moving air reinforcements to them. By the third week of April, the Eighteenth Army Group, as it was now called, began its final attacks to throw the enemy out of Africa and the rest of the month was spent in fighting all along the front.

On lst April, there were fourteen submarines out on patrol. Of these, seven, Safari, Unseen, Torbay, Unrivalled, Sahib, Dolfijn and Tribune were in the Tyrrhenian Sea and United and Saracen were on their way back to base from the same area. Two, Unbending and Unbroken, were off the east Tunisian coast in the Gulf of Hammamet and the new Tactician was making a working up patrol in the Gulf of Lions. Finally two submarines, Parthian and Katsonis were in the Aegean. The Eighth Flotilla at Algiers continued throughout the month to send the bulk of its submarines to the Tyrrhenian Sea including Taurus, Trooper, Sibyl, Sahib, Splendid, Saracen and Shakespeare. Newly arrived submarines still made working up patrols in the Gulf of Lions, off the coast of Spain, the south coast of France and in the Gulf of Genoa and these included patrols by Sickle, Ultor, Unruly, Sportsman and Uproar as well as the Polish Sokol and Dzik. The Tenth Flotilla finally withdrew from the east coast of Tunisia as the Eighth Army advanced and took Sfax and Sousse on 10th/12th of the month, Unbending and Unshaken being the last to leave. The bulk of the Flotilla's strength was then sent north of Sicily to help the Eighth Flotilla and included patrols by Unison and Unbroken as well as by Unrivalled, United and Unseen. Unruffled made another beach reconnaissance off south east Sicily in the early part of April, and United went to the east Calabrian coast towards the end of the month. The First Flotilla submarines, depleted by the loss of the three T-class in March, were somewhat scattered. Parthian and Katsonis returned from the Aegean and the former, after a rest period, left again for the same area at the end of April. Trooper and Rorqual were on loan to the Eighth and Tenth Flotillas respectively and the recently arrived Regent was sent from Malta on 11th to stir up the Adriatic on her way to Beirut.

On 1st April Torbay (Lieutenant RJ Clutterbuck RN), in the middle of the Tyrrhenian Sea fired three torpedoes at a small merchant ship at a range of 1500 yards but missed. On the same day a few hours later, Unrivalled (Lieutenant HB Turner RN), in the Marittimo area found a large schooner in Castellamare Bay and fired two torpedoes at 1400 yards hitting with one of them. This was Triglav of 231 tons and she blew up and sank. Unbroken (Lieutenant ACG Mars DSO RN), on arrival to patrol east of Calabria had five days of very rough weather. On 3rd April, when on patrol off Cape Spartivento she sighted an Italian cruiser of the Regolo-class northbound and fired a full salvo of four torpedoes but the range was 6000 yards and there was no result. Unbroken then retired towards Cape Stilo and next day sighted a large southbound tanker. She fired four more torpedoes at a range of 2000 yards and obtained one hit, damaging Regina of 9545 tons so badly that she had to be beached. Unbroken suffered a moderate counter attack but could not, in any case, complete Regina's destruction, as she had no torpedoes left. On 3rd April, Trident (Lieutenant PE Newstead RN), submerged by day off La Spezia, sighted a German U-boat and fired a salvo at 5000 yards on a late track. One of the six torpedo tubes misfired and she only got five away, missing the target. On 5th April in the middle of the night she was off the east coast of Corsica and attacked a northbound merchant ship with an escort of two destroyers. She fired four torpedoes at the very close range of 300 yards and missed, the torpedoes probably running under. Next day she carried out a special landing operation in Corsica and on 8th sighted another merchant ship with a torpedo boat escort. She fired another four torpedoes at 1600 yards and missed again. The enemy ship was in ballast and the torpedoes may well have also run under. On 9th she sighted an Italian U-boat early in the morning before it was light. Trident now had only two torpedoes left forward and fired both at 3000 yards. The enemy, however, saw the torpedo tracks and avoided them. Trident then, with only one torpedo left in her stern tube, spent two days searching for a schooner to capture for which she had a prize crew on board. On 12th, however, off Cape Noli, she encountered a small merchant ship and fired her last torpedo at 3000 yards and this, like all the others, missed too. Trident, exasperated by her lack of success, continued on patrol hoping to find a target for her gun. On 14th off Cape Mele she surfaced to engage what she took to be a small tanker. It was, however, a converted auxiliary anti-submarine vessel with two quick firing guns with which she soon forced the Trident to break off the action and dive, but not before the submarine had obtained two hits. The enemy then counter attacked with fourteen depth charges dropped uncomfortably close and continued the hunt using echo detection gear to a total of 81 charges. Miraculously Trident only suffered minor damage and, still with a blank score card, returned to Algiers on 18th April.

At this time too, three submarines from Malta were successful in the Marittimo area and north of Sicily. On 16th, Unseen (Lieutenant MLC Crawford DSC RN), on her way to her area was bombed but fortunately missed by an enemy aircraft south west of Marittimo. On 18th in the Cape Gallo area she attacked a convoy of three ships in line abreast. Her target was a tanker at which she fired four torpedoes at a range of 800 yards. She missed but hit one of the escorts, the German UJ2205, which sank. She was then heavily counter attacked but was not damaged. Next day there was information, false as it proved, that the Italian battlefleet had put to sea. Unseen was ordered to the northern entrance to the Straits of Messina but, of course, did not sight it. She did, however, sight a U-boat after dark but did not fire, keeping her torpedoes for the battleships. She was also unsure as to the U-boat's identity. Unrivalled (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) also met an enemy before reaching her area. She sighted two northbound vessels in the early morning of 19th off Marittimo. These were already receiving the attention of the RAF and while Unrivalled was in the process of attacking, they were bombed. A small merchant ship was hit and stopped. Unrivalled then fired three torpedoes at 1400 yards hitting and sinking the German KT7 of 850 tons. Later the same day she met a tanker with air and surface escort off Cape St Vito. She fired four torpedoes at 1400 yards hitting with all four of them. The target, the Italian Bivona of 1642 tons disintegrated but Unrivalled suffered an accurate counter attack. She now had only one torpedo left and had not even reached her patrol area so was recalled to Malta. The third submarine was Unison (Lieutenant AR Daniell DSC RN) and she had a comparatively uneventful time until 21st April when, off Marittimo, she sighted the brand new Italian Marco Foscarini of 6406 tons escorted by torpedo boats. The weather was rough but she got away four torpedoes at a range of 1500 yards on a very broad track so that the torpedoes would run parallel to the swell. Two of the torpedoes hit and the target sank, Unison continuing on her way back to Malta. On 18th April, a bomb near missed Torbay in Algiers during an air raid, and this caused considerable internal damage. Subsequently she had to be towed to Gibraltar for repairs in the dockyard, which took until July to complete.

It is now known that the last large enemy supply ship to reach Tunisia arrived on 19th April. After this date any ships that were at sea returned to ports in Italy, sometimes waiting at sea for some days. The advance of the Eighth Army had captured a number of airfields from which the RAF and the USAF could completely dominate the Sicilian narrows and this virtual blockade of Tunisia must be credited largely to them. Submarines had done extremely well but fewer of their sinkings were actually of ships on their way to Tunisia. From now on only small ships, ferries, landing craft and small warships made the passage and the Axis armies were starved and their fighting power emasculated for want of supplies.

At this point the Mediterranean submarines suffered a setback by the loss within a week of three more of their number. The first of these was Regent (Lieutenant WNR Knox DSC RN) who had returned to the Mediterranean at the end of March after a refit in the United States. She left Malta on 11th April for a patrol in the Adriatic after which she was to go on to Beirut to rejoin the First Submarine Flotilla. On 18th April she attacked a convoy of two ships bound from Bari to Patras in a position five miles north east of Monopoli. Her torpedoes missed and exploded on the shore. No counter attack was made by the escorts. Regent was not heard of again and it seems most likely that she struck one of the Italian defensive mines laid in the vicinity on about the 21st April. She was lost with all hands including her Commanding Officer with six other officers and fifty-six men¹⁴. Splendid (Lieutenant ILM McGeoch DSO RN) left Malta on 18th April to patrol on the west coast of Calabria and in the Naples area. Early on the morning of 21st April when three miles south south east of Capri she heard the hydrophone effect of a destroyer but could, at first, see nothing through her periscope due to the glare of the sun. She raised her large periscope to a height of four feet and sighted the German destroyer Hermes¹⁵ coming towards her. Hermes was keeping a good lookout and sighted the submarine's periscope. Splendid began a torpedo attack but was forced deep and Hermes made an accurate depth charge attack and then turned and gained asdic contact. After a hunt of about an hour and a half and dropping a total of thirty six depth charges in three well placed patterns, Splendid's after hydroplanes jammed, the clips of the after escape hatch parted and the port main motor caught fire. She dived involuntarily to 450 feet and took in a great deal of water and so decided to surface and abandon ship. Hermes opened fire when Splendid broke surface and nineteen men were killed but the remaining thirty, including the Commanding Officer, were rescued and taken prisoner. If it had not been for the Commanding Officer's quick thinking, she would have been lost with all hands. Splendid was scuttled by Lieutenant McGeoch and the First Lieutenant and sank stern first. Sahib (Lieutenant JH Bromage DSO DSC RN) had been at sea for two days longer than Splendid and her patrol area was north of the Straits of Messina. On 22nd she surfaced five miles south of Cape Vaticano and attacked the tug Valente towing a lighter fitted with sheer legs, with her gun. She obtained forty five hits on the tug, which was driven ashore on fire and burned itself out and twenty five hits on the lighter. Two days later off Cape Milazzo, Sahib attacked a heavily escorted ship before dawn and fired four torpedoes at 2800 yards. She obtained one hit and Galiola of 1430 tons sank. Sahib was at once heavily counter attacked by the Italian corvette Gabbiano, fifty-one depth charges being dropped in seven minutes, and she was forced to the surface. She abandoned ship and was scuttled in deep water ten miles north of Cape Milazzo¹⁶. Fortunately only one man was killed and the rest of the ship's company including Lieutenant Bromage, the Commanding Officer, were rescued and taken prisoner. Painful as the loss of these three submarines was, it was mitigated to some extent by the saving of the greater part of two of the crews and the fact that substantial reinforcements were now arriving in the Mediterranean.

Not all submarines on patrol encountered the enemy and some had blank patrols. In the first week of April, Unbending (Lieutenant ET Stanley DSC RN) saw nothing in the Gulf of Hammamet and for most of the month Trooper (Lieutenant JS Wraith DSO DSC RN) found no targets in the central Tyrrhenian Sea. Shakespeare (Lieutenant MFR Ainslie DSC RN) saw nothing in the waters round Sardinia but was attacked at night by an aircraft with a searchlight but fortunately the missile it dropped did not explode. Five submarines on working up patrols also had nothing to interest them and these were Sportsman and Uproar, the Polish submarines Sokol and Dzik and the French Antiope. Nevertheless in April, the Allied submarines again did very well. In thirty-six torpedo attacks firing 117 torpedoes they sank a torpedo boat, an anti-submarine vessel and eighteen ships of 39,909 tons and damaged another four of 17,913 tons. By gunfire they sank a minesweeper and three small vessels and damaged three others. Of these totals, however, only about half were actually engaged in supplying Tunisia. Aircraft sank fifteen ships of 59,566 tons and this was all engaged in supplying Tunisia. Two thirds of the casualties caused by aircraft were sunk by bombing in harbour by the United States Army Air Force. Surface ships, mines and other causes including casualties shared, sank another eight ships of 21,165 tons. Axis records show that during April, twenty-six ships of over 500 tons, sailed on the Tunisian route, fifteen of which were sunk and four damaged, representing 78%. Two thirds of these were sunk or damaged by aircraft, a fifth by submarines and the rest by other causes. These ships succeeded in getting 29,233 tons of supplies across with a loss of 41.5% on the way. A few hundred tons were flown across. These supplies were just enough to keep the Axis army fighting for the last ten days of April, but by the end of the month, General von Arnim was reporting to Rome that unless convoys were at once restarted there would be a total collapse in the supply of the army.

IN MAY THE END IN TUNISIA came swiftly. In the first few days the Eighteenth Army Group renewed its offensive and by 6th, von Arnim had lost control of his forces, which by now had virtually run out of ammunition, fuel and, indeed, supplies of all kinds. Tunis and Bizerta fell on 7th May. On this day C-in-C Mediterranean ordered all naval forces to close in and prevent an evacuation. The final surrender came on 13th May. Minesweeping began at once and before the end of the month, through traffic was restored in the Mediterranean.

On 1st May there were twelve Allied submarines at sea. Safari was in Sardinian waters, Dolfijn was on the north coast of Sicily, Tactician east of Corsica while the French submarines Antiope and Marsouin were working up on the French coast and in the Gulf of Genoa respectively. Rorqual was returning to Malta after laying mines off Trapani and Unshaken was returning from the north coast of Sicily with only one torpedo left. Three submarines, Ultor, Dzik and Unruly were making their way from Algiers to Malta to join the Tenth Flotilla and finally Parthian and Papanicolis had just left Beirut for the Aegean. These boats were reinforced or relieved early in May by Unison, Sibyl, Unrivalled, Trident and Trespasser. In the first week of May, which was the final week before Tunis and Bizerta fell, the attack on the supply route amounted almost to a complete blockade. In spite of desperate and, indeed, heroic efforts, the enemy only got one full sized ship through and lost another eight in the attempt. The blockade, as we have already noted, was enforced mainly by aircraft and to a certain extent by destroyers and motor torpedo boats: submarines, stationed further north in the Tyrrhenian Sea took little part, and the few ships they sank were not bound for North Africa.

Safari (Lieutenant RB Lakin DSO DSC RN), on the west coasts of Sardinia and Corsica, surfaced on 2nd May and attacked the Italian Sagliola of 307 tons off Asinara scoring 25 hits with her gun. Sagliola sank after abandoning ship. On 8th Safari sank the steam trawler Onda of 98 tons, this time scoring 40 hits. Safari then decided to investigate Port Torres and the same evening fired two torpedoes separately at 2700 yards into the harbour. The first torpedo hit the breakwater but the second sank Pippino Palomba of 2035 tons and a Norwegian ship in Italian service, Liv of 3070 tons. Unrivalled (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) in the northern approaches to Messina attacked a large schooner off Cape Vaticano with two torpedoes on 6th May but missed at 1400 yards. She had another opportunity against the same ship next day and fired another two torpedoes at 1000 yards, but one of them broke surface and had a gyro failure and she missed again. She then surfaced and drove the ship, Albina of 223 tons, ashore by gunfire. On 9th off Vuicano Island, she fired three torpedoes at 1000 yards at Santa Maria Salina of 763 tons, a small naval auxiliary, hitting with two of them and sinking her. About an hour later she fired her last torpedo at a small schooner at 1000 yards but the target saw the track and turned towards and the torpedo missed.

During the first week of May, however, three other submarines on patrol achieved nothing at all. Sibyl (Lieutenant EJD Turner DSC RN) off Sardinia, Unison (Lieutenant AR Daniell DSC RN) on the north coast of Sicily and Trident (Lieutenant PE Newstead RN) off the south coast of France, all had blank score cards. Trident also failed to land and pick up agents as planned. The new submarine Trespasser (Lieutenant RM Favell RN) left Gibraltar for a working up patrol in the Gulf of Lions. On 11th she sighted two merchant ships but they were out of range. Subsequently she went on to Algiers. The French submarine Marsouin was more successful than Trident and carried out a special operation on the south coast of France but met disaster as she returned, running ashore on Cape Caxine in thick weather and being seriously damaged. In the Aegean, Parthian (Lieutenant MB St John RN) sank a 50-ton caique by gunfire that was carrying fuel and then engaged an escort vessel at close range causing some damage before she was forced to dive by the return fire. She was then subjected to a counter attack of 76 depth charges in which she suffered some damage to her battery and a periscope. Parthian then bombarded the railway near Platamone damaging a viaduct, a signal box and water tank and some railway wagons. She also sank two more caiques but return fire killed one of her crew. Papanicolis (Ypoploiarkhos N Roussen) also sank two caiques of 250 and 150 tons in the Aegean, but then had defects that necessitated her return to Beirut.

WITH THE EJECTION OF THE AXIS FORCES from North Africa and the opening of the Mediterranean to through traffic, it is appropriate to give some thought to the overall question of maritime strategy and how it worked at this stage of the Second World War and to discern the part that submarines played in it. We have seen how Operation 'Torch' was launched with inferiority in numbers of capital ships, and that this apparent defiance of earlier principles of maritime strategy did not lead to disaster. Even Alfred Thayer Mahan would have conceded that the nature of naval warfare must have changed radically. It could, of course, be held by the old school that the crippling shortage of oil fuel in the Italian Fleet meant that it could not be used and was effectively removed from the board. This is true, although the Allies were not aware of it. Even if the Italians had had sufficient fuel it is doubtful if they would have done much to prevent the Allies landing in North Africa. Their insistence that their battleships should not attempt to operate beyond fighter protection from the shore is the key to the matter. The Allied Navies also held this principle, and they had no intention of throwing their few battleships into action to stop the Axis supplies getting to Tunisia. They did not feel that their naval air groups in aircraft carriers were strong enough to compete with Axis shore based air power either. Battlefleets and indeed all surface ships could now only operate in areas beyond the reach of enemy front line shore based air power, or when their own shore based or carrier borne fighters could achieve local air superiority. The same principle applied also to the use of sea communications and the mounting of overseas expeditions and this principle was now of far greater importance than battlefleet supremacy.

The application of sea power had therefore changed radically and it is of interest to our subject to study what part submarines were now, in these changed circumstances, able to take. It is generally acknowledged that in the Second World War that it was the Allies who commanded the sea, and that the Axis were only able to dispute it by using weapons of attrition such as U-boats, surface raiders, aircraft and mines. As far as the Allied forces in North Africa were concerned this was certainly true. The British Armies in the Middle East were supplied by sea from India, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and also from the United Kingdom by the Cape and the first part of the Takoradi air route. The Allied forces in Morocco and Algeria were supplied direct by sea from the United States and the United Kingdom. The Axis forces in North Africa were also largely supplied by sea although they were able to use direct air transport to a certain extent. It was possible for them to do this because it was they who commanded the sea in the central Mediterranean from mid 1940 to mid 1943. The Allies were only able to dispute this command with weapons of attrition. It is true that they were, on occasion, able to dispute the Axis command of the sea by sweeps by the Fleet and by running Mediterranean convoys. It was not, however, the superior Italian Fleet which gave the Axis command of the sea in the central Mediterranean so much as the enemy air forces especially the Luftwaffe, and it was under their general cover that the enemy convoys to North Africa sailed. The disputing of this Axis traffic by light British surface forces was very successful in the autumn of 1942 when the Luftwaffe was weak, but thereafter produced few results. The Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm were very effective when they could use Malta or air bases in Cyrenaica or Algeria, but there were long periods when they could achieve nothing at all. It was the submarines that were the only forces able to exact a steady toll throughout the three years. It was only for a period of two months in 1942 that their operations virtually ceased when their base in Malta was neutralised by bombing and mining and when Medway was sunk.

The British and US Navies were not therefore able to secure command of the sea between Italy and Tunisia in the final stages of the campaign in 1943 and they could only dispute it by using weapons of attrition. Weapons of attrition, such as the submarine, however, are seldom able to exercise complete command of the sea. Command of the sea may be defined as the ability to instil in the enemy a state of mind that deters him from using the sea at all.