The Atlantic,
Home Waters and North Russia: June - December 1941
References
Patrolgram
8 S/M War Patrols in Home waters and Atlantic - second half
1941.
Map 18 British submarines in North
Russia Aug-Dec 1941
Map 19 Third and fourth 'Iron Rings'
Dec 1941
WITH THE SINKING
OF BISMARCK in late May, the strategic situation in Home
waters was that the German surface fleet was divided into two
groups with Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz
Eugen at Brest and the newly completed Tirpitz with
Lutzow, Scheer and Hipper in German Baltic
ports. With the arrival of the Prinz Eugen at Brest in
early June, there were no German warship raiders left at large.
Both these groups constituted 'fleets in being' and steps had
to be taken to try to intercept any units which put to sea.
There were also four German armed merchant raiders at large
on the oceans and a number of supply ships were in support of
them. Furthermore the German U-boat campaign had taken a serious
turn. A hundred U-boats were now in existence and our merchant
ship casualties rose sharply during May. The U-boats were doing
their best to extend their range of operations by using supply
ships and thirty of our merchant ships were sunk as far south
as Freetown. Enemy coastal traffic in the Bay of Biscay consisted
of some iron ore ships plying between Bilbao and Bayonne and
a few small blockade-runners to Spain and Portugal. There was
a trickle of large blockade-runners mostly from South America,
but some from Japan. In the Channel most of the traffic was
for military purposes and was irregular. On the Norwegian coast,
iron ore traffic was important although not so important as
in winter when the Baltic was frozen. At all times of the year
there was traffic to supply the German armies in North Norway.
On both the Norwegian coast and in the Bay of Biscay, therefore,
there was a strong case to maintain effective submarine patrols
to watch for sorties by the German heavy units, to wage a war
of attrition on U-boats, blockade runners and enemy supply ships
as well as to interdict the enemy iron ore and military traffic
along the coasts. The Admiralty, however, held to their directive
that the Mediterranean was the primary theatre for our submarines
and continued to send all reinforcements to that area. Strength
on the Home station was reduced to a single flotilla of a size
that could no longer look after both the Norwegian coast and
the Bay of Biscay at the same time. With the short summer nights
in northern latitudes and the memory of painful casualties and
little to show for it during the mid summer of 1940, the decision
where to use them was not difficult to make. VA(S) chose the
Bay of Biscay for operations and decided virtually to abandon
the Norwegian coast until the end of August. It was, however,
decided to keep a submarine at Lerwick at short notice for sea,
for use should sufficient warning be received of any movement
of enemy heavy units.
The need for
submarines for reconnaissance to detect enemy main units putting
to sea had, in fact, decreased. This was because Intelligence
had improved substantially. Not only were the cryptographers
reading the German naval as well as air force ciphers regularly
and with little delay, but there were more photo-reconnaissance
aircraft available which were of longer range1.
It was also easier to set up a spy network in the French bases
than in Germany. As a result the positions of the German main
units were normally known and checked regularly in Norway, in
the Baltic and in the Bay of Biscay. Signal Intelligence, however,
seldom gave the whole picture and only very rarely revealed
enemy intentions. The reason was that it could do nothing about
written orders sent by courier or signals transmitted by landline.
The Bay of
Biscay therefore became the principal area of operations during
the summer in Home waters. In mid June there were four submarines
on patrol there, which were Trident,
Tuna,
Sokol and Seawolf.
Rubis (Lieutenant de Vaisseau H Rousselot) had just returned
from the same area where she had been sent to intercept raiders.
In bad weather on 8th June, however, her helm jammed at 25 degrees
to starboard. She had to proceed in circles for two days and
nights until the weather moderated and it was possible to make
repairs. It was difficult to keep four submarines on patrol
especially after the departure of two submarines for North Russia
as will be related shortly. Numbers on patrol fell to three
and later only two. This was a pity as in the second half of
June, Kota Pinano, Ermland and Spichern,
which had been at sea to support Bismarck, all reached
France. Three blockade-runners, the Italian Atlanta and
Todoro and the German Regensburg also got into
Biscay ports at this time. The patrols themselves were not particularly
eventful. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz
Eugen were, in fact, damaged and under repair for most of
this period. Sealion
(Commander B Bryant DSC RN) found an Admiralty Fleet Order that
encouraged the destruction of fishing vessels in enemy hands
and in July sank a French tunny fisher and picked up the crew.
She sank another and then a steam trawler and had twenty-six
survivors on board. Some of these she transferred to another
trawler. VA(S) did not agree with these attacks as they compromised
the positions of the submarines and no more took place, although
supplies continued to be sent to the French Resistance. On 5th
July Tigris
(Commander HF Bone DSO DSC RN) fired six torpedoes at an Italian
U-boat escorted by two trawlers. The range was 3000 yards and
she thought she had hit at the time, but subsequent research
does not support this. On 9th July Tuna
(Lieutenant Commander MK Cavenagh-Mainwaring DSO RN) was
bombed by an RAF aircraft, fortunately without damage and next
day gained contact with a U-boat on asdic. She fired a single
torpedo at 500 yards with a depth setting of 32 feet but without
result and two hours later heard the U-boat using its diesel
engines. She fired another torpedo also without result. Later
on during her patrol, on 19th July, she sighted a large merchant
ship sixty miles west of the Gironde. Destroyers escorted her
and Tuna
fired a salvo of six torpedoes, but the range was some 6000
yards and again there was no result. On 15th July Sokol
(Kapitan B Karnicki) also missed a large ship west of the Ille
de Yeu.
On 21st July,
Coastal Command aircraft reported that Scharnhorst
in Brest was probably ready for sea. On the very next day
she was found to have sailed. We had Tuna,
Sokol and Trident
on patrol in the Bay at the time but they saw nothing. On
23rd, Coastal Command found her again in La Pallice. She was
heavily attacked by aircraft of both Bomber and Coastal Commands,
and was seriously damaged. On 24th she returned to Brest with
3000 tons of floodwater on board and went straight into dock.
By the end of July the number of submarines available for
the Biscay patrol had fallen to four, (Tuna,
Sealion,
Seawolf
and Sokol). Seawolf
(Lieutenant RP Raikes RN) missed U562
off Lorient in a snap attack on 30th July although
the range was 2500 yards and she expended a full salvo of
six torpedoes.
It was after
the return of Minerve from patrol at the beginning
of June that the Norwegian coast was abandoned for the mid
summer months. On 10th June, signal intelligence reported
the movement of a heavy German unit northwards. P31
(Lieutenant JBdeB Kershaw RN) was at once sent from Lerwick
to patrol midway between the Shetlands and Norway. Three days
later, Coastal Command aircraft sighted Lutzow outward
bound in the Skagerrak. An aircraft strike torpedoed her but
she got back to Kiel under her own power. Nevertheless a sortie
onto the trade routes was prevented and she was out of action
until January 1942. Subsequently P31
and Minerve, instead of remaining at short notice
in Lerwick, were used for anti U-boat patrols north east of
the Faeroes. Here they were still available if there was a
sortie by enemy heavy ships, and they had a chance to catch
a U-boat too.
After the
sinking of Bismarck, the escort of convoys by submarines
from Gibraltar continued for another three months. The exact
state of the German ships in Brest was not known and it had
to be assumed that they were able to come out and raid commerce.
The escort of convoys from Halifax, on the other hand, ceased.
The U-boat campaign had spread westwards across the Atlantic
and anti-submarine escorts began working from Iceland and
Canada. At the end of May, anti-submarine vessels escorted
HX129 right across the Atlantic. As there were no known warship
raiders at sea, submarines as escorts were less welcome and
tended to get in the way more than they had when the anti-submarine
escorts only brought them half way across. In mid-June, our
cryptographers revealed that a supply U-boat was to be in
a position about a thousand miles east of New York and south
east of the Newfoundland Banks. Thunderbolt (Lieutenant
Commander DB Crouch DSO RN) was sent out from Halifax to intercept.
On 18th June she sighted a U-boat but in a westerly gale.
She nevertheless fired a salvo of six torpedoes but two tubes
misfired, one torpedo running hot in its tube. The range was
4500 yards and it was doubtful if the torpedoes could keep
their depth in such a sea. They all missed, although two more
torpedoes were fired later and the U-boat, which was U557,
dived and was not seen again. Early in July, the Second Submarine
Flotilla at Halifax was disbanded. Forth
was used to support escort vessels, and the last two submarines,
Talisman
and Thunderbolt, were sailed for the Mediterranean.
In May, the
Eighth Flotilla submarines, as we have seen, began to be used
in the Mediterranean. By the end of the month the Netherlands
submarines 021, 023 and 024 started patrols
in the western basin and Pandora,
Severn
and Clyde
were kept to escort Gibraltar convoys. The two River-class
submarines, apart from their size, were not considered suitable
for the Mediterranean, as they could not dive deeper than
250 feet. However, there was a change of heart and both made
a Mediterranean patrol in June. The Sierra Leone convoys now
had continuous escort, SL81 being the first during July. The
Admiralty then decided that Severn
and Clyde
should be used for Atlantic patrols in areas formerly occupied
by French submarines. Clyde
patrolled off the Cape Verde islands at the end of June and
early in July, and off Cape Finisterre later in July. At the
end of July, Severn
escorted HG69 home from Gibraltar. On 31st July the convoy
was diverted to avoid a U-boat concentration and Severn
was detached to carry out an anti U-boat patrol in the vicinity
of the Seine Bank off the coast of Africa. On the night of
6th/7th August a U-boat was sighted on the surface in rough
weather. Four torpedoes were fired but those missed, so two
more were fired, one of which hit and sank the Italian submarine
Bianchi. On passage back to Gibraltar, Severn
sighted a German U-boat on 9th August but she dived before
an attack could be made. Clyde
escorted HG7O home in September and this was the last Gibraltar
convoy to have a submarine escort. In September, Clyde
was despatched to Freetown to give some much-needed anti-submarine
training to the escorts stationed there. She was ordered to
patrol off the Canary Islands on the way, and arrived off
Teneriffe on 24th. Almost at once she was ordered to proceed
with all despatch to Tarrafal Bay in the Cape Verde Islands
where signal intelligence indicated that U-boats were about
to refuel. Clyde
made the passage at 17.5 knots, which was her highest reliable
continuous speed, arriving on 27th September. She dived into
Tarrafal Bay and surfaced after moonset. At 0030 she sighted
U68 leaving the anchorage but before she could turn
to fire she saw U111 on her port beam. She turned towards
U111 to ram and engage with her gun, but her quarry
dived and she passed over her. U68 was then pursued
and six torpedoes fired after her. U68 saw the tracks
and dived and escaped. Clyde
then dived too and unsuccessfully attempted to regain contact
by asdic. She also reloaded her torpedo tubes. Clyde
then surfaced to charge and after an hour sighted a third
U-boat, U67, surfacing close by. Both submarines tried
to ram each other and U67 hit Clyde
right aft causing minor damage. Both submarines then dived
and there were no further contacts. The three U-boats had
met to transfer torpedoes from U111 to U68 and
a sick man from U67 to U111. U67 was damaged
and had to return to base. Clyde
(Commander DC Ingram DSC RN) then returned to Gibraltar.
On 22nd June,
Germany invaded Soviet Russia and the maritime situation in
Home waters changed again. The Admiralty were keen to find out
how best they could co-operate with the Russian Northern Fleet
and Rear Admiral Vian was sent to find out. He reported that
the Russians were worried about the build up of the German Army
in North Norway and Finland through the ports of Kirkenes and
Petsamo, and were afraid that the enemy would soon be strong
enough to advance and capture Murmansk. The Russians wanted
attacks to be mounted on the sea supply route up the Norwegian
coast. At the end of July, the Home Fleet aircraft carriers
Victorious and Furious struck at Petsamo and Kirkenes
but the results were disappointing and the losses of aircraft
serious. It was clear that the Luftwaffe was strong in the area
and that submarines were probably the best way to attack the
traffic in spite of the constant daylight. It was therefore
decided to send two submarines north straight away and to base
them at Polyarnoe2.
Tigris
left for the North on 26th July and Trident
was recalled from patrol in the Bay of Biscay and left on 1st
August.
A Senior British
Naval Officer with a submarine staff officer had been appointed
to North Russia and arrived before the two submarines. In consultation
with the Russian C-in-C Northern Fleet they decided upon patrol
areas and other matters necessary for operations. The submarine
force of the Soviet Northern Fleet had a strength of fifteen
boats. It was organised as a 'brigade' of three divisions under
Captain 1st Class NI Vinogradov. The first division consisted
of two large submarines of the K-class and one older boat. The
K-class were of 1000 tons with a speed of 18 knots and mounted
ten torpedo tubes. They were also capable of laying mines. The
second division was composed of six boats of the Shchuka-class
of 800 tons and six torpedo tubes and they were equivalent to
the British S-class.
The third division had six boats of the small coastal M-class
of 200 tons with two torpedo tubes. It had already been decided
to reinforce the Northern Fleet submarines and eight boats were
under orders to proceed from the Baltic to Archangel by the
White Sea Canal. They arrived at intervals between September
and November. Four of the reinforcements were of the large K-class
and the rest of medium size. On the outbreak of war, four of
the Russian submarines were sent to patrol off the north coast
of Norway and five were kept back in defensive positions to
protect the evacuation of the bulk of the civilian population
from Murmansk and to support the Russian XIV Army. The XIV Army
was defending Murmansk against the German XIX Mountain Corps,
which attacked at the end of June. The Russian submarines kept
up their patrols on the north coast of Norway and up to early
August had made four torpedo attacks, which had all missed.
They also made an attempt to penetrate into Petsamo. The German
opposition in the area now consisted of five large destroyers
based at Kirkenes as well as a flotilla of UJ-boats. Two German
U-boats were also sent to patrol off Murmansk, and the Luftwaffe
from their air bases at Banak and Bardufoss covered the whole
area.
Tigris
arrived on 4th August and was escorted in by a Russian destroyer.
Trident
met another escort and arrived in Polyarnoe on 10th August.
It was decided that Tigris
(Commander HF Bone DSO DSC RN) should patrol off Porshanger
Fjord with special interest in Mageroy Strait and she sailed
on 11th August. The weather was glassy calm with variable visibility
and daylight was constant, She sighted two German destroyers
in Svaerholthaven on 13th August and went on to Breisund. She
had to be careful because of air patrols and a large number
of shore lookout posts. Some ships were sighted in Breisund
but attacking conditions were impossible so she returned to
Svaerholthaven. Here on 17th she fired four torpedoes at a range
of 4500 yards and, in spite of a gyro failure, hit and sank
the westbound Haakon Jarl of 1482 tons. There was considerable
anti-submarine activity during the next two days. Trident
(Commander GM Sladen DSO RN) left Polyarnoe for patrol off Soroy
on 16th August. Diving in between Hjelmsoy and Ingoy on 19th
she fired two torpedoes at Levante of 4789 tons but missed.
She then surfaced and opened fire with her gun obtaining five
hits before she had to dive because of the return fire and the
fire of a shore battery. On 21st August she attacked the German
minelayer Bremse in Kvaenangen Fjord with four torpedoes
at a range of 1500 yards and inexplicably missed again. Three
hours later she fired two more torpedoes also at a range of
1500 yards at the Norwegian tanker Tripp and missed yet
again. Next day she had better luck in an attack on a convoy
of four ships escorted by two trawlers. She fired six torpedoes
at a range of 600 yards and obtained three hits on Ostpreussen
of 3030 tons and sank her. A counter attack of nine depth
charges was ineffective. On 24th she sighted Bremse again
but she passed out of range. On 30th August she saw a low flying
aircraft which was found to be escorting a convoy of four ships
west of Silsden with two destroyers and two trawlers, She fired
her last two torpedoes aimed individually at two of the ships,
hitting and sinking the troopship Dona II of 2938 tons
with considerable loss of life. She also sank Bahia Lanca
of 2581 tons. Trident
then suffered a forty-six-charge counter attack from which she
emerged unscathed. On her way back to Polyarnoe she sighted
a U-boat on the surface and gave chase hoping to engage with
her gun. The U-boat, which was U566, saw her and dived
and fired torpedoes at Trident,
which missed. On 12th September the Russian submarines scored
their first success when Shch 422 sank Ottar Jarl
of 1459 tons off Tanafjord. Two days earlier K2 laid
the first of a number of minefields and this was off Vardo.
On her second
patrol, Tigris
sank Richard With of 905 tons in Breisund. This was
on 13th September with two torpedoes at a range of 1500 yards.
Four days later she missed a ship in convoy when she fired
four torpedoes at the very long range of 8000 yards. In Trident's
second patrol, she fired three torpedoes at the small merchant
ship Weser escorted by a destroyer and an R-boat off
Rolsvoy. This was on 23rd and, hampered by the presence of
an aircraft, and with a range of 5000 yards, she missed. On
27th also off Rolsvoy she fired six torpedoes at a merchant
ship escorted by trawlers. The range was 4000 yards and she
missed the target, but hit and sank one of the escorts, which
was UJ1201. In the counter attack Trident
suffered minor damage. Finally on 30th she fired her last
three torpedoes at a large merchant ship escorted by two R-boats.
Fortunately the range was very long (7000 yards) and she missed
since this was the hospital ship Brika. On return to
harbour, Trident
noted that the enemy were using more escorts than before and
that they used the dark hours, which with the onset of winter,
were becoming longer and made attacks more difficult.
When Tigris
sailed for her third patrol on 6th October, she had only ten
torpedoes on board. Supplies were expected in the first of
the North Russian convoys but this did not arrive at Archangel
until 10th October. Tigris
patrolled off Svaerholthaven and on 11th October she attacked
a convoy of three ships with an escort of four trawlers. She
fired four torpedoes at a range of 3000 yards. It was snowing
and although she claimed hits at the time, the attack was
unsuccessful. On 14th, two more merchant ships were sighted
escorted by a destroyer and three minesweepers. She lost trim
and 'missed the DA' and one torpedo was fired in error, without
result. Later the same day she attacked two more merchant
ships with a trawler escort firing first three, and then four,
torpedoes. She claimed to have hit one ship at a range of
1500 yards and that the second ship at a range of 4000 yards
had taken avoiding action. In fact she missed them both. This
was Tigris'
last patrol in North Russia and she returned to the United
Kingdom on 10th October. Trident
left for her third and last patrol that was off Svaerholthaven,
on 16th October after completing repairs from her depth charge
attack. She was only carrying twelve torpedoes and on 3rd
November, she fired three of them at a small merchant vessel
in Porsanger Fjord. This was at a range of 2500 yards but
she hit and sank her target. This was Flottbeck of
1950 tons. Shortly afterwards two more torpedoes were fired
and these hit and sank the anti-submarine vessel UJ-1213.
Next day she fired four torpedoes at long range (6000 yards)
at another small merchant vessel without success and finally
made a night surface attack with three torpedoes at long range
too (6500 yards) but she was seen by the escort and damaged
in a counter attack and the torpedoes missed. Trident
sailed for home waters on 15th November, Sealion
and Seawolf
having arrived at Polyarnoe to take her place.
In this mini-campaign
Tigris
and Trident
made eighteen attacks firing 62 torpedoes and sinking the
anti-submarine vessels UJ-1213 and UJ-1201 and
six ships of 18,839 tons and damaging another of 4769 tons.
It can hardly be claimed that such results 'saved' Murmansk,
but the sinkings seriously worried the German naval command.
They first attributed the casualties to the Russians, and
at one time believed it unsafe for ships to round the North
Cape. They sent for the 12th Anti-submarine Flotilla from
the Bay of Biscay to reinforce the area, and opened up a new
line of supply by the Baltic and overland through Finland.
It was, of course, the Red Army that defended Murmansk, but
the British submarines helped substantially. An additional
bonus was that the Russian submarines learnt from them, and
their efficiency was increased. This diversion of strength
from the Bay of Biscay therefore proved well worthwhile and,
considering that operations began in constant daylight, they
were fortunate to be conducted without any casualties. During
this period the Russian submarines were active and the K-class
laid a number of minefields and the smaller submarines landed
agents. M176, when trying to penetrate into Kirkenes
ran into nets but survived. There were many missed attacks
but on 17th October, Shch 402 sank Vesteraalen
of 602 tons in Soroysund. Russian submarine mines sank Bessheim
of 1774 tons.
By the middle
of August, there was sufficient darkness to resume patrols
off the Norwegian coast. The Netherlands O14 (Luitenant
ter zee 1e K1 G Quint) led the way and took up position off
Kors Fjord but she had a blank patrol, all the traffic passing
in Indreled behind the islands. She also reported that there
did not appear to be any air or surface patrols on the Norwegian
coast. The Free French Rubis (Lieutenant de Vaisseau
H Rousselot) followed a day or two later and laid mines off
Josing Fjord. The minefield was half laid when she sighted
a small southbound tanker and attempted an attack but a torpedo
ran hot in her rotating deck tube and it failed. Fortunately
the enemy did not detect her. After completing her lay, she
attacked two merchant ships with her two bow torpedo tubes,
both of which hit a Finnish ship of 4360 tons. The torpedo
explosions damaged Rubis herself and split open a number
of battery cells. She lost control and after being on the
bottom for five hours managed to surface with a fifty-degree
bow up angle. The battery gas forced the crew on to the upper
deck but she was able to get a wireless signal through to
tell of her plight. She was forty miles off the Norwegian
coast and fortunately the enemy did not locate her. On 23rd
August, she managed to get her engines going and made contact
with surface forces sent out to her assistance. She arrived
at Dundee on 25th under her own power. Rubis' mines
accounted for one small steamer, Cito of 124 tons.
O14 and Rubis were followed by Minerve
(Lieutenant de Vaisseau PM Sonneville), who took up position
off Utvaer. She had a blank patrol and her Commanding Officer
strongly advocated patrolling inside the Fjords, which was
where the traffic was to be found. A severe shortage of operational
submarines in Home waters, however, meant that the taking
of undue risks could not be allowed.
At the end
of August, signal intelligence revealed that Scheer was
about to sail from the Baltic. On 11th September the RAF found
that she had left Kiel. There were no submarines off the Norwegian
coast at the time and O14 was at once sailed to patrol
off Utsire. Scheer was then found to be in Oslo Fjord
and Bomber Command attacked her there. On 18th September she
was located again back in Germany at Swinemunde. O14
had an uneventful patrol in very bad weather. She was relieved
by Minerve, who left Lerwick on 10th September to patrol
off Utvaer. Her orders were to attack enemy warships and northbound
merchant vessels. Sighting nothing off the coast, Minerve
entered Bue Fjord and on 21st September she attacked, but
missed, a small merchant ship. On 28th September she entered
Frosjoen Fjord and sighted three 250 ton U-boats. The narrow
waters made an attack impossible. Minerve returned the
next day but there were no targets to be seen and she set course
back to Lerwick according to her orders. Both Minerve
and O14 sailed for patrol again on 17th October, Minerve
for the Obrestadt area and O14 to the south of Stattlandet.
Both these patrol positions were where the enemy traffic had
to come out to sea. On 25th, Minerve sighted a large
merchant ship but was unable to get in an attack and this was
repeated three days later. On 29th, however, she fired torpedoes
at a small Norwegian tanker but they missed. A convoy was sighted
on 31st October which she was unable to attack and on 27th she
returned to Lerwick. The weather in both these patrols was very
bad and both submarines subsequently needed extensive repairs.
Minerve broke down at the start of her next patrol, and
both she and O14 ended up in dockyard hands.
There had
fortunately been no submarine losses due to enemy action in
Home waters during the summer but on 19th July the new submarine
Umpire,
on passage with convoy EC4 off the Wash, broke down and dropped
astern. She was rammed and sunk by an escort of convoy FS44
coming the other way. Her Captain, Lieutenant MRG Wingfield
RN and fourteen men were rescued but two other officers and
fourteen men were drowned. Such a loss could be ill afforded
at this time when the numbers of operational submarines in Home
waters were low.
Meanwhile
the submarines for the Bay of Biscay had fallen to two. Sokol
had been sent to the Mediterranean and Tuna
was under repair leaving only Sealion
and Seawolf
to watch the German squadron in Brest. Both these submarines
carried out a patrol in the Bay during September. Sealion
(Lieutenant GR Colvin RN) supplied the Resistance and exchanged
agents with a fishing vessel off Penmarch on 16th and then patrolled
off the Loire and the Isle de Yeu. She sighted a large escorted
merchant ship but was unable to attack due to bad visibility
and a navigational alteration of course by the enemy. Seawolf
(Lieutenant RP Raikes RN) encountered a U-boat but was unable
to get into an attacking position. When she left patrol, both
Seawolf
and Sealion
were withdrawn to relieve Tigris
and Trident
in North Russia. From 3rd October, there were no submarines
on patrol in the inner Bay of Biscay for over a month. It was
fortunate that the enemy battle cruisers were being kept immobilised
by the RAF during this time. Even so the blockade-runner Annalis
Essberger from Japan got in to Bordeaux safely.
At the end
of October and in November, three submarines did working up
patrols off the Bay of Biscay. P36
patrolled some 400 miles west of Lands End from 24th October
to 7th November, an area that was safe from enemy anti-submarine
measures but gave a chance of sighting a U-boat. Una
patrolled 150 miles west of Bordeaux from 4th-20th November
and P38
relieved P36
and patrolled from 7th-23rd November, These patrols were uneventful
except that P36
sighted a few trawlers and P38
lost an officer overboard in bad weather. The minelayer
Rorqual
had returned from the Mediterranean to refit early in November
and as Devonport Dockyard was not ready to take her, she was
used to lay 50 mines off La Rochelle on 18th and 19th November,
This field sank the French trawler Coligny of 600 tons.
On her way back, Rorqual
was attacked at night by a U-boat, the torpedoes narrowly missing
her. P36
(Lieutenant HN Edmonds RN), now fully worked up and operational,
patrolled off Belleisle in late November. She sighted a U-boat
on 26th and missed with two torpedoes from fine on the quarter.
The range was 3000 yards and she lost trim in the heavy swell
and 'missed the DA'. Next day she met a fishing vessel for a
transfer of petrol and stores for the French Resistance. Una
(Lieutenant DSR Martin RN), on her way to the Mediterranean,
made a short anti U-boat patrol between 11th and 14th December
but without result. When she resumed her passage, however, a
U-boat attacked her in heavy weather, the torpedoes just missing
her astern. Throughout this period a number of our submarines
passed through the Bay on their way to and from the Mediterranean
and would have been available to patrol there in emergency.
Porpoise,
Trusty,
Thorn,
Proteus,
P34
and Sokol passed southbound and Taku
and O23 as well as Rorqual
northbound.
During the
autumn, Coastal Command of the RAF had been planning what came
to be known as the 'Bay Offensive'. This consisted of
patrols in the Bay of Biscay with radar fitted aircraft to sink
U-boats on passage. Clearly the presence of our submarines with
their bombing restrictions interfered seriously with such an
operation. On 2nd December, VA(S) agreed to keep our submarines
clear of practically the whole Bay of Biscay for six nights
on either side of full moon, which the aircraft needed to see
their target. For the rest of the time, submarines could use
the area but were always to be submerged by day. This increased
the time on passage for submarines proceeding to and from the
Mediterranean but greatly helped Coastal Command. Any disadvantage
to the submarines was to a certain extent mitigated by the probability
that the German heavy ships would not try to break out in periods
of full moon.
Sealion
and Seawolf
arrived in Polyarnoe early in November. By this time conditions
in the area were very different; it was now getting cold and
there was plenty of darkness, and in December only a few hours
of daylight. Furthermore Russian submarine strength had been
increased by the reinforcements from the Baltic, and they
were able to do more. There were now twenty-three boats in
the Russian Northern Fleet and in September they had operated
as far round as the Vestfjord, and had claimed to have sunk
five ships. Tigris
and Trident,
on relief by the two S-class received a signal of congratulation
for their exploits from the Admiralty. Sealion
(Lieutenant GR Colvin RN) sailed from Polyarnoe for the Svaerholthaven
area on 12th November, and missed a small convoy with a torpedo
at a range of 5-6000 yards on 15th, the target being difficult
to see against the land. Three days later she fired two torpedoes
at a small tanker at 6-800 yards but missed again. She then
surfaced and sank the target by gunfire, which was Vesco
of Bergen of 331 tons with a cargo of benzene for Kirkenes.
Sealion
took two prisoners and returned to Polyarnoe to land them
as one was badly wounded. Seawolf
(Lieutenant RP Raikes RN) sailed to patrol in Syltefjord
and on 21st started a night surface attack on a four-ship
convoy. The main battery fuses blew just as she was about
to fire and caused some confusion. She managed, however, to
get away four torpedoes on a late track but at long range
(5 - 6000 yards) and they missed. The next night she sighted
a stopped tanker, 6400 yards away and fired two torpedoes,
which, although claimed to have hit at the time, actually
missed. On 24th she sighted a four-ship convoy at night that
was westbound and, after a chase, fired four torpedoes at
a range of 4000 yards sinking Bahia of 4117 tons. A
fifth torpedo was fired in error and had a gyro failure and
she had an anxious few moments avoiding it. Sealion
left for her second patrol on 2nd December and on the 5th
torpedoed and sank the merchant ship Island of 683
tons off Nordkyn. This was a day-submerged attack at a range
of 900 yards with a salvo of three. The Germans claimed to
have sunk Sealion
in a counter attack, and this caused some anxiety but she
was not even damaged. Seawolf
left Polyarnoe again on 5th December in very cold weather
for the Bassfjord area. She attacked a convoy on 12th December
with six torpedoes fired in two groups at ranges of 600 and
2000 yards but they all ran under. When returning to Polyarnoe
on 19th she was machine-gunned by a Ju88 aircraft. Sturgeon
(Lieutenant MRG Wingfield RN) arrived in Polyarnoe on 11th
January but by this time it had been decided to leave the
area to the Russians. Sealion
had already left on 21st December for a patrol in the Vestfjord
on her way back to the Holy Loch. Soon after, Seawolf
left to patrol in the Vestfjord and in Fro Havet on her way
back too. Sturgeon
was also withdrawn soon after her arrival.
By now the
Russian submarines were having slightly better results. On
9th December the enemy lent a hand and U134 scored
an 'own goal' by sinking Steinbek of 2184 tons off
Tanafjord. Russian submarine mines sank UJ1110 and
two small ships but K3 was forced to the surface in
a counter attack by three UJ-boats. K3 opened fire
with her gun sinking UJI708 and the other two UJ-boats
only mounted small arms and K3 escaped. On 21st December,
M174 sank Emshorn of 4301 tons off Vardo.
On the Norwegian
coast in November, intelligence supported the belief that
Scheer was about to sortie for commerce raiding and
that she was likely to take supply vessels with her. The only
submarine that was available was P35
(Lieutenant SLC Maydon RN), which had completed her trials
and work-up and was ready for her working up patrol. Instead
of being sent to a 'safe' area for anti U-boat purposes, she
was despatched to patrol off Utvaer with orders to attack
and report enemy cruisers and above, and any merchant ships
with them. She was on patrol from 4th-14th November but sighted
nothing. Trident
(Commander GM Sladen DSO RN), who had left Polyarnoe on 15th
November to patrol off the North Cape on her way back to the
United Kingdom, was ordered to take up a position south west
of Stattlandet instead. Almost at once, however, the scare
subsided and the submarines on the Norwegian coast became
involved in Commando operations that were being planned in
the area. Tuna
(Lieutenant MBSt John RN) had already left the Holy Loch on
12th November to investigate radar and navigational marks
in the Vestfjord area. She was restricted by orders not to
attack anything smaller than a cruiser. She was bombed by
German aircraft on 18th November and later the same day she
was ordered to cancel her radar reconnaissance and patrol
off Utvaer as part of the operations to intercept Scheer.
She already however, had gained useful information. Tigris
(Commander HF Bone DSO DSC RN) after resting from her exertions
in North Russia, took part in the first Commando operation
known as 'Anklet'. This was intended as a landing to interfere
with the enemy's communications with North Norway. Tigris
made the necessary reconnaissances and on 25th December acted
as a radio beacon off Skomvaer to lead in the surface forces.
After the operation she patrolled off Utvaer. At the same
time a second Commando operation took place south of Stattlandet
at Vaagso (Operation 'Archery'). In this Tuna
acted as a radio beacon to lead in the raid, which was most
successful.
On 15th December,
when there were no submarines on patrol in the inner Bay of
Biscay and the only submarines in the vicinity were on passage
to and from the Mediterranean4,
or in a working up patrol well out to sea5,
intelligence revealed that a sortie by the whole German squadron
in Brest was likely. Prinz Eugen had undocked on the
14th December and Scharnhorst was due to undock on
16th and Gneisenau on 21st. All these ships were believed
to be fully repaired and it was a moonless period suitable
for a sortie. Bomber Command renewed its attacks both by day
and night but it was considered essential for the submarine
command to take energetic measures to prevent a breakout as
well. All submarine and anti-submarine training was stopped
and every available submarine was ordered to the Bay. The
intention was to form another 'iron ring' by stationing the
submarines on the arc of a circle 300 miles out from Brest
so as to catch the enemy in daylight presuming that he would
sail as soon as it was dark.
Altogether
fifteen submarines wore mustered. Nine were training submarines,
which were Oberon,
Otway,
H28,
H31, H33, H34,
H43, H50 and the Netherlands O10. Two
were working up, P39
and the French Junon: O21 was on passage back
from the Mediterranean; H32
had just completed a refit at Sheerness and P36
was at Portsmouth having just finished a patrol in the Bay.
Ursula,
returning from the Mediterranean, had been diverted to an anti
U-boat patrol off Alboran Island, was also sailed for the Bay
but Regent,
also returning from the Mediterranean, had few torpedoes on
board and she was allowed to proceed on her way. The plan was
to have nine of these submarines in position by 21st December
and another four by 22nd, but Oberon
had defects in her pressure hull and had to return to Rothesay,
and H43
and H34
developed other defects and had to put in to Yarmouth. The 'iron
ring' began to form on 19th and by the 21st consisted of (from
north to south) H31.
O10. H50,
H28, H33, P39.
Otway,
O21 and Ursula.
The submarines P38
and H32
from Portsmouth took up positions off Cherbourg in case
the enemy were to proceed up the Channel. Scarcely was the 'iron
ring' established when air reconnaissance of Brest showed all
three ships in their usual refitting berths and it was surmised
that they were not yet ready for sea. The submarines were therefore
recalled to Falmouth where they were to remain at short notice.
P36
and P39
were ordered to continue their passage to the Mediterranean
and Ursula,
P38
and H32
were sent into Portsmouth. The Netherlands submarines
O21 and O10 went to Milford Haven where they were
joined by O9. One submarine did not return. This was
H31,
which had not been seen since her escort off Lands End released
her on 19th. The cause of her loss is unknown, although it is
possible that she hit a drifting British mine laid as a submarine
trap off the Little Sole Bank in March. She was lost with all
hands including her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant FB Gibbs
RN, three other officers and 29 men.
Before many
days had passed, however, opinions began to alter again. It
was realized that if the heavy attacks made by Bomber Command
on the ships had not damaged them, then they were likely to
drive them out of Brest to seek somewhere safer. On 24th December,
H28,
H32 and H43 sailed for patrol again, followed
next day by H33
and Otway,
and the day after that by H34,
Junon and O10. O21, O9 and H50
were temporarily out of action. The patrol positions had now
been changed and were on an arc some 150 miles from Brest. This
was because it was now a period of full moon and it would be
possible to make night attacks. The aim of the submarines was
to attack and report enemy cruisers and above, and to attack
U-boats.
On 29th, when
a large merchant ship was reported to have left Bordeaux on
a westerly course, the aim was altered to attack all enemy ships.
Nothing, however, was seen.
If Bomber
Command had failed to damage Scharnhorst, Gneisenau
and Prinz Eugen, then the submarines would clearly have
to stay on guard. If not, then the demands of training, both
pro and anti-submarine, must be listened to. The risk of losing
these elderly submarines with inexperienced crews must also
be weighed and the wear and tear on them taken into consideration.
At the time, opinion was that the three enemy ships had suffered
further damage and that the prospect of a sortie had been put
back. By the end of the year, therefore, it was decided to withdraw
all the submarine patrols and resume training. We now know that
the enemy ships were, in fact, undamaged.
DURING THE
SECOND HALF OF 1941, therefore, there was an urgent need for
submarines in Home waters to watch for sorties by the heavy
German ships and the other important purposes already noted.
At least three times as many operational boats could have been
usefully employed than were actually available. The reason for
the shortage was, of course, the Admiralty's adherence to the
policy that the Mediterranean had priority. At this point, however,
it is expedient to review the total strength of the British
and Allied submarine fleets and to comment on their size for
the duty they were required to perform.
Of the fifty-seven
boats that comprised the British submarine fleet at the beginning
of the war in September 1939, twenty-seven, or roughly half,
had been lost by the end of 1941. Of the survivors, seven were
refitting, twelve were used for training and only eleven of
the pre-war boats were still employed in operations. During
the same period, another thirty-nine boats had been completed
by the building yards, twelve of which were already under construction
in September 1939 and the rest had been ordered since. Of these,
another nine had already been lost, two were refitting and twenty-eight
were available for operations. There was a third category and
that included one captured from the Germans and the addition
of twenty eight other submarines from countries over-run by
Germany in Europe. These consisted of nine Netherlands, eight
French, two Polish, one Norwegian, five Greek and one Yugoslav.
Five of these had been lost on operations under British operational
control; nine were refitting, five were used for training; five
had had to be relegated to reserve as unfit for use altogether,
leaving only six for operations. The U-boat captured was U570,
renamed Graph6
in British service and now being refitted to carry out first-of-class
trials, and later to be used for operations. Two were American,
P551 (ex S25) and P511 (ex R3) acquired under
lease lend from the United States Navy. The rest remained under
their national flags but were operated, paid for and maintained
by the Royal Navy. It was not expected that this group would
yield any more operational submarines. Difficulties in obtaining
spare parts, torpedoes and ether equipment were considerable,
and it was clearly going to be more economical to turn over
some of our new construction to Netherlands, French, Greek,
Polish and Norwegian crews. Already Urchin,
renamed Sokol, and P551 renamed Jastrzab,
were manned by the Polish Navy, and P41
renamed Uredd by the Norwegian Navy.
By the end
of 1941 there were no less than ninety-two submarines in various
stages of construction. These ranged from Trooper
and Traveller
nearing completion to others only just laid down. Thirty were
due to complete within a year. The T-class, the 1940 S-class
and the U-class were ordered in roughly equal numbers but
the five new minelayers ordered earlier in the year were cancelled.
The four peacetime submarine building yards at Vickers of
Barrow, Cammell Lairds of Birkenhead and Scotts of Greenock
with Chatham Dockyard were all in full production. In addition,
Vickers had started building submarines at their yard on the
Tyne, and both Portsmouth and Devonport Dockyards had accepted
some orders. Since before the war, Vickers had been building
four submarines or their own design for Turkey and the last
two, which were nearly completed, were taken over for the
Royal Navy as P614 and P6157.
It had been hoped that some submarines might also be built
in the USA for the Royal Navy under Lend Lease. America, however,
had no spare capacity at this time and was only prepared to
turn over some of its older submarines, but after the first
two they were reluctant, with their entry into the war, to
turn over any more. Nevertheless negotiations continued into
1942. Since March 1941, however, the Americans were prepared
to refit our submarines, and several had already taken advantage
of this facility, which greatly eased the pressure on our
own repair yards.
The number
of British and Allied operational submarines at the end of
1941 was therefore forty-three. Of these twenty-nine were
in the Mediterranean, twelve were in Home waters and two had
just left for the Far East8.
In Home waters the number of submarines available was quite
insufficient if the German main units were to be watched for
constantly on both the Norwegian coast and in the Bay of Biscay.
More boats still were required for anti U-boat patrols and
in North Russia. In the Far East the Japanese had attacked
and we had no submarines operational on the station at all.
It was only in the Mediterranean, to which we had given priority,
that numbers in any way matched the task. A case could be
made therefore for a submarine fleet of double the size that
we had at the end of 1941. To achieve this, resources in shipbuilding
and manpower would have had to be taken from some other arm
such as convoy escorts, destroyers, heavy ships, landing craft
or merchant shipping and all of these could make similar claims
for expansion. The number of submarines we possessed at this
time were probably a fair share of the country's resources,
and it is unlikely that any great expansion of the fleet could
have been achieved without unacceptable cuts elsewhere and
without an overall fall in efficiency.
Apart from
the minor campaign in North Russia by Tigris
and Trident,
followed by Sealion
and Seawolf,
submarines in Home waters during the second half of 1941,
were able to make only comparatively few attacks on the enemy.
In all forty-two torpedoes were fired by British submarines
and less than a dozen by Polish and French boats. Rorqual
and Rubis laid a total of eighty-two mines. Altogether
eleven torpedo attacks were executed, seven of which were
on U-boats and the other four on merchant ships. The results
were meagre; the Italian U-boat Bianchi was sunk and
a 4000-ton French ship damaged. Two small vessels were sunk
by the mines. Most of the attacks on U-boats were at long
range or in bad weather. The period was, however, one in which
we only lost two submarines in Home waters and the enemy destroyed
neither of these. U-boat torpedoes however, narrowly missed
two submarines.
Decorations
awarded for this period were a Distinguished Service Order
for Commander Sladen of Trident
and a Bar to the DSC for Commander Bone of Tigris
for their exploits working from North Russia during the autumn
of 1941. Lieutenant de Vaisseau Rousselot of Rubis also
received a Bar to his DSC for his minelaying operations and
for bringing his damaged submarine home safely. The sinking
of the Italian submarine Bianchi by Lieutenant Commander
Campbell of Severn
was not recognised by any award as his attack was not thought
to have been successful at the time. Sadly he had been killed
in action in general service by the time the sinking was confirmed.
