Operation 'Torch' - The Landings In North Africa: November - December 1942

References
Patrolgram 15 War patrols during North Africa Landings
Map 35 Submarines during North Africa Landings 8-11 Nov 42
Map 36 Operations in the Mediterranean after North Africa Landings Nov-Dec 42

IN JULY, THE BRITISH AND UNITED STATES Governments decided that the best offensive action they could take in 1942 was to land in French North Africa. For the steps which led up to this decision, the reader must consult other histories and here we only have room to say that Operation 'Torch' was the first large scale Allied amphibious operation during the Second World War. Some four army divisions were to be landed, initially at Algiers, Oran and on the Atlantic coast of Morocco and were to be followed up by a considerably larger army. It has always been an important principle of naval warfare that an overseas amphibious operation should not be embarked upon without command of the sea. Command of the sea still, in the minds of many high naval authorities, meant superiority in capital ships. The new battleship Roma had just joined the Italian Fleet and altogether they now had six battleships operational. The French, who now had to be counted as potential enemies as we were invading their territory, had three capital ships making Axis strength nine battleships in all. The British, after the loss of Prince ofWales and Repulse in the Far East and of Barham in the Mediterranean and the disabling of Queen Elizabeth and Valiant in Alexandria, were seriously reduced in numbers. They had also to watch Tirpitz and Scharnhorst in Home waters and so could only spare three capital ships for Operation 'Torch'. The Americans, after Pearl Harbour, were short of capital ships too and could only provide three more, two of which were elderly. The Allies could therefore actually be inferior in battle fleet strength and it was essential to redress the balance by some means, notably by providing as many submarines as possible.

Submarines were also required to co-operate in several other ways. Firstly there were a number of clandestine comings and goings by senior American and friendly French Officers to try and secure French co-operation and if possible to land without opposition. Secondly it was hoped to use submarines for reconnaissance of the beaches where the landings were to take place and subsequently to act as navigational beacons to lead in the amphibious forces. They were also needed, especially on the Moroccan coast, to send back weather reports. Thirdly, as explained above, they were required to watch for reactions by the Italian and French Fleets. In the eastern Mediterranean, where the Eighth Army was attacking at El Alamein, submarines were needed to continue their campaign against the Axis communications with North Africa.

In August, A(S) estimated that he could reinforce the Mediterranean submarine flotillas for Operation 'Torch' to a strength of twenty-four operational boats. This was in addition to two older submarines employed carrying supplies to Malta, and two Greek submarines fit only for limited operations. He also hoped to be able to lend another eight operational submarines from Home waters provided that no convoys were run to North Russia and that the German ships in Norway made no hostile move. Negotiations had also been in progress with the United States Navy for some of its submarines to be used in European waters. It had already been decided to send Subron50, consisting of the tender Beaver and six boats of the Gato-class. The original intention had been to base them at Londonderry for patrols in the Bay of Biscay. In the end this unit became absorbed into Operation 'Torch', and five of its submarines were used to co-operate with the Western Naval Task Force that sailed directly from America.

By the end of October, there were ten submarines in the Eighth Flotilla at Gibraltar, thirteen at Malta in the Tenth Flotilla and six at Beirut in the First Flotilla. There were five more submarines on their way to the Mediterranean from the United Kingdom, as well as the supply and Greek submarines mentioned above. Five submarines of the US Navy were also on their way across the Atlantic. The grand total was therefore forty-three. For Operation 'Torch' it had been decided to place all maritime operations in a wide area under the Allied Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force (Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham) who would answer to General Eisenhower, the Allied C-in-C. The area under his control not only included the western approaches to Gibraltar and Morocco, but also the Mediterranean as far as the Sicilian narrows. Submarine operations were to be controlled west of the longitude of 8 degrees east, which passes just west of Sardinia, by Captain(S) Eighth Flotilla at Gibraltar, and to the east of this longitude by Captain(S) Tenth Submarine Flotilla at Malta¹ who also controlled the area to the east as far as 19 degrees East which included most of the Ionian Sea, but for this he answered to the C-in-C Mediterranean in Alexandria. East of 19 degrees East was the business of Captain(S) First Submarine Flotilla at Beirut².

Two more submarines, lent from the First Flotilla, Parthian (Lieutenant MB St John RN) and Turbulent (Commander JW Linton DSO DSC RN), were placed southeast from Cavoli in Sardinia so further blocking the passage between Sicily and Sardinia. If the Italian Fleet should attempt to attack through the Sicilian narrows, this patrol line could be moved south and, in addition, there were a number of torpedo planes based in Malta. A feature of these dispositions was that the small U-class were stationed inshore where it was considered they could cope more effectively with the expected heavy enemy antisubmarine measures, and the larger submarines were stationed in the open sea where they might be able to surface and use their superior speed if they had to be redisposed. The French Fleet at Toulon was to be covered by three submarines from Gibraltar. These were P222 (Lieutenant Commander AJ Mackenzie RN), P51 (Lieutenant MLC Crawford DSC RN) and P217 (Lieutenant EJD Turner DSC RN), disposed close south of the port. As it was hoped that Admiral Darlan at Algiers might persuade these ships to join the Allies, the three submarines had orders to report, but not to attack any French warships that put to sea. On the Atlantic coast, the US Navy had provided its own covering force based on the modern battleship Massachusetts, which was more than able to deal with any opposition in this area. The submarine Herring (Lieutenant Commander RW Johnson USN) was, however, sent to patrol off Casablanca and Blackfish (Lieutenant Commander JJ Davidson USN) off Dakar in case the French cruisers in those places put to sea. It will be seen that not all of the available submarines were deployed at first and that a number were kept back in harbour as reliefs including three sent temporarily to the Tenth Flotilla from the First Flotilla at Beirut³.These submarines on their way to Malta were also used to run in supplies.

THE FIVE BRITISH SUBMARINES which were to lead in the landing forces at Oran and Algiers arrived in position several days before the landings were to take place. To avoid compromising the operation they had orders not to attack any ships below cruisers or U-boats and then only if they were in a good position and practically certain to hit. They were occupied making periscope reconnaissances of the beaches for the benefit of special pilot officers who were on board and who were to land with the amphibious forces. They also made closer reconnaissances by folbot. All went well except that Ursula and P221 were harassed by the presence of French fishing vessels, and on 4th November a sudden storm drove P221's folbot, which was on reconnaissance, out to sea. It was picked up, with its crew exhausted, by a French trawler and taken to Algiers where fortunately their cover story was believed, and the operation was not compromised. On the night of 6th/7th November, due to an error in staff work, one of the amphibious convoys for Algiers passed through P54's area, but fortunately without more than surprise on both sides. On the night of 7th/8th November, the five submarines took up their positions about five miles to seaward of the beaches to act as beacons. They were all successfully contacted by motor launches leading in the convoys and the pilots were transferred to them⁴. The folbots from the submarines having taken up their positions close in to the beaches to signal in the landing craft, the submarines themselves withdrew. They made their way to seawards to allow unrestricted anti-submarine operations to begin in the amphibious areas.

On the coast of Morocco, the three American submarines also arrived on station a few days before the landings. They had slightly more flexible orders and were allowed to attack enemy vessels provided that the accomplishment of their primary mission was not thereby jeopardised. They also made periscope reconnaissances of the beaches and disembarkation ports, and took still and motion pictures too. An important part of their duty was to report the weather especially the swell on the beaches that was known to be bad on four days out of five. On 6th November they reported a heavy swell but on 7th the sea was calm and the swell moderate. When acting as beacons off the coast, infra-red lamps were used but the destroyer Rowe, sent ahead of the Northern Attack Forces could not find Shad. Fortunately Rowe was fitted with SG radar and. she pressed on in and established her position with it only finding Shad on her way out to meet the convoy. Shad had no opportunity to transfer her photographs to the landing force. Gunnel off Fedhala was successfully contacted in her beacon position by the destroyer Boyle but subsequently met an American cruiser at close range and submerged for the rest of the day. At Safi, Barb had special orders to report the surf and outlying rocks and to send in a rubber boat with scouts to establish a beacon off the breakwater. Unfortunately she released the rubber boat too far out to sea and it arrived exhausted and too late to be of use. The enemy also fired on it.

Herring off Casablanca was not able to attack the French ships that sortied as soon as it was light. They turned close along the coast towards the landings at Fedhala and were intercepted by the American covering and bombarding forces. Herring then sank the Vichy Ville de Havre of 5083 tons, but it is difficult to understand what this achieved at a time when the Allies were trying to get the French to come over to their side. Far to the south, Blackfish, off Dakar, detected no movement of the surface forces there. Next day she attacked a Vichy convoy off Point Alemadies and probably damaged a ship and the counter attack proved ineffective. Shad, Gunnel, Herring and Barb were then withdrawn from the coast to form a patrol line between Madeira and the coast of Africa to protect the landings from the French ships at Dakar, Blackfish remaining off the port. On 14th November all five submarines were ordered to proceed to the Clyde where their tender Beaver was waiting for them at Rosneath. All the submarines, which had left New London on l9th/20th October, had engine trouble. Gunnel broke down off the coast of Spain and was reduced to a speed of five knots. She was, however, found by a British escort vessel and brought into Falmouth.

On 9th November, German aircraft landed in Tunisia and on 11th the first convoy of two transports escorted by five destroyers sailed for Tunisia, arriving at Bizerta next day. The convoy carried a thousand Italian soldiers and 1800 tons of ammunition, equipment and supplies. On 11th too, a British brigade was landed at Bougie, and next day British commandos and parachute troops arrived at Bone, the intention being to forestall the Axis forces arriving in Tunisia. At noon on 11th November the Naval Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force issued orders for all the submarines under his command to be re-disposed to cut the Axis communications from Italy to Bizerta, Tunis and the east Tunisian ports. He also indicated that it was no longer necessary to guard against the movement of the Italian Fleet from Taranto to the westwards. Captain(S) Ten then broke up the concentration of submarines north and south of the Straits of Messina, and the patrol lines between Sardinia and Sicily. Utmost and P46 were already returning to Malta having expended all their torpedoes. P211 and P212 were ordered to transit the Sicilian narrows to the Gulf of Hammamet and a position off Kerkenah respectively, while Una and P44 were recalled to Malta. The remaining submarines, Parthian, P37, P43, P247, P221, P45 and P48 were re-disposed between Palermo and Bizerta. Orders were issued that only southbound supply ships were to be attacked, and that warships and northbound ships were to be left alone. P35, who had commandos on board, was ordered to land them to disrupt the railway line in the Gulf of Euphemia as troops for Tunisia might well be using it. Turbulent, from the south east coast of Sardinia was ordered to the Naples area.

No sooner had these orders been issued than the three Littorio-class battleships left Taranto with their escorting vessels for Naples, proceeding at moderate speed to save fuel. It was twenty-four hours before air reconnaissance established that they had left Taranto, by which time they were approaching the Straits of Messina. As we have seen, Una had also been recalled to Malta and only P35, north of the Straits, was able to get into an intercepting position. She sighted the battle squadron and fired four torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards allowing for a speed of 29 knots, which the revolutions counted by asdic, seemed to confirm. The speed was actually 16 knots and all the torpedoes missed far ahead. It does not seem that the enemy even realised that they had been attacked and the screen made no counter attack. There was, however, one more chance; Turbulent was closing Naples from the southwest. However, the Italian battleships increased speed and passed ten miles ahead of her during the night and entered Naples safely.

With the Axis landings in Tunisia and the collapse of French resistance on 10th November, the whole strategic situation changed. From an amphibious operation to establish Allied forces in North Africa, it became a race to Tunisia to get there first if possible and if not, to get there in greater numbers and throw the enemy forces out. On 11th November as well, the Germans invaded Unoccupied France and the Italians landed in Corsica. With Admiral Darlan at Algiers, invitations were sent to the French Fleet to join the Allies and it was no longer considered a threat to the North African landings. On 14th November the patrols south of Toulon were abandoned. Little had happened in this area. P51 was depth charged by a patrol on 13th but otherwise it was quiet. P228, Sturgeon and Tribune, which had relieved P51 and P222, were ordered south to the Naples area to blockade the Italian battlefleet that had arrived there⁷.

THE WHOLE SUBMARINE FORCE had now, therefore, returned to the work it had been doing for two years and resumed its war of attrition against Axis shipping. The geography of the campaign had, however, changed substantially. The main enemy traffic now passed from ports in the Tyrrhenian Sea direct to Tunisia and the old route by Messina was no longer used. The Eighth Army had broken out at El Alamein on 4th November and the Axis forces were in full retreat. They were pursued across the Egyptian frontier on 11th November and by the 13th the British entered Tobruk unopposed. All the enemy traffic by sea to Cyrenaica then ceased and only a trickle of supplies for the Axis armies arrived through Tripoli. Already by 11th November, the submarines of the covering forces had been released by their operation orders from the restrictions on what targets they could engage. P44 (Lieutenant TE Barlow RN), north of Marittimo on that day, made a submerged attack on a small merchant vessel and although the range was only 900 yards and she fired two torpedoes, she missed. Turbulent (Commander JW Linton DSO DSC RN) when still southeast of Sardinia and before she moved to Naples, sighted a naval auxiliary northbound for Cagliari. She fired two torpedoes at a range of 1800 yards hitting her aft with one of them and sinking her. This was Benghazi of 1554 tons, an ex Danish ship converted by the Germans into a U-boat depot ship and carrying forty torpedoes as well as other valuable stores and spare gear. Next day, P45 (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) sighted an Italian U-boat but her adversary dived before she could get into a position to attack.

The main scene of operations now became the area between the west end of Sicily and the north coast of Tunis and it was here that the enemy concentrated their air and surface anti-submarine forces. The passage could be made in a single night and this was often when the submarines were trying to re-charge their batteries on the surface. To increase their problems, the weather always seems have been bad in November with poor visibility and heavy seas. Although the cryptographers had given us the positions of the minefields, there was a southerly current which pushed the submarines towards the Sicilian mine barrier and there were few navigational marks to help except off the coasts of Sicily and Tunisia. This area, a rectangle about 100 miles long and 20 miles wide between Marittimo and the Cani Rocks could be entered from Malta at either the Cape Bon end, or the Sicilian end. Captain Simpson was apprehensive about sending his submarines in and decided that only the agile U-class were likely to survive a patrol there. What was worse was that there was no direction in which to withdraw if the opposition was found to be too strong. On 17th November, Utmost (Lieutenant JWD Coombe RN) was sent to Cape Bon to patrol off Bizerta. She then worked her way northeastwards along the rectangle and on 23rd reported that she had expended all her torpedoes, that one attack had been successful and that she was returning to Malta. It seems from post war research that she attacked and missed the minelayer Barletta escorted by the torpedo boat Ardente on that day. On the morning of the 25th she was sighted by an aircraft and bombed north west of Marittimo and this attack was followed up by the torpedo boat Groppo, who was escorting another convoy. She was sunk with all hands including her Commanding Officer, three other officers and 29 men⁸.

WE MUST NOW TURN to study what had been happening in the eastern Mediterranean during the North African landings. When the Eighth Army opened its offensive on 23rd October, it will be recalled that most of the submarines, which had been attacking the Axis supply lines, had been withdrawn to prepare for the landings in French North Africa. Only five were actually on patrol and two of these, P35 and P212 in the Ionian Sea were soon on their way back to Malta. This left Taku, Traveller and Thrasher working in the southern Aegean. Traveller and Thrasher too were back in Beirut by the end of October leaving only Taku on station. The Greek submarine Nereus (Plotarkhis A Rallis) made a short patrol off Rhodes at the end of October and landed a party with stores on Euboea on 3rd November. On 1st November, Taku was ordered that only southbound tankers and ships of over 5000 tons were to be attacked, and that no attacks were to be made after dawn on 4th November. These restrictions were lifted on 8th November after the landings in North Africa. Clyde and Rorqual, as we have already noted, ran supplies, which included the all-important submarine torpedoes, into Malta arriving early in November. Traveller, Porpoise and Rorqual were lent to the Tenth Flotilla as well as Turbulent and Parthian. Only Taku and two Greek submarines were then left in the eastern Mediterranean.

The attack on the Axis communications during the twelve days struggle at El Alamein was, of course, of great importance and it was fortunate that, with the submarine campaign virtually at a standstill in the area, that the RAF were able to do conspicuously well. In this period they were able to sink a tanker and four ships carrying cased petrol to Cyrenaica that contributed greatly to the enemy's defeat. Taku (Lieutenant AJW Pitt RN) did her best to help, and had sunk Arca already mentioned on 26th October. She also attacked a naval auxiliary on 8th November firing a single torpedo from almost right astern at a range of 1100 yards, which missed.

On 20th November, the Eighth Army entered Benghazi and practically the whole of Cyrenaica with its airfields fell into British hands. On 21st, British and US forces of the First Army made contact with the Germans who had landed, at Medjez el Bab, about thirty miles west of Tunis. The rival forces in Tunisia were of about the same size, that is of two divisions and the build up, and so the attack on the Axis sea communications was therefore of the utmost importance. The enemy supply lines from the Aegean and west coast of Greece to Cyrenaica were, of course, no longer in use and the maritime arena stretched from the Tyrrhenian Sea by the west end of Sicily to Tunisia and to a small extent, on to Tripoli. Small coasting vessels were also trying to get supplies forward to Rommel's army along the coast from Tripoli. On 21st November, too, the Admiralty, at the request of the Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force extended the 'Sink at Sight' zone to include practically the whole Mediterranean except, of course, Turkish territorial waters and an area off the Spanish coast to allow trade to develop between Spain and Algiers in the future.

On 20th November, a much-needed convoy from the east reached Malta safely⁹ and this was followed by a number of other ships. The island at the time had only a few days' supplies remaining and this may be taken as the end of Malta's long siege. Over the period of nearly two and a half years, the island had been sustained by ten Malta convoys and by supplies brought in by a few warships¹⁰. Altogether submarines made twenty-two storing runs. They began in August, 1940 when Pandora and Proteus had brought in material and maintenance personnel from Gibraltar for the Hurricane fighters. Store carrying started in earnest in May 1941, with the arrival of Cachalot from the United Kingdom and thereafter no opportunity was missed to use any submarines visiting the island to carry mail and personnel, as well as the all important submarine torpedoes. The minelaying submarines were probably the most useful as they could carry cargo in place of their mines, but Clyde carried most when she landed one of her battery sections and could take over 100 tons of ammunition or stores, as well as a similar weight of fuel in her tanks. The large submarines of the O, P and R- classes were valuable too. Clyde made four trips, and Rorqual and Cachalot three. The total amount of cargo landed by submarines must have been over 4000 tons including at least 300 torpedoes. Small though this may seem (it could have been loaded into a single merchant ship) it was valuable and was transported at a time when it was desperately needed and could not be carried in any other way. Three submarines were lost on these duties; Cachalot on her way back to Alexandria sunk by a torpedo boat, Pandora bombed in harbour, and Olympus mined off Valetta.

On 20th November there were sixteen submarines on patrol in the central Mediterranean. Tribune, Sturgeon and P228 were off Naples or in the Tyrrhenian Sea, while P54 and Ursula had just left Gibraltar for the Genoa area. Una, P42, Utmost and P221 were north of Tunis and off Marittimo while P247 was in the vicinity of Lampedusa. P212 was north of Tripoli and P44 and P46 had arrived in the Gulf of Sirte to relieve P211, Turbulent and Porpoise. On 20th, P228 (Lieutenant ILM McGeoch RN) when fifteen miles south west of Naples, fired a full salvo of six torpedoes at an Italian U-boat but the range was 3500 yards and she missed, probably under estimating the speed. She had now expended all her bow torpedoes and only had a single torpedo left in her stern tube. This she expended on an Italian destroyer escorting a convoy that passed her at 700 yards. A hit was obtained on this target, which was Velite, but she was only damaged and was towed in to harbour. On 22nd, on her way back to Gibraltar, P228 sighted a convoy and reported it by wireless. The RAF attacked it and the supply ship Luigi Favorita of 3576 tons was damaged. Having no torpedoes left, P228 sank her by gunfire. Her adventures were still not at an end and P228 was attacked but fortunately missed by a U-boat when on her way home. On 18th, P44 (Lieutenant TE Barlow RN) arrived in the western end of the Gulf of Sirte. She was told to investigate Burat el Sun where a supply dump was being built up for Rommel's retreating army by coasters and U-boats. Almost at once on 21st, P44 sighted a U-boat and fired a full salvo of four torpedoes at a range of 2600 yards, but the speed was badly over estimated and she missed ahead. This U-boat was definitely running supplies to Rommel's army that on 23rd turned at El Agheila to try and make a stand. P44 tried to attack the same U-boat again at night in Burat harbour but ran aground. After refloating herself, P44 engaged a schooner also in the harbour with her gun and obtained twelve hits before her gun jammed. Finally on 23rd, P44 made a night attack with her gun on some small ships which, however, turned out to be anti-aircraft barges. Her gun jammed again and she had to dive and was depth charged by an E-boat after hitting the bottom at 200 feet. On the same day off the north coast of Sicily, P42 (Lieutenant ACG Mars RN) attacked a convoy of two merchant ships with four torpedoes at a range of 2000 yards. Although the targets were overlapping, she fired on the swing and missed. P42 was then harassed by anti-submarine vessels and bombed by aircraft. On her way back to Malta she followed a new route heading directly from the Skerki Bank for Pantellaria along the enemy convoy route.

WE MUST NOW TURN to the introduction of a new weapon into the Mediterranean theatre. Even before the failure of the attack on Tirpitz by Chariots in late October, it had been decided that the best area in which to deploy them was the Mediterranean. The cold water in winter in Norway meant that they could only be used in summer and the distances from the sea of the German Fleet bases in such places as Trondheim and Alten Fjord were too great for Chariots to dive in all the way to attack. The use of the fishing boat Arthur solved the problem in October, but this method was now compromised and could not be used again. The best way to take Chariots to their objectives was obviously that used by the Italians, which is to carry them there in large submarines. It had therefore been decided that the attacks on Tirpitz, important though they were strategically, must be left to X-craft and that the Chariots should be used against the Italian battle fleet in the Mediterranean. These practical problems were not the only reason for this decision. There were important strategic reasons too. The weakness of the Royal Navy in capital ships in the Mediterranean, which we have already studied, was the most urgent and originally it was hoped to destroy the Italian battleships before the landings in North Africa, but in spite of intense efforts, this was not possible. The Chariots, although the same diameter as a torpedo, had large breakwaters behind which the drivers sat and which prevented them from being washed off and these made them too large to go down a submarines' torpedo hatch and be carried inside. Pressure tight cylinders, several feet in diameter and nearly twenty feet long, had therefore to be clamped on to the casing of the submarine, each carrying one Chariot. The submarine Trooper was fitted with three of these cylinders, one forward and two aft and P311 and Thunderbolt with two. To launch the Chariots, the submarine had to surface, open hatches to open up the cylinders to extract the Chariots that would then be floated off with the divers in control. Apart from such a hazardous launching procedure in which the submarine had to lie stopped with hatches open, and many men on deck in dangerous waters, the existence of the cylinders rendered the submarines vulnerable. They substantially increased the silhouette and made the submarines difficult to handle submerged and seriously decreased their seaworthiness on the surface. The submarines fitted to carry chariots could not therefore be used for normal offensive patrols while the cylinders were on board. In spite of these disadvantages, P311, Trooper and Thunderbolt arrived in the Mediterranean in late November with a detachment of nine chariots under the command of Commander GM Sladen DSO RN and all went on to Malta. A single chariot for trials had already been transported from Gibraltar to Malta in a container on board P247 during October. The plan was to mount an attack on the three modern Italian battleships in Taranto, but before much progress had been made these three ships sailed for Naples. Nevertheless it was decided to go ahead with the preliminary reconnaissance in case they returned there. On 28th November, Traveller (Lieutenant Commander DSt Clair Ford RN) left Malta for this purpose. Traveller never returned and was lost with all hands and it is probable that she struck a mine near Taranto. She went down with her Commanding Officer¹¹, five other officers and 59 men including some chariot personnel. Whatever the cause of her loss, the employment of the chariots was now in some doubt.

IT WAS DURING THIS PERIOD, when studying the operation orders for 'Torch' that the Prime Minister (The Right Hon Winston S Churchill PC MP) took exception to submarines being numbered rather than named. In a minute to the First Lord in early November he expressed his opinion that all new and existing submarines now known by 'P' numbers should be named. To the Admiralty's protests that it would be difficult to find enough names, especially beginning with 'U', he offered to help with his dictionary. The Prime Minister felt that names instead of numbers were important for morale. There is little doubt that submarine crews in general preferred names, although it must be admitted that the numbering of submarines throughout the First World War posed no problems and numbers such as Horton's E9 and Nasmith's E11 assumed an identity. It was, perhaps, the use of the signal pennant numbers such as P311 for our latest T-class submarine that upset the Prime Minister. In any case he was going to have his way and he was hastening the Admiralty on the subject in December.

IN DECEMBER, BOTH SIDES PREPARED to renew the conflict with vigour. Already at the end of November, the Royal Navy had established surface striking forces both at Malta and Bone to attack the Axis traffic. The air striking forces at Malta were increased and Motor Torpedo Boats were sent to the island. At the same time aircraft from Cyrenaica as well as from Algeria could now reach the area. With the loss of only one submarine in November and the arrival from Home waters of Tigris, submarine strength had been maintained. Although control of the Tenth Flotilla at Malta had reverted from the Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force to the C-in-C Mediterranean on 15th November, its submarines were wholly employed against the Axis traffic to North Africa and the First Flotilla at Beirut continued to lend boats to Malta for this purpose. With the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon on 27th November, moreover, the Eighth Flotilla was relieved of this anxiety. When, after a heavy air raid on Naples by Liberators of the Ninth US Air Force from Egypt, in which the cruiser Attendolo was sunk and other ships damaged, the Italian Fleet moved to La Spezia and Maddalena, allowing the submarines to concentrate on the Tunisian route without distraction.

On 10th December, Captain(S) Eighth Submarine Flotilla with the depot ship Maidstone, moved from Gibraltar to Algiers. This advanced the base over 400 miles closer to the operational areas and greatly decreased time spent by submarines on passage. He also took over operational responsibility for the whole western basin up to the line Sicily to Cape Bon. He still answered for this area to the Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force. The eastern basin remained under Captains(S) Ten and One at Malta and Beirut, both of whom now came under C-in-C Mediterranean. The system of command, however, remained flexible and submarines operated across the lines of responsibility when necessary and were lent from one flotilla to another as required. In December the armies in Tunisia became literally bogged down with heavy rain and mud after a desperate effort to take Tunis in the middle of the month. In Libya, the Eighth Army had dislodged the enemy from the position at El Agheiba but at the end of the year was held up by another position 230 miles east of Tripoli at Buerat. Supplies and reinforcements were the key to success on both fronts and the campaign against enemy shipping across the Mediterranean was still of vital importance.

The Italian Navy was badly shaken by the destruction of a whole convoy by Force Q early in December and decided that in future all troops that went by sea rather than air, should cross at night in destroyers at high speed. The bombing of the harbours in Sicily forced them to use departure ports for their convoys farther north, such as Naples and Leghorn, with correspondingly lengthened voyages. The Allied domination of the air in the central Mediterranean also forced them to use submarines to run supplies across especially to Tripolitania. The Italians felt that the convoy route to Tunisia was fairly well protected on its southeast side by the existing minefields in the Sicilian narrows. They now started to reinforce the fields on the northwest side and this work was mostly done at night by cruisers and destroyers as well as by the minelayer Barletta.

The general disposition of the Allied submarines remained the same for the rest of December. In the Naples-Genoa area, except for one short period, strength on patrol varied from one to four boats. P54, P42, Rorqual, Turbulent, P222 and P247 all visited this area. Submarines from Malta operated south west of Sicily and in the Gulf of Tunis. P44, Ursula, P51, P48 and P37 worked here. The Malta submarines also patrolled on the east coast of Tunisia and on the coast of Tripoli. P211, Una, P46, P212 and P45 were employed in these areas. Finally Taku visited the Aegean from Beirut.

P222 left Gibraltar on 30th November to patrol off Naples. She had cause to make a signal on 7th December and was sighted by P247 on 10th, but was not heard of again. Post war research reveals that she was sunk by depth charges dropped by the Italian torpedo boat Fortunale when attacking a convoy south east of Capri. She was lost with all hands including her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander AJ Mackenzie RN, three other officers and forty-two men. On 13th December, P35 (Lieutenant SLC Maydon RN) off Sousse fired two torpedoes at a small ship escorted by aircraft at a range of 1800 yards but missed. She had another chance an hour later and this time hit Macedonia of 2875 tons with a single torpedo fired at 1100 yards. With a deck cargo of motor transport she sank in shallow water. An hour or so later, P35 tried to finish her off while she had a torpedo boat alongside. The single torpedo, however, fired at 4100 yards ran wide of the mark.

On 14th, an important convoy of three ships escorted by two torpedo boats and by aircraft began to cross from Sicily to Tunisia. There were three submarines in its path in the 'rectangle' and P228 (Lieutenant ILM McGeoch RN), north of Cape Bon, sighted the enemy first. She found herself between the columns of the convoy and fired four torpedoes from her bow tubes at one ship at 1000 yards and one torpedo from her stern tube at another. She went deep at once and heard explosions but there was no counter attack. She had, in fact, hit and sunk Sant Antioca of 5048 tons, which was carrying munitions, and she blew up. The surviving two ships of the convoy with its escorts went on south and three hours later was sighted by both P212 (Lieutenant JH Bromage DSC RN) and P46 (Lieutenant JS Stevens DSC RN), who seem to have got rather close to each other. At 1350, P212 fired five torpedoes at a range of 1900 yards and hit and sank Honestas of 4960 tons. The torpedoes that missed ran close to P46 who heard them pass. P46 fired three torpedoes at 1800 yards at the surviving ship hitting her amidships and stopping her. Two hours later she was able to fire a single torpedo at 6000 yards, sinking this ship too, which was Castelverde of 6665 tons. By this series of submerged attacks, the last two being an unintentional but very effective pack attack, the whole convoy of three valuable ships on their way to Tunisia, was destroyed. Next day, P46 attacked another southbound convoy consisting of a tanker and a merchant ship. She fired four torpedoes at 4000 yards and claimed to have damaged the tanker. She was skillfully counter attacked by one of the escort who dropped sixty-five depth charges over a period of five hours causing damage, which fortunately was not serious. P46 was able to break contact and get away after dark.

Away in the Aegean, Taku (Lieutenant A.JW Pitt RN), after passing through the Kaso Strait, sank Delfin of 5322 tons escorted by an armed yacht off the north coast of Crete. The range was 750 yards and she used two torpedoes. The counter attack was accurate and heavy but she escaped undamaged. The 14th December was therefore a red-letter day for our submarines who sank four ships of well over 20,000 tons. P54 (Lieutenant J Whitton RN), off Genoa, however, did not share the good marksmanship or good luck of her colleagues. During the afternoon of 14th December, she fired four torpedoes at a barge ship at a range of 2500 yards and missed with all of them.

However, an eventful patrol having made a reconnaissance of Leros, being sighted by patrol craft and hunted for thirty-six hours on l7th-l8th December. On 20th she landed Greek agents on Skiathos and on 22nd engaged a large caique by gunfire and left her abandoned and on fire. The same day she bombarded Port Kumi hitting a small merchant ship, some caiques and some warehouses. On 28th December, early in the morning, Ursula (Lieutenant RB Lakin DSC RN) off Marittimo encountered a large steamer escorted by two destroyers. She got into a submerged firing position at a range of 700 yards in moonlight and launched three torpedoes all of which hit and sank Gran of 4140 tons, an ex Norwegian ship in German hands. Ursula then moved on to Cape St Vito and on 30th made another submerged moonlight attack on a convoy of three ships escorted by four destroyers. She got too close and was run down by one of the merchant ships damaging both her periscopes and standards. She decided not to attempt a transit of the Sicilian mine barrage without any periscopes, and headed for Algiers instead of Malta where she arrived safely. The day before, the 29th December, three submarines made attacks. P45 (Lieutenant HB Turner RN) in the Kerkenah-Kuriat area had already engaged a large southbound schooner accompanied by two small craft in moonlight off Mahedia with her gun. The enemy returned the fire, killing one of the gun's crew and the action had to be broken off. Early on 29th a southbound merchant ship was sighted and four torpedoes were fired at 800 yards from submerged in the moonlight. The torpedoes missed probably because of an underestimation of range and allowing for too high a speed. A counter attack followed from one of her escorts but was shaken off. On 31st also in the Mahedia area she made another submerged moonlight attack on the three masted Maddalena of 345 tons. She had intended to fire two torpedoes but the periscope was dipped after launching the first. Nevertheless this torpedo hit at a range of 1500 yards and sank the target, two survivors being picked up.

On 27th, P211 (Commander B Bryant DSC RN), who was out again off the Tripolitanian coast at Zuara, destroyed the schooner Elenora Rosa carrying 100 tons of petrol to Tripoli. She blew up after five rounds and burned out. On 29th soon after daylight, P211 sighted a ship but it went into Zuara. It left again at dusk and P211 pursued all night, getting into position for a dawn attack. Four E-boats and an aircraft by now escorted the ship.

P211 fired three torpedoes at a range of 4000 yards from the quarter and was bombed by the air escort as she fired, shaking her up considerably but one of the torpedoes hit and sank Torquato Gennari of 1012 tons. This pursuit and attack extended over a period of 27½ hours after which P211 returned to Malta. This eventful patrol had also included a search for a crashed aviator off Pantellaria, a plan to blow up a railway line near Sousse and being hunted by five torpedo boats. Finally on this same day, Turbulent (Commander JW Linton DSO DSC RN) off Cavoli in Sardinia fired two torpedoes at 1300 yards at an escorted ship of medium size. One of them hit and sank Marie of 5290 tons, which was a very satisfactory conclusion to the 1942 submarine campaign in the Mediterranean.

The results of the submarine offensive in December were a great improvement on the previous month. There were fifty attacks in which 135 torpedoes were fired and together with two minefields and a number of gun actions they sank a destroyer, a submarine and fourteen ships of 47,770 tons. Another destroyer and two ships of 5710 tons were damaged, one of 2422 tons was shared with other forces and four small vessels of 1277 tons were also disposed of. Other forces also did well, aircraft sinking another ten ships of 37,055 tons, while three surface ships of 8,058 tons and another three of 10,761 tons were shared. On 14th December, Rommel's tanks, out of fuel, had come to a standstill for a time in the desert. For the second half of the month little got through to Tripoli, and the port was virtually closed. Nevertheless enough got through to continue the build up in Tunisia and prevent the total collapse of the Axis army in Libya. Fuel and supplies totalling 58,763 tons got across to Tunisia with a loss of 23% but only 6151 tons with a loss of 52% arrived in Libya. This was the first month of what the Italian Official Naval Historian has called the 'Third Battle of the Convoys', which was to prove the hardest fought and most bitter of the three.

Although submarines sank a greater tonnage during December than in October, the marksmanship, in fact, was not so good. The percentage of successful attacks against merchant ships in October was 48% while in December it was only 34%. It was, however, far better than in November which worked out at 22%. During November and December, five Allied submarines were lost in the Mediterranean¹⁵. Four of these were sunk by depth charges dropped by enemy torpedo boats or anti-submarine vessels and the fifth by a mine.

THE POINT HAS NOW BEEN REACHED when it is appropriate to summarise and comment upon the part played by Allied submarines in Operation 'Torch'. The thirty-two British submarines of the total Allied force of forty-three gathered together for Operation 'Torch' represented the largest number yet concentrated by them during the war in one theatre for a single operation. In the three roles in which they were employed in assisting the amphibious forces, that is for clandestine operations, for beach reconnaissance and as beacons, they proved of mixed value. British submarines had plenty of experience in minor landings in the Mediterranean and were able to put General Mark Clark ashore in Algeria successfully and retrieve General Giraud from the south of France. It would have been difficult to succeed in these operations using any other method than the submarine. The C-in-C of Combined Operations in the United Kingdom had developed the important function of beach reconnaissance in the form of Combined Operations Pilotage Parties (COPPs). These parties were to be landed in folbots to obtain details of the beaches but were not used to the full extent as there was no time to do so. As already pointed out it really needed to be done in the planning stage of an operation when deciding where and when to land. This function clearly had a future.