Home
Waters to the End of the War in Europe
References
Patrolgram 27 War patrols in Home Waters
to the end of the War (1)(2)
Map 54 Home Waters to the end of
the War in Europe Aug 44 - April 45
Appendix
XV Organisation of Allied Submarines September 1944
ON 12TH SEPTEMBER
1944, Rear Admiral GE Creasy CB CBE DSO MVO hoisted his flag
as A(S) in place of Rear Admiral CB Barry, who had had to
relinquish the appointment a month earlier because of illness.
Rear Admiral Creasy was not a submarine specialist. He came
from the Headquarters of the Allied Naval Command of the Expeditionary
Force where he held the appointment of Chief of Staff during
the Normandy landings. Formerly he had been in the Admiralty
as the Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare at the height of
the Battle of the Atlantic. Previously he had commanded the
new battleship Duke Of York in the Home Fleet and before
that the First Destroyer Flotilla. He was of wide experience
in the service and an officer of outstanding ability destined
for high rank. The Submarine Command was indeed fortunate
to secure the services of this exceptional officer. Admiral
Creasy, on his arrival, found three Chief Staff Officers,
all submarine specialists, to assist him. Captain GBH Fawkes
CBE RN was Chief Staff Officer(Operations), Captain GC Phillips
DSO GM RN was Chief Staff Officer(Administration and Personnel)
and Captain JRS Brown RN was Chief Staff Officer(Material).
Rear Admiral
Creasy brought with him very definite ideas on the fundamental
purpose of the submarine branch in the Royal Navy. With his
experience of the Battle of the Atlantic he was certain that
the submarine was the greatest menace to our command of the
sea. He was, however, strongly opposed to the British abolitionist
policy in fashion after the First World War, and believed
that this would have been fatal to us if it had been adopted.
We would then probably not have developed asdic, or for that
matter, any other anti-submarine measures. He believed that
we should develop the submarine to the maximum, and should
be in the lead in this in the navies of the world. Our anti-submarine
methods would then have the most modern opposition against
which to develop. He was, in common with many officers experienced
in anti-submarine matters, critical of the British submarine
branch for failing, between the wars, to warn them of the
dangers of the night surface attacks and of the pack tactics
employed by the U-boats. He was far from happy with the views
of the staff of A(S), when intelligence of the 'schnorchel'
was first obtained, who poured cold water on it and referred
to it as a dangerous device for a submarine and nothing to
worry about!1 British
submarine development during the war had been confined mostly
to small changes found necessary during their operations.
No new type of submarine had as yet been put into service
and the three prewar T, S and U-classes had been mass-produced
and only slightly improved. The principal developments introduced
had been the wholesale silencing of machinery so that it could
not be picked up by hydrophones; the introduction of radar
and a slight increase in diving depth obtained by using welding
and higher-grade steel. A magnetic ground mine launched from
the torpedo tubes had been developed. There were also such
minor improvements as air conditioning, air purification,
flashless cordite for guns, the magnetic non-contact pistol
for torpedoes and the mine detecting unit for the asdic set.
All of this had been developed to help our submarines in their
operations against the Germans, Italians and Japanese, who
had only inferior asdic sets and low powered radar, neither
of which caused us very much concern. British submarine development,
as shown in the new A-class under construction, emulated the
submarines of the US Navy: it was to be a fast submarine on
the surface fitted with centimetric radar. The American submarine
tactics in the Pacific were basically the same as those used
by the Germans before 1943 in the Atlantic, but with the addition
of radar and very high frequency voice radio. They were proving
devastating against the Japanese. However they would not have
worked against our anti-submarine forces in the Atlantic.
They would have been defeated by radar in ships and aircraft
and by efficient asdic. This the Germans already knew and
they had embarked on a more radical stage of submarine development.
This was to produce boats that would counter radar by remaining
submerged continuously. This was first to be done by fitting
'schnorchel' to existing U-boats. The price, however, was
that they lost their surface mobility. Furthermore 'schnorchel'
did nothing to protect them against asdic and they became,
in fact, more vulnerable than before as they found it too
dangerous to attack on the surface at night, and so lost their
immunity from detection by asdic. To help against asdic they
had developed decoys to confuse the escorts, and homing torpedoes
with which to attack them.
The next stage
of German submarine development was more fundamental and that
was the design of the type XXI and type XXIII U-boats. In these,
submerged qualities were greatly increased at the expense of
surface qualities. In addition to an improved 'schnorchel',
they would have enlarged high capacity batteries and powerful
electric motors to give them a submerged speed of 16 knots or
so. This should render them practically immune to attack by
the slow sinking depth charge and would greatly decrease the
effectiveness of the new 'Squid' and 'Hedgehog' ahead throwing
weapons. These German plans had been revealed to us by the cryptographers2.
Intelligence also indicated that U-boats of even greater submerged
speed and endurance were being developed in Germany. These reports
caused great alarm in the Admiralty. If effective counter measures
were to be devised, fast, submerged submarines must be available
for experimental purposes and for training. They must be available
before the new German U-boats, which were known to be building
in quantity, came into service. The first suggestion was to
modify an S-class submarine to give a submerged speed of 12
knots. Seraph
had already been put in hand at high priority to be streamlined
and given high capacity batteries to meet this need. The second
important move was to fit a dummy 'schnorchel' to a training
submarine on which to practise attacks. Vulpine
was so fitted and these two measures received fresh impetus
from Rear Admiral Creasy, who also obtained Admiralty approval
to fit three British submarines with full workable 'schnorchels'.
He accepted that this device was not required operationally
at present, but it would be available for realistic trials with
anti-submarine devices and could be fitted to all operational
submarines should this become necessary.
Rear Admiral
Creasy did not at once propose any alterations to the main British
submarine building programme. The end of the campaign in the
Mediterranean provided a number of modern U-class submarines,
which were of too limited endurance for use in the Far East.
These were now available to replace most of the elderly pre-war
submarines now employed for training and allowed the older submarines,
which were becoming difficult to maintain, to be scrapped. There
were, however, a number of V-class still building which were
now surplus to requirements and some of these were transferred
to the French, Greek and Norwegian Navies and later to the Danish
Navy too. A problem of immediate concern to A(S) was the performance
of the CCR pistol for torpedoes. Meetings were held with the
Admiralty and the results analysed. At the end of 1944 it had
been reluctantly concluded that the number of premature explosions
were such that the non-contact setting, which detonated the
torpedo under the target with much greater effect than against
the side, could no longer be used. In future all torpedoes must
be set to hit and to fire on contact. There were many other
important issues for the new A(S) to decide, especially the
strength and logistics of the submarines in the Far East and
he decided he must visit the area as soon as possible.
THE STRATEGIC
SITUATION IN HOME WATERS when Rear Admiral Creasy took command
was that the Allied armies had broken out of the Normandy bridgehead
and had over run most of France. German garrisons were, however,
cut off in Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Lorient and Nantes. The German
U-boats had abandoned their French bases and had retired to
Norway or Germany itself. Most of them were now fitted with
'schnorchel' and they had begun their inshore campaign close
around the British Isles. The coastal route to north Norway
was now of increased importance to the Germans. Since the Finnish
armistice with the Soviets in September, they had to supply
an army of eight divisions fighting the Russians in the Far
North entirely by this route. The minelaying by Bomber Command
in the Baltic had caused the Swedes so many casualties that
they refused to let their ships go to German ports and so practically
all the iron ore had now to use the Norwegian coastal route
even in summer. Of the German main units, only the damaged Tirpitz
remained in Norway with four destroyers at Alten Fjord. Although
she was never expected to be fully operational again, our intelligence
believed that she would shortly be able to move at slow speed.
Tirpitz and five destroyers in fact made a short sortie
from Alten Fjord into the Arctic for exercises between 31st
July and 1st August. The other German main units were all in
the Baltic: the pocket battleship Scheer was at Kiel
and Lutzow at Swinemunde but the battle cruiser Gneisenau
was out of action at Gdynia. The cruisers Prinz Eugen, Hipper,
Leipzig, Koln, Nurnberg and Emden were all believed
to be ready for sea.
At the beginning
of September, when Rear Admiral Creasy took over, there were
six Allied submarines operational in Home waters but another
nineteen were doing trials and were working up and most of them
were to go to the Far East. Six submarines were employed on
submarine training and eighteen on anti-submarine training while
another twenty-four were refitting. The six operational submarines
were Sceptre,
Satyr,
Venturer
and Viking
and the French Rubis and the Norwegian Ula. Sceptre
was in the Third Submarine Flotilla in the Clyde and the others
in the Ninth Flotilla at Dundee. In August the nights became
long enough for submarines to patrol off the Norwegian coast
and it was decided to use the six operational submarines against
the German coastal traffic, while the working up patrols by
new and refitted submarines would continue to be for anti U-boat
purposes in the Shetlands area. Submarines, now that they had
been joined by other forces in the attack on the Norwegian coast
route, had become very much the junior partners for this task.
In addition to the intensive mining campaign in the Baltic by
Bomber Command, Coastal Command had now moved strong anti-shipping
striking forces north and Norwegian Motor Torpedo Boats were
now stationed in the Shetlands. The Home Fleet also made periodical
strikes and minelays with carrier borne naval aircraft and surface
ships. There were plenty of targets for all but there were also
problems in operating so many forces in the same area, especially
for Coastal Command and our submarines.
The first
submarine to return to the Norwegian coast was Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston DSC RN), who patrolled off Skudenes
between 18th and 27th August. On 20th she attacked a convoy
of four ships with three escorts firing five torpedoes at
a range of 2200 yards. There was no result except an ineffective
counter attack and she either missed or the CCR pistols failed
or prematured. Two days later off Egeroy she had another chance
and fired six torpedoes at a convoy of five ships with eight
escorts at a range of 2500 yards, but although explosions
were heard at approximately the right interval, these were
torpedoes hitting the cliffs. Satyr
was relieved by Viking
(Lieutenant R Bannar Martin DSC RN), who patrolled in the
Karmay and Lister area from 30th August to 5th September.
On 1st, she attacked a supply ship in convoy at a range of
5000 yards with four torpedoes with CCR pistols and heard
explosions at the right time but these must have been prematures
as the ship was not hit. On 4th, she sighted a large tanker
with six escorts and fired another salvo of four torpedoes
at 3000 yards with the same negative result. Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSC* RN), off Skudenes from 5th-16th
September, had better luck or was more skilful. On 11th she
fired a full salvo of four torpedoes, which hit and sank Vang
of 678 tons at a range of 1300 yards. Two days later she fired
another full salvo of four torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards,
hitting and sinking Force of 499 tons. Both ships had
escorts but their size was greatly over-estimated. These torpedoes
had CCR pistols but were set to run at a depth of eight feet
and may have exploded on contact. Nevertheless they did not
fire prematurely.
Allied convoys
to North Russia were started again in August and although
the Luftwaffe in Norway was much weaker than before, they
were still menaced by a strong force of U-boats. Tirpitz,
although by no means operational, was believed to be nearing
the stage where she would be able to move. It was, however,
thought that the few Allied operational submarines available
would be better employed against the coastal traffic in Norway
rather than to patrol off Alten Fjord to cover the convoy
against a sortie by Tirpitz. In any case the Soviet
submarines were active on the north coast of Norway. Four
boats were out in the second half of August and they made
four attacks. M201 sank the patrol vessel V6112
off Persfjord and S15 hit and damaged a ship of 5483
tons off the Nordkyn but she was towed in.
In September
it was decided to make another X-craft attack on the floating
dock in Bergen. X24, the same craft as before but under
a new Commanding Officer, was selected for this operation.
X24 (Lieutenant HP Westmacott DSC RN) left the Shetlands
on 7th September towed by Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSO DSC RN). On the passage, heavy
weather was encountered and an officer was lost overboard
from an X-craft and drowned. X24 was slipped off Feje
and entered Bergen successfully. She laid her charges under
the dock on the morning of 11th and withdrew without further
incident. That night she made contact with Sceptre
and was towed back to Balta Sound in the Shetlands. This perfectly
executed attack damaged the dock beyond repair and also seriously
damaged Sten of 1820 tons and Kong Oscar II
of 914 tons, which were alongside at the time.
It is appropriate
here to note what the future plans were for X-craft at this
time. During 1944 it seemed clear that the best targets for
X-craft were the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy in the Far
East. The depot ship Bonaventure
(Captain WR Fell OBE RN) was already available to carry six
X-craft and to maintain them and was capable of giving them
a worldwide strategic mobility. A new class of X-craft was
therefore designed especially for the Far East. They were
known as XE-craft and they were practically the same as the
X20-class except that they had a more streamlined casing and
were fitted with air conditioning machinery3.
Twelve XE-craft were ordered from the Broadbent group and
by the end of 1944, the first six XE-craft had been completed
and were sent to Bonaventure
forming the Fourteenth Submarine Flotilla under the command
of Captain Fell. Six T-class submarines of the Fourth Submarine
Flotilla had been fitted to tow them and, anticipating the
long distances involved in the Far East, each XE-craft was
allowed two passage crews as well as her operational crew.
The Fourteenth Submarine Flotilla sailed for the Far East
by the Panama Canal during February 1945.
Immediately
after towing X24 back to the Shetlands, Sceptre
sailed to relieve Venturer
off Skudenes. On 20th September, she fired three torpedoes
at a range of 1000 yards at a small merchant ship and missed.
This time the CCR pistol could not be blamed as the torpedoes
were fitted with the old fashioned contact pistols. The same
day, after dark, she made contact with a convoy at 11,000
yards by radar. She made a surface attack and fired a full
salvo of six torpedoes at a range of 2200 yards securing four
hits on two ships and sinking Vela of 1180 tons and
the escort vessel M132. These torpedoes were also fitted
with old-fashioned contact pistols. Sceptre
left patrol on 21st September and the French submarine Rubis
arrived on 24th and laid 32 mines off Egeroy. This field was
most successful and sank KnuteNelson of 5749 tons,
Claire Hugo Stinnes of 5295 tons and the escort vessels
UJ1715 and UJ1106. Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston DSO DSC RN) patrolled off Tennholm from
24th September to 2nd October but the visibility was bad throughout
this period and she only sighted one small ship on 30th. She
fired four torpedoes with CCR pistols set to non-contact at
a range of 1400 yards but without result. During September
too, Seascout
(Lieutenant JW Kelly RN), Thrasher
(Lieutenant Commander MFR Ainslie DSO DSC RN) and Trump
(Commander EF Balston DSO RN) carried out anti U-boat
working up patrols in the North Sea and east of the Orkneys
but saw nothing.
In October
Ula (Kapteinloytnant RM Sars) patrolled off Lister
but sighted nothing and Sceptre
(Lieutenant IS McIntosh DSO DSC RN) arrived to relieve her.
Our intelligence kept us informed of the positions of the
German minefields off the Norwegian coast behind which their
convoys were routed. Our submarines were therefore able to
penetrate the mine barriers and patrol submerged behind them
by day lying in wait for the convoys. By night, however, they
had to withdraw to seawards to charge their batteries. At
this time, however, the Germans decided that their convoys
should only proceed at night and so avoided attack by our
submarines, which were out at sea charging. On the night of
21st/22nd September, Sceptre sighted a large convoy
off Egersund from outside the minefields. She fired four torpedoes
in a surface attack at a range of 3500 yards across the barrier.
She heard two hits and, in fact, sank UJ1111, one of
the escorts, which broke in half and blew up. She also sank
a ship of 2207 tons. The Germans then suspended all traffic
for twenty-four hours. Sceptre
went home on 26th and was relieved by Satyr
(Lieutenant TS Weston DSO DSC RN) who had a blank patrol before
returning to base on 7th November. Meanwhile Rubis
(Capitaine de Corvette H Rousselot) had put to sea with another
load of mines, which she laid off Feje on 18th October. This
field, however, did not sink anything. Viking
(Lieutenant R Bannar-Martin DSC RN) had been sent to patrol
farther north and was off Bodo from 3rd to 19th October. The
weather was very bad but on 14th, she sighted a northbound
convoy in Fleinvaer and fired four torpedoes at 1500 yards,
hitting and sinking the Norwegian Standard of 1286
tons. During October too, Silene (Lieutenant Commander
HRB Newton DSC RN), Varne
(Lieutenant IG Raikes DSC RN) and Seadog
(Lieutenant EA Hobson DSC RN) carried out anti U-boat working
up patrols east of the Shetlands but saw nothing. The German
U-boats were now nearly all fitted with 'schnorchel' and so
did not need to surface on passage either by day or night,
and this was probably the reason that our patrols never seemed
to sight them.
So far, since
the return of our submarines to the Norwegian coast, they had
sunk, by X-craft, mines and torpedoes, a floating dock, six
ships of 14,687 tons and four escort vessels and had damaged
two more ships of 2734 tons. Other forces had been busy too.
Naval aircraft from Home Fleet aircraft carriers, in a series
of strikes, sank three ships of 3,145 tons and three minor war
vessels, and damaged twelve more ships of various types. Coastal
Command air strikes sank twelve ships of some 8000 tons and
an escort vessel and our Motor torpedo boats four ships of 10,960
tons, and another three minor war vessels. These results were
making it difficult for the Germans to keep their army supplied
in North Norway and were substantially cutting down their imports
of iron ore. In most of these anti-shipping operations there
was little mutual interference. The naval aircraft laid mines
and made their attacks inside the leads where our submarines
could not go. Our submarines attacked where the traffic was
forced into the open sea by geography. In anti U-boat operations,
however, Coastal Command found themselves severely hampered
by the bombing restrictions necessary to protect our submarines.
With the need to give our submarines reasonable freedom of action
and to allow for navigational errors by ships and aircraft,
the areas covered by the bombing restrictions were very large,
as a glance at the map will show. During October, there were
discussions between A(S) and the Admiralty with Coastal Command
to try and resolve the matter. In the end, the Admiralty decided
not to send submarines to southwest Norway for a trial period
of three weeks starting on 1st November to give Coastal Command
a free hand against U-boats south of 62 30' N. The Russians
deployed five submarines on the north coast of Norway in September
but without success, and their own aircraft sank Shch402
in error.
November was
a stormy month but eight submarines made patrols. Four of these
were working up and their areas were in the middle of the North
Sea, south east of the Shetlands, where they might catch a U-boat
on passage. These submarines were Torbay,
Solent,
Scythian
and the Norwegian Utsira, and none of them saw anything.
Of the operational boats, Ula (Kapteinloytnant RM Sars)
was sent north to patrol off Fro Havet from 4th-24th November
and Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSC* RN) to the north of the Lofotens
off And Fjord from 10th- 19th. Ula's patrol was blank
but on 11th, Venturer
sighted a U-boat on the surface. She was able to close to 2000
yards and fire four torpedoes, one of which hit and sank U771.
This boat was one of the Panther Group operating in the Arctic
against the convoys to North Russia. She then closed the coast
to land supplies for the clandestine shipping-reporting organisation.
The day after Venturer
sank U771, Bomber Command finally sank Tirpitz.
She had been moved to Tromso and thirty-two Lancaster bombers,
each carrying a 12,000 lb. bomb attacked her from high altitude.
Three direct hits and two near misses caused her to blow up
and capsize. The only seagoing warships of the German Navy now
left in Norway were four fleet destroyers. In the middle of
November, the Home Fleet took advantage of the absence of our
submarines from southwest Norway and sent in the cruisers Kent
and Bellona, with four destroyers, to the vicinity of
the Lister Light. Here they attacked a convoy sinking a merchant
ship and five escort vessels. The three-week period free of
bombing restrictions for Coastal Command was now over and on
18th November, two submarines left Lerwick to resume patrols
in this area. Sokol took up a position off Skudenes and
Rubis laid 32 mines on 24th off Egersund. This field
caught and severely damaged Castor of 1683 tons.
Analysis of
the three weeks clear field for Coastal Command off the southwest
coast of Norway showed that their anti-submarine aircraft had
achieved nothing. Five U-boats had, however, been seen by anti-
shipping strike aircraft and one had been attacked by an aircraft
with no depth charges. With Venturer's
success against U771 during the same period, it was decided
that submarines should continue to operate off the southwest
coast of Norway. Coastal Command now questioned the anti U-boat
working up patrols by submarines which denied considerable areas
to their aircraft. Here they were on firmer ground. No U-boat
had been sunk by a submarine on a working up patrol for over
two years. A(S) was reluctant to give up these patrols. They
were ideal as a final exercise for submarines before carrying
out patrols against opposition, and it was desirable that they
should conduct them on the Home station under the supervision
of Captain(S) Third Submarine Flotilla. At first, however, the
Admiralty came down on the side of Coastal Command and no working
up patrols were carried out during December and Sleuth
had to leave for the Far East without a working up patrol. Subsequent
discussions, however, arrived at a compromise with Coastal Command,
and working up patrols were resumed in January 1945.
Three patrols
were carried out in December 1944. Utsira (Loytnant
S Valvatne) patrolled off Fro Havet between 11th and 17th
December. On 14th, she sighted a U-boat with a small escort
early in the morning. She fired a full salvo of four torpedoes
at a range of 2000 yards but she missed. Two days later she
got another chance off Halten, this time at a range of 1000
yards and she fired her second full salvo of four torpedoes.
This time she thought she had hit but it proved to be a premature
by a CCR pistol. Venturer's
patrol was off Egeroy and Obrestadt from 15th-28th but she
saw nothing at all. The third patrol was another minelaying
sortie by Rubis. She laid 32 mines off Jaederens on
19th and was back in Dundee for Christmas. This minefield
sank the escort vessels UJ1113 and UJ1116; the
minesweeper R402 and the merchant ship Weichselland
of 3583 tons. Rubis was now due for refit but because
of the shortage of refitting yards and her age, it was decided
not to take her in hand. France now having been liberated,
it was possible to send her crew on leave. Rubis, since
the fall of France in 1940, had laid 683 mines sinking fourteen
ships of 21,410 tons and damaging another of 1683 tons. Her
mines also sank seven minor war vessels and damaged a U-boat.
She also sank a ship of 4300 tons by torpedo. Rubis,
under her two able Commanding Officers (Capitaines de Corvette
GEJ Cabanier and H Rousselot) fought a splendid war, and she
was a great credit to her country and now a sad loss to her
comrades of the British submarine branch.
It had originally
been hoped that the Germans would have been defeated by the
end of 1944. The German attacks with V1 and V2 weapons, the
failure to cross the lower Rhine at Arnhem, the time taken
to open the port of Antwerp and the German counter offensive
in the Ardennes, however, all delayed matters. On 1st January
1945, therefore, although most of France and Belgium had been
liberated, the main armies were still well short of the Rhine
and most of Holland remained in enemy hands. On the eastern
front, the Red Army had reached the frontiers of Germany.
In Norway, a large German army of 170,000 men in the far north
was also retreating, and the enemy hoped to withdraw it to
the Narvik area to defend the vital iron ore mines. A large
amount of shipping had been amassed there for this purpose.
Although the end for Germany was in sight and clearly only
a matter of time, the Admiralty were seriously alarmed that
a new campaign with the Type XXI and Type XXIII U-boats was
about to begin, and they were pessimistic about coping with
it. The conventional U-boats using the 'schnorchel' had already
virtually countered radar in anti-submarine warfare, especially
when used from aircraft, and the U-boat campaign in inshore
waters was only being held by a huge force of surface escorts
using asdic. The Type XXI, with its high underwater speed,
not only threatened to render counter attacks using asdic
ineffective, but also to restore some of the mobility totally
submerged which the conventional U-boats had lost when 'schnorchelling'.
The German Navy had a huge building programme of Type XXI
U-boats and some fifty were nearing completion.
Our submarine
policy, except for the conversion of half a dozen S-class
into fast anti-submarine targets and the fitting of more dummy
'schnorchels' to the U-class, remained unchanged. The use
of our submarines on anti U-boat patrols against the Type
XXI did not show promise. Indeed the introduction of the 'schnorchel'
seemed already to be responsible for a dearth of sightings:
the considerable effort expended on these patrols by submarines
working up had produced no results at all. U771 sunk
by Venturer
was caught on the surface and this type of attack was unlikely
to occur with the Type XXI. The policy therefore was continued
of sending most of our submarines to the Far East, and only
keeping a few operational boats at home.
AT THE BEGINNING
OF 1945, there were few operational submarines at home, but
eight others were working up and doing trials. Utsira
(Loytnant. S Valvatne) patrolled off Fro Havet from 6th-19th
January. On 11th just before midnight, she sighted a U-boat
escorted by an anti-submarine trawler and fired four torpedoes
at 800 yards but they had CCR pistols and they fired prematurely
so the U-boat escaped. After this disappointment she had to
wait four days for another target. On 16th she sighted what
she took to be a small merchant ship two hours after midnight.
She fired a salvo of four torpedoes at a range of 1200 yards
and this time the CCR pistols did not let her down. She secured
a hit and sank the German Naval Auxiliary V6408 of
1281 tons. Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSC* RN) patrolled off Skudenes from
18th- 25th January but was severely handicapped for most of
the time by having one engine out of action. However on 20th
she fired four torpedoes at a convoy at a range of 3500 yards
but missed. Two days later in a night attack she fired four
torpedoes at another convoy at 6000-6500 yards on a late track.
Surprisingly one torpedo hit and sank Stockholm of
618 tons. Agreement was now reached with Coastal Command to
send four working up submarines on anti U-boat patrols. Seanymph
(Lieutenant MI Usher RN) was placed east of the Orkneys from
3rd-17th, as was Dolfijn (Luitnant ter zee 1e Kl Maas)
from 6th- 11th. Taciturn
(Lieutenant Commander ET Stanley DSO DSC RN) was off the east
coast of Scotland from 23rd- 30th and finally Sibyl
(Lieutenant HR Murray RN) was placed in a similar area. Not
one of these submarines even sighted a U-boat and the only
incident was that Dolfijn was machine gunned by an
RAF Mosquito aircraft in a total attack restriction area.
Her periscopes and bridge were damaged putting her out of
action for a month.
Three of the
large German destroyers, which had been intended as escort
for Tirpitz, left for Germany on 26th January. There
were no submarines on the Norwegian coast at the time. Venturer
had just left Fro Havet for base. The German ships were, however
intercepted and engaged by the cruisers Diadem and
Mauritius off Bergen and were damaged.
In February,
A(S) set off on his Far East tour, which lasted over a month.
He conferred with C-in-C of the British Pacific Fleet and C-in-C,
East Indies. He also conferred with the United States Commanders
in the Pacific and settled the composition and disposition of
the British submarines in the East Indies and the Pacific for
the rest of the war. These will be dealt with later in the Chapters
dealing with the Far East. It will be recalled that it was the
plan to have forty boats operational in the Far East by January
1945. Due to delays in the building programme, especially of
the A-class, and in the refits of other types, the total number
operational was, on Rear Admiral Creasy's arrival, less than
thirty, and did not reach forty until the end of April. The
problem was not manpower, there were, in fact, another seven
submarines in the Far East for anti-submarine training, but
these were V-class and of too short endurance to be used on
operations. To keep forty submarines operational would have
needed a fourth submarine flotilla east of Suez. The liner Montclare
had been converted in the USA as depot ship. She, however,
had been taken by the Admiralty for duty in the Pacific Fleet
Train and was no longer available. It was, however, decided,
and this was approved by the Admiralty in April, that all long-range
submarines of the T and A-classes should be sent east and three
short range T-class (Torbay,
Thrasher
and Trident)
should be employed in the East Indies. The available S-class,
some fourteen boats, would be divided equally between the Pacific
and East Indies.
While A(S)
was away, operations in Home waters continued as before. Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSO DSC* RN) patrolled off Feje from
4th February to 15th. On the forenoon of 9th she detected a
U-boat by hydrophone effect on her asdic and then sighted a
periscope on the bearing. Lieutenant Launders stalked the enemy
for an hour, plotting her course and speed using asdic and making
a few sightings of her periscope. Just after noon he fired four
torpedoes set to depths of 30 and 36 feet at a range of 2000
yards, and aimed by hydrophone bearing on asdic. One hit was
obtained and U864 was sunk and lost with all hands. Although
Venturer
never sighted a 'schnorchel', it seems likely from the amount
of noise the U-boat was making, that she was, in fact, 'schnorchelling'.
The sighting of the periscope was probably due to its liberal
use when 'schnorchelling' and the fact that it was arranged
in the U-boats to look over the top of the 'schnorchel' and
so was generally high out of the water. The other three submarines
that patrolled during February saw nothing. These were Viking
(Lieutenant R Bannar-Martin DSC RN) off Fro Havet from 16th
February to 4th March; Dolfijn (Luitenant ter zee 1e
Kl Maas) east of the Orkneys from 5th-16th February and the
Free French Morse4
from 14th-24th February in the same area.
In March,
the Germans began to withdraw from Norway and there was a marked
decrease in their antisubmarine and air activity, so much so
that it was considered safe to send submarines on their working
up patrols to the Norwegian coast. A total of eight submarines
were sent out, half of which were on their first working up
patrol. Sidon
(Lieutenant HC Gowan RN) was the first away and patrolled off
Andoy from 8th-23rd March but saw nothing. Stubborn
(Lieutenant AG Davies RN) was next and was off Feje from 9th-18th
also having a blank patrol. The veteran Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSO DSC* RN) was out again, this time
off Fro Havet, sailing on 14th. On the 19th, early in the morning,
she attacked a convoy of four merchant ships with five escorts.
She fired four torpedoes at a range of 6000 yards hitting and
sinking Sirius of 918 tons. On 21st, she fired another
four torpedoes at a merchant ship at 6000 yards, just after
midday, but this time she missed. Dolfijn (Luitenant
ter zee 1e Kl Maas) relieved Stubborn
off Feje sailing on 17th. On the afternoon of 24th she sighted
an inward bound U-boat but she was unable to get within range
before the U-boat entered the leads. Utsira (Loytnant
S Valvatne), Turpin
(Lieutenant Commander JS Stevens DSO* DSC RN), Viking
(Lieutenant R Bannar-Martin DSC RN) and Spearhead
(Lieutenant Commander RE Youngman DSC RNR) left for patrol between
29th and 31st. Utsira made the last patrol of a Norwegian
submarine in Home waters under British operational command.
On the evening of 5th April she attacked a large convoy off
Fro Havet firing four torpedoes at a range of 1300 yards, hitting
and sinking Torridal of 1381 tons with three of them.
She then suffered the last counter attack with depth charges
in Home waters and, although there were no less than ten escorts,
she was undamaged. Viking
had a blank patrol off Egeroy but the new submarine Spearhead
off Kors Fjord had contacts with U-boats on two occasions. At
midday on 23rd March she saw a U-boat on the surface, but it
dived almost at once and was not sighted again until it was
inside Kors Fjord and no attack was possible. Three days later
another U-boat traversed Spearhead's
area without being detected and was only sighted when she surfaced
inside Kors Fjord.
In April,
four submarines crossed the North Sea to patrol off Norway.
The brand new Totem
(Lieutenant Commander MBSt John DSC RN) was off Kors Fjord from
the 8th to the 19th April but saw nothing. The equally new Tapir
(Lieutenant JCY Roxburgh DSO DSC RN) patrolled off Feje from
5th to 16th and on 12th April, early in the morning, heard the
hydrophone effect of a U-boat on asdic. The U-boat then obligingly
surfaced and Tapir
fired six torpedoes at a range of 3200 yards, hitting and sinking
U4865. This was the last success of the war
by one of our submarines in Home waters. Venturer
(Lieutenant JS Launders DSO DSC* RN) relieved Tapir
off Kors Fjord and Varne
(Lieutenant IG Raikes DSC RN) was sent to patrol off Skudenes.
On 19th, intelligence suddenly came in that Prinz Eugen
was northbound in the Sound. It had always been possible that
the German Navy would attempt a final break out as they had
contemplated doing in 1918.
Venturer
was ordered to patrol off Egersund and Varne
off Lister and other submarines in harbour were brought
to short notice. On 21st, fresh intelligence revealed that
Prinz Eugen was in harbour at Copenhagen and the panic
died down. Most of the rest of the German heavy ships had
by now been put out of action in German ports by Allied bombers
and only Prinz Eugen and Nurnberg were fit for
sea. Varne
left patrol on 24th and Venturer
next day. The hours of darkness were now becoming short, and
no more patrols were ordered on the coast of Norway. The war
was, in any case, nearly over. On the same day that Venturer
left patrol, the American and Russian armies met on the Elbe
and on 29th the German army in Italy surrendered. On 7th May,
the Germans signed an instrument of unconditional surrender.
This was in the nick of time. The first of the Type XXIII
U-boats, U2336, sank two ships off the Firth of Forth
on 6th May and a number of Type XXI U-boats were about to
start operations.
With the German
capitulation, the British submarine command was heavily involved
in the surrender of the U-boats. The operation was under the
overall direction of C-in-C, Western Approaches, but A(S)
was required to provide inspection parties as well as for
the care and administration of the U-boats once they had been
surrendered. Planning for this operation had been in progress
since Rear Admiral Creasy's return from the Far East in March.
The surrendered U-boats were to be concentrated at Loch Ryan
in Scotland and at Lisahally in Northern Ireland.
THE SUBMARINE
CAMPAIGN IN HOME WATERS during the last seven months of the
war in Europe was on a very small scale. There were never
more than half a dozen operational submarines allocated to
the area, and twenty-three of the patrols were made by new
and refitted submarines working up and destined for the Far
East. The fitting in of submarines with the operations of
the Home Fleet and Coastal Command posed some problems. The
weakness of the Luftwaffe and our good intelligence, which
told us where the German minefields were, coupled with the
fact that, at this time of year, there was no problem with
constant daylight, meant that the opposition was far less
than in former years. In fact not a single submarine was lost
in this period, and only one was damaged and that was the
Netherlands Dolfijn by an RAF aircraft. Altogether
thirty-four patrols were made on the Norwegian coast in this
period, eight of which were by submarines working up. They
attacked five U-boats firing twenty torpedoes and sank U771,
U864 and U486. They also attacked nineteen convoys
sinking eight ships totalling 7841 tons and the escort vessels
M132 and UJ1111. The four minefields laid by
Rubis sank three ships of 14,627 tons and five minor
warships and damaged another merchant ship of 1683 tons. The
fifteen anti U-boat working up patrols round the Orkneys and
Shetlands achieved nothing at all. When these results are
compared with the results by other forces against enemy shipping,
they seem small, but when added to them, they constituted
a useful bonus6.
It is fair
to comment that probably at least one more U-boat and several
more ships would have been sunk but for the premature firing
of the CCR pistol. It may seem odd that these pistols were
tolerated for so long. However the CCR pistol had very great
advantages. Not only was the damage done by an explosion under
a ship much greater than a hit on the side, but it also allowed
torpedoes to be run deeper. This meant that they could be
fired in a rougher sea and the tracks would be less distinct.
It also made it possible to attack shallow draught ships with
success and also submerged U-boats. There was therefore reluctance
to abandon it without very definite evidence that it was proving
ineffective. It was not easy to be sure whether a CCR pistol
had failed in a given attack, or had just missed. Prematures
were not always seen, because the submarine was normally taking
avoiding action to clear the torpedo tracks after firing,
and would not be looking. In any case all new warheads were
fitted with CCR pistols and the older types were out of production.
The decision made at the end of 1944 to set all CCR pistols
to contact only and to run them shallow to hit, was inevitable
and the only way to ensure that they did not fire prematurely.
This book
is really no place to speculate on what would have happened
if the Germans had had time to deploy large numbers of Type
XXI and Type XXIII U-boats at sea. We can merely note that
if they had proved a serious menace, our submarines might
well have been able to operate with some success against them.
The attack by Venturer
on U864 and the Tapir
on U486, demonstrated that 'schnorchelling' U-boats
could be detected and sunk by a submarine on patrol. It was
probable that, had the war continued and the Type XXI become
a serious menace, our submarines could have been developed
and trained to be useful anti-submarine weapons against 'schnorchelling'
U-boats on passage and their strength could have been greatly
increased in Home waters for this purpose at the expense of
the Far East.
In the New
Year's Honours of 1945, Captain RS Warne, commanding the Third
Submarine Flotilla, received the CBE, not only for the work
of operational submarines under his command, but for bringing
forward and working up a large number of new and refitted
submarines. Lieutenant Launders of Venturer
received the DSO for sinking U771 and a Bar for sinking
U864. Lieutenant Westmacott of X24 also received
a DSO for sinking the floating dock in Bergen. Capitaine de
Corvette Henri Rousselot of Rubis was presented with
a second Bar to his DSC when his submarine returned to France
and ceased to be under British operational control. A bar
to the DSC was awarded to Lieutenant Roxburgh of Tapir
for sinking U486, an exploit that surely merited
greater recognition. Finally Lieutenant McIntosh of Sceptre
was Mentioned in Despatches for his patrols in September and
October 1944, in which he sank four ships.
