ON 9TH NOVEMBER 1942, the day after the landings in North Africa, Admiral Sir Max K Horton KCB DSO hauled down his flag as Admiral(Submarines). Rear Admiral CB Barry DSO relieved him. Admiral Horton was appointed to be C-in-C of the Western Approaches, the principal naval command in the Battle of the Atlantic, and a post for which he was particularly well qualified. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty wrote to express their “high appreciation of the exceptional manner in which you have carried out the duties of Flag Officer (Submarines) for nearly three years of war'. They went on to say that “The outstanding successes achieved by British submarines in both Home and Mediterranean waters bear striking witness to the morale of the Submarine Service and to the efficiency of the training and skilful planning of operations carried out under your supervision'.

Admiral Barry, like his predecessor, had commanded a submarine during the first world war and was awarded the Distinguished Service Order when captain of D4 for sinking the German submarine UB72. Between the wars he commanded K26, the last and largest of the K-class, and he was the first captain of the new fleet submarine Thames. He also served as Chief Staff Officer to the Rear Admiral(Submarines) and as Captain(S) Fourth Submarine Flotilla in the Far East. He came immediately from the command of the battleship Queen Elizabeth. At the time of the relief of Admiral Horton by Admiral Barry, there were three Chief Staff Officers at Northways. Captain JG Roper OBE RN was still at his post for Administration and Personnel, Captain SM Raw CBE RN had relieved Captain Fawkes for Operations, and Captain JP Claridge RN was responsible for Material.

THE SENDING OF EIGHT OPERATIONAL SUBMARINES from Home waters to take part in Operation 'Torch' left only six boats for the North Sea and Bay of Biscay¹. With the suspension of convoys to North Russia this had seemed acceptable, but even before the landings took place, German heavy units in Norway began to move and a new requirement to intercept blockade-runners in the Bay of Biscay was apparent. Fortunately there were a number of new construction submarines coming forward, and two of these, P312 and P216 were kept to reinforce the Home Station.

The disposition of the German main units on 1st November 1942 was that Tirpitz and Scheer were at Trondheim, Hipper was in Alten Fjord and Koln was at Narvik. The British knew these positions by signal and other intelligence. It had been decided to try running single unescorted merchant ships to Russia, and thirteen ships were to attempt the passage in the moonless period of 28th October to 9th November. Tuna and O15 were moved up to Lerwick with the intention that they should patrol off the North Cape to give these ships some cover. On 24th October the Russians reported that wireless intelligence indicated that enemy main units were about to move north. Tuna (Lieutenant RP Raikes DSO RN) and O15 (Luitenant ter zee 2e Kl T G Quint) were therefore ordered to patrol off Utvaer and Stattlandet respectively. It transpired, however, that the movement was of Hipper from Narvik to Alten Fjord so the submarines were too far south and in the wrong place. As soon as this was realized, Tuna and O15 were ordered to the vicinity of Bear Island and the independent merchant ships were re-routed to go as far north as the ice permitted. On 6th November, Tuna sighted a U-boat early in the morning and fired six torpedoes in two salvoes of three at a range of 3500 yards but the U-boat saw them coming and took avoiding action. A distress signal was then received from one of the independent merchant ships reporting that she was aground on the South Cape of Spitzbergen and Tuna set course to go to her assistance. The ship was seen overturned on the rocks with no sign of boats or survivors and there was nothing to be done. Hipper with some destroyers had left Alten Fjord the day before, and steaming northeast, intercepted and sank a tanker and then turned southwest. The fact that Hipper was at sea was revealed by signal intelligence and Tuna was ordered to a position off Soroy to intercept her on her return. Hipper entered Alten Fjord on 9th November passing some forty miles to the eastward of Tuna and using the passage east of Soroy. Tuna and O15 were then recalled².

Tuna (Lieutenant RP Raikes DSO RN) after a period of trials and exercises in the Clyde, sailed on 2nd December for the Bay of Biscay with a party of Royal Marine Commandos under Major Hasler RM with six folbots for Operation 'Frankton'. This was to be an attack on shipping in Bordeaux and Bassens, some of which were believed to be blockade-runners. Tuna reconnoitred the coast on 6th and 7th December, launching five folbots off the entrance to the Gironde. After a two-day patrol, Tuna then returned to base. The operation seriously damaged four large merchant ships putting them out of action for several months. Major Hasler and one other man escaped to Spain but the remainder were, in due course, killed or taken prisoner.

It had been decided to run another convoy to North Russia at the end of December. C-in-C Home Fleet wished to split the convoy into two sections sailing about a week apart. Four submarines were to patrol off Alten Fjord to cover each convoy and their patrols were to be eight to ten miles off the coast. Because of the long passage involved, it was necessary to relieve these submarines between the movements of the two halves of the convoy. Fortunately enough submarines were available with the commissioning of the new P223, P339 and P49 and the refitted Sokol and Torbay. The first group consisting of P223 (Lieutenant GDN Milner DSC RN), P339 (Lieutenant Commander MRG Wingfield DSO RN), Torbay (Lieutenant RJ Clutterbuck RN) and Sokol (Podporucznik Komandor Koziolkowski) sailed in mid December and were in position for the passage of JW51A past Bear Island on 20th. Lutzow, which had been refitting at Kiel, made the passage north to Alten Fjord between the 9th and 18th December calling at Trondheim on the way. Signal intelligence told us of this move but not in time to make an interception. She kept forty miles out from the coast and she was in Alten Fjord two days before the first group of submarines arrived in position. Her passage was made in bad visibility and foul weather. The striking force in Alten Fjord now consisted of Lutzow, Hipper and six destroyers. The first group of submarines patrolled in very heavy weather until 28th December when they were withdrawn: the convoy was not sighted by the enemy and had arrived intact in the Kola Inlet on 25th.

The second group of submarines consisting of P312 (Lieutenant RM Favell RN), P216 (Lieutenant CR PeIly RN), P49 (Lieutenant JP Fyfe RN), Graph (Lieutenant PB Marriott RN) and O14 (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl HAW Goossens) left Lerwick on 24th December. O14 had engine trouble and had to return. The other four arrived in position off Alten Fjord on 29th December.

In Herr Hitler's view the German heavy ships were stationed in North Norway for defence against Allied landings and he was loath to risk them in attacking convoys. He had, however, agreed that Lutzow should make a sortie into the Atlantic to raid commerce. The German Naval Staff, nevertheless, obtained permission to use both Hipper and Lutzow to attack the next Russian convoy, but only on condition that no risks were taken which might prejudice their primary roles of the defence of Norway, or the sortie of Lutzow into the Atlantic.

The second half of the convoy, JW51B, was sighted and reported by a U-boat south of Bear Island on 30th, and the German ships at once put to sea. They left by the Fjords to the west of Soroy and passed neatly round the western end of our submarine patrol line by steering north east to intercept the convoy. At the critical moment our cryptographers ran into difficulties and gave no warning. It was a dark night with bad visibility but P49 sighted three dark shapes at 0142 on 31st. She was unable to see what they were and made no sighting report but it is possible that this was part of the German force. The convoy was brilliantly defended by the destroyers of its escort and by its covering force of six-inch gun cruisers. The much more powerful German ships retired in accordance with their orders. The Germans returned to Alten Fjord by the same route as they had come out. Graph sighted a darkened vessel on a southeasterly course and gave chase but lost her and decided not to make an enemy report. Later she sighted what she took to be two destroyers and fired four torpedoes at 7000 yards but without success⁷. Convoy JW51B arrived safely as did the return convoy RA51. The submarine patrols were withdrawn on 4th January but next day signal intelligence was received indicating that Tirpitz was expected to move from Trondheim to Narvik on 8th. P216 and P49 were ordered to guard the entrance to Vestfjord and Graph and P312 to watch the northern exit from Trondheim while Uredd who was engaged in some trials off the Shetlands was refuelled and sailed on 6th for the Trondheim area too. P55 (Lieutenant AD Piper DSC** RNR) who had been on a working up patrol since the 31st was off Utvaer. On 6th further signal intelligence indicated that Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen might move north to Norway from the Baltic and Uredd was diverted to join P55 between Stattlandet and Bredsund. Signal intelligence then revealed that Hipper had been damaged when attacking JW51B and had a boiler room flooded. On 11th January the RAF sighted Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen off the Skaw but when the ships realized that they had been seen they turned back to Germany. The submarines on the coast of Norway were withdrawn on various dates from 9th-13th January after their arduous patrols. The intense cold, almost perpetual darkness, often in bad visibility and foul weather made success under such conditions very difficult. It is of interest that both the sightings of enemy ships by our submarines defending convoy JW51B were made when they were, by post war analysis, wildly out of position. Nevertheless the campaign against the enemy main units and the protection of convoys to Russia, were the most important use that could be made of our submarines in Home waters at this time, and it continued throughout the rest of the winter. The Russian submarines were also active during this period and the Soviet L20 sank Muanse of 5472 tons off Tanafjord. She also laid a minefield and landed agents. L22 also laid a minefield.

Before Christmas, however, there were two accidents. In November X3 sank during exercises and although her crew escaped successfully and she was soon salvaged, she had to be sent south by rail for a refit. Shortly afterwards X4, also on exercises, lost a man overboard who was drowned and she suffered some damage. She did not sink, but this accident was also a set back to the training programme. Meanwhile at Barrow, there were delays and teething troubles with the operational craft and by the end of the year it was clear that the X-craft could not be completed, tested and properly trained in time for an attack in the spring. The attack on Tirpitz had therefore to be postponed until the autumn of 1943.

THE SUBMARINES IN HOME WATERS at the beginning of 1943 had the same tasks as before. The first of these was to supervise, man, try out and train the considerable number of new construction submarines coming forward and to despatch them with as little delay as possible to the Mediterranean which was still the major theatre of operations. The second task was to administer the twenty odd submarines required for the training of new submarine commanding officers and crews and to provide targets for our ever-growing anti-submarine forces to practice upon. Operationally their principal task was to keep a watch on the German heavy ships in Norwegian waters and to cover the passage of convoys to North Russia. A subsidiary task was to try and catch some of the growing number of blockade-runners arriving at and leaving the French Biscay ports. It had been part of a new submarines' training for some time that they should make a working up patrol in Home waters before being declared fit for operations. These patrols were normally made in a comparatively safe area and were generally designed to intercept U-boats on passage to the Atlantic. However the shortage of operational submarines in Home waters meant that the working up patrols were often used to boost their strength on the Norwegian coast. The US Navy's Subron50, now based at Rosneath in the Clyde was also a substantial reinforcement and it was decided that it should concentrate on the blockade-runners in the Bay of Biscay¹³.

The next convoy for North Russia, JW52, sailed in mid January and, unlike its predecessor, was not divided into two groups. Hipper, Lutzow and Koln were in Alten Fjord¹⁴ while Tirpitz and Nurnberg were at Narvik and Scharnhorst, Prinz Eugen, Leipzig and Emden were ready for action in the Baltic. The only submarine at sea at this time off the Norwegian coast was Uredd. She had left Dundee to patrol off Stattlandet on 6th January. Trident (Lieutenant PE Newstead RN), P224 (Lieutenant JR Drummond DSC RN) and later P314 (Lieutenant Commander AF Collett DSC RN) left Lerwick for the approaches to Alten Fjord in mid January to cover JW52 but the first two were diverted on the way for short patrols off Trondheim when signal intelligence warned that Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen were about to make another attempt to get to Norway. The period on patrol to cover JW52, and the return convoy RA52, was such that the submarines off Alten Fjord had to be relieved and P216 (Lieutenant CR Pelly RN), O15 (Luitenant ter zee 2e Kl AJ Schouwenaar), Junon (Capitaine de Fregate J Querville) and Sokol (Podporucznik Komandor GC Koziolkowski) left Lerwick to be in position by 26th January¹⁵. Convoy JW52 made a fast and successful passage and the German ships in Alten Fjord made no move against it. The three submarines off Alten Fjord therefore saw nothing except that P314 sighted the Russian submarine S51 on 22nd January. Other Russian submarines, which were out covering the convoy, had some success. Shch404, M172 and Shch402 all missed targets although M171 damaged Ilona Siemens of 3243 tons. Shch403 sank the patrol boat V6115; M172 sank V5909; and Shch422 sank UJ1108. Finally L20 sank the large transport Othmanschen of 7007 tons off the Nordkyn. Further south Uredd (Lojtnant RQ Roren) sighted the E-boat depot ship Adolph Luderitz off Alesund on 17th January. She fired four torpedoes and an explosion was heard. Success was claimed and Uredd was subsequently congratulated by A(S). Unfortunately post-war research shows that she missed the target.

The German heavy ships, however, made other movements unconnected with JW52 and signal intelligence of them was received in advance. On 23rd, the four submarines on passage as reliefs for the boats off Alten Fjord were diverted to the Trondheim area; P216 and O15 to the vicinity of Gripholen and Sokol and Junon to the Bredsund area. Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen passed through the Great Belt and were reported west of the Skaw on 25th but they then again returned to base. On 24th Hipper and Koln left Alten Fjord and made their way south through the leads and arrived at Narvik on 26th. The submarines off Trondheim, except for Junon, who was left on patrol off Svino Light, were ordered to Alten Fjord on 26th. Two days later Hipper and Koln left Narvik for Trondheim keeping inside the leads and arrived there on 30th January. They left again for the south on 4th February and passed inside the leads so avoiding Junon. They passed Stattlandet in daylight and were in the Great Belt by 6th. We had no submarines on patrol off the south west coast of Norway to intercept them at the time as all were in the far north covering the return convoy RA52, from which duty they were withdrawn on 3rd February.

During January there had also been some activity in the Bay of Biscay. After the first patrol by Gurnard in December, Barb (Lieutenant Commander JR Waterman USN) and Herring (Lieutenant Commander RW Johnson USN) left Rosneath on 16th December to patrol off Vigo and Ferrol. On 26th December, Barb sighted a tanker putting to sea, which, although showing navigation lights, was otherwise incorrectly illuminated for a neutral. Furthermore no information had been received from the Spanish authorities of any movement. She therefore torpedoed her but she didn't sink and got into Vigo. It proved to be the Spanish Campomanes but the British Naval Attaché was able to tell the Spanish Government truthfully that no British submarine was in the area, and they assumed that a German U-boat must have been responsible! At the end of December, A(S) received Admiralty permission to investigate the Bilbao-Bayonne-Bordeaux iron ore route. Shad (Lieutenant Commander EJ Mac-Gregor USN) and Blackfish (Lieutenant Commander JF Davidson USN) who left Rosneath on 20th December were ordered to this area arriving off Bilbao on 30th. No sooner had they arrived than signal intelligence was received of a blockade-runner approaching from the west. A(S) ordered Barb, Herring and Blackfish with the Netherlands submarine Dolfijn (Luitenant ter zee 1e Kl HMLFE van Oestrom Soede), on her way to the Mediterranean, to form a patrol line north west of Ferrol to intercept. Shad was given a position to the eastwards as 'longstop'. There were some difficulties with communications with the US Submarines and they took some time to get into position. Herring was delayed by contact with a U-boat, and Shad did not get the signal in time to take up her position at all. The blockade runner which had been sighted by Coastal Command, probably passed fairly close to Barb but without being seen and was sunk by British surface forces to the east of the patrol line. After the submarines had been ordered to return to their patrol positions, the German tanker Spichern slipped out of Ferrol and got to Brest. Blackfish and Herring left patrol on 12th January followed by Barb on 18th, leaving Shad to continue with the first of the fifty day patrols which it had been decided to institute for Subron50. Shad patrolled to the eastwards to intercept the iron ore traffic, and on 4th January sank the German minesweeper M4242 by gunfire while another was towing her. Unfortunately her gun jammed before she could sink both of them. On 9th she sighted another ship burning navigation lights and fired torpedoes but without result, probably due to a torpedo pistol failure. On 25th the fully laden eastbound Nordfels of 1214 tons was attacked with torpedoes, one of which hit and definitely failed to explode, and the ship turned back and got into Bilbao. Another eastbound fully laden ship was sighted but Shad could not get within range, and that night German anti-submarine trawlers hunted her but the iron ore traffic was suspended for several days.

Meanwhile submarine patrols continued in the Bay of Biscay. Barb (Lieutenant Commander JR Waterman USN) and Blackfish (Lieutenant Commander JF Davidson USN) left Rosneath on 1st February to patrol off Cape Ortegal and Bilbao. Barb had no luck but sighted no less than 485 fishing vessels and 127 large ships, but all were neutral. Blackfish fired torpedoes at two German anti-submarine trawlers on 19th February, hitting and sinking V408 and was counter attacked by the other, damaging her conning tower and main induction pipe and she had to abandon the patrol and return to base. On 7th March, Shad (Lieutenant Commander EJ MacGregor USN) and Herring (Lieutenant Commander RW Johnson USN) were on patrol again. On 27th, signal intelligence was received that three blockade-runners had left Bordeaux. Herring with Sokol and Uproar/P31 (Lieutenant LE Herrick DSC RN), which were on passage to the Mediterranean, were positioned to intercept but saw nothing. On 31st, Shad off Bilboa was ordered to intercept an inbound ship escorted by three destroyers and reported by Coastal Command. She used her surface speed and caught up with the enemy sixty miles south of the entrance to the Gironde, where the swept channel began. In a night surface attack using radar she fired a salvo of torpedoes, one of which hit the blockade-runner Pietro Orseolo and another the destroyer Z23, but this torpedo failed to explode. Both ships, however, got into harbour and there was no counter attack, as the enemy believed the hit on the blockade-runner was due to a mine.

DURING MARCH THE MARITIME strategic situation in Home waters changed substantially. The Battle of the Atlantic was going very badly for the Allies and the sinkings by U-boat had reached a dangerous level. At the Casablanca Conference in January it had been decided to invade Sicily in July. At the same time the Russians, while demanding that the convoys to North Russia should continue, did very little to help. They were difficult about Allied air forces and wireless stations being maintained on their territory. The movement of a powerful German surface force to Alten Fjord meant that the convoys would have to be escorted into the Barents Sea by the Home Fleet, putting it in great danger from the Luftwaffe. The result was that it was decided to stop convoys to Russia during the summer in order to provide destroyers to help in the Battle of the Atlantic and reinforcements of all types for the invasion of Sicily. At the same time the Admiralty were determined to deal with any break out by the German heavy ships into the Atlantic. The movements of the German heavy ships might well be the preliminaries to a break out by one or more of them, and the C-in-C Home Fleet made dispositions accordingly. A(S), however, due to the despatch of reinforcements to the Mediterranean, had only two boats immediately available. These were Truculent/P315 (Lieutenant RL Alexander RN) and Seanympth/P223 (Lieutenant GDN Milner DSC RN) and they were sailed from Lerwick on 20th March for inshore areas outside the Lofoten Islands where they arrived on 23rd and 24th. They were joined by Templar/P316 (Lieutenant DJ Beckley DSO RN) on 26th. The powerful German squadron consisting of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Lutzow was now concentrated at Narvik and Admiral Kunmetz hoisted his flag in command. After carrying out exercises in Vestfjord, the squadron sailed on 23rd passing south of the Lofoten Islands and forty miles off the coast at high speed, and arrived at Alten Fjord on 24th March without being sighted by Truculent or Seanympth who had only just arrived in their patrol positions.

The three submarines were shifted to patrol off Alten Fjord and remained there until 6th April when they were withdrawn. The 6th April was the date laid down by A(S) as the last day, due to the short nights, that submarines could maintain inshore patrols. From now on they would have to be placed fifty miles or more out to sea so as they would be able to charge their batteries in daylight without interference from patrols. At this time the Russians were proposing to use their submarines further to the west to attack the traffic coming north from Narvik. Although it was not clear how they intended to do this during the constant daylight of the summer, they were given freedom to operate east of 16 degrees East. The Admiralty, however, reserved the right to move our submarines east to watch Alten Fjord should this become necessary. They also had in mind the X-craft attack that they intended to mount in the autumn, and for which preparations and training continued throughout the summer. The Soviet submarines had been busy in late March and early April. M104 damaged Johanisbergen of 4533 tons in Varanger Fjord, and she had to be beached. K3 failed to secure any hits in two attacks off the Nordkyn and was then sunk in a counter attack by UJ-boats. On 24th March, M174 struck a mine and was badly damaged although she survived. Two more convoys were attacked by S102, S55 and S101; S55 sank Ajax of 2297 tons. L20 and L22 laid mines in early April.

It will be recalled that Junon in November 1942, had left four men behind during a special operation in Me Fjord. On 10th March she left Lerwick to try to recover them. This was accomplished successfully on 14th March in a snowstorm for which Capitaine de Fregate Querville received an expression of Their Lordships appreciation. As early as October 1942, the elderly ex-American submarines P555 and P556, which had been sent to the South Atlantic Station for anti-submarine training duties, were suffering from many defects. This was partly because there was no depot ship support for them. It was therefore decided to relieve them with two modern submarines. The ex-Turkish P614 and P615 were chosen and sailed accordingly. P615, however, was torpedoed by U123 and sunk in the Freetown area on 18th April while being escorted by MMS105. There were no survivors and the casualties included her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant CW St C Lambert DSC* RN, four other officers and 38 men of her ship's company.

A breakout by the German heavy ships was believed possible all through April and May, and A(S) brought into force a new plan to intercept them without the submarines having to close the coast of Norway. Patrol zones were established on a line from the Lofoten Islands to Spitzbergen between the latitudes of 70 and 75 degrees north. Submarines on patrol in these areas would be free to attack U-boats provided that they kept a full salvo for attacking heavy ships. To provide enough submarines it was decided to include the American Subron50 and to discontinue their patrols in the Bay of Biscay. This was acceptable as the Axis blockade-runners were suffering heavily from interceptions by surface warships guided by signal intelligence, and their patrols were now of less importance. On 1st April, Stubborn/P238 (Lieutenant AA Duff RN), Severn (Lieutenant Commander ANG Campbell RN) and Barb (Lieutenant Commander JR Waterman USN) sailed from the Clyde for these areas followed on 5th April by Blackfish (Lieutenant Commander JF Davidson USN). At the same time, signal intelligence indicated that the Germans had established a U-boat patrol line southeast of Jan Mayen Island to intercept the next convoy to Russia. Tuna (Lieutenant DSR Martin RN) was sailed from Lerwick on 3rd April for this area. The submarines on the patrol line off North Norway sighted nothing but on the 7th April, Tuna sighted a U-boat at a range of 5000 yards and when the range had fallen to 1200 yards she fired five torpedoes, one of which hit and sank U644. A single survivor drowned before he could be picked up. Next day Tuna sighted another U-boat, which was U251, but the enemy dived before an attack could be made. Two hours afterwards a periscope was sighted but she was unable to develop an attack. On 14th, she detected hydrophone effect on her asdic set and then sighted a conning tower at long range. After half an hour's stalking, she fired a salvo of eight torpedoes but U302 saw the tracks and dived and they missed. On U302's report of this attack, the U-boat patrol line was moved fifty miles to the northeast and Tuna had no more sightings.

They also suffered from a great deal of engine trouble, Gunnel and Gurnard having had to return to the USA for repairs. These two submarines had been replaced by Hake and Haddo towards the end of April, but the other boats were still plagued by defects. It was clear that, in any case, all the submarines of Subron50 would have to return to the USA before long to have their engines put right. Fundamentally, however, the US Navy believed that these large long-range submarines were wasted in European waters and desired to re-deploy them to the Pacific. They first suggested, however, that their long endurance could be utilised by making anti U-boat patrols in mid Atlantic but A(S) was not in favour. Apart from problems of mutual interference, British experience of such operations was not encouraging. Nevertheless it was decided to allow the American submarines to operate in the way they thought best. Hake (Lieutenant Commander JC Broach USN) and Haddo (Commander WA Lent USN) carried out anti U-boat patrols in mid Atlantic on their way to join Subron50. On 15th May Herring (Lieutenant Commander RW Johnson USN) left her patrol north of Iceland for a position in mid Atlantic followed by other submarines of Subron 50, but the Commander Submarines Atlantic in New London controlled these operations. In June, Admiral Stark, commanding US Naval Forces in Europe stated that a requirement existed to move Subron50 to the Pacific, and shortly afterwards this redisposition was agreed to by A(S) and the Admiralty.

The last patrol carried out in Home waters before the end of June was a special operation. The Allies had, for some time, maintained a small garrison and meteorological station at Barentzburg in Spitzbergen. In June a party from this garrison attempted to dislodge an enemy meteorological post at a place called Signehaven, but were attacked by a U-boat and their motorboat was sunk. They were stranded and the garrison at Barentzburg called for assistance. Seadog (Lieutenant CR Pelly RN) left Lerwick on 26th June and after calling at Barentzburg, rescued the party from Signehaven. She sailed on 3rd July to return to base. Next day she encountered a U-boat and fired six torpedoes at a range of 3500 yards. She fired with a bow up angle and one of the torpedoes broke surface. The U-boat saw the torpedoes and took avoiding action. Seadog then tried a gun action but the U-boat dived.

IN THE EIGHT MONTHS COVERED by this chapter, most of the operational activity of the submarines in Home waters was directed against the German main units off the coast of Norway. The only result was two shadowy sightings in the arctic night, and neither the one nor the other was identified or provided any useful information for our forces. Only four torpedoes were fired and those were at what must have been patrol vessels and not ships of the main units or their escorts. In any case the torpedoes missed. The German main units proved elusive, partly because they kept to the leads and passages inside the islands off the coast of Norway. When they did come out into the open sea, they did so either at night or in bad visibility and adopted a new method using high speed and keeping some forty miles off the coast. It is also true that our patrols were designed to intercept the enemy if he attacked the convoys to North Russia, or if he tried to break out into the Atlantic, whereas for most of the time the enemy heavy ships were deployed for the defence of Norway. Nevertheless this was a very proper use of our submarines. Only one boat was lost off the coast of Norway in this period, and that was the Norwegian Uredd. She was not lost operating against the enemy heavy ships but while attempting a special operation within the leads.

The second use of our submarines in Home waters in this period was to try and intercept blockade-runners in the Bay of Biscay. This was also the main employment for the American Subron50. This was not particularly successful. Only one blockade-runner and one small iron ore ship were hit and the blockade-runner was only damaged. The main reason for this lack of success was that submarines were operating in the same area as air and surface forces and submarines were given the patrol positions where air and surface vessels found it difficult to operate, and which were by no means the best for interceptions by them. The operational control of the various forces was also badly co-ordinated. Two British submarines were lost in the Bay, one of which was sunk by our own forces.

The third use of our submarines was for anti U-boat patrols and these, aided by cryptography, were more successful. Two U-boats were sunk out of a total of eight attacks firing forty-four torpedoes. This was at a very critical time in the Battle of the Atlantic and was a valuable contribution. It is of interest that the number of attacks made by submarines in Home waters, and the number of torpedoes fired in this period of eight months at all types of target, was less than those in the Mediterranean during an average week.

As must have been expected there were few awards for gallantry on the Home Station during the period of this chapter. Distinguished Service Orders were given to Lieutenant Alexander of Truculent for sinking U308 and to Lieutenant DSR Martin of Tuna for the destruction of U644. Lieutenant Martin was also awarded a bar to his DSO for anti U-boat operations¹⁷. Finally Lieutenant Commander MacGregor of Shad was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross for his attack on a blockade-runner in March 1943.

WHILE THESE OPERATIONS were in progress, no less than twenty-eight submarines passed through the trials and working up organisation run by the Third Submarine Flotilla in the Clyde. Twenty-two of these were new submarines¹⁸ and six¹⁹ had just completed refit. The majority of these submarines made one working up patrol in Home waters and then went on to the Mediterranean. A few remained as operational boats in Home waters, and these replaced the American Subron50 when it left for the Pacific.

On 24th February, a submarine accident led to the loss of Vandal while working up. She was exercising independently between the Mull of Kintyre and the Isle of Arran and sank without trace. Her wreck was discovered in 1995, but the cause of her sinking remains unknown. She was lost with all hands including her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant JS Bridger RN, three other officers and 33 men. On 30th May, there was a second submarine accident in the Clyde. In this case Untamed, also a new submarine working up, was carrying out anti-submarine exercises with an escort group off Campbeltown. She was located almost at once but although the diving ship Tedworth arrived promptly, the weather and tidal streams were too strong and no members of the crew were rescued. The casualties included her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant GM Noll RN, four other officers and 31 men of her ship's company. Divers later found Untamed on the bottom and the cause of her loss was established as flooding through the patent log. Untamed was salved after a month's work and was towed back to Barrow to be reconditioned. In March Wolfe, a liner converted in the United States to a submarine depot ship, joined Forth in the Third Flotilla in the Holy Loch. Her help to cope with the heavy workload of working up the output of the six submarine production lines was very necessary.